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THE DIPLOMACY OF THE GREAT WAR 



•I^^o. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO ■ DALLAS 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 



THE DIPLOMACY OF 
THE GREAT WAR 



BY 
ARTHUR BULLARD 

AUTHOR OF " PANAMA, THE CANAL, THE COUNTRY AND 
THE PEOPLE," " THE BARBARY COAST," 

" A man's world," etc. 



^m fork 
THE MACMH^LAN COMPANY 

1916 

All rights reserved 






Di5 



Copyright, 1916 

By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Set up and electrotyped. Published January, 1916. 



JAN 27 \m 



S)JI,A418609 



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PREFACE 



-■-: The object of this book is limited. It has the same rela- 
^ tion to a treatise on diplomacy that a high school "algebra" 
has to a text-book in "celestial mechanics." 

Very little has been written in America on European 
diplomacy. We have not been interested in the subject. 
Suddenly the roar of cannon has broken in on our ordinary 
life and month by month as the War drags on the vital 
necessity of knowing more about Europe becomes apparent. 
Many people ask: "What is it all about? "^ The more 
determined ask: "Where can we find out about it?" In 
our larger public Hbraries there is a great deal of material, 
but interest in such matters had been so sHght that this 
material was not fully catalogued. What the libraries 
have to offer in our own language is mostly from EngHsh 
sources and as Great Britain is a party to the dispute it is 
unadvisable to hear only one side. 

A general wish is evident among us to do something 
towards a settlement of the conflict, not merely to hasten 
the cessation of hostilities, but especially towards the estab- 
Kshment of decent relations between our European cousins 
after the War. All chance of success in this direction de- 
pends on our having some conception of the issues at stake. 

So it has seemed to me worth the effort to attempt an 
introductory text-book, a first-year course in European 
diplomacy, more especially, as for many years the subject 
has fascinated me. 

Sooner or later the War will burn itself out. The diplo- 
matists will gather around their traditional "green table" 
to see what they can save from the general bankruptcy. 
The news of their proceedings will come to us in fragments, 
cablegrams to our daily papers, articles on one or another 
phase of the situation in our magazines. This information 



VI PREFACE 

will seem chaotic and often petty. One morning we will 
read of acrimonious debates about WaljQsch Bay in South 
West Africa, the next of a wrangle over the harbor dues of 
Trieste. There will be suave but virulent discussion over 
whether the name of the capital of Galicia should be spelt 
after the German or Russian, Pohsh or Ruthenian fashion. 
There will be apparently undue excitement over the ques- 
tion whether the majority of the population of the little 
town of Temesvar is Roumanian or Magyar or Serb. 

I have tried to draw a sketch map into which such iso- 
lated details will fall naturally and intelligibly. 

The book is divided into four sections. The first is an 
account, almost stenographic in its condensation, of the 
development of international politics in Europe since the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878. This period is too recent to 
admit of definite history. There are few important events 
on which there is any general agreement. The more nearly 
we approach the present the greater becomes the difiiculty. 
I have tried to meet it by a study of as many and as various 
documents where there is no definite consensus of opinion. 

In Part II. there is a consideration of the new ideas which 
have grown up about the functions of diplomacy during 
the last generation. 

Part III. is pure hypothesis. I have suggested a solu- 
tion which may, but probably will not, result from this 
War. This suggestion is not a prophecy but simply a 
means by which to display how these more modern ideas 
of diplomacy would apply to problems raised by this War. 
In so far as the actual results differ from the outcome I 
suggest it will be possible to judge how far these new ideas 
of diplomacy have prevailed. 

Part IV. deals with the diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Europe. This War is an important 
point, perhaps a turning point in our history. We may 
continue along our traditional policy of non-interference 
in the disputes of Europe, or we may be drawn into 
active participation in world politics. Few decisions which 



PREFACE vii 

face our generation will have more effect on those to 
follow. 

As my object is essentially elementary, I have not bur- 
dened the text with foot notes. These thumbmarks of 
erudition would have small value to any but specialists, 
residing in Europe, for most of the sources to which they 
would refer are not easily available to American readers. 
I have appended a condensed and critical bibliography 
of the books I have found most valuable. The amount 
which has been printed on the various phases of the sub- 
ject is stupendous. The official pubKcations of the different 
foreign offices — Yellow Books, White Papers, etc., are volu- 
minous. Thousands of books of all value and from all 
points of view and in every language have been issued. 
And of most importance is the endless flow of articles in 
reviews and daily papers of Europe. 

The one common note of all this mass of material is its 
partiality, its partisanship. The War itself becomes more 
comprehensible as one discovers the fanatically patriotic 
bias of learned historians. 

The memories of my childhood have, I think, helped 
me somewhat to meet this difficulty. I was born and bred 
in a "border state" and the wounds of our great war were 
only half healed. I remember a schoolmate telKng quite 
seriously how the Yankee soldiers had wrecked the planta- 
tion of his grandfather on Sherman's march and of the 
abominations they had committed. "All the Yankees 
are like that," he said, and he believed it. I could not. 
My father was a Yankee and I knew he was a very decent 
sort of person. Quite as often I heard equally vindictive 
denunciation of the "Rebs." But I knew too many South- 
erners to believe these stories either. One of my friends 
went to a school where he was taught that the Confederate 
Army won the Battle of Gettysburg. We fought the battle 
over again several times and although I was bigger than 
he, I never convinced him that the North really won. 

In rather vague terms our Bible promises us that the 



viii PREFACE 

Messiah will come again to marshal the forces of Hght in 
a last great war against the powers of darkness. There 
is small chance that, in any combat with merely human 
generals, the lines will be so sharply drawn. Until it comes 
to that last stupendous struggle the student of history 
will be surprised and a Httle sceptical if his researches 
show him an army commanded by a real saint or a nation 
led by a thorough-going villain — or blood being shed in a 
spotless cause. We may be very sure that leading figures 
in the history which our times are making are quite like 
their predecessors in times past. The more closely we 
study them the more surely we will find them human beings 
with aspirations and efforts and defects and pettinesses 
very similar to our own. 

Almost the first act of the Congress which was elected with 
Lincoln was not to free the slaves but to revise the tarifif 
upwards. The records of the Crusaders, of their intrigues, 
their treasons, their love of spoils, show that the Holy 
Sepulchre was only one of their preoccupations and not 
always the principal one. And more than one of King 
Arthur's knights turned aside from the quest of the San 
Graal to kiss a pretty girl or pick up a bit of loot. 

So, not expecting to find superhuman virtue or vice on 
either side, I have tried to be impartial. But I must con- 
fess to a very definite fondness for France. If I could not 
enjoy our American privilege of being misgoverned by 
American citizens of foreign descent (from the Mayflower 
to the latest immigration); if I had to submit to "foreign 
domination" I would rather be ruled by the French than 
by Germans. Unfortunately the choice is not so simple. 
The Allies of France make it somewhat easier for me to 
persuade myself of a large degree of impartiaHty. 

Undoubtedly the fact that my mother tongue was Eng- 
lish, that I have chanced to live much more in France and 
Russia than in Germany, has given my impression a certain 
unavoidable bias. My judgment might also be changed 
on many points if I knew the Hungarian and Slav languages, 



PREFACE ix 

and if I could read German as easily as French. But I 
have done my best to see straight and I certainly am not 
tempted to partisanship as much as are the patriots of the 
various belligerent nations. 

The book will have met its purpose if it helps the Ameri- 
can reader to understand the moves on the diplomatic 
checker board after the War. 

The chapters in Book IV. are based on articles which 
appeared in The Century Magazine. 

It would be quite impossible to acknowledge in detail 
my personal indebtedness to the many European friends 
who during the recent years have so often helped me with 
their advice and their special information. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 
Preface v 



BOOK I 

TEE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 
Chapter 

I. The Congress of Berlin, 1878 3 

II. The Europe of Bismarck 13 

III. Das Deutschtum 24 

IV. The Resurrection of France 36 

V. The Anglo-German Friendship Cools 54 

VI. L'Entente Cordiale 69 

VII, The Algeciras Crisis 84 

VIII. Eight Years of Tension, 1 906-1 9 14. A. Morocco-Bosnia 102 

IX. Eight Years of Tension. B. The Balkans 124 

X. The Fatal Year 150 

BOOK II 

THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

XI. The Rights of Nations , 163 

XII. Dollar Diplomacy 178 

XIII. The Colonial World 190 

XIV. The Growth of Public Opinion 206 

zi 



xu CONTENTS 



BOOK III 



THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 
Chapter Page 
XV. The Military Outcome 219 

Xyi. Diplomatic Tactics 228 

XVII. The Demands of the Entente 235 

XVIII, The Division of the Spoils 241 

XIX, The Fate of Turkey 248 

XX. If Germany Wins 257 

XXI. The Problems of Power 262 

XXII. Democratic Control 270 

BOOK IV 
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

XXIII. Our Traditional Policy 281 

XXIV. The Problems of the War 291 

XXV. National Defence 305 

XXVI. The United States and Peace 313 

Bibliography 325 

Index 335 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE GREAT WAR 



BOOK I 
THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE GREAT WAR 
CHAPTER I 

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 

Some writers on the history of diplomacy begin the 
"Modem Epoch" with the founding of the German Em- 
pire after the Franco-Prussian War. The Treaty of Frank- 
fort which ended that war — lo May, 187 1 — took Alsace- 
Lorraine from France and struck at the industrial life of 
the Republic by a colossal war indemnity. Some of the 
seeds of hatred which are bearing fruit now were planted 
then. But the Congress of Berlin, seven years later, gives 
a more convenient starting point for a brief review of recent 
diplomacy. 

The Congress of BerHn was the last of the kind. It fol- 
lowed the traditions of the ancien regime. It was essen- 
tially monarchical. The delegates, when they had finished 
their work, had to report not to their peoples but to kings. 
They were free to intrigue and conspire without any fear 
of democratic publicity. 

Disraeli, the British Premier, returned to London in 
triumph. "Peace, with honor," he announced. Under the 
sinister tradition of secrecy, all the other delegates could 
make the same claim and the nations they were sup- 
posed to represent could not know whether the peace they 
brought home was honorable or not. 

A number of ideas, then hardly born, have grown amaz- 
ingly in Europe since 1878. Perhaps the most important — 
an incident of the general progress of democracy — has 
been the idea that the people have a right to know what 



4 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

the diplomats are doing in their name. The Congress of 
Berlin was the last important diplomatic conference which 
entirely ignored public opinion. It was the end of an epoch. 

Also from quite another point of view this congress fur- 
nishes a good starting point. It was the last great victory 
of Prince Bismarck. It was the apotheosis of his career. 

The congress was summoned to settle the Near Eastern 
question. Russia's victorious war against Turkey had 
once more brought up the thorny problem of the Balkans. 

The malady of the Sick Man was of the purulent kind, 
which had made a stench in Europe for many years. With 
rather monotonous persistence, various doctors had pro- 
posed cures, but their jealousy — the traditional hostility 
of the Great Powers — had prevented any effective treat- 
ment. For some unaccountable reason, after a long series 
of unspeakable atrocities, the Bulgarian massacres es- 
pecially caught the attention of Europe. Everyone agreed 
that something ought to be done about it. But everybody 
suspected everybody else and for many months nothing 
was done beyond exchanging diplomatic notes. 

Russia, claiming a vague sort of protectorate over all 
christians of the orthodox church, professed a special in- 
terest in the fate of the Balkan Slavs. But rightly or 
wrongly — probably rightly — the English felt that the 
Tsar cared very Kttle for "bleeding Bulgaria" and a great 
deal for a good excuse to conquer Constantinople. Aus- 
tria, feeling that she had "legitimate aspirations" and a 
"manifest destiny" in the Balkans, was opposed on prin- 
ciple to any increase of Russian influence in that quarter. 
So the statesmen of London and Vienna blocked the Tsar's 
efforts to get some united action out of the Great Powers 
on behalf of the Bulgars. 

At last, after much muttering and many threats, the 
Russians lost patience and decided to go in and settle the 
matter alone. In those days the fighting quaHties of the 
Turks were ranked very high. All Russia's enemies, hop- 
ing for her defeat, urged her to go ahead. 



THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 5 

Before Russia opened hostilities she arranged some sort 
of a treaty with Austria at Reichstadt. It was typical 
of the way things happen in diplomacy. The text has 
never been published. All we know about it is from occa- 
sional allusions to it and shrewd guesses. Russia wanted 
to be sure that Austria would not jump on her back in the 
midst of her struggle with the Turks. And as payment 
for this promise of benevolent neutrality she recognized 
Austria's claim to a predominant interest in the two Turkish 
provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Russia started her campaign by sending a notice to the 
little country of Roumania that her armies were going to 
pass that way and that the Roumanians must not object. 
The Roumanians — unHke the Belgians in 19 14 — did not 
object. 

At first it looked as if the general expectation would 
prove right and that Russia would be defeated. As usual 
she was slow in getting started, her army was poorly or- 
ganized, her generals inefficient and corrupt. But after 
months of reverses, the campaign was saved by the Rou- 
manians, who decided to change from benevolent neutrality 
to active cooperations. These new reinforcements arrived 
before Plevna at the critical moment. The Turkish mili- 
tary power was crushed. The christian armies marched 
to the very walls of Constantinople (they were kept from 
entering by the fear of European intervention). In the 
little suburb of San Stefano the Sultan was forced to sign a 
humiliating treaty. 

By this treaty most of the Balkan christians were freed 
from Turkish rule, but its main feature was the creation 
of a large independent principality of Bulgaria. It was 
generally assumed in Europe that this new nation — a unit 
composed of Slavs — would be an adjunct of Russia, in 
reality a new province. Such undoubtedly was the ex- 
pectation of the Tsar. Although Constantinople and the 
control of the Straits were left to the Turks, Bulgaria was 
to have ample ports on the iEgean Sea, and if Bulgaria was 



6 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

only another name for Russia, it meant that at last the 
great empire of the North had reached warm water. British 
naval control of the eastern Mediterranean was threatened. 
Of course the Austrians were equally displeased to find 
that they had guessed wrong and that the war, instead 
of ruining Russia, had greatly increased her hold on the 
Balkans. 

So London and Vienna joined in claiming that the fate 
of Turkey was not a private quarrel between Tsar and 
Sultan, but a matter of European interest. The affair 
could not be "locaHzed," it was of such importance that 
it could only be settled by an international congress. 

Germany was in a deUcate situation. Bismarck would 
have preferred to keep on good terms with both Russia 
and Austria. There was an ancient tradition of friendship 
between the Hohenzollerns and the Romanovs. During 
the long struggle between Prussia and Austria for pre- 
dominance in the German federation and more recently 
during the war with France, Bismarck had made this 
Russian friendship the foundation stone of his poKcy. But 
he was no longer merely the prime minister of Prussia, he 
was now chancellor of the German Empire. And from this 
new point of view the friendship of Austria was more valu- 
able to him than that of Russia. 

This was plainly a crisis where it was necessary to be 
"reahstic." So Bismarck secretly pledged his support 
to Austria and reassured Russia by protestations of undy- 
ing affection. And Russia, relying on the debt of gratitude 
which the kaisers undoubtedly owed to the tsars, came to 
the congress — like a sheep to the shambles. 

The Congress of Berhn was the most brilliant ever held. 
Ordinarily such affairs are settled by mere ministers pleni- 
potentiary and ambassadors extraordinary. But three 
prime ministers — of the three great empires — were present. 
Bismarck presided in person, Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli) 
represented Great Britain, and Prince Gortschakov headed 
the Russian delegation. Austria, Italy and France sent 



THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 7 

their ministers of foreign affairs — Count Andrassy, Count 
Corti and Monsieur Waddington. Most of these gentlemen 
were in uniform. All of them were bejewelled with decora- 
tions. 

The seances were held in the rather gaudy ball-room 
of the Chancellerie. In the middle of the great room a 
long table was covered with the traditional green cloth of 
diplomacy. The head of each delegation had a highbacked 
chair. Lesser chairs were provided for the lesser lights. 
And down at the far end of the table a space was reserved 
for the Turkish delegates, whose red fezzes gave an added 
touch of color to the brilliance. Close by was a buffet 
where the hospitable German government offered endless 
supplies of port wine and sandwiches. 

A great many books have been written about the Con- 
gress of BerHn — objective criticisms and personal memoires 
by the participants. It is clear from all of them that very 
httle happened about the "green table" which really 
mattered. The work of the congress was not done pub- 
Kcly. The important deals were put through in secret. 
It was an almost perfect example of what ordinarily decent 
men would agree an international congress should not be. 

In the weeks preceding the opening — 13th June, 1878 — 
at least a dozen secret agreements had been arranged by 
the different parties. Bismarck, while posing as a disin- 
terested presiding ofl&cer, had pledged his support to every- 
body. 

England and Russia had signed a "convention" on 
30th of May, which in the course of the congress they both 
tried to break. And on the 4th of June, England had signed 
a secret treaty with the Sultan. Disraeli was primarily 
interested in checking the Russian advance, but he per- 
suaded the Sultan that it was only out of his great love 
for Turkey that he had insisted on revising the treaty of 
San StefanO — and in return for this disinterested service 
he demanded Cyprus. This treaty was secret but Disraeli 
communicated it to Austria, so it got out. For some days 



8 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

the Turkish delegates — at the foot of the table — were the 
only people at the congress who did not know of its exist- 
ence! And in the corridors, during the congress, DisraeU, 
in spite of this defensive alHance with the Sultan, secured 
the French vote by offering them the Turkish province 
of Tunisia — which, by the way, the ItaHans thought was 
being promised to them. All through the congress Austria 
and Russia were trying to tear up the treaty they had 
signed at Reichstadt. 

Anyone who is inclined to doubt that such honorable 
gentlemen could lend themselves to such sinuous double- 
deahngs, should read Bismarck's " Memoires." The threads 
of most of these intrigues were in his hands and he stands 
out distinct from other statesmen and diplomats by his 
amazing frankness. Machiavelli was only a theoretician. 
The Iron Chancellor tells us simply and naively just how 
he practised politics. 

Even more interesting sidelights on the congress are 
furnished by the ^^ Souvenirs inedits" of Caratheodory 
Pasha, the chief of the Turkish delegation. 

"We were already in the third week of the congress when 
the bomb was exploded" — i. e., the news that the English 
were preparing to repudiate the Anglo-Russian convention, 
which was favorable to the Turks. "Broken-hearted by 
the news, I reminded the Marquis of SaHsbury that he 
had given his signature and begged him to honor it. The 
foreign secretary admitted the binding nature of the en- 
gagement but told me he would get around this. He would 
resign, so that he could be replaced the next day by another 
minister of foreign affairs, who would not be bound by his 
signature." 

But the most impressive part of this Turk's account of 
the congress is where he tells of the insults he had to swal- 
low. Not knowing of the Anglo-Russian agreement, Cara- 
theodory Pasha was unprepared for the discussion which 
followed its announcement. He asked for time to -consult 
his government. "The Prince Bismarck spoke to the 



THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 9 

Ottoman delegation with extreme harshness: 'If the pleni- 
potentiary has anything to say, he must say it at once and 
without delay, and even if he wishes to take the floor im- 
mediately I cannot permit him to use his opportunity 
to make objections,'" 

"The Prince Bismarck," he writes in another place, 
"did not miss any occasion to point out that the Oriental 
question, in so far as it concerned the peoples and forms of 
government which are outside the circle of European civili- 
zation, ought not to interest Europe except for the effect 
it might have on the relations between the Great Powers. 
It was only on this count that he deigned to interest him- 
self in us," 

The very existence of Turkey was at stake. But no one 
paid any attention to what the Ottoman delegates had 
to say. 

Next to the Turks, the people most intimately affected 
by the decisions of the congress were the various christian 
nations of the Balkans, They were not even allowed to 
have a voice in the discussions. Delegations of Serbs and 
Montenegrins, of Roumanians and Greeks hung about in 
the anterooms of the Chancellerie, longing to lay their 
grievances and their hopes before this high court of Europe. 
They were treated Hke troublesome children. 

Quite as shocking as the plenipotentiaries' lack of interest 
in the human aspect of their task, was their almost un- 
behevable incompetence. They had not taken the trouble 
to study the problems they met to solve. The Near East 
offers a most complicated question in ethnology. Not one 
of them was an ethnologist. A large part of their work con- 
sisted in drawing frontiers. There was not a geographist 
among them. And of course they knew nothing about 
economic problems. They were lordly gentlemen — not 
business men. 

They were diplomats, but some of them at least did not 
even know their own profession. The incident of the Cau- 
casus frontier was worthy of comic opera. It is sufficiently 



lO THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

amusing — and typical — to warrant a rather long quotation 
from the unpubHshed memoirs of Count Schouwalov, who 
was the second Russian delegate. 

*'I do not exaggerate in saying that he (Prince Gort- 
schakov, the Russian prime minister) was incapable of 
pointing out on a map, even approximately, the different 
countries of the Balkan Peninsula or, for example, the 
location of Kars and Batoum." ... "So I was consider- 
ably disturbed one morning when the Prince told me that 
he left all other questions to me but that he reserved es- 
pecially for himself the case of Batoum" (and the Caucasus 
frontier). — "He would treat directly with Lord Beacons- 
field about that." Count Schouwalov told Lord Salisbury, 
the second English delegate, about this decision of his 
chief. "He replied to me in vexation: 'But, my dear Count, 
Lord Beaconsfield cannot arrange that. He has never even 
seen a map of Asia Minor. ' " 

The matter dragged along till the end of the congress. 
Prince Gortschakov and Lord Beaconsfield could not come 
to terms. It looked for a while as if negotiations would 
be broken off and war result. But at the last moment 
it was announced that an accord had been reached. 

Count Schouwalov explains that the Russian general 
staff had prepared a special confidential map for them on 
which was drawn two frontiers. One represented the border 
as arranged between Turkey and Russia by the treaty of 
San Stefano. But some concessions would certainly be 
necessary, so the general staff had drawn a second frontier 
considerably further back, which represented the utmost 
they were willing to give up. The delegation was instructed 
to demand the San Stefano frontier and to concede, if 
necessary, mile by mile back to this ultimate line. Russia 
was prepared to go to war rather than give up more. Of 
course these maximum concessions should have been 
guarded as the most strict secret of state. 

"This last session, consecrated to the question of Asia, 
had an air of solemnity. On its issue depended peace or 



THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 II 

war for Europe. The president asked the two negotiators, 
Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortschakov, to take places 
side by side and explain the nature of their accord. The 
two gentlemen sat down and each spread out a map specially 
drawn for the occasion. The rest of us, standing up, formed 
a group behind them. At once I saw the terrible confusion 
which was coming. The map of Prince Gortschakov con- 
tained a single frontier, that of San Stefano, and the Prince 
declared with emphasis that 'my lord' had accepted it. 
He, on the contrary, replied to each word of the Prince 
by a laconic 'No.' And he indicated on his map the frontier 
they had agreed upon. And, to my great surprise, this 
line, with all its twistings and turnings, was exactly the 
one we were authorized to accept as the extreme concession. 

"The denials, which the two plenipotentiaries exchanged, 
began to envenom the discussion. Each one insisted bitterly 
on his frontier. At last Prince Gortschakov stood up and 
gripped my hand. 'There has been treason,' he said to me, 
'they have had the map of our general staff.' 

"I found out after the session that the evening before 
Prince Gortschakov had asked for a map of Asia Minor. 
Some one had entrusted to him the confidential map with 
the two frontiers. He not only showed it to Lord Beacons- 
field but had lent it to him for a few hours so that Lord 
Salisbury could see it." 

The results accomplished by these diplomats, with their 
incompetence and their spirit of intrigue, was — what could 
be expected. 

Benoit Brunswik, in his careful analysis of their work, 
"Le Traite de Berlin," gives a judgment which is on the 
whole the kindest I have found in all the literature on the 
subject. In his introduction he admits that the work of 
the congress has been severely criticised. "... this 
treaty does not give satisfaction to any interest, does not 
respond to any aspiration, does not condemn any ambi- 
tion ... it touches many questions and does not satisfy 
any. Its decisions are based on contradictory motives, 



12 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

are opposed to sane logic, indifferent to justice and insensi- 
ble to honor." But the alternative to accepting this sorry 
patchwork was a general European war. "The treaty," 
he writes, "is the result of a compromise between the Eng- 
lish fear of a Slavic advance and everybody else's fear be- 
fore the threatening war. It is a document of opportunism, 
the fruit of hostile rivalries." 

Unfortunately, the history of diplomacy is full of such 
documents. 

"Peace, with honor," Lord Beaconsfield could report. 
It is not fair to charge him with h3^ocrisy. The brand of 
chicanery, which we would now call disreputable, in those 
days came within the definition of diplomatic honor. 

That is why I choose the Congress of Berlin as the start- 
ing point for modern diplomacy. Our more recent times 
have not been free from similarly disgraceful intrigues, but 
prime ministers no longer call them honorable. All the 
world — or at least a large majority — has changed its ideals 
of common decency in such matters, since 1878. 



CHAPTER II 

THE EUROPE OF BISMARCK 

A STUDY of the Congress of Berlin is a sad matter for 
anyone who Hkes to believe that honesty is the best policy. 
Bismarck, whose sinister genius for intrigue inspired most 
of the crookedness, accomplished exactly what he wanted. 

Territorial expansion was not at the moment his ambi- 
tion. He wanted — and secured — two things from this crisis. 

First of all he wanted an ally. Under his guidance Prus- 
sia had fought three successful wars, against Denmark, 
Austria, and France. Germany had ceased to be a mere 
geographical expression and had become a great empire. 
But Bismarck was shrewd enough to reaKze that grandeur 
acquired by such strong-arm methods does not make one 
popular. And immediately after the war with France he 
began to be haunted by his "coahtion nightmare." He 
feared that Europe would unite against him, as a few 
generations before it had united against the great Napoleon. 
His "Memoires" show that his principal worry was the 
danger of an Austro-French alliance. These two nations, 
whom he had so recently humiliated, seemed logical allies. 
To guard against this hostile combination it was necessary 
to make friends with one of them. Of the two, he chose 
Austria, and in order to make Austria forget her anger over 
her recent defeat it was necessary to render her some re- 
sounding service. 

The domain of the Hapsburg was in a precarious position. 
On its southwestern frontier was the new kingdom of 
Italy— made up of recently revolted provinces. On the 
north was this young German nation which had shattered 
her armies at Sadowa: and on all other sides, north, east 
and south, were Slavs. 

13 



14 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

The Congress of Berlin gave Bismarck the chance to 
step in gracefully and say: "I will save you from Russia. 
See what a powerful and valuable friend I can be!" It 
still took some time to overcome the "traditional" hos- 
tility between Austria and Prussia, but the foundations of 
the present Germanic alliance were laid at this Congress of 
Berlin. 

It was not till the next year — 7th October, 1879 — that the 
alliance was signed. It was at first kept secret, but part 
at least of it has since been pubHshed. It was a defensive 
alhance directed principally against Russia. Although its 
terms imply perfect equality it was really a case of Germany 
promising to protect Austria. What Bismarck gained 
was the assurance that Austria would not unite with France 
against him. 

The second result which Bismarck sought from this 
congress over the affairs of the Near East was the chance 
for a new and more emphatic assertion of German suprem- 
acy on the continent of Europe. 

The spokesmen of the entente — in the present crisis — 
frequently state that they are fighting to prevent German 
hegemony. It would be nearer the truth to say that Ger- 
many is fighting to maintain — or, better, to regain — her 
supremacy. While Bismarck was chancellor no one had 
any doubt about who was master of Europe. 

Caratheodory Pasha was not the only one to whom 
Bismarck spoke sharply. The Turkish delegate records 
his surprise that not even the British prime minister showed 
enough spirit to resent the chancellor's dictatorial manner. 
The Great Powers of Europe docilely performed bJs goose- 
step in honor of the Man of Blood and Iron. There was 
not the slightest indiscipline. 

Besides their marvellous mechanics, and their manifold 
conquests over the material world, the Germans have a 
large measure of high — perhaps extravagant — idealism. 
Their Fatherland is not only of this world. Much of it is 
in the clouds — where they were said to live before Bismarck 



THE EUROPE OF BISMARCK 15 

taught them victory. And the French, whose imagination 
deals with things concrete, and the matter-of-fact Enghsh- 
men find this strange ideahsm the hardest part of the Ger- 
man character to understand. 

Over and above the Deutschland — the geographical sec- 
tion of the globe where their flag flies — hovers a mystic 
ideal, — the "Deutschtum". It is an expression impossible 
to translate into English. 

It is the force of this ideal which has made Germany 
what it is. It has amalgamated scattered dukedoms and 
petty principaHties into a great, coherent, forward-pushing 
nation. It has performed a miracle of psychology. It 
furnishes the most striking example in history of how to 
change human nature. Whether you consider it a regenera- 
tion or a malignant degeneration, it is impossible to dispute 
the amazing change which has come over the German people 
since the days of Goethe or Kant. 

To Germans, this ideal is entirely beneficent. It means 
orderly comfort. It means everyone finding the niche 
they fit. It means mutual, well-organized effort, a har- 
monious striving together — a force of progress which is 
irresistible. And in their faith that this Hfe-giving dis- 
cipline is to spread abroad and regenerate all the earth 
there is something a great deal finer than gross political 
or economic greed. To their minds it is almost, if not 
quite, synonymous with the millennium. There is a very 
marked messianic note in some of Bismarck's speeches. 

The ordinary Latin or Anglo-Saxon, who studies his 
life, is forced to the conclusion that he ought to have been 
locked up. He was a magnified brigand — a robber baron 
of the Dark Ages strayed into the nineteenth century. 
No jury — after reading the confessions in his " Memoires " — 
would acquit him. And yet Bismarck was undoubtedly 
an ideahst! — every bit as much as Torquemada. The 
Inquisitors burned heretics at the stake — for the greater 
glory of God. And Bismarck, in a similar state of cold- 
blooded exaltation, falsified telegrams, lied copiously and 



l6 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

unchained the dogs of war for an ideal, which seemed to 
him equally holy — the greater glory of the Deutschtum. 

Never in history has the ideal of the Deutschtum seemed 
so near realization as at the Congress of Berlin. Every- 
thing in Europe was at sixes and sevens; a general war 
was imminent. Bismarck rapped on the table and all 
the Great Powers stopped their disorderly noise. Sitting 
at the head of the green table, Bismarck — his armor laid 
aside and rather after the manner of an irritable but kind- 
hearted school-master — told them how to behave, and not 
one of his unruly flock dared — under his eye — to question 
his will. A sort of Pax Germanica reigned in Europe. 
It was the great moment of Bismarck's career. It was a 
proud moment for the young German nation. 

The international relations of Europe since 1878 have 
been immensely complicated. They are hopelessly con- 
fused, unless one starts out with the idea that Bismarck 
had — past any doubt — established the supremacy of Ger- 
many in the continent of Europe. In the seventies and 
eighties no one thought of questioning this proposition — 
except a French officer named Boulanger, who gathered a 
certain following in France by preaching that it was better 
to die fighting than to live on ignobly under the almost 
ceaseless insults from across the Rhine. In all the diplo- 
matic correspondence of those years — White Papers, Blue 
Books, etc., — it is hard to find a single document which 
does not accept the German predominance as the basis 
of European poHtics. No one of the continental powers 
dared to dream of a different order. 

Without doubt Bismarck and the Germans enjoyed 
the sensation — for so many years their race had been ig- 
nored and despised! Many of their acts can be explained 
on no other basis than that they liked to remind others — 
and themselves — of the power of the Deutschtum. 

This idea that at last they had come into their own — 
that the superiority and preeminence of the German race 
was recognized by all the world — became a national pes- 



THE EUROPE OF BISMARCK 17 

session the loss of which would be as heart-breaking to 
them as the cession of Alsace-Lorraine had been to France. 

There was only one of the European powers which did 
not admit that Berlin was the center of the world — the 
British empire. But Great Britain is not a continental 
country. In those days its island situation allowed it a 
splendid isolation. More important than this matter of 
geography was the fact that English and German interests 
did not clash. On all the continent of Europe the only 
British soldiers were at Gibraltar. They would have had 
to march across the length of Spain and breadth of France 
to meet the Kaiser's army. And in most other matters 
they were equally far from points of conflict. 

So long as Britons ruled the waves the EngHsh were 
quite content to let the Germans rule the land. The British 
interests were overseas — colonial — and Bismarck was not 
inclined to colonial adventure. 

Later in life he was forced by the growing commercial 
and industrial classes to devise a colonial policy, but from 
his "Memoires" it is clear that his interest in these projects 
was not keen. Colonial matters attracted his attention 
principally as they furnished an endless supply of apples 
of discord to toss among his rivals. The more England 
quarreled with Russia in Asia and with France in Africa, 
the less likely they were to trouble him. He was forever 
urging his possible enemies to squander their energy in 
distant parts. And even after he half-heartedly launched 
his own colonial enterprises he was careful to avoid fric- 
tion with England. This pohcy worked to perfection and 
it became a maxim of diplomacy that England and Ger- 
many had the same enemies. 

Always the Chancellor of Iron and Blood was shivering 
with fear of a hostile coaKtion. He himself called it his 
"nightmare." His clever and unscrupulous manipulation 
of the Congress of Berlin had increased the cordiality of 
the EngHsh and had resulted in the alliance with Austria. 
But this did not content him. 



l8 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

By approving England's offer of Tunisia to France at 
the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck had seriously hurt the 
feelings of Italy. But he needed Italy in his system, so 
he set to work to draw her in. 

The brand new nation of Italy was in an uneasy and pre- 
carious position. Above everything else she needed a period 
of peace for internal reorganization. But in the first dec- 
ades of her national life hardly anyone believed that she 
was destined to enjoy forty years of peace. She was threat- 
ened on both her land frontiers. 

Austria was the "traditional" enemy. The story of 
the Italian struggle for national unity is very similar to 
the recent history of Servia. The kingdom had been built 
up by provinces snatched from the patchwork empire of 
the Hapsburgs. The work was not completed. There 
were still many thousand "unredeemed" Italians under 
the Austrian yoke in Istria and the Trentino. And the 
Hapsburgs were not reconciled to the loss of the fair Italian 
provinces. They would never have given up the struggle 
to hold them if it had not been for the crushing defeat 
they received from Prussia. A new Austro-Italian war 
was chronically imminent. 

The second menace came from across the French frontier. 
Napoleon III. had — off and on — favored the Italian na- 
tionalist movement. And for what aid he had given he 
had claimed as his price the province of Nice. The repubhc 
was unenthusiastically friendly. During the presidency 
of Marshal MacMahon the French were too torn by in- 
ternal dissension to be of any help to Italy even if they had 
wanted to be. Paris was aflame with Royalist conspiracies. 
Not even the Repubhcans were sure of their victory. A 
monarchical restoration was always possible — the danger 
became acute in the late seventies — and the Royalists 
were good catholics. No king could reign in France with- 
out the support of the clericals, and they made it very clear 
that if ever they won to power their first demand would 
be for war against the impious Italians who had deprived 



THE EUROPE OF BISMARCK 19 

the Pope of his temporal power. Fear of a possible attack 
from catholic France seems to have been the chief motive 
which led Crispi to seek an alHance with protestant Ger- 
many. 

Bismarck met Crispi's advances with calculated coy- 
ness. Italy needed his help a great deal more than he 
needed Italy. 

There had been some rmnors of an ItaHan-Russian 
alliance. In case the Tsar went to war against the two 
Germanic empires there was danger that the ItaHans might 
attack Austria in the back. The prevention of this compli- 
cation was the one advantage which Bismarck hoped for 
from the ItaHan alliance. He was very contemptuous of 
their mihtary power. He did not expect them to help him 
in his work for the Deutschtum, he wanted to make sure 
that they would not hinder him. So the only terms he 
would offer Italy was a chance to enter the existing Austro- 
German alliance. Crispi had been one of Garibaldi's 
"Thousand." He would not hear of making friends with 
Austria. So, for the moment, the negotiations fell through. 

But in 1 88 1 France clashed in on the promise of the 
Congress of Berlin and declared a protectorate over Tu- 
nisia. This infuriated the Italians. They were too weak — 
too young a nation — at the time to risk colonial adventures, 
but from historical and economic reasons they claimed 
"rights" in Tunisia, which the French action violated. It 
was Bismarck's opportunity. Crispi had fallen from 
power. A new Minister signed the Triple Alliance at 
Vienna. The date is uncertain, but it was near, if not on, 
the 20th of May, 1882. 

Once more Bismarck had had his way. But he was 
not content. 

He foresaw the danger of a Franco-Russian alliance. 
It was something which everyone foresaw. The three 
nations of central Europe had united. The island empire 
of Britain was friendly to this alUance. The two other 
powers had to unite or be crushed separately. Sooner or 



20 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

later the autocracy and the repubHc would be forced into 
each other's arms. And all the last years of his official 
life Bismarck dedicated to preventing this occurrence 
which everyone felt was "logical." Once more he suc- 
ceeded. 

As, after the Congress of Berlin, he had tried to check- 
mate an Austro-French aUiance by making friends with 
Austria, so now he tried to prevent a Franco-Russian 
alHance by making the Tsar forget the sorry trick he had 
played on him in 1878. 

Russia was engaged in that stage of her expansion which 
gave her Transcaspia, Boukhara, and a predominance in 
central Asia. Her advance guards were in Afghanistan 
on the frontier of India. The English were much worried 
by what Kipling called "the bear who walks like a man." 
When the Tsar's forces occupied the Oasis of Merv all 
England shook with what Punch called "mervousness." 
The only thing which prevented an Anglo-Russian war 
was the obvious fact that Moscow could not be captured 
by a fleet. The English articles on international politics 
of the day showed a certain peevishness over Russia's lack 
of a vulnerable sea-board. 

But the Russian Bear was more afraid of the British 
Whale than it had any reason to be. Worry over this 
quarrel with England induced the Tsar to bury the grudge 
he had against Germany for the betrayal at the Congress 
of Berlin, and once more to listen — with attention, if not 
with enthusiasm — to the siren-song of Bismarck. 

So, in spite of every probability against it, Bismarck 
was able to sign a new treaty — 21st March, 1884 — at Skier- 
nowice, between the emperors of Germany, Austria and 
Russia. This amazing agreement— it must be remembered 
that Austria and Germany had an anti-Russian alliance — 
is generally called "the counter-assurance." 

The text of the "Dreikaisersbund" was kept secret. 
But its purpose was evident. Bismarck wanted to make 
it impossible for Russia and France to unite, and this 



THE EUROPE OF BISMARCK 21 

bizarre treaty served his purpose. But no one less clever 
than Bismarck at making black seem white could have 
managed to persuade Russia that this alliance was in her 
interest. It did not outlive his term of office. 

Great Britain had not at that time started the fashion 
of Oriental alliances or Bismarck would certainly have 
re-countered or anti-countered his insurance by seeking a 
treaty with the Great Mogul or the Grand Llama. 

A notable point about this intricate network of Bis- 
marckian treaties is, that France was left out. The Iron 
Chancellor's policy towards the Repubhc was simple to a 
degree. France ought to be eliminated. He told his friends 
that the greatest mistake of his career had been in fixing 
the indemnity after the War of 1870 too low. He had 
thought that five milliard francs— a thousand million dol- 
lars — would "bleed France white." When she paid this 
immense sum within three years he was so chagrined that 
he wanted to "begin again" and "finish with her." 

It is a well-established fact that nothing but the ener- 
getic intervention of Russia and England saved France 
from a new invasion in 1875. ^ second war would probably 
have been the end of France. While these two powers — 
England and Russia — had not objected to the crushing 
of Napoleon III. they did not want to see the French na- 
tion entirely rubbed out. Of even more importance^ — for 
altruism has small weight in international pohtics — they 
were beginning to feel that Germany was growing over fast. 

Although Bismarck reluctantly decided that it would 
be unwise to indulge in a new war, he rarely neglected an 
opportunity to humiHate his victim. The Schnaebele 
incident in 1887 was only the most marked, the most in- 
excusable of the long series of Franco-German crises which 
marked Bismarck's regime. 

The Chancellor was trying to force a new and very ex- 
pensive mihtary law through a reluctant Reichstag. It 
was necessary to find a menace of war in order to justify 
the new taxes. In the same cynical manner in which he 



22 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

had twisted the Ems telegram he manufactured this "in- 
cident." 

A French custom official, Schnaebele, was invited by his 
German colleague to cross the frontier to straighten out 
some accounts. He had scarcely put his foot on the Ger- 
man side of the line when he was arrested. The news was 
spread in France that the German police had arrested this 
official on the French side of the line, and so Bismarck was 
able to read to the Reichstag excited extracts from the 
French newspapers. No one knows, even today, exactly 
what happened. Only one thing is sure, nothing happened 
which was serious. But Bismarck had engineered the 
entire affair to faciHtate the success of his internal policies. 
It is possible that he did not reaHse that such action would 
embitter the French. It is more probable that he did not 
care. He pretended to blame the French for not forgetting 
the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. But he was forever opening 
again the old wound. 

After he had given up his project of a second war in 
1875, his guiding principle towards France was to encourage 
her in colonial adventure. This, he held, would use up 
and scatter her forces, keep her mind off revenge and em- 
broil her with England. He seems to have never given 
up hope of an Anglo-French war. 

But even geniuses grow old, and, in 1890, the impatient 
young Kaiser, Wilhelm II. dropped the old pilot. 

The heritage which Bismarck left to his people was 
imposing. Very rarely has such stupendous growth been 
achieved in one man's watch at the helm. Of all the great 
ministers from Richelieu to our day none have accomplished 
so much for their sovereigns. 

But this heritage was not all rosy . A Chinese proverb 
tells us that while it is easy to lie, it is exceedingly difficult 
to lie well. Bismarck left to his nation a tradition of states- 
craft which only genius could manage. His technique in 
the hands of lesser men has not worked so smoothly. 

And perhaps of even greater detriment to his people is 



THE EUROPE OF BISMARCK 23 

the legacy of hate which he left. People feared the Ger- 
many of Bismarck, some admired it, but nobody loved it. 

The new regime in Germany seems to have tried to es- 
tablish better relations with its neighbors, to build up a 
better reputation. But the tradition of Bismarck was too 
strong. Nobody trusted it. 



CHAPTER III 

DAS DEUTSCHTUM 

To pretend, as so many of their present enemies do, that 
the Germans are simply retrograde barbarians engaged 
in a reckless military raid for spoils, is to vastly and dan- 
gerously underestimate their force. They are a great and 
intensely modern nation; they are moved by an ideal. 

It is extremely difficult for an American to grasp what 
the Germans mean by the "Deutschtum." It is something 
so foreign to our habits of thought that it inevitably seems 
extravagant and fantastic. 

Here we are faced by a psychological situation the im- 
portance of which cannot be over emphasized. Some 
people find it easy to laugh at the German pretensions — 
more are angered by them. But it is impossible to have 
any understanding of recent history — or the present crisis — 
if one ignores this ideal, or believes that when Germans 
speak of the Holy Mission of the Deutschtum it is arrant 
hypocrisy to cover gross greed and love of gore. 

The Germans may be insane — but they are not insincere. 
The amount of devotion they have given to their ideal — 
and are giving— is stupendous. There has probably never 
been a time in history when so large a number of individuals 
have given so large a share of their energy to a common 
ideal as has been the case in Germany during the last gener- 
ation. College professors, historians, and philosophers — 
after the manner of Peter the Hermit — have infused into 
the people an ardor which is not of this world. It is a fact 
of social psychology which must not be ignored. The 
Deutschtum is a crusade. 

It is well to remember that such national spasms are 
not unknown to history. Just about a century ago the 

24 



DAS DEUTSCHTUM 25 

French suffered from a somewhat similar frenzy. The 
barefooted soldiers of the First Republic went out crusad- 
ing on behalf of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." "Le 
chant de depart," their recruiting song, shows clearly how 
they were thrilled by a passionate desire to impose their 
ideal on all the world. 

D'aneantir les oppresseurs! 
En tous lieux, dans la nuit profonde, 
Plongeant I'infame royaute. 
Les franf ais donneront au monde 
Et la paix et la liberie. 

(To annihilate the oppressors! 
In all places, hurling into the profound night, 
The infamous royalty. 
The French will give to the world 
Both Peace and Liberty.) 

The further the French marched the more they strayed 
away from their ideal and eventually they were defeated 
by people who — as they said — preferred to be slaves. 

The Germans of today feel towards their crusade very 
much as French revolutionaries did towards theirs. It is 
quite aside from the point to discuss which ideal is the 
better. I, personally, prefer the French. But it is an 
ostrich policy, a refusing to look danger in the face, to 
pretend that the Germans are mere bandits. They are 
people on fire — exalted by a stupendous ideal. 

Professor John Dewey's admirable book " German Philos- 
ophy and Politics," traces the genealogy of this ideal back 
to the beginning of the last century. Out of the ruin which 
was brought to the scattered peoples of central Europe by 
the vast adventure of Napoleon there arose here and there 
prophets who foresaw the imposing strength which would 
come to the Germans, if only they would unite. Poets sang, 
philosophers discoursed, statesmen intrigued, and soldiers 
fought to this end. 



26 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

The program for this mighty reconstruction was formu- 
lated by the philosopher Fichte in his "Address to the 
German Nation." (1807.) 

"Elevate the German name to that of the most glorious 
among all peoples, making this nation the regenerator and 
restorer of the world." 

He tells the people of his generation how their ancestors 
had by the Reformation saved the race from the suffocating 
traditions of Roman obscurantism, but "yours is the greater 
fortune: you may establish once for all the kingdom of the 
spirit and of reason." 

Fichte believed — or he could not have preached it so 
passionately — that the Germans were a chosen people. 
There is something sublime in the faith he showed in those 
days when Napoleonism was triumphant. But his crusade 
was no merely selfish joy of dominion. 

"The great promise of a kingdom of right, reason, and 
truth on earth must not become a vain and empty phan- 
tom; the present iron age is but a transition to a better 
state." He had no hope except in the Germans. "There 
is no middle road: if you sink, so sinks humanity entire 
with you, without hope of future restoration." 

And for the great task — the reconciliation of all the 
warring branches of the Teuton family, their coordination 
in a supreme effort to overthrow Napoleon, the binding 
of them all together in a unified state — some surpassing in- 
spiration was necessary. The apostles of Germanism found 
it in "pride." 

Historians delved into the records of the past for items 
to feed their new and dynamic pride. Poets revived — and 
invented — folklore of the glorious antiquity. The legend 
of Barbarossa — who, like the Messiah, was to come again — 
was popularized. It was discovered that Charlemagne's real 
name had been Karl der Grosse. The goal which these 
apostles of the new order set before them was that no one 
would boast of being a Hessian or Prussian, or Bavarian, 
but to find a greater pride in being a German. 



DAS DEUTSCHTUM 27 

It is delicate business criticising ideals. There is so much 
to be said for the proposition that any ideals are better 
than none. And also, if someone else's ideals are not pleas- 
ing, it is so easy to call them base. This is what most 
writers are doing in Europe in the fervor of the present 
war. Tons of such uninteresting invective have been pub- 
lished during this last year. If the Germans have called 
their neighbors scurrilous and puerile names because they 
refused to bow down before the Deutschtum, it is every bit 
as true that the self-styled "intellectuals" of France and 
Russia and England have been just as childish in their 
vituperation. 

It is also necessary to bear in mind the staggering force 
of what has been called "mob psychology." Auguste 
Comte said that there was more of past generations in 
us than of ourselves. It is equally true that there is in us 
a very large — if not predominating — element of this genera- 
tion. The most objective philosopher cannot escape from 
the influence of the social mind. It is entirely normal for 
our thinking — chameleon-like — to take in color from our 
environment. The guardians of insane asylums often go 
mad. It is easier to be gentle among gentlefolks. To the 
Mohammedans it seems the most natural thing in the 
world to beheve in Allah. And we, in America, are repub- 
licans, very little because of a reasoned antipathy to mon- 
archy, much more because the chance of birth arranged 
to have us grow up in a republic. If the crane had dropped 
us in Tibet, we would have kowtowed to the Grand Llama 
without the slightest idea that government rests on the 
consent of the governed and that taxation without repre- 
sentation is iniquitous. 

There is every reason to believe that the English and 
Frenchmen, who are now most loudly denouncing the 
German idea of Kultur, would, if they had been born in 
Germany — if they had grown naturally into a habit of 
discipHned life, if they had seen at close quarters how all 
these rigid laws, these Verboten signs, lead to order and 



28 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

peaceful progress and Gemiithlichkeit — be among the most 
ardent apostles of the Deutschtum. 

The Germans do not see anything outrageous in their 
ideal. In fact they can bring forward an impressive mass 
of evidence to back up their belief in its beneficence. One 
who cared to defend the German position could build a 
very strong case for them from the books and magazine 
articles which were written in English before the outbreak 
of this war. It was the fashion, not so very long ago, to 
admire the stupendous progress which the Germans have 
made in science, in industry, above all in education and 
various forms of social legislation. 

It is no sentimental sympathy for the under dog which 
makes me emphasize the marvellous achievements which 
the Germans have won under the impetus of such passion- 
ate idealism as that of Fichte. Personally I have always 
felt (having had the good fortune to have been born and 
bred on the other side of the world) less sympathy for them 
than for any people on earth. But private likes and dis- 
likes are of small moment: the important thing is to try to 
understand what they think about themselves. And 
nothing is more evident than that they do not feel the 
same distaste to their theory and manner of life that I do. 

The charge most often brought against them is that they 
have sacrificed all personal liberty to their grandiose ideal — 
which, whether they admit it or not, — seems, to an out- 
side observer, to have been very closely synonymous with 
the grandeur of the Hohenzollern dynasty. This charge 
they indignantly deny. The German who is sufficiently 
educated to discuss such matters — and to our shame we 
must admit that there is a larger percentage of such people 
in Germany than with us — believes passionately and sin- 
cerely that they have more real freedom than we. They 
believe that it pays — in terms of freedom — to be obedient 
and orderly in what they call the "kitchen-side of hfe." 
They say that it is only by submitting willingly to a strict 
discipline in such incidentals that we can realize freedom 



DAS DEUTSCHTUM 29 

in the more important phases of life. They say that you 
cannot get music out of an orchestra unless the performers 
consent to play in time. If the first violin insists on going 
too fast — well — you can call that Hberty if you want to, 
but the result is not music. 

Deep rooted in their philosophical tradition is the great 
dualism of Kant, the contrast between the heaven of pure 
reason and the world of matter. In dealing with " things " — 
in their struggle to dominate and use the material world — 
they believe in working together. They have learned to 
march in step. Their actual practice is based on the for- 
mula, which we all pretend to believe, that there is strength 
in unity. In their dealings with the material world they 
have surpassed us all. Their success in industry and com- 
merce, even in their scientific research, has been due to 
their habit of playing in time — of team-work. And they 
assert — and this is the crux of their contention — that be- 
cause they have learned to subordinate the will of the 
individual in these material affairs they have won to a 
greater and nobler freedom in the realm of the spirit. 

They are full of pitying contempt for the undisciplined 
Americans or Frenchmen and Britishers who have not 
sense enough to keep off the grass, who are forever breaking 
ranks and getting in each other's way, forever working 
at cross purposes, and who — following a will-o'-the-wisp 
fantastic conception of individual Hberty — have become 
the slaves of disorder. 

It is, of course, a bootless quarrel over terms. But there 
is no gain in pitying the Germans because of the lack of 
liberty in their political regime. They Like it, and think 
they enjoy more freedom than the rest of us. 

This ideal of the Deutschtum — that every German who 
was doing good work where it was demanded in the scheme, 
in the fields and workshops, in the army or laboratory, in 
political life or the public school, was working for a great 
and worthy cause, the "making of this nation, the regenera- 
tor and restorer of the world" — has given to the German 



30 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

peoples national unity, which, with reason, they value highly. 
It has given them a material prosperity, which all the 
world can estimate — and envy. It has given them a poHt- 
ical regime which is powerful and imposing and which they 
consider a satisfactory substitute for what we call liberty. 

But there has been a reverse to the medal. The effort 
of Fichte and his friends to awaken an invigorating pride 
in his people has resulted in a great deal which is merely 
vulgar conceit. The effort of the German historians to 
find warrant in the past for their great hopes for the future 
has led them to falsify the records. Even their science has 
been debauched in order to find fuel for their flame of 
"holy pride." 

In order to justify the claim of their philosophers that 
the Germans were a peculiar race with a special mission, 
it was necessary to invent a false theory of ethnology. 
There is no fact more firmly estabhshed about development 
of humanity than that there is no such thing as a pure race. 
Man has developed by an immensely long process of hy- 
bridization. From the biological point of view the Ger- 
mans are no different from the English. The "kitchen 
middens" — the refuse heaps of prehistoric communities — 
along the shores of the Baltic show beyond dispute the 
presence of the Alpine and Mediterranean brunettes side 
by side with the northern blondes. Modern science — out- 
side of Germany — is unanimous on this point. But in 
Germany the myth of a pure race is still taught. 

Professor Dewey, in the book referred to above, quotes 
a remarkable passage from a treatise on philology. This 
learned professor, to bolster up the decidedly rickety race- 
theory, points out that the German language is the most 
wonderful invented by man, because the accent always 
falls on the root syllable. His premise is doubtful, but his 
deductions from it are amazing. — "Hence the faith of 
the German in his mission among the nations as a bringer 
of truth, as a reorganizer of the real value of things as 
against the hollow shell of beautiful form, as the doer of 



DAS DEUTSCHTUM 31 

right deeds for their own sake and not for any reward be- 
yond the natural outcome of the deed itself." It is a de- 
cidedly sweeping generaHzation from the fact of a not very 
important peculiarity in speech. But such pseudo-erudition 
inspires a dynamic sort of pride. 

The race idea has become little short of an obsession with 
the Germans, Much comment and indignation has been 
caused in Europe by some of the maps used in the school 
geographies of Germany. Neighboring independent coun- 
tries have been given a color very nearly the same as that 
of the German Empire. But the men who drew these maps, 
far from intending to insult the people they represented as 
almost German, undoubtedly thought they were compli- 
menting them. 

The same naive conceit is evidenced in the work of 
Professor Woltmann. To add to the glory of Leonardo da 
Vinci he tried — not very convincingly— to prove that his 
family was an illegitimate offspring from some German 
prince, who passed a night in their village on his way to 
Rome. Quite a polemic sprang up between the German and 
Italian newspapers on the subject of this alleged historic 
discovery. It is evident that the Germans, who took up 
their pens in defence of Professor Woltmann, simply could 
not comprehend why the Italians resented the idea that 
their great painter was not pure ItaKan. It seemed to them 
that it was obviously finer to have some German blood. 

Little has happened of late in the intellectual world as 
amazing — and as significant of this psychological condi- 
tion — as Chamberlain's book, "The Foundations of the 
Nineteenth Century." 

Despite his Scotch name, Professor Chamberlain is a 
fanatic apostle of the rehgion of the Deutschtum — plus 
royaliste que le Roi! His thesis is simple. Everything of 
virtue in the nineteenth century is of German origin, every- 
thing unsavory came from other sources. 

The amazing thing about the book is its gravity. Spread- 
eagle books — in cheap and popular style — have been writ- 



32 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

ten in every language to prove that one nation or another 
is the salt of the earth. But this book pretends to erudi- 
tion. He begins with minute and formidable definitions — 
which always gives an impression of scientific methods — 
and then uses the words so carefully defined in a dozen dif- 
ferent senses in as many pages. He impressively cites as es- 
tabhshed facts of history things which no historian believes. 

As one instance out of his immense tome, he casually 
states that the Paris Commune — the revolution of 187 1 — 
was the work of the Jews. It has long been a project of 
mine to write a history of this period. I have read every- 
thing I could lay hands upon on the subject. I have never 
encountered that statement anywhere else. 

And from this "fact" — which no one else believes — 
Professor Chamberlain deduces the turpitude of the Jewish 
race. With the same inexorable logic he eliminates all 
other non-Germanic people from the treasure-house of the 
spirit. Anyone in the nineteenth century who performed 
a work of culture, carved a beautiful statue, sang a beauti- 
ful song, discovered some new truth, or won a victory over 
nature, must — whether he knew it or not — have been a 
German. 

More amazing than the book itself is the fact that it was 
cordially received in the intellectual circles of Germany. 

An equally interesting book — in the matter of appre- 
ciating the psychological background of the international 
politics of Europe — is that of Rudolf Gotte, "Deutscher 
Volkgeist," — the "soul of the German people." He 
writes: "Respect for personality and for one's own rights, 
the sentiment of what one owes to oneself and to others, 
is our special virtue." . . . "But," he continues, "this 
is not in contradiction to our expansion, for that is our law 
of life. To live and expand at the expense of other, less 
meritorious (minderwertig) peoples finds its justification 
in the conviction that we are of all people, the most noble 
and the most pure, destined (bestimmt) before others to 
work for the highest development of humanity." 



DAS DEUTSCHTUM 33 

There is no gain in laughing at Mr. Chamberlain and 
Herr Gotte. It is necessary to reahze the extent to which 
the Germans felt themselves "called" to. play a stupendous 
r61e of reformation in the world — or all their recent foreign 
pohcy is inexplicable. 

Undoubtedly these writers, from whom I have quoted, 
von Bernhardi and others, whose works have suddenly 
been called to the attention of Anglo-Saxon readers, are 
extravagant exaggerations of the German pride. But, 
cutting off these manifestly crack-brained excrescences, 
there remains the great mass of the nation, who although 
they did not join the pan- Germanic societies — did not 
protest against this sophisticated history and super-heated 
pride. The ideal of the Deutschtum did not seem to them a 
sinister plot of world domination but — with all its implica- 
tions of orderly progress, advanced methods of general 
education, social amelioration and the harnessing of modern 
science to the needs of man — it appealed to them as a 
holy mission. 

That the realm of the Deutschtum was destined to 
transcend the existing frontiers of the Deutschland, that 
German ideas would rule over all the world, seemed to 
Bismarck and his followers part of God's plan. Those 
who opposed this progress either failed to understand the 
benefits which would come to them with new light, or they 
were wicked ones who loved darkness. 

Bismarck and the Germans of his day had an immense 
respect for their army. Individual Germans had here 
and there made names for themselves in pacific pursuits, 
but Germany was a creation of Eisen und Blut. The great 
Chancellor certainly beheved in keeping the sword sharp 
and the powder dry. But he was a follower of Von Clause- 
witz, he accepted the theory that "war is only a continua- 
tion of state pohcy by other means." In the carrying 
out of the divine mission to which they were called war 
was only one — and not necessarily the most important 
means. 



34 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

The apostles of the Deutschtum have relied greatly 
on intellectual and economic propaganda. The policy of 
the present Kaiser towards the United States in recent 
years has been typical. There is scant reason to think 
that he has seriously considered attacking us, but he has 
undoubtedly tried to convert us. By his gifts to our univer- 
sities, his encouragement of exchange professorships, by 
his courtesies to American commissions who have gone to 
Germany to study their institutions, and so forth, he has 
tried to show us the inestimable blessings of the Deutsch- 
tum, tried to educate us to the point of appreciating 
how unfortunate we are to live in a haphazard republic, 
instead of in his progressive and orderly domain. 

If a Paris audience applauded a German opera; if the 
king of a cannibal island decided that a breech cloth of 
German manufacture was preferable to one "made in 
England," if a German professor invented a new drug to 
cure the ills of humanity; if German shipyards could get 
the contract — underbid all the world — for the giant dredges 
with which we dug the Panama Canal, these were triumphs 
for the Deutschtum quite as important as a mere battle 
won. 

There have always been Cassandra-like prophets in 
Germany who preached the virtue, the necessity, the inev- 
itability of war. Few countries have escaped such plagues. 
But the great mass of the German people and — for more 
than a generation — the responsible rulers of the empire 
have given a deaf ear to such promptings. There is no 
reason to believe that their faith in their divine mission 
weakened or that they had allowed their swords to rust. 
But they hoped to win without fighting. War was the 
supreme weapon, the last resort. They were resolved 
not to unchain it lightly — not till other means had been 
exhausted. 

If it is necessary — as I believe — to try to reach a real 
understanding of the German attitude, to appreciate the 
sincere and deep devotion they have given to their ideal, 



DAS DEUTSCHTUM 35 

to reckon up its real values, its positive achievements, as 
well as to point out its fantastic perversions, it is equally 
necessary to sound the thoughts of non- German peoples 
and to understand what the rest of Europe thought about 
the Deutschtum. 

In a matter like this it is relatively unimportant what 
any one of us individually thinks about the rights and 
wrongs of the controversy. The fact — writ large in the 
newspapers of France and England, in most Russian and 
Italian, and Scandinavian and Dutch and Spanish publica- 
tions, more discreetly but just as emphatically in almost 
every diplomatic despatch — was that the rest of Europe 
did not want to be Germanized. The other peoples of 
Europe resented the German pretension of superiority. 
They preferred their accustomed institutions and did not 
want to have them forcibly reformed after the German 
model. 

Most European history of the last thirty years could be 
compressed into two statements: 

The non-Germanic peoples felt that it was not only 
their right, but their most sacred duty to resist the en- 
croachments of the Deutschtum. 

The Germans could not conceive how any but idiots and 
perverts could resist the realization of their beneficent 
and reforming mission. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE 

The rebirth of France after "the terrible year" of 1870 is 
one of the romances of history. And France will cease to be 
France before she reaches that happy condition of a nation 
which has no history. Almost alone of all people in this drab 
cormnercial age, the French have managed to fill the record 
of their daily life with color, tense suspense — and thrills. 

The Third Republic was born out of the blood and travail 
of war and revolution. Peace had scarcely been signed 
with Germany when the working class of Paris took up 
arms in a desperate insurrection against the threat of a 
monarchical restoration. 

The new government inherited most of the vices of the 
bas empire of Napoleon III. Its first and most imperative 
duty was to pay off the staggering war indemnity — five 
milliard francs — ^which Bismarck had imposed. The 
German army still occupied a great part of France, and 
according to Bismarck's terms they would only retire as 
the instalments of the indemnity were paid. 

A generation ago a thousand million dollars was an 
unheard of sum. But very pluckily the French set to work 
to pay it off. 

The necessity of great internal loans — credit operations 
on an unprecedented scale — resulted in granting immense 
power to the financiers. They rose to the occasion and 
freed France of the German occupation within three years. 
But when the immediate crisis was safely passed the French 
financiers were quite as reluctant in giving up their privi- 
leges as some of our railroad magnates have been slow to 
relinquish their grip on the western territories they had 
helped to develop. 

36 



THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE 37 

As a result of its pressing financial need in the first stage 
of its history the French Republic has been more closely 
and openly allied with Big Business — more often smirched 
by its scandals — than the countries of Europe which have 
had a more placid history. Also the French — like us — 
have the habit of fighting corruption with pubHcity. So, 
many things which would be carefully covered up in Eng- 
land or Germany are openly discussed in their newspapers. 

The RoyaHsts died hard. If the various anti-republican 
forces — Bourbonistes, Orleanistes, Bonapartistes — had 
united in the first decades of the Republic they could have 
restored the monarchy. The Republic survived because 
there were three rival pretenders for the throne. It was 
not until the third president, Grevy, was inaugurated — 
January, 1879 — that the nation had a chief executive who 
was a repubhcan. And this event, while a definite victory 
for progress, by no means ended the danger of reaction. 

The eighties and nineties were two decades when a vast 
amount of unspectacular work was done in organizing the 
internal life of the RepubHc. Encouraged by the amazing 
success of the credit operations by which they had paid 
off the war indemnity, the government, under the technical 
leadership of de Freycinet, the financial advice of M. Leon 
Say, launched on gigantic expenses for the improvement 
of harbors and canals and roads, the buying of existing 
private railroads and the building of new ones. Large 
sums were spent on improving agricultural conditions. 
And above all, money was poured out on strengthening 
the system of public schools. 

The parliamentary history of these years is largely a 
record of debates on finance. The Republic was accused 
by its enemies of wanton extravagance, of leading the 
country to bankruptcy. Certainly no government had 
ever been so lavish in borrowing money to capitalize the 
community. The pessimists foretold ruin. But de Frey- 
cinet and Say and the other Republicans had faith in the 
future of France. In the light of the present results it is 



38 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

easy to criticize some of this expenditure in detail. There 
was a normal amount of log-rolling and stupidity — but 
the general policy has certainly been justified by the event. 
Most of this borrowed money was invested in increasing 
the earning capacity of the nation. The present extraor- 
dinary wealth of France is largely due to the financial 
daring of the eighties and nineties. 

This is especially true in regard to the expenses on public 
education. There is a statue of Danton in Paris and on 
its base is carved a sentence from one of his speeches: 
"Apres le pain, Veducation est le premier besoin du peuple." 
(After bread, education is the first need of the people.) 
This has been the most revered motto of the French Repub- 
lic. 

But this immensely important foundation work fur- 
nishes dreary reading. The "dash" which is so typical of 
French history is furnished by "colonial enterprises." 
Tunisia was conquered in 1881 — thereby incurring the 
bitter enmity of the Italians, Soon the French began their 
advance in Indo-China, so gaining frontiers which marched 
with those of the British Empire and gave rise to new 
quarrels. It was the same in Madagascar, Zanzibar, Egypt, 
and Morocco. Everywhere that the French and EngHsh 
colonial interests touched there was friction. 

These over-seas adventures had the hearty indorsement 
of Bismarck. He was primarily a Continentalist; it was 
only reluctantly that he turned to colonial enterprises. 
The more the French squandered their resources in "foreign 
parts" the better he was pleased — especially as it kept 
them at loggerheads with their other neighbors. 

But in one thing Bismarck's theory was wrong. He 
thought that colonial adventures would make the French 
forget Alsace-Lorraine. It is one of the picturesque inci- 
dents of history that when, shortly after the fall of Bis- 
marck, a French column, after an exceedingly hard march 
through bitter jungles and over desperate desert trails, 
entered Timbuctoo (12 th February, 1894) they renamed 



THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE 39 

the main street of that African town, the Boulevard Alsace- 
Lorraine. One of the blockhouses they built they christened 
Fort Metz, another Fort Strassbourg. The chief of this 
expedition was a relatively unknown young "command- 
ant" named Joffre. It was his first notable achievement 
and he was given the Legion of Honor and the rank of 
lieutenant colonel. 

Colonial adventure did not make the French forget 
Alsace-Lorraine, and it gave a rugged, hardening training 
to a great many French officers. 

Ten years after the Congress of Berlin Wilhelm II. as- 
cended the throne. Two years later — 20th March, 1890 — 
Prince Otto von Bismarck retired to private Hfe. And 
almost at once a striking change was evident in European 
politics. 

What were the real causes of the rupture between the 
young Kaiser and the old Chancellor are obscure- — they 
were probably multiple. But one thing is well estabHshed. 
They differed as to the proper poKcy towards Russia. 
Bismarck was in favor of tightening the bonds with Russia. 
The Kaiser, preferring the Austrian alliance, did not renew 
the Dreikaisersbund, and it lapsed immediately. 

On the 27th August, 1891, a diplomatic understanding 
was reached at Paris, between France and Russia. Its 
purpose was announced to be the maintenance of peace and 
of the balance of power in Europe. A year later — August, 
1892 — a Russo-French "military convention" was signed, 
and in March, 1894, the Franco-Russian alHance — or 
"Duplice" — was definitely concluded. All of these texts 
and the exact date of the last two have been kept secret. 
But on the 23rd August, 1897, the Tsar Nicolas II. and 
President Felix Faure met and exchanged toasts in which 
the existence of the alliance — which had been an open 
secret for a long time — was publicly and oflficially pro- 
claimed. 

From one point of view, the Franco-Russian alliance 
seems incredible. Tsars are not expected to be friends with 



40 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

decidedly red republics. And it is indeed an anomaly that 
the France of the great revolution should seek an alKance 
with the most stubborn defender of the ancien regime. 

But the text of the German- Austrian alliance had become 
known and clearly showed to Russia the uncertain value of 
Bismarck's friendship. Besides the Tsar needed money. 
The young Repubhc, whose citizens were a saving people 
with hoards to lend, needed a friend — any friend at any 
price. 

There is much difference of opinion among the historians 
of our times as to the extent to which French poHcy has 
been influenced by the idea of "revanche,''^ revenge for the 
defeat of 1870. That the French profoundly mourn the 
loss of Alsace-Lorraine is beyond dispute. And a certain 
noisy clique have taken "The Revenge" for a watchword. 
The so-called "nationalist party" — the remnants of the old 
monarchial groups — have monopolized most of the jingoism 
in France of recent years. It is noticeable that their writings 
are an attack on the Republicans for having forgotten la 
revanche, and on the Republic for being a form of govern- 
ment which is hopelessly pacific and could never lead the 
French back to the Rhine. 

But after all, the question of revenge is relatively un- 
important. There can be no doubt that the fear of a new 
attack from Germany has been the constant preoccupation 
of almost every French ministry. 1875, 1887, 1891, 1906, 
191 1 are some of the years when the tension was especially 
sharp. The Germans have never allowed the French to 
forget their Terrible Year. 

The Germans say that this fear of a new aggression was 
unfounded; that they never dreamed of re-attacking 
France — except once or twice when they did not like the 
way the Republic was behaving. Very probably this fear 
has been exaggerated. Sometimes, perhaps, the French 
thought the Germans were preparing a new war, when they 
were only indulging their vanity in a meaningless display 
of force. This seems to have been the case more than once. 



THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE 4I 

But whether the fear of a new aggression was justified or 
not, it was very real and of profound influence in French 
policy. If it had not been for the constant rattling of the 
German sword, much of the bitterness might have evapo- 
rated from the memory of 1870. 

The comparison with the aftermath of our own Civil 
War is inevitable. Happily for us, most of the rancor of 
that struggle has died out. To a very large extent the new 
generation has forgotten it. The new generation in France 
was not allowed to forget. 

And France, threatened — or believing herself threatened — 
by Germany, certainly on bad terms with her neighbors, 
Italy and England, needed a friend. RepubHcan scruples 
against an alliance with the bloody Tsar went by the board. 
With so powerful an ally, the French began to dare to 
breathe freely once more. 

This dual alliance was primarily significant because it 
indicated to all the world that the epoch of Bismarck was 
over. Something had happened in Europe without the 
consent of the Germans, something which Bismarck had 
taught them to believe was undesirable. 

The French and Russian statesmen, although they re- 
fused to publish the text of these agreements, insisted that 
they were purely defensive; that their sole object was to 
safeguard the peace of Europe. But the Germans could 
not consider it simply defensive — it was so manifestly a 
blow at the prestige of the Deutschtum. And here we are 
very close to the subtle psychological misunderstanding 
which has had a great deal to do with the present conflict. 

The French attitude towards this alliance was very clear. 
Their action seemed to them above reproach. To be sure, 
a few enthusiasts of the revanche hoped that there would be 
a war and a chance to wipe out old scores. But everyone 
who was well informed about Russia knew better. The 
Tsar tried to bring about a rapprochement between France 
and Germany, an attempt which met the approval of the 
French foreign minister, Hanotaux. In 1895 — at the sug- 



42 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

gestion of Russia — the French sent some of their war-ships 
to participate in the fetes at the opening of the Kiel Canal. 
It was the first instance of official cordiaKty between the 
victims and victors of 1870. In 1898 Nicolas II. sent out 
his invitation to the peace conference at the Hague. There 
was very little in the Russian alliance to encourage the 
bellicose element in France. 

To thinking Frenchmen the alfiance meant an end to 
their dangerous isolation. It meant a counter-balance to 
the German "Triplice." It meant that the chances of a 
successful defence in case of a new attack were greatly in- 
creased. And so — of course — it meant that there was less 
chance of their being attacked. They did not consider that 
the Germans had any moral right to dictatorship in Europe. 
They did not want to succumb to the Deutschtum. And 
with Russia for an ally they could feel themselves more at 
their ease. They could not see how any right thinking 
people could object to their desire for independence. 

But while the dual aUiance was not in a geographical 
sense aggressive, while it did not threaten to take an inch 
of soil from the Deutschland, it was — from the German 
point of view — a very definite assault on what they held 
most sacred — the prestige of the Deutschtum. If you 
announced to a Second Adventist that you and your 
neighbor had formed a defensive alliance to resist the 
second coming, you would hardly shock him more than the 
typical German mind is shocked if you announce that you 
do not want to enjoy the manifold blessings of order and 
discipHned comfort and happiness which thrive under 
German kultur. He cannot conceive how any right think- 
ing people would combine to resist the expansion of this 
beneficent regime. -; ' 

As long as Bismarck had been chancellor he had thumped 
on the table whenever this alliance had been suggested and 
by keeping alive his flimsy counter-assurance with Russia 
he had managed to prevent its consummation. But it is 
doubtful if he could have postponed it much longer. If 



THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE 43 

there is any one proposition in regard to European history 
which has been proved so often that it can be made the 
basis of a "law," it is that the continent cannot be ruled 
from any one capital. All attempts at a European empire, 
whether they have started from Rome, Madrid, or Paris, 
have eventually been met by a hostile coalition and at last 
defeated. So the fall of Bismarck was not so much the 
cause as the signal. The announcement of the Franco- 
Russian alliance was the tangible indication that resistance 
to the Deutschtum was crystalizing. 

Would Germany passively accept this diminution of its 
prestige; this open revolt from its thrall? 

The young Kaiser and his new chancellor, Caprivi, can 
hardly be thought to have refrained from war through fear. 
To be sure, the Russian army was supposed to be for- 
midable, the mihtary power of the DupHce was not to be 
despised, but still it was weak as compared to the TripHce. 
The Germans could have gone to war at that time with 
every chance of success. 

Wilhelm II., far from having less reverence for the 
Deutschtum than Bismarck, had an even more ardent devo- 
tion to the mystic idea of the mission of his people. Noth- 
ing but a sincere love of peace on the part of the rulers 
of Germany in this period can explain their acceptance of 
the dual alliance — in spite of the chagrin and vexation it 
caused the nation — without going to war. The Germans, 
who speak of the Kaiser as a pacifist, have very good argu- 
ments to support their statement. The German jingoes 
have always attacked him for weakly preferring peace to 
his duty as the standard bearer of the Deutschtum. 

This new Kaiser had no intention of abandoning the 
ideals of his house nor of his people. But for a quarter 
of a century he ruled without drawing the sword. He was 
apparently proud to receive the Nobel peace prize. 

Wilhelm II. is inexplicable in the hypothesis that he is 
a crude hypocrite, always, in spite of his peace talk, de- 
siring war. But if one considers him as a man of mystic 



"^^Sp" 



44 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

temperament, who took his kingly position seriously, who 
was profoundly convinced that he was "called" of God 
to the high mission of extending his rule on earth, then 
his speeches and acts fall into Hne. Of all the apostles 
of the Deutschtum, he was the most convinced, the most 
devout. Only he differed from his more miHtary entourage 
in beheving that it was best to argue first. The sword 
seemed to him not sinful, but too holy to be drawn lightly. 
He hoped to convince his barbarian, (Regenerated, and 
miserly neighbors of the righteousness of his cause. That 
it was a difficult task only went to prove that these vile 
names were deserved. 

While he has never neglected his army, has given espe- 
cial attention to his navy — has always felt that in this 
world of sinful humanity it might be necessary to use force 
in the cause of righteousness — his real interest has been 
elsewhere. In a blundering, tactless, German way he 
has tried to live on as good terms with his less meritorious 
neighbors as might be possible for an apostle of unserem. 
guten, alten, Deutschen Gott. He has rehed principally on 
economic and intellectual arguments to win converts to 
his German creed. At least, he did not declare war at the 
first symptoms of rebelHon. 

The French seem to have worried very little about what 
the Germans would think of their alhance. As a general 
proposition, as is almost always true in a repubHc, they 
are very much more interested in internal affairs than in 
their international relations. And a matter came to their 
attention of such passionate and absorbing interest that 
they always speak of it as "the affair." 

Several French writers have pointed out that "T affaire 
Dreyfus'' was the struggle of the new generation, who had 
grown up since the Terrible Year, to break forever with 
the tradition of defeat. And to a large extent, it was a revolt 
of forward-looking youth against backward-looking age. 

An unimportant Jewish officer — Captain Dreyfus — was 
accused and convicted in a military court of selling state 



THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE 45 

secrets to the enemy. The question of his guilt or inno- 
cence had httle importance. Some of those who fought 
hardest for him beheved he was guilty. But— guilty or 
innocent — he had been unjustly convicted. He had not 
had a fair trial. Certain officers — perhaps believing that 
he was a traitor and that it was a patriotic act to insure 
his punishment with the least possible scandal— had forged 
the documents on which his conviction was based. 

To a large extent the matter was taken out of the courts 
and tried in the newspapers before pubhc opinion. Esprit 
de corps, and a desire to stop an exposure which would dis- 
credit the army, led some of the officers of the Etat Major 
to try to deny the forgery and cover the culprits. Never 
was there a more glowing example of the tangled web we 
weave when first we practise to deceive. 

The conflict became bitter to the verge of civil war. 
On one side was all the ideahsm of the young Republicans 
who said: — ^Let justice be done though the heavens fall. 
On the other side were a number of gray haired old gentle- 
men who wanted to keep the heavens in their place at 
any price; who were willing to perjure themselves to main- 
tain the honor of the army; who held that it is expedient 
for one man to suffer for the people — especially as he hap- 
pened to be a Jew. Perhaps it was only a chance coin- 
cidence, but most of the anti-Dreyfus party were good 
cathoHcs. 

To the everlasting glory of France the Dreyfusards kept 
up the fight for ten long years and at last won. But the 
personality of the man over whom the ruction arose had 
been lost sight of in the more fundamental quarrel which 
grew out of his case. Most of those who began rioting in 
the streets of Paris — and even in the outlying villages of 
France — to the cry "Vive Dreyfus" soon found themselves 
shouting "Vive la Republique" "A has VArmee." And 
the mobs who had gathered to the slogan "A has le Juif" 
began to shout "A has la Republique" and "Vive le roi." 

There was much which was incoherent in "VAfaire.^^ 



46 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

Sometimes anti-Semiticism seemed the dominant element. 
Again, it appeared to be a struggle between the army and 
the civilian population, between court martials and "due 
process of law." And at times it seemed that the cause of 
all the trouble was a royalist or Bonapartist conspiracy. 
The anti-republican forces of France have always main- 
tained — and perhaps believed — that 'H'Affaire^' was caused 
by "foreign gold," that England or Germany was trying 
to stir up civil strife to weaken France. But out of all 
the turmoil came the clear cut issue which was to dominate 
the internal life of the Republic on the threshold of the 
new century, — the conflict between Church and State. 

Rightly or wrongly, all the sinister elements of French 
life which were trying to undermine and discredit the Re- 
pubHc became typified in the priest. Neither side kept 
their temper in this fight. Neither side was always just 
and reasonable. But out of the conflict the Republic 
emerged solidified and at last firmly established. 

By 1 910 it was no longer a question of whether or not 
the king should come again to France. But — was the 
French RepubKc to be a sohd and respectable form of gov- 
ernment like ours, severe on "agitators" and strikers, and 
kindly disposed to people of wealth, or should it push for- 
ward along the paths of democracy and strive to win the 
affection and loyalty of all its citizens? 

As a result of their alliance with Russia the French 
worried less over the probability of a new attack from Ger- 
many, but their relations with England grew steadily worse. 
The English also disapproved of an alliance between their 
two "hereditary" enemies. 

"Allant" young officers like le commandant J off re, were 
exploring and conquering vast territories in Africa. Every 
day the young Republic was becoming more of a rival to 
Britain in the colonial world. And French officials — M. 
Gabriel Hanotaux was minister of foreign affairs — were 
forever telhng about their "rights" in Egypt. And those 
Englishmen who were well informed in the matter knew 



THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE 47 

that the French "rights" in Egypt — as "rights" go in 
colonial enterprises — were better than their own. So such 
discussion was annoying. When the British landed troops 
in Egypt in 1882 they had solemnly covenanted that it 
was only a temporary "police" measure to reestablish 
order. One British minister after another had formally 
promised to evacuate Egypt. 1888 had been set as a final 
date for the occupation. And when one is determined to 
repudiate a promise it is unpleasant to be reminded of it. 

An old but quite explicit treaty gave the French the 
right to maintain fisheries along the "French coast" of 
Newfoundland. The British government did not exactly 
t-ear up this scrap of paper — they gave the colony of New- 
foundland a self-governing charter. And the colonial 
assembly promptly passed laws in violation of the French 
rights. The situation was not unlike that which the Cali- 
fornians have caused for us by their anti- Japanese laws. 
When M. Hanotaux protested on behalf of the Breton 
fishers, the British government said that they could not 
coerce a self-governing colony. This reply, however, did 
not satisfy M. Hanotaux — he kept on protesting. The 
English decided that he was a troublesome person — a gen- 
tleman, they felt, would not be so querulous. 

This long series of disputes — and I have only mentioned 
two — came to a head over the Fashoda affair. A French 
expedition under Colonel Marchand started up the Congo 
from the Atlantic to cross Africa to the Upper Nile. The 
English "rights" in lower Egypt were sketchy in the ex- 
treme, they were too small in the Soudan to be visible to 
the naked eye. But someone started the fool story that 
the French intended to ruin Anglo-Egypt by damming 
the Upper Nile and diverting its waters into the Sahara — 
or perhaps into the Canals of Mars. A great hue and cry 
arose at once and the British government annexed the 
Soudan while Colonel Marchand was still struggling in 
the heart of the jungle. When at last he struck the Nile 
at the little mud village of Fashoda, he had a memorable 



48 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

interview with a British officer, named Kitchener, For 
several days the issue of war and peace hung in the balance. 
But at last France gave in. 

This Fashoda incident demonstrated a fact of diplomacy 
worth noting. It is dangerous to allow the Department of 
Foreign Affairs to operate singlehanded. International rela- 
tions should be the business of aU the ministers in common. 
More than any other phase of government it requires team- 
work. 

There is this overwhelming criticism to be brought 
against the policy of M. Hanotaux. He worked alone — 
and it caused his downfall. He was a high-minded patriot. 
He was above the cheap chicanery which has often dis- 
graced diplomacy. His actions were based on a fine con- 
ception of international law. He was engaged in insisting 
on the recognized "rights" of France. But the nation 
which was threatening these "rights" was the greatest 
naval power in the world. And the French fleet of that 
time was a joke. If war had been declared, France could 
not have sent one of her soldiers overseas to protect her 
far away colonies. M. Hanotaux had led his country to a 
crisis from which there were only two exits — war or humilia- 
tion. And France was not prepared for war. 

If M. Hanotaux did not foresee the crisis he was a very 
shortsighted diplomat. If he foresaw the crisis and did 
not consult with his colleague, the minister of marine, 
he was a rather lightminded statesman. 

He has been variously criticised by his compatriots. My 
own impression is that he was somewhat naif. He seems to 
have been convinced that his cause would triumph because 
it was just: but the English refused to argue. Their navy 
was overwhelming. So Colonel Marchand ignominiously 
marched out of Fashoda and M. Hanotaux resigned — 
following the example of many other men who have been 
too good for this world. 

M. Hanotaux was followed at the Quai d'Orsay — the 
French foreign office — by M. Theophile Delcasse. He is 



THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE 49 

one of the most outstanding personalities in recent European 
history — and in this present crisis. A rather insignificant 
man to look at, he is of that dynamic kind, whose every 
relation is fierce. His friendships and enmities — both at 
home and abroad — are intense. Quite as many, and as 
diverse estimates have been written of him as of the Kaiser. 
But in one point at least — and it is to his credit — he differs 
profoundly from his great antagonist. He has never claimed 
to be inspired by God. 

His enemies — in France as well as in Germany — accuse 
him of a sinister, persistent, and fanatic will to war. Seeing 
the results of his policy — or rather the course European 
poHtics have taken during his years of prominence — they 
jump at the conclusion that from the cradle up he foresaw 
his destiny; that his every act has been inspired by a venom- 
ous plot to prepare the cataclysm we now witness. There is a 
legend that his father administered to him an oath of hate 
against Germany, even as Hannibal was sworn to overthrow 
Rome. But this interpretation of his character tends to- 
wards the miraculous. History does not record any other 
case of a statesman who enjoyed so marvellous a prevision, 
such a remarkable consistency of purpose. Until there is 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, it is well to assume 
that M. Delcasse is a man quite like the rest of us. 

When he became minister of foreign affairs there was 
very little difference of opinion among intelligent French- 
men as to the principal point of danger. The most serious 
menace came from Germany. The Dreyfusards, who had 
come into power, were pacific. They had no idea — in spite 
of the Nationalist noise about ^'la revanche"- — of starting a 
war to regain Alsace-Lorraine. But there was a chance of a 
new German aggression. The humiliation of the Fashoda 
incident had been indeed painful, but after all the gage 
involved had been small, — at most they stood to win or 
lose a distant colony. It had been an affair of amour 
propre. But in a war with Germany, the very existence of 
France would be at stake. 



50 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

At least twice, the French government had tried hard to 
heal the breach with Germany. One such movement to- 
wards rapprochement had been attempted by Gambetta. 
Another had been tried more recently, after the signing of 
the Russian alliance, under the auspices of the Tsar. They 
had both failed. The Germans could not or would not 
treat on any base of equahty. If the Republic had been 
willing to admit its inferiority — numerically, in military 
power, morally — if it had asked for "protection," the 
Germans might have been willing to be friends. 

Undoubtedly M, Delcasse disliked the Germans. Most 
Frenchmen did. It is very rare for anyone to Kke people 
who are openly disdainful. The Nicaraguans — for in- 
stance — do not like us. 

There were only three solutions. 

(i) A change of heart on the part of the Germans, a 
wilKngness to treat their neighbors as equals and to accept 
sincerely their collaboration in the common work of civiKza- 
tion. 

(2) A French acceptation of defeat without fighting. 

(3) War. 

How clearly M. Delcasse saw this situation we do not 
know. There are many indications of hesitancy and in- 
decision on his part. At times he seems to have felt out the 
ground as to the possibiKty of an accord with Germany. 
In the early days of his administration he certainly did not 
foresee the entente with England. But in spite of such 
waverings most of his acts group about a central and con- 
sistent theory. 

France, in the face of the threat from across the Rhine, 
was in an unnecessarily weak position. Her energies were 
being dissipated by endless, scattered, and relatively petty 
quarrels all over the world. This Fashoda incident had 
been typical. France had had nothing to gain compared 
to what she might have lost. Nothing would have more 
pleased the Germans of the Bismarckian school than an 
Anglo-French war. M. Delcasse realized — as did most 



THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE 51 

thoughtful Frenchmen — that these subsidiary quarrels were 
playing into the hands of the Germans. 

M. Delcasse's theory was to liquidate these secondary 
quarrels and to conserve the force of France for the threat- 
ening Hfe and death struggle. 

Ever since France had snatched Tunisia and Italy had 
entered the Germanic alliance, these two Latin sisters had 
been accusing each other of treason to the proposition that 
blood is thicker than water. A tarifif war had been started 
in which each country was biting off its own nose to spite 
the other's chin. It did neither any good and the net 
result was to throw the Itahan market open to German 
enterprise and to fan the bitterness between the two peo- 
ples. 

M. Delcasse began his career by smoothing out the 
Itahan quarrel. With rare diplomatic skill he succeeded, 
first in reducing the quarrel to its simplest being and then 
in persuading the statesmen of Rome that the matter was 
not worth losing one's temper over. By the middle of 
1902 — neither the exact date nor the text of the document 
have been published — he was able to sign with Italy the 
first of his ^^ ententes." It was not a formal treaty, it was 
"a gentleman's agreement" — a frank statement of a desire 
to live on cordial neighborly terms. 

The German chancellor spoke of this affair — whereby the 
ally, Italy, showed a disposition to make friends out of the 
family — as a harmless flirtation — un tour de valse. But this 
witticism did not content the more ardent adepts of the 
Deutschtum. There was a great outcry in Germany. Italy, 
they had thought was completely converted to their ideal. 
Her pretension of independence was an even more serious 
matter than the Franco-Russian alHance. The force of 
the ungodly was growing. 

Simply un tour de valse? In this matter the German 
patriots saw more clearly than their chancellor. It was 
more than a harmless flirtation. In one of his rare state- 
ments of pohcy before the French Chamber — for M. Del- 



52 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

casse believes in secret diplomacy and has never erred on 
the side of taking his people too much into his confidence — 
he was able to say (3rd July, 1902): "ew aucun cas et sous 
aucune forme Vltalie ne pent devenir ni Vauxiliaire ni Vinstru- 
ment d'une agression contre notre pays." (In no case and 
under no form will Italy become the accompHce nor the 
instrument of an aggression against our country). In the 
same year, the Triple Alliance was renewed, but Signor 
Prinelli, the ItaHan minister of foreign affairs, announced 
to his Parliament that the treaty contained no clause of 
aggression against France. The real sense of this entente 
became apparent in the early days of August, 19 14, when 
Italy refused to march with her allies against France. 

Did M. Delcasse foresee the harvest of war which would 
spring from the seeds he planted? There are many who 
think he did, who say that the Italian Entente was only 
the first link in the chain he was forging for the binding of 
Germany; who scoff at every word he said about peace, and 
see in his every act the inspiration of a vindictive hatred 
against the victors of 1870. 

It may be true, but it is not a necessary assumption in 
order to explain his activity. In fact, there are several 
indications which point in the opposite direction. While 
he was working on the Italian rapprochement he was carry- 
ing on negotiations with Spain in view of an eventual 
partition of Morocco. Very Httle light has been thrown on 
this matter by French publications, but some Spanish 
"indiscretions" indicate certainly that M. Delcasse had not 
at this time definitely thrown in his lot with Great Britain, 
for these first Spanish negotiations seem to have had an 
anti-British tone. The Spaniards at least were afraid that 
the deal proposed by the French would offend the English. 
There are other indications — less certain to be sure, but 
worth consideration — that M. Delcasse was also carrying 
on anti-English negotiations with Germany at this time. 

In 1 901 he made a trip to Saint Petersburg. Its object 
seems to have been to persuade the Russians to withdraw 



THE RESURRECTION OF FRANCE <,^ 

their opposition to the German plans for railroad develop- 
ment in Asia Minor. But more of this Bagdad railroad 
venture in the next chapter. The point I wish to establish 
is that in the early years of his ministry, M. Delcasse seems 
to have explored the poKtical wilderness in all directions. 
He does not seem to have been committed to a venomous 
anti-German policy. In fact, more than once in this period 
he was accused by the English — and by the French "na- 
tionalists" — of having sold out to the Germans. 

It is now evident that two conflicting — apparently un- 
reconcilable — ideals were abroad in Europe. A determina- 
tion on the part of the Germans to spread their rehgion of 
the Deutschtum. A determination on the part of almost 
everybody else to resist Teuton domination. Even in the 
early days of the century there were those who said that 
war was inevitable, but it is quite likely that M. Delcasse 
hoped that the catastrophe might be avoided. It is not 
only possible, but more than probable, that he did not 
possess any mystic clairvoyance. 

Why should he think that the smoothing out of a quarrel 
with Italy was a cause of war? They were sovereign, 
independent nations. They certainly had a right to be 
friendly if they cared to. 

As soon as M. Delcasse had arranged matters to his 
satisfaction with Italy, he turned his attention to England. 
The difficulties here were much greater. His first task on 
entering the Foreign Office had been to get out from under 
the Fashoda crisis, which his predecessor had bequeathed 
to him. By very large surrenders of the "legitimate as- 
pirations" of the French in the Nile valley— by sweeping 
concessions to the "British point of view" — he paved the 
way to a better understanding. And various other events 
had been playing into his hands. 



CHAPTER V 

THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP COOLS 

In the years which immediately followed the Congress 
of Berlin there was no friction between the empires of 
Germany and Great Britain. It is rather amusing now to 
read the honeyed words they exchanged not so very long 
ago. 

The roots of the discord which was soon to separate 
these "friends" run far back. The Germans were much 
quicker than the English to foresee the coming conflict. 
At a time when the relations between Downing Street 
and Wilhelmstrasse — the two foreign offices — were most 
cordial Treitscke had begun to teach that war with Great 
Britain was inevitable. 

But the EngHsh were slow to read the signs of the times, 
they were preoccupied with their colonial rivalries with 
France and Russia. In the eighties and nineties almost 
any EngUshman would have said that the Tsar was the 
great enemy. Every advance of Russia into central Asia 
towards the borders of India was a new menace. And the 
French were considered to be riotous, unreliable, dangerous 
people. 

The circumstances which gradually developed ill-feeling 
between Germany and England are too complex to allow 
any single date to be set for the change. But roughly it 
coincided with the advent of Wilhelm 11. and the fall of 
Bismarck. 

The great man theory is no longer popular among his- 
torians, and it is ungracious in these days of democracy to 
attribute a high role to a king. And while it is manifestly 
foolish to give the Kaiser credit for all the marvellous 
advance of Germany since his accession, it is true that his 

54 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP COOLS 55 

influence was great. He knew how to group about him 
and to encourage everywhere the artisans of this stupendous 
progress. 

Mr. O'Farrell in his very careful study in poHtical econ- 
omy, "The Franco-Prussian War Indemnity and its Eco- 
nomic Results," argues that the foundations of the amazing 
prosperity of modern Germany were laid, not by the present 
Kaiser, not by the War of 1870 and its immense indemnity, 
but ten years farther back by the organization of the 
"Zollverein" or the tariff federation of the disunited Ger- 
man states and principalities. Professor Veblen, in his 
"Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution," also 
contends that the Kaiser had little to do with the remark- 
able growth of German economic strength. 

But ever since Wilhelm II. came to the throne there 
have been in his entourage apostles of war. And the leaders 
of the German war party were men whose devotion to the 
ideal of the Deutschtum the Kaiser could not doubt. It 
was also his most cherished ideal. But all through the 
first quarter of a century of his reign he turned from them 
and chose for his ministers men who believed that the way 
to spread the influence of the German idea was by the 
peaceful means of economic organization. And, on the 
surface, his wisdom seemed to be proved by results. 

It would be easy to mass statistics on the amazing growth 
of German industry and commerce. I choose only a few 
which were current at the time the relations between 
Britain and Germany began to cool. The Revue de Statis- 
tique of 21st October, 1900, gives some tables on the num- 
ber and capital of new industrial and financial stock com- 
panies in Germany. In 1894, 92 companies were char- 
tered with a capital of 88,000,000 marks. In 1899, five 
years later, 364 new companies with a capital of 544,000,000 
marks, were formed, From 1876 to 1895 the weight of 
merchandise carried on the rivers of Germany increased 
159 per cent. The freight trafiic on the railroads in this 
same period went up 143 per cent. In 1895 the number 



56 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

of ships which entered the harbor of Hamburg was 9,443. 
In 1900, the number of ships was 13,103 and the tonnage 
was over 8,000,000, more than the record of Liverpool 
for the same year. In the total movement of commerce — 
importation and exportation — Germany climbed up be- 
tween 1 87 1 and 1900 from fourth place to second. 

Inevitably much of this progress was at the expense of 
England. But this commercial competition might possibly 
have continued without producing war. There were many 
other currents flowing in the direction of trouble. Towards 
the end of Bismarck's career the merchants of the German 
seaports organized a colonial society and began a vigorous 
campaign in this sense. Rather reluctantly Bismarck gave 
in to their urgings and launched the empire on a colonial 
poHcy. But he was half-hearted about it and anxious to 
avoid a quarrel with England. He confided to them that 
Germany had developed ambitions in Africa. 

The two largest sections of Africa which were then un- 
claimed by any European power, were the districts which 
are now called German East Africa and German South West 
Africa. The British government at once strengthened its 
grip on Zanzibar, the island off the coast of East Africa, 
which is the natural economic gate to the territory which 
the Germans wanted and also "occupied" Walfish Bay 
and the important islands off the coast of South West 
Africa. Then they made no serious objection to the Ger- 
man occupation of the hinterland. 

The colonists — the individual citizens of the two coun- 
tries — came into the sharpest kind of conflict. The story 
of the efforts of these pioneers of Britain and Germany to 
over-reach each other reads like a romance. Some chapters 
are as blood-curdling as the best of Nick Carter, full of 
murder and intrigues, the fomenting of native rebellions, 
the smuggling of arms. Some chapters are like a story 
from the Arabian Nights. The Germans — if not the cen- 
tral government, at least the local consul — encouraged a 
handsome young German boy to climb over the harem 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP COOLS 57 

wall and elope with the Princess Salme, the sister of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar. And some of the chapters are side- 
splittingly funny. Little has happened in the record of 
WeltpoHtik more amusing than Stanley's rescue of Emin 
Pasha — who did not want to be rescued and at last had 
to pretend to be sick and jump out of a hospital window 
in order to escape his rescuer. But as the relations be- 
tween the two foreign ofhces did not become strained over 
these matters, they hardly enter the realm of European 
politics. 

But as the years passed, the Germans, when they set 
to work to develop their colonies, found that they had been 
tricked and outplayed at every point. Waliish Bay is 
typical of the entire situation. The West Coast of Africa 
suffers from lack of natural harbors. Walfish Bay is the 
only one on the long coast line of the territory Germany 
wished to colonize. They quite naturally lost their temper 
when they discovered that the Enghsh had forestalled 
them. It was a crude case of the dog in the manger. The 
British have never used Walfish Bay in any way. Time and 
again the Germans have tried to buy it, but the English 
would not sell. Apparently they did not care to have their 
new neighbors become prosperous. By stubbornly hold- 
ing on to this natural harbor they have forced the Ger- 
mans to spend millions in developing an artificial port. 
The situation is very similar in Zanzibar. 

Such incidents began to cause friction at home. But 
the young Kaiser, after he had dropped Bismarck, tried to 
reestabhsh cordial relations. By the treaty of 14th June, 
1890, he received from the English the Island of Hehgoland 
off the mouth of the Elbe, which from the point of view 
of naval strategy was of immense value — but at that time 
the English did not regard the Germans as dangerous 
naval rivals. And in exchange he paid four milHon marks 
for a strip of East African coast (which was as much his 
as it was England's); gave up all claim to Zanzibar (in 
spite of the money which had been spent on the trousseau 



58 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

of the Princess Salme) ; ceded to England the rich country 
of Uganda and agreed to a northern frontier to the East 
African colony which entirely suited the EngHsh. When 
Stanley, who knew these African countries intimately, 
read the treaty, he threw up his hands in amazement and 
said that the Germans had been cheated. Of course the 
German colonists on the spot and the Colonial Society 
at home raged. 

The explanation of these sweeping concessions to Eng- 
land is to be found in the fact that the young Kaiser, having 
dropped his pilot, was worried by the trend of European 
politics. In the face of rapprochement between France 
and Russia, he was willing to make sacrifices overseas to 
maintain the EngKsh friendship. And in such matters the 
British statesmen have always shown themselves shrewd 
bargainers. 

But towards 1893 the German colonial poHcy became 
aggressive again and new frictions arose. The Kaiser's 
famous telegram to President Kruger at the time of the 
Jameson raid in South Africa was a symptom of the rivalry. 
From that time on the colonial conflict between the two 
nations intensified. 

But even more important than this colonial and com- 
mercial competition was the fact that the Kaiser was a 
passionate yachtsman. He loved the sea. It was not 
only the navy which interested him. He was even more 
interested in the merchant marine. He broke over all 
the traditions of caste and religion to make a personal 
friend of the civihan Jew, Herr Ballin, who has engineered 
the stupendous growth of the Hamburg-Amerika Line. 
"Our future," he told his people, "lies on the seas." And 
committed to pushing, aggressive colonial enterprises, fas- 
cinated by oversea expansion, he needed a fleet of war. 

The Deutschtum — when it ceased to be merely conti- 
nental and entered Weltpolitik — required a navy as much 
as it did an army. The beneficent work of German kultur 
was being limited in South West Africa — to take only one 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP COOLS 59 

point of the globe — because the EngHsh held Walfish Bay. 
The Kaiser would have preferred to buy it. The English 
would not sell. A fleet was necessary. 

The English were slow to reahze the significance of this 
steadily growing friction with Germany. Deep sunk in 
their mind was the tradition that their hereditary enemies 
were France and Russia. Her navies supreme in the seven 
seas, Britain had no fear of invasion. Her worries were 
with her armies on the far-away frontiers of her colonies. 
The two foreign offices — Downing Street and Wilhelm- 
strasse — continued to exchange honied words. 

The quarrels of traders and colonists might be com- 
promised, but this naval competition was quite a different 
question. The English attitude towards their navy was 
very well expressed by a member of Parliament, Mr, Urqu- 
hart, in 1862 : — 

''Beware. The sea threatens, while it serves you; it 
bears you, but it environs you. The position of this island 
is such that there is no via media for her between being all 
powerful and being nothing at all. This is why she was 
always conquered until, having subjugated the sea, she 
became mistress of the world. England will be the sea's 
victim on the day she ceases to be its queen." 

Sir Walter Raleigh expressed the same sentiments long 
before, and one can find them re-stated in the latest speech 
in Parliament on the naval situation. 

The growth of Germany's sea power was early noted by 
English observers. And naval supremacy is to the British 
mind very like the conception of the Deutschtum to the 
Germans. It is sacro-sanct. It is something one does not 
dispute. Several years ago one of the German comic 
papers had a picture of a worried looking John Bull, busily 
turning over the pages of his Bible and asking his wife, 
Britannia, "Where is that verse, where God told the Eng- 
lish to rule the waves?" If there is no such injunction in 
the Bible a great many Englishmen think it is due to a 
careless oversight on the part of one of God's stenographers. 



6o THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

He certainly must have said it. To dispute the manifest 
justice of England's sea-rule is to show an evil and impious 
heart. 

Here are the disturbing facts. The naval budgets of 
Germany grew by leaps. These are the approximate 
figures in dollars by five year periods. 

In 1883 the naval budget was 9.0 millions; 
" 1888 '' " " " 12.0 " 

" 1893 " " " " 19.8 " 

" 1898 " " " " 30.4 

And here is the Kaiser's comment. "As my grandfather 
worked for the reconstruction of the army, I will work, 
without letting myself be checked, to reconstitute this navy, 
so that it will be comparable to our land army." 

It took the English a long time to realize that they could 
not make their old friends, the Germans, understand and 
appreciate their reasons for ruling the sea. There is no 
doubt that the English made a sincere effort to open the 
German eyes in this matter. There is a large literature on 
the subject, leading articles in The Times, profound dis- 
cussions in the reviews, not a few books and endless speeches 
by cabinet ministers and leaders of the opposition, by land- 
lubbers and sea-lords. 

The British Isles are not self-supporting. They do not 
produce sufficient food. If any hostile power closed the 
sea-routes the English would starve. Anyone can see that. 
The English need naval supremacy. 

The British empire is not like Germany, a compact 
geographical unit. In the farthest corners of the world the 
English have taken up the white man's burden. And some 
of the "native" races are so unintelligent that they pretend 
to a right to carry their own burdens. The only way the 
British empire can go on with its duty of carrying burdens 
that are not its own (and there is something in the Bible 
about other people's burdens) is to be able to send troops 
to the ends of the earth to impress — and if needs be to 
kill — these unruly natives. It is as evident as the nose on 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP COOLS 6l 

your face that England needs the most powerful navy in the 
world. 

And besides Britannia always has ruled the waves. 

These arguments did not impress the Germans any more 
than their arguments in favor of the Deutschtum impressed 
the Enghsh. One of the most authoritative expressions of 
the German attitude in the matter is given by the ex- 
chancellor von Billow in his book — "Imperial Germany," 
He makes a careful analysis of the history of British foreign 
poUcy. Since the days of the great Elizabeth, the English 
have fought every nation which has tried to rival them on 
the sea. She made and broke a kaleidoscopic series of 
treaties and always with the object of smashing some sea 
power. The Dutch fleet followed the Spanish armada to the 
bottom of the sea. She fought protestant nations just as 
bhthely as catholic — if they dared to build ships. This is 
von Billow's interpretation of our War of 1812. The French 
fleets of Louis XIV. and Napoleon followed those of the 
Dutch. 

Now Germany was building ships. Von Biilow makes it 
clear that he expects whatever sound and vital elements 
there are in English life to seek an excuse to smash the 
German fleet before it would reach a threatening size. 
Nevertheless he is an optimist about it. He believes that 
Germany will succeed in wresting the rule of the waves from 
Britannia. Although he does not say so in so many words 
he evidently thinks that there is very httle in modern 
English life which is virile and sound. He thought the 
English would be afraid to fight. 

As it became evident that the Germans, instead of listen- 
ing to these arguments were going ahead building warships, 
the English naval men began to grow suspicious of the 
cordial and genial messages exchanged by the two foreign 
offices. Plainly it was impossible to be friends with people 
who were evil minded enough to dispute England's right to 
supremacy in the sea-world. 

Side by side with the growing suspicion that Germany's 



62 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

intentions on the sea were not honorable there grew the 
certainty that British trade and industry were in danger. 

For a long time — too long a time for their own good — the 
English had enjoyed a practical monopoly in over-seas 
trade. They not only reaped the profits of manufacturing 
the goods and selHng them, but also they had the carrying 
business in their hands. This favored position in the 
world's industry had not been won by force of arms. Even 
their own historians admit that to a large extent it happened 
to them. 

In the early days winds and currents favored the English 
shipping and after the invention of steam engines England 
had a great advantage in her easily accessible supply of 
coal. And besides other people had been too busy with 
wars and revolutions and internal developments to worry 
about international trade. Our case is typical. Our Civil 
War distracted our attention from ''foreign markets" and 
besides we had the nearer and much more profitable work 
of winning the West. 

This monopoly bred its inevitable results. British trade 
methods grew slack. In some markets — I happen to have 
seen the statistics of the Moroccan port of Mogador — the 
EngHsh trade had begun to fall off before any rivals ap- 
peared. 

Suddenly the world was overrun with pushing, hard- 
working, keen young German salesmen. They had very 
little trouble in demonstrating that they were better busi- 
ness men than their easy going British competitors. Of 
course this seemed to the Germans a new proof of their 
racial superiority and of the divine mission of the Deutsch- 
tum. And just as the EngHsh navalists felt that it was not 
right for other people to compete with them in warships, so 
the merchants of England felt that it was not right for other 
people to successfully undersell them. 

It is worth while analyzing this commercial rivalry a little 
deeper. The unsatisfactory condition of British industry 
became evident as far back as 1879, when Parliament 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP COOLS 63 

appointed a commission to study the subject. Another 
''commission on the depression of trade" sat from August, 
1885, to December, 1886, collected an immense number of 
consular reports and statistics and unanimously decided 
that the trouble was German competition. Another par- 
liamentary commission reached the same results in 1896. 

When the British merchants first felt the pressure of this 
new rivalry, they began to cry "unfair competition." The 
claim was general that the German goods were "shoddy." 
There was some truth in this charge at first, goods "made 
in Germany" often fell below "the good, old EngHsh 
standard." But very soon it became evident that the 
English business men had to do with a phenomenon much 
more serious than such "unfair" competition. The Ger- 
man products became as good — or better than — the English 
and everywhere cheaper. 

The new industrial Germany had no traditions. It did 
not stop work for afternoon tea, it did not care for cricket 
nor football, it did not close the factory on Derby Day. 
It did not pay such heavy ground rents to foxhunting gen- 
try, nor hand over such a large share of its profits to un- 
productive heirs. It did not sit down in dignity and wait 
for business to come to it. It sent out "hustling" sales- 
men — no Yankees have more thoroughly deserved this 
adjective — who felt that it was their first duty to learn the 
native languages. 

And these salesmen were much better educated than 
their EngHsh rivals. "Education" in England is to a 
large extent intended to produce "gentlemen." In Ger- 
many it is much more practical. "Technical" instruction 
both in the production and sale of material is among the 
principal causes of German superiority in industry. In 
industrial rivalry there can be no doubt that "a two-power 
naval standard" is not as efiicient as a progressive system 
of pubHc instruction. And in educational matters Great 
Britain is notably retrograde. 

But probably of greater importance was the fact that 



64 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

British industry was seriously handicapped by having an 
immense amount of capital invested in antiquated plants. 
A reluctance to "scrap" obsolete equipment is a cumulative 
impediment. The older the industrial life of a community, 
the larger is the proportion of capital tied up in out-of-date 
machinery. In this matter England is inevitably worse 
off than her upstart rival. The German factories from 
which this threatening competition came were new, they 
had been planned on the lines of modern efficiency. In 
general — aside from the question of wages and the price of 
raw material — the cost of production because of up-to-date 
methods and machinery is less in Germany than in Eng- 
land. It is not necessary to believe in any mystic superior- 
ity of the Teuton race to understand why they beat the 
moss-grown, custom-ridden English in every department. 

Perhaps in no other point has the superiority of the 
German methods been more e\'ident than in the special 
pride of the English — the sea- trade. The Hamburg- 
Amerika Line has built just as pretentious "show-boats" 
for the North Atlantic route as the Cunard or White Star, 
but it is in the freight trade that they have completely out- 
distanced the Enghsh. The German merchant marine — in 
the Pacific trade; through Suez or around the Horn — has 
been better equipped in almost every detail than that of 
their rivals. 

For a great many years the trade along the west coast of 
South America was a practical monopoly for the Pacific 
Steam Navigation Company. They had no rivals and no 
need to be obliging. A few of their ships were less than 
twenty years old and those which came around the Horn 
to England had to live up to the British board of trade 
rules. But when their ships became too old and battered 
to pass the home inspection they were kept on the west 
coast. Recently a German line, the "Kosmos," decided 
to cut in on this trade. They built a fleet of great modern 
freighters and their agents and captains were told to be 
poUte and obliging — not to call the natives "niggers." 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP COOLS 65 

The loss of trade to the P. S. N. C, was a mathematical 
certainty. In desperation they sold out to the Royal Mail 
Steam Packet Company and the new management intended 
(before the War) to build some ships which would have a 
chance in the competition. Now that the War has driven 
their rivals to cover they may decide that this expense 
is unnecessary. 

It is typical that while all these modern German ships 
were handhng their cargo by hydraulic derricks, most of 
the EngHsh merchant marine still relied on the antiquated 
steam "donkey engine." And of course this means higher 
operating expenses. If the War had not come, the Eng- 
lish — in order to compete with the Germans on equal 
terms — would have had to "scrap" the largest part of 
their older merchant fleet. 

The connection between this commercial rivalry and 
colonial disputes is very close. The two questions are 
continually interlocking. Future historians of this period 
will give a good deal of attention to the German project — 
''Die Bagdadbahn.^' No phase of the Near Eastern prob- 
lem has called forth more bitterly passionate discussion 
than this German attempt to build a railroad through 
Asia Minor to Bagdad. The heat of the argument has been 
so great that it is difficult to reach a cool judgment on 
the dispute. 

The German point of view is this. The market most 
suited for their wares is the Turkish empire. The great 
valleys of Mesopotamia, which once supported dense popu- 
lation, are now deserts which can be reclaimed by irriga- 
tion. It is a no man's land (of course the "natives do not 
count"). Their colonial enterprises in other directions 
have been thwarted and limited by other powers who had 
preempted the best territories. Asia Minor is a part of 
the world where no one else has a prior claim, which is 
ideally suited to their needs. It is a climate where Ger- 
mans can live, a reservoir into which they can pour their 
surplus population and their surplus production. They 



66 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

hoped to make the desert blossom Hke the rose and give 
to all the world a new and impressive demonstration of 
the beneficence of the Deutschtum. 

The dominant English point of view was that all this 
fine talk of economic development was merely a blind to 
a sinister political project of wresting from them Egypt 
and India. From a military point of view the weakness 
of the British empire lies in its immense extent. The 
sun never sets on the Union Jack and this means that the 
British system of protection must extend to the ends of 
the earth. Of all the imperial possessions India and Egypt 
are at once the most vulnerable and the most valuable. 
The memory of the Sepoy Rebellion is in the minds of all 
colonial administrators. And the English have looked 
with hostility on any efforts of another power to establish 
itself near the borders of these not over loyal colonies. 

The German projects in Turkey and Mesopotamia were 
grandiose. Their cleverest diplomat since Bismarck, 
Marschall von Bieberstein, at Constantinople had wrung 
very sweeping concessions from the Sultan. The Kaiser 
himself had honored the Sick Man with a personal visit. 
The enterprise came to be called "the Bagdad railroad," 
although the rights to construct the line from the coast to 
Bagdad was the smallest part of the concessions. The 
German promoters had the privilege to extend the rails 
in almost any direction. They were granted vague, all- 
embracing "development" concessions, for irrigating, 
land purchase, mining, trading, and forest rights. To any 
one familiar with the district it was evident that to be really 
profitable the railroad must be extended to the Persian 
Gulf. It needed an Eastern port for a terminus. 

The Transiberian railroad had proved how such a com- 
mercial enterprise could be used for political and military 
purposes. The concessions also granted the right to the 
Germans to take the necessary measures to protect their 
property from the Bedawi bandits which infest the desert. 
This clause might readily serve as an excuse for the estab- 



THE ANGLO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP COOLS 67 

lishment of a military outpost on the confines of India. 
A port on the Persian Gulf might be a base for German 
spies to encourage the chronic sedition in India. The 
railroad would allow the Germans to throw two or three 
army corps into the colony in support of a rebelUon. The 
same class of Englishmen who a few years earlier had been 
"mervous" over the Russian advance, and had thought that 
Colonel Marchand was going to divert the waters of the Nile 
into the Sahara, took alarm over the fell designs of Germany. 

An equally numerous and influential section of the Eng- 
lish public — those whose wealth depended on the Indian 
trade — also took fright. 

But it is true that a smaller and less influential section 
of the English welcomed this German "outlet." Sir Harry 
Johnson, in his book "Commonsense and Foreign Policy," 
argues that Germany should be encouraged in this venture. 
He believed that there was enough work in Asia Minor to 
absorb the excess of German energy for a century or more. 
But it was not till too late that the British government began 
to listen to the advice of this liberal section of their nation. 

The announcements of the Bagdad railroad concessions 
attracted the attention of all diplomats — not only the 
English. The non-German critics of the project said that 
it was "crooked." The Turkish government not only 
gave away very valuable rights, but it guaranteed the 
railroad builders an annual income of so much for every 
mile they put in operation. In the opinion of most un- 
biassed observers there was no chance of the railroad earn- 
ing anything like the amount of this guarantee for a great 
many years. This meant a heavy drain on the already 
bankrupt Turkish treasury. In other words, the Turks 
accepted a heavy debt towards the Germans. 

England gained her present position in Egypt from the 
fact that the Khedive owes her money he cannot pay. 
France was preparing to absorb Morocco by lending money 
to the unbusinesslike Sultan — money he could never hope 
to pay. It is the traditional method. Everybody felt 



68 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

that the Bagdad raihoad concession was a first step 
towards a German protectorate over Turkey. 

To Russia this meant the end of her dream of getting 
to Constantinople. It threatened French "interests" in 
Syria. But the main opposition came from England. I 
do not think a single British politician would deny that 
their government did all it could to block this German 
advance. They could not — without immediate war — stop 
the building of the road to Bagdad, but they put every 
obstacle they could contrive in the way of its extension 
towards the Persian Gulf. They revived a shadowy pro- 
tectorate over Koweit — a little principality which con- 
tained the logical harbor for a gulf terminus. And later 
they made peace with Russia and divided Persia with 
their old enemy, so as to erect a barrier between India 
and the new enemy. 

Whether or not the English opposition to the Bagdad 
railroad was justified (and in the spring of 19 14 they seemed 
to have changed their mind and rallied to the advice of 
Sir Harry Johnson) their action in the matter created 
immense bitterness in Germany. The Kaiser may have 
had a secret and sinister plan of political aggression against 
India, but the great majority of his people considered 
the Bagdad development plan as a legitimate business 
undertaking which the English had ruined out of pure 
spite. The Bagdad railroad took a place beside Walfish 
Bay as an example of the British policy of trying to smother 
Germany — of denying it a place in the sun. A great many 
of the anti-English jingo books and pamphlets of the Navy 
League and the pan-German societies took the Bagdad 
railroad as a text in their sermon of hate. 

The Germans were much quicker to notice the clouds 
of the coming storm than the English. It was not in fact 
until the Boer War that the British suddenly woke up to 
the fact they they did not like the Germans. The awaken- 
ing was so abrupt that they could hardly remember that 
they had ever liked the Germans. 



CHAPTER VI 

l'entente cordiale 

The war in South Africa had a profound effect on British 
life. 

The issues involved in that conflict are within the mem- 
ory of all of us. It is idle to discuss the rights of the case 
but it is well to remember that all through the war there 
was a strong opposition in England who loudly denounced 
the poKcy of the government. Rarely have the issues 
between imperiahsm and liberalism been more sharply 
drawn in British poKtics. According to the accepted stand- 
ards of imperiahsm, it was a righteous war. According 
to the slowly formulating ideals of liberaHsm, it was un- 
righteous. 

It was the work of the British imperialists. The Tory 
government, who represented this element, mismanaged 
the war in a most humiliating manner. But more dis- 
tressing than the early mihtary reverses, than the army 
furnishing scandals, than the ugly rumors of inhuman 
treatment of the wives and children of the Boer in the 
concentration camps, was the sudden realization that Great 
Britain did not have a friend in the world. 

I do not suppose that a single EngHshman ever doubted 
that sooner or later the empire could crush the Boer resis- 
tance. But there were many anxious months when every 
one in touch with the diplomats knew that a hostile con- 
tinental coahtion to save the South African republics was 
a possibiHty. With one despatch after another bringing 
news of another defeat, Britain was in no position to resist 
new attacks. Europe almost unanimously took the side 
of the Boers. The comic papers of the continent were full 
of virulent caricatures of the Boer David and the English 

69 



70 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

Goliath. Protest meetings against British atrocities were 
held right and left. This anti-English campaign reached 
its climax in Germany. A mob smashed the windows of a 
British consulate. 

The Kaiser, in a bizarre interview which he gave to 
the London Telegraph some years later, professed to have 
been England's friend throughout this crisis. He even 
claimed to have helped them by his advice when their own 
strategy was going wrong. But the general impression in 
England was that the Germans — of all the European na- 
tions — had been the most unfriendly. 

The watchword of British foreign policy was "splendid 
isolation." They had developed an unfounded legend 
that this had always been their poHcy. In the years which 
had followed the vast adventure of Napoleon, Great Brit- 
ain — the richest and industrially the most advanced country 
in Europe and the only one which had not been ravaged 
by the wars — found it relatively easy to maintain a land 
and sea force amply strong enough to protect her frontiers 
and now and then to conquer a few thousand more miles 
of new territory. But this did not prevent her from fre- 
quently entering into the various and constantly changing 
combinations of continental policies. The Crimean War 
was only the most notable of her departures from splendid 
isolation. 

But in the last half of the nineteenth century the nations 
of Europe, recovering from the devastation of the Napole- 
onic wars, grew strong. The Boer War demonstrated to 
the English the danger of their position. If they were to 
be able to meet single-handed any combination of their 
rivals, they would need an army not only much bigger, but 
also very much better than they had been able to muster 
against the Boers. The logical defenders of the old im- 
perialist policy — like the late Lord Roberts — began to 
agitate for universal military service. "Isolation" in the 
face of a hostile Europe was evidently going to be either 
immensely expensive or anything but "splendid." The 



L'ENTENTE CORDIALE 71 

only escape from this distressing dilemna was a policy of 
making friends. 

So when M. Delcasse, having arranged a reconcihation 
with Italy, turned his attention to Great Britain, he found 
that events had been working in his favor. And in M. Paul 
Cambon, his ambassador to the Court of St. James, he 
found a most able lieutenant. 

The rapprochement with France began where the friction 
with Germany had been keenest and most widely felt — 
in business. The Associated Chambers of Commerce of 
London passed a resolution — 14th September, 1901 — in 
favor of an arbitration treaty with France and based their 
proposal on the argument that better and more cordial 
trade relations would result. Similar resolutions were 
passed by various French societies. In 1903 some deputies 
from the French Chambre made a courtesy visit to the 
British ParKament. Sir Edward Sassoon in a speech of 
welcome said: "Our aim should be to arrive at the one 
entente which is really stable — that based on material 
interests." The chambers of commerce of both countries 
endorsed the idea. In the same year King Edward VII. 
visited Paris. Two months later President Loubet and 
M. Delcasse returned the visit. The fetes and official 
toasts were most friendly. The hereditary enmity was 
being decently buried. 

On 8th April, 1904, "I'Entente Cordiale" — the cordial 
understanding — was signed. 

The role which King Edward played in this reconciliation 
is the subject of much heated dispute. The polemics which 
have raged over his character and motives have been as 
vehement as — and very similar to — those which have 
been waged over the personalities of M. Delcasse and the 
Kaiser. 

To the Germans, the late king was a close rival to the 
legendary devil, the very embodiment of this Satanic revolt 
against the Deutschtum. It is pretty well estabhshed that 
he was not fond of his nephew, the Kaiser, and — according 



72 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

to the German tradition — his whole Hfe was spent in giving 
vent to this jealous and personal spite. The epoch which 
saw the gradual grouping of Europe against them, they 
call the Edwardian period. He was the arch conspirator 
in the plot to encircle and smother Germany. With malig- 
nant and mealy-mouthed hypocrisy he talked of peace, 
while all the time he was deliberately planning to drench 
the world in blood. 

A man is rarely as bad — or as clever — as his enemies 
think him. There is even less reason to beHeve that King 
Edward was mystically clairvoyant and foresaw all the 
results of his diplomacy than in the case of M. Delcasse. 
At least the French foreign minister has very definite re- 
sponsibilities. But with a constitutional king it is impossi- 
ble to distinguish what he does from what he is told to do. 
The British sovereign has no more responsibility for the 
foreign policy of his nation than he has for the bad pictures 
painted by his subjects. The German emperor accepts 
responsibility in both matters. 

After all, it is relatively uninteresting to speculate over 
the degree of the royal initiative. Perhaps King Edward 
imposed his will on his ministers — first Tories, then Lib- 
erals. Perhaps he was a docile tool in their hands. The 
important thing is that the foreign office, under Lord 
Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey, and Buckingham Pal- 
ace, inhabited first by King Edward and then by his son 
George, have worked in complete accord. 

That King Edward's dislike for his nephew was not the 
sole foundation of the British foreign policy is evidenced by 
the numerous, if not altogether intelligent, efforts by which 
the British diplomats strove from time to time to reach an 
amiable agreement with Germany. 

L'Entente Cordiale — and whether its author was M. Del- 
casse or King Edward is a small matter — was an agreement 
in regard to the colonial world. In the published texts 
Europe was not mentioned. Like the Franco-Italian 
entente it was a compromise. The two contracting parties, 



U ENTENTE CORDIALE 73 

desirous of stopping their quarrels, took up one point of 
friction after another and spht their differences. 

Now for England and France to stop quarrelling over 
colonial affairs was contrary to the theory of international 
relations which Bismarck had taught his people. The bare 
fact of their shaking hands disturbed the "balance of 
power." It decreased the relative strength of the Germans. 
And they believed that it was part of God's and nature's 
plan that their power and prestige should increase. But 
Britain and France can hardly be called belHcose because 
they refused to accept this viewpoint, because they refused 
to continue to snarl at each other for the greater glory of 
the Deutschtum. 

From this point of view the Entente was above reproach, 
it was a definite step towards a more peaceful condition in 
Europe. For the contracting parties the only alternative 
to this policy of friendship was one of intensified armament. 
France gained certain advantages in Indo-China, the New- 
foundland fishery dispute was amicably settled and there 
were some frontier "rectifications" in equatorial Africa to 
the benefit of the Enghsh. 

But the crucial — and also the questionable — part of the 
understanding dealt with the opposite corners of North 
Africa — Egypt and Morocco. As the importance of this 
document can hardly be overestimated — the importance 
of its wording as well as of its subject matter — I will quote 
from the official text the parts dealing with these two 
points : 

Art. I. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have 
no intention of altering the political status of Eygpt. 

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, 
declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain 
in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for 
the British occupation or in any other manner. . . . 

Art. II. The Government of the French Republic declare that they 
have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. 



74 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part recog- 
nize that it appertains to France, more particularly as a 
Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great dis- 
tance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that coun- 
try, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all adminis- 
trative, economic, financial and mihtary reforms which it may 
require. 

They declare that they wUl not obstruct the action taken 
by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall 
leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of 
Treaties, Conventions and usage, enjoys in Morocco. . . . 

Art. III. His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will 
respect the rights which France, in virtue of Treaties, Conven- 
tions and usage, enjoys in Egypt. 

Art. IV. The two governments, being equally attached to the 
principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, 
declare that they wUl not, in these countries, countenance 
any inequahty either in the impositions of customs duties 
or other taxes, or of railroad transport charges. 

Art. IX. The two governments agree to afford to one another 
their diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution 
of the clauses of the present declaration regarding Egypt and 
Morocco. 

Since Napoleon's battle of the Pyramids France had had 
what are called *' interests" in Egypt. The digging of the 
Suez Canal had been their work and French engineers had 
built the "barrage," the first step in the irrigation "rec- 
lamation" scheme of which the British dam at Assouan 
is the latest. The French had also done a great deal of 
"cultural" work. They had taken the lead in the study of 
archaeology and their language was current among the 
educated. They also — as well as the English — were heavy 
creditors of the Khedival government and for sojne years 
the two governments exercised a joint financial control over 
Egypt. In 1 88 1, a native rebellion broke out under Arabi 
Pasha against this foreign interference, to the cry of "Egypt 



L'ENTENTE CORDIALE 75 

to the Egyptians." The British fleet bombarded the open 
city of Alexandria (Mr. Winston Churchill had not at that 
time invented the phrase "baby-killing" to describe such 
naval operations) and in the next year a British expedi- 
tionary force smashed the native army at Tel-el-Kebir. 
This was done as "police work," nominally on behalf of the 
lawful sovereign, the Sultan of Turkey. As the Sultan was 
not exactly enthusiastic over this unasked for help and the 
other European powers were a bit sceptical of the dis- 
interestedness of the English, the British foreign ofSce as- 
sured everyone that the occupation was temporary. But 
their grip tightened and tightened. In 1884 in the face of a 
very general protest the British government renewed its 
promise to evacuate as soon as order was established and 
set 1888 as an extreme limit of their occupation. But 
circumstances over which they had no control. . . . 

By the entente the French promised not to remind the 
English of these antiquated pledges nor to "obstruct" her 
action in Egypt ... "in any other manner." 

The French situation in Morocco was not so well estab- 
lished. By a long series of costly wars, France had con- 
quered Algeria and Tunisia, she had annexed the Sahara, 
and had pushed her way up from the South to Timbuctoo 
and Lake Tchad. With the exception of Morocco all of 
North West Africa was under French rule. And Morocco 
was potentially the richest colony of them all. 

The Sultan was an independent sovereign. He did not 
rule his realm very well from the French point of view. 
He did not rule it very well from the point of view of his 
own subjects. There was widespread discontent, chronic 
rebelHon, and continual disorder. 

As so often happens in similar cases much of this unrest 
was financed by foreign interests. And — also as often hap- 
pens in similar cases — the seriousness of the situation was 
methodically exaggerated by these same foreign interests. 

In the years which have passed since, a great many Moors 
have given their Hves to prove that they preferred the 



76 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

misrule of their own Sultan to the superior civilization of 
the French. 

The great mass of French people were as little interested 
in Morocco as the average American is in Nicaragua. But 
even a repubHcan form of government does not purge a 
nation of imperiahsts. And the Colonial Party believed 
that it was "the manifest destiny" of France to absorb 
Morocco. 

By the entente Great Britain promised not to thwart 
French action in Morocco. 

But more important than these promises to get out of 
each other's way in Eg>'pt and Morocco is Article IX., in 
which the two governments pledged themselves "to afford 
to one another their diplomatic support in order to obtain 
the execution of the clauses of the present declaration re- 
garding Egypt and Morocco." 

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the wording of 
this document is intentionally obscure. France's pledge 
not to remind England of her broken promises is clear 
enough. But what is meant by preserving "order" in an 
independent country? We, vis-d-vis to Mexico, see what 
differences of opinion such a phrase allows. England had 
done the job in Egypt in a straightforward strong-arm way. 
Was similar action in Morocco intended by the signers of 
this declaration? And who was to decide when Morocco 
needed tranquilizing? France? England? The Moors? 
Or somebody else? All these vague phrases give rise to 
wide possibilities of interpretation. 

But the clause about giving each other diplomatic help 
is most worthy of note. If I pledge my honor not to dun 
you for money you owe me, I do not need your diplomatic 
help to five up to that promise. The only possible meaning 
of this Article IX. is that if any third party tried to inter- 
fere with them in the execution of the clauses of this present 
declaration, they would bear each other help. If Honduras 
protested against the continued occupation of Egypt by 
British troops, French diplomats would assist the EngUsh 



L'ENTENTE CORDIALE 77 

in explaining why the promise to evacuate could not be 
kept. If Persia or Siam objected to French "action" in 
Morocco, British diplomats would intervene. 

This criticism of mere words may seem trivial. But the 
fate of Europe has depended on the interpretation of this 
phrase. What did the signers of the entente mean by 
' ' diplomatic support? ' ' To what extent was England bound 
to back up France when Germany interfered with her 
Moroccan pohcy? "Diplomatic support" the text says. 
At one stage in the long tension — during the Agadir crisis — 
the British home fleet, cleared for action, was sent cruising 
in the North Sea. Was such action implied in the word 
"diplomatic?" 

The very vagueness of the terms employed in this docu- 
ment as published, indicated a more far-reaching, unpub- 
hshed accord. It was hard to beheve that the representa- 
tives of the two governments who prepared and signed this 
declaration had any doubts as to the meaning of the words 
they used. When two governments decide to remove all 
causes of friction between them they are not Hkely to be 
content with half measures. The entente, as pubHshed, was 
a half measure, eminently fitted as a starting point for new 
disputes. 

No European statesman read the document without 
asking himself what were the probable contents of the 
secret clauses. I do not think that any experienced dip- 
lomats doubted their existence. Both the French and 
British governments protested that this pubhshed text was 
all there was to the entente. But pubKc treaties with secret 
riders are a commonplace of diplomatic history. But it 
was not until November, 191 1 — seven years later — that the 
existence and nature of any of the secret clauses was known 
to the pubhc. All that could be assumed with any cer- 
tainty at the time was that undoubtedly the two Foreign 
Offices had talked over and agreed upon many of these 
disputable points. 

Why was there any necessity of secrecy about it? The 



78 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

British and French governments seem to have been in- 
spired by a very reahstic sense of politics. They knew that 
the published text would be passionately discussed in the 
newspapers and parHaments of their respective countries. 
To have written in anything which the pubHc opinion of 
France and England would not accept, would have ruined 
the whole enterprise. The men who signed the entente 
certainly foresaw the probabiHty of German opposition. 
But the pacific democracies of the two countries would 
undoubtedly have rejected any sort of a miUtary alliance 
which seemed an affront to Germany. It was so in regard 
to other points. The diplomats could only pubHsh what 
they knew their people would approve of. The rest had to 
be kept secret. The entente was the first step — the prover- 
bially difficult first step. It was intentionally modest. It 
could be developed. 

In fact the very day it was signed, it was amended in 
detail by the method of interpretation. In the clause about 
the Newfoundland fisheries there was a phrase of uncertain 
meaning. And M. Cambon wrote a letter to Lord Lans- 
downe: — 

M. Paul Cambon, 
Ambassador of the French Republic at London. 

To the Marquis of Lansdowne, Secretary of State to the Office 
of Foreign Affiairs. 

8 April, 1904. 

In the second article of to-day's Convention in regard to New- 
foundland it is said in the third paragraph that the French fishers 
should abstain from using "stake-pots" and "fixed engines" with- 
out the permission of the local authorities. 

I will be obliged to your Lordship if you will kindly let me 
know what should be understood by "stake-pots" and "fixed en- 
gines." . . . 

To this Lord Lansdowne replied : 



L'ENTENTE CORDIALE 79 

Foreign Office, 8 April, 1904. 

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the note which you 
have addressed to me requesting to be informed what signification is 
to be attached to the words "stake-pots" and "fixed engines" used 
in the Third paragraph of Article II. of the Convention we have just 
signed respecting Newfoundland. 

I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that accord- 
ing to various acts of Parliament relating to salmon fishery these 
words include all nets and other implements for taking fish which 
are fixed to the soil or made stationary in any other way so that 
they may be left tmattended by the owner. 

This is the signification attached to the words by His Majesty's 
Government. 

Lansdowne. 

This correspondence is published in the same collection 
(Documents Diplomatiques. Accords conclus, le 8 Avril, 
1904, entre la France et I'Angleterre. No. 7 & 8) which 
contains the official text of the entente. It was a sort of 
cipher language. To the lajnnan it seemed innocent enough. 
"Stake-pots" and "fixed engines," have a harmless bucoHc 
sound. To the initiated it indicated the method by which 
the pubHshed text could be expanded without limit. Were 
there similar letters exchanged to precise the meaning which 
His Majesty's government attached to the words "diplo- 
matic support?" 

That such suspicions were justified was proved by the 
event. 

A secret naval agreement — the text of which has not 
yet been published — was reached, whereby the British 
entrusted their interests in the Mediterranean to the French 
navy and so were able to concentrate their war-ships in the 
North Sea. In 191 1, Le Temps of Paris pubHshed what 
purported to be the text of the secret annex to the entente. 
And at the outbreak of this War Sir Edward Grey read in 
the House of Commons some correspondence in regard 
to military cooperation, which had been exchanged in 1912. 



8o THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

It is probable that some day the opening of the archives 
will show that this interpretive correspondence in regard 
to the entente has been voluminous. 

But at the time — 1904 — all this was only a matter of 
guess work. To be sure, practically all continental states- 
men felt that they had a "moral certainty" that the entente 
went much further than the published text. Only a few 
of the Enghsh liberals were naif enough to believe that 
what Sir Edward Grey told them was true. 

On the whole the news of this accord was well received 
in England and France. Public opinion had been "pre- 
pared." But the praise was not unanimous. There was a 
small but bitter opposition in both countries. Those 
Frenchmen who had "special interests" in Egypt wailed 
that they had been deserted by their government. The 
English in Morocco raised a similar complaint. In fact 
it had been a quid pro quo. Each government, in order 
to gain greater advantages elsewhere, had ruthlessly sacri- 
ficed the interests of some of their citizens. French "in- 
terests" in Egypt were already compromised. In order 
to preserve them they would have had to fight the first 
sea-power of Europe. In Morocco there were only half- 
civilized, disorganized tribes to fight. And the English 
interests in Morocco were only possibilities for the future, 
Egypt and Suez were actualities. The entente was popular 
in both countries. 

It is rather hard for an American to grasp the European 
attitude towards colonial adventure. First of all, we are 
not an exporting nation. Of all the wealth we produce 
less than ten per cent goes abroad. Our colonial markets 
are an insignificant part in the prosperity of our small 
foreign trade. Since we grabbed Texas and California 
we have not extended our frontiers to any extent. The few 
colonies which happened to us as a result of the Spanish 
War are not popular. We have neither the need for colonies 
nor the tradition. We would probably fight if anyone 
assaulted our "national dignity" by trying to steal the 



L'ENTENTE CORDIALE 8l 

Philippines, but if those islands should gently fade off 
the map, the few of us who would notice the difference, 
would feel relieved. But it is hardly an exaggeration to 
say that no one in Europe understands why we did not 
keep Cuba, nor why we have not annexed Mexico. 

It is one of those differences in the social mind which 
divide one nation from another — like that which separates 
the Enghsh and the Germans over the respective merits 
of militarism and navalism. Few Frenchmen could have 
told why they were interested in Morocco, but many of 
them felt like cheering when it was announced that Great 
Britain had recognized "the manifest destiny" of their 
country to "tranquilize Morocco." 

There were however, groups in France — they were not 
sufficiently united to deserve the name of a Colonial Party — 
who saw very definite, concrete advantages to be gained 
by this new colonial enterprise. The army is important 
in a country of universal conscription. The officers — pro- 
fessional soldiers— inevitably develop an esprit de corps 
which is a factor in pohtics. And promotions are dolefully 
slow unless something is doing. The French colonial policy 
has not been that of the open door, they have sometimes 
been constrained to render Hp-service to this idea, but 
they have done so reluctantly and wherever possible they 
have arranged tariffs to favor their own trade. The French 
manufacturers who make a "protected" profit in their 
exports to Tonkin and Tunis are in favor of colonial ex- 
pansion. And France has a highly developed bureaucracy. 
There are all sorts of "civil servants," men on the govern- 
ment pay roll, postmen, police, railroad employees, forest 
guards, the "ponts et chaussees" — a corps of civil engineers 
for public works. When a new colony is organized the 
administrative personnel is taken from this bureaucracy, 
which means advancement all along the line. Almost 
every French "fonctionnaire^' is an ardent advocate of 
colonial expansion. But perhaps of greatest importance 
are the financiers. Besides all the opportunities for profit- 



82 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

able investment in a new colony, there are sure to be great 
credit operations. All of these varied forces were organized 
in " Le Comite MarocainJ' For Morocco was manifestly 
the next step. 

There was, however, bitter and organized and continuous 
opposition to the "Moroccan adventure" on the part of 
the Socialists. Their motives were complicated. The 
working class whom they represented would have to pay 
the piper, in taxes and blood, and would have a very small 
share in the plunder. As humanitarians they objected to 
the inevitable slaughter of the "natives." As Repubhcans 
they were instinctively opposed to imperialism. Some of 
them felt that a Moor had quite as much right to political 
independence as a Frenchman. And of course the whole 
theory of colonization is in direct conflict with the idea 
of the rights of man. The Socialists of more penetrating 
vision — men like Jaures — clearly foresaw that colonial 
adventures tended— if they did not fatally lead — to Eu- 
ropean war. In fact a party as profoundly opposed to war 
and militarism as the French Socialists were in inevitable 
conflict with M. Delcasse and his policy of colonial ex- 
pansion. 

But the most dangerous opposition to "I'Entente Cor- 
diale" came — as was to be expected — from Germany. 

The Germans had little interest of any kind in either 
Egypt or Morocco. The published text of the entente was 
explicitly pacific. Nevertheless, it would have been diffi- 
cult to contrive anything which would have seemed to 
the Germans a more definite affront. The document was 
communicated to the foreign offices of the Sultan and the 
Pope as soon as to Wilhelmstrasse. If it had no hostile 
intent, why was it prepared so secretly? Once upon a time 
nothing had happened in Europe without the consent of Bis- 
marck. Evidently the times had changed. More and more 
Europe was escaping from the thrall of the Deutschtum. 

The Kaiser's pacific method of Germanizing the world 
by arguments was not working well. A policy which tended 



L'ENTENTE CORDIALE 83 

to dispute German predominance in Europe was becoming 
more and more manifest. The Franco-Russian alliance. 
The Franco-ItaUan entente. And now this Anglo-French 
arrangement! It was necessary to rap for order, it was 
necessary to remind Europe of the stern realities of life. 
If they would not listen to argument it was necessary to 
make a display of grim force— to rattle the sword. 

The issue was joined in the sharpest possible manner. 

The non- German nations were grouping themselves 
with no avowed intent of attacking Germany, but with 
an open determination to resist the development of the 
Deutschtum. 

It is necessary to recall the interpretation I have tried 
to give (Chapter III) of the nature of this mystic ideal— 
the Deutschtum. 

"Two great German movements were born from the 
German intellectual hfe, on which, henceforth, all the in- 
tellectual and moral progress of mankind must rest: — 
The Reformation and the critical philosophy (Kant). . . . 
The German nation not only laid the foundation of this 
great struggle for a harmonious development of humanity, 
but took the lead in it. We are thus incurring an obligation 
for the future from which we cannot shrink. ... It is 
this quality which especially fits us for leadership in the 
intellectual domain and imposes upon us the obHgation 
to maintain that leadership." 

It is not a mere coincidence that a cavalry ofi&cer — von 
Bernhardi — should use such philosophical terminology 
to express the mystic mission of the German race. Phrased 
in simple language, it would sound absurd. But such 
pseudo-philosophic ideas are commonplaces in Germany; 
they are taught to the nation from kindergarten to the 
universities, and especially in the barracks. 

And it is evident that people who felt so about the mis- 
sion they were called to perform, could not help considering 
that this effort to resist it — typified by the entente — was a 
serious affront. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE ALGECIRAS CRISIS 

The European question raised by VEntente Cordiale — 
this colonial agreement between England and France — 
was: Will the Germans give up their pretensions to over- 
lordship without a struggle? 

Anyone who thought they would was singularly ill- 
informed on the temper of the German people. If it was 
not for the exaggerations of their claims — as witnessed by 
the quotations in Chapter III, — it would be hard to deny 
that this agreement gave them cause for complaints. After 
all, why should anything happen in Europe without the 
Germans being consulted? Whether one likes or dislikes 
their ideals, there are eighty milhons of them and Austria 
besides. They are not a neghgible quantity. They natu- 
rally resent being ignored. 

Their claim that they are the only people of true culture 
in Europe is puerile, but no one, unless the heat of the War 
has warped all the accustomed meanings of words, can 
deny that their contribution to the common work of civili- 
zation has been immense. Their claim to dictatorship 
cannot be admitted by any nation which loves freedom, 
but their right to at least an equal vote in the councils of 
Europe cannot be denied with any show of justice. They 
were not consulted over the fate of Egypt and Morocco. 

Everyone who followed European politics was greatly 
reheved — and not a little surprised — at the attitude which 
official Germany took in the matter. At a session of the 
Reichstag — April 12, 1904 — four days after the entente 
was pubKshed, the chancellor Herr von Bulow, speaking 
of this event, said: "We have, from the point of view of 
German interests, nothing to object to it. In this which 

84 



THE ALGECIRAS CRISIS 85 

concerns Morocco ... we have there above all else com- 
mercial interests. We ought to protect them and we will. 
We have no reason to fear that they will be ignored nor 
troubled." 

The chancellor's speech was literally true. The material 
interests of Germany were not openly threatened. But 
he dodged the real issue — that of prestige. The German 
newspapers pointed out this fact and the War Party — it 
is a poor term for a heterogeneous group of interests, like 
"Colonial Party" in France — made a good deal of noise. 
The 20th April the Pangermanic Society of Wurtemburg 
in its congress at Esslingen protested and a few days later 
the Union of Pangermanic Societies held their annual meet- 
ing at Lubeck and adopted a long resolution on the subject. 
The clause of greatest interest said they were profoundly 
wounded by the humiliation to Germany in not being con- 
sulted in so important a matter. In private conversations 
it was a commonplace to say that Bismarck would not have 
accepted the affront, and that the Kaiser's love of peace 
was a treason to the German idea. 

Very few people were optimistic enough to believe that 
the incident was closed. 

It had become the custom in the diplomatic world to 
take the Kaiser's speeches as a sort of barometer of the 
political weather. And they certainly indicated a coming 
storm. At Karlsruhe (28th April), at Mayence (ist May) 
at Saarbrlick (14th May) it sounded as if he was trying 
to reassure those of his subjects who charged him with 
being enslaved by peace. It was necessary to bury internal 
difference in order to be united in case Germany should 
be forced to intervene in world politics. The bridge which 
he inaugurated at Mayence was a work of peace but it 
was well to remember that it might have been a use in war. 
He bombastically recalled the victories of 1870. Germans 
were not looking for a quarrel, but woe to anyone who 
sought trouble with them, etc. 

On the 31st March, 1905 — almost exactly a year after 



86 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

the publication of the Anglo-French entente — the Kaiser's 
yacht Hohenzollern dropped anchor in the harbor of Tangier. 
He went ashore and made a speech to the representative 
of the Sultan — which like the famous shot at Lexington 
was heard around the world. 

*'It is to the Sultan, in his quality of an independent 
sovereign, that I make my visit today. I hope that under 
the sovereignty of the Sultan an independent Morocco will 
remain open to the peaceful competition of all nations, 
without monopoly, or annexation, on a footing of absolute 
equality. My visit to Tangier has had for its object to 
make known that I am decided to do my utmost to safe- 
guard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco. 
Since I consider the Sultan as an absolutely independent 
sovereign, it is with him that I wish to reach an under- 
standing on the necessary means to protect these interests. 
As to the reforms which the Sultan is considering, it seems 
to me advisable to proceed with great caution, taking into 
consideration the religious sentiments of the population 
to the end that public order may not be disturbed." 

There were three outstanding points in this short speech. 
(I) The Kaiser addressed the Sultan as an independent 
sovereign. A defiance to the French projects of a protec- 
torate. (II) He said he intended to protect German inter- 
ests in Morocco. The French by the ententes had freed 
themselves from Italian, English and Spanish rivalry, but 
not that of Germany. (Ill) He advised the Sultan to go 
slow in introducing reforms in his realm. The French had 
submitted a long program of "reforms" which — none too 
gently — they were urging the Sultan to accept. The whole 
speech was an indirect but definite promise from the Ger- 
man government to back up the Sultan in resistance to 
French "action in Morocco." 

When the report of this incident was printed, a few hours 
later, in the newspapers of Europe, everyone knew that 
the fat was in the fire. Germany was not going to submit 
to what seemed to her an affront. The struggle had com- 



THE ALGECIRAS CRISIS 87 

menced. It was the first of the series of European crises 
which have disturbed the world these recent years. 

Why had it taken Germany a year to make up her mind 
to throw down the gauntlet? For the French the answer 
is simple and their explanation is plausible. In Septem- 
ber, 1904, the Japanese gained their first big victory at 
Liao-Yang. In March, 1904, the Russians were definitely 
crushed at Mukden. For a good many years the French 
had felt that the only thing which protected them from a 
new German aggression had been their alliance with Russia. 
The last day of the month which saw the military power 
of the Tsar crushed, the Kaiser exploded his bomb at 
Tangier. 

There is another — German — explanation of the abrupt 
change in the chancellor's attitude since he had assured the 
Reichstag that there was nothing for them to object to in 
the Anglo-French understanding. It is alleged that by 
means of an international "indiscretion" on the part of 
some members of the Spanish diplomatic corps the com- 
plete text of the secret agreements between France and 
England and Spain reached the German foreign office. 
There has always been a pro- German and therefore anti- 
French and English element among the ruling class of 
Spain, so this explanation also is plausible. 

Although it was not until 191 1 that any of the secret doc- 
uments were published it is well to have them in mind at this 
time. In the "secret annex" to the Anglo-French entente 
the two governments, while reiterating their desire to main- 
tain the status quo in Morocco, envisaged the possibility of 
a partition of the country. Great Britain did not ask for 
any share of the spoils, but insisted that her position of 
dominance over the Straits of Gibraltar should not be 
menaced in any way. She did not want to have a strong 
nation established on the African side of this important 
waterway, so she stipulated that when the Sultan of Mo- 
rocco could no longer protect his country from foreign 
domination, all the northern part of his realm, the Mediter- 



88 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

ranean coast, should go to Spain, and that Spain should be 
pledged not to erect any fortifications which would threaten 
the British supremacy in the Straits. It was agreed that 
France should at once begin negotiations with Spain to 
get her to become a party to this accord. 

M. Delcasse — 3d October, 1904 — published a statement 
that an entente had been reached with Spain. The text 
of the agreement was published by Le Matin in 191 1 a few 
days before Le Temps published the secret annex to the 
Anglo-French entente. This Spanish treaty restated — a 
little more in detail — the arrangement on which Britain 
had insisted. 

If Germany knew of these secret agreements for the 
partition of Morocco — -at a time when the three contracting 
parties were solemnly proclaiming their desire to maintain 
the integrity of the Sultan's realm — it certainly gave the 
Germans a legitimate reason for intervening. 

The probabihties are that both these matters influenced 
the German government. Knowledge of these secret 
treaties had almost surely reached them. This gave them a 
reason to act. The Russian defeat offered a favorable occa- 
sion. But the French and British pubKc did not know of 
these secret treaties and of course felt that the German ac- 
tion was unjustified. 

The Germans, having decided on action, did not content 
themselves with a mere speech of defiance. Their news- 
papers, evidently acting on an official tip, summed up the 
situation in this fashion: "We are a peace loving people. 
We do not want to go to war with France. But this M. Del- 
casse has misled the French people into a policy which 
displeases us. It is their move. They can choose between 
our friendship or the friendship of M. Delcasse. If they do 
not act reasonably their blood will be upon their own 
head." 

To make sure that the French understood how they felt 
about it, they carried the newspaper war into the enemy's 
country. An ambiguous character, the Prince Haenkel 



THE ALGECIRAS CRISIS 89 

von Donnersmarck, had lived in Paris for many years. He 
held no official position but was supposed to be on a "mis- 
sion" comparable to that which brought Dr. Dernburg to 
the United States. Early in June he gave out interviews to 
the Paris papers, from one of which I give some char- 
acteristic quotations. "Is this poHcy (the entente) that of 
France, or must we consider it as being merely personal to 
Monsieur Delcasse? . . . We are not concerned with 
M. Delcasse's person; but his policy is a threat to Germany; 
and you may rest assured that we shall not wait for it to be 
reahzed" ... "In a war against Germany, you may 
possibly be victorious, since in her most tragic crises France 
has always found extraordinary resources in herself; but, 
if you are vanquished— and my first hypothesis deprives 
my second of all offensive character — if you are vanquished, 
as you probably will be, it is in Paris that the peace will be 
signed." . . . "Believe the word of a German, who has 
always had great sympathy for you. Give up this minister, 
whose only aspiration is to trouble the peace of Europe; and 
adopt with regard to Germany a loyal and open poKcy." 

It would have been hard to be more exphcit. Germany 
was resolved on war or M. Delcasse's scalp. 

When at last the archives of the various foreign offices are 
opened, the documents in regard to this affair will be of 
immense interest. What attitude did Great Britain take 
in this crisis? How did they interpret the phrase "diplo- 
matic support?" Two serious French writers on interna- 
tional politics — Andre Tardieu and Ernest Lemonon — 
believe that the British government urged the Republic to 
stand firm — and this meant war. This is one of the crucial 
points of modern diplomatic history and it is veiled in 
secrecy. 

At all events France decided not to fight. Her army was 
in a pitiful state. The Dreyfus affair had discredited the 
high command. The Dreyfusards, several of whom had 
had their heads broken for rioting to the cry of "^ bas 
l^armee," had become ministers. Those in power were 



90 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

preoccupied with internal affairs — the great fight against 
clericalism. The various ministers of war had not dared to 
ask the Chambre for large miUtary credits. The eastern 
fortifications had been neglected. Munitions, equipment, 
everything was lacking. And, as usual, the Germans were 
ready. 

On the 6th of June, M. Delcasse's resignation was ac- 
cepted. Nothing in modern history can be compared to this 
hu mili ation — one government forcing another under threat 
of war to sacrifice a minister. 

The new generation, which had come into power in the 
Repubhc, had been rapidly forgetting 1870 and the idea of 
"revanche." France — not only the Sociahsts, but a com- 
fortable majority of the voters, the existing ministry — was 
anti-mihtarist. But this Delcasse affair embittered the 
nation profoundly. A great many people who had hoped 
that, with the passage of time, the relations with Germany 
would ameliorate, gave up the hope and regretfully decided 
that France would have to fight or abdicate! 

Delcasse, in a remarkably similar way^ had repeated the 
blunders of Hanotaux. He had tried to run the foreign 
poKcy of his country single-handed. He had not consulted 
his colleagues in the ministry, nor had he taken them into 
his confidence. He had not even laid his secret treaty with 
Spain before the cabinet. He had been very reserved — in 
fact rather contemptuous — in his relations to the deputies 
of the nation in the Chambre. It is hardly an exaggeration 
to say that no one — not even the president of the Republic 
nor the premier — knew what he was doing. 

And in this manner he had steered the ship of state to a 
place from which there were but two exits: — war or humiha- 
tion. If he had not foreseen this he was rather stupid. If 
he had foreseen it and had not taken the trouble to see if 
France was prepared for war — he deserved humihation. 
But the humiliation fell on all the nation. 

The Germans were not content with this reassertion of 
their prestige. The Kaiser gave von Biilow the title of 



THE ALGECIRAS CRISIS 91 

Prince as a reward for his successful tilt with Delcasse, but 
success tempted them to new proofs of their power. They 
decided to give France a public spanking. They demanded 
a European conference to discuss the affairs of Morocco. 

There was nothing the French Colonial Party wanted 
less. They did not want pubKc attention, even in their 
own country, called to their manner of work in Morocco. 
They did not want to admit that this was a matter of 
European interest. They wanted to ''locahze" their dis- 
pute with Morocco — just as in 1878 Russia had wanted to 
treat single-handed with Turkey and as in 19 14 Austria was 
to insist on "localizing" her affair with Servia. 

By ententes with Italy, England, and Spain, France had 
been able to arrange things quietly. German interests in 
Morocco were admittedly small, but if the Kaiser insisted 
on making a noise about them it was much better to discuss 
the matter a deux. 

The French made it clear that they would grant any 
reasonable demands which Germany would formulate in 
regard to Morocco in order to avoid a conference. But 
concessions in Morocco were only a part of what Germany 
wanted. We have the words of Prince von Biilow himself. 
An interview with the chancellor — which he had had the 
opportunity to correct — was published in Le Temps of 
Paris (5th Oct., 1905). 

"There are," he said, "in the incidents of the last six 
months, which have given rise to the Moroccan affair, two 
distinct things to consider. Morocco is the first and general 
pohtics (the international relations of Europe) are the 
second. In Morocco we have important commercial inter- 
ests. We had and we have a duty to protect them. In 
regard to general politics we have been obhged to reply 
to a poHcy which tended to isolate us, and which, with this 
avowed intention, took on towards us a clearly hostile 
character. The Moroccan affair was the most recent and 
most characteristic manifestation of this pohcy; it was for 
us the necessary occasion to strike back." 



92 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

The German government felt that this matter of amour 
propre — of prestige — had not been satisfied by the ignomin- 
ious resignation of Delcasse. All the nations of Europe — 
and the United States — should be called together to witness 
the application of pubHc punishment. The Kaiser rattled 
his sword. The conference or war. 

The French government had had to give in in regard to 
Delcasse, it had to give in again and accept the conference. 
But under these repeated threats the attitude of the gov- 
erning Radicals had changed completely. The Minister of 
War, instead of being ashamed to show himself in the 
Chambre, became a personage. The Deputies were ready 
to give him aU the money he wanted. For the first time 
since 1870 France began seriously to prepare for war. It 
was not like the spread-eagle jingoism of the Boulanger 
episode. It was a quiet — grim — adult period in French 
politics. In the interval between the fall of Delcasse and 
the opening of the European conference in the little Spanish 
town of Algeciras immense mihtary credits had been voted 
and spent. 

If Germany had been seriously pre-occupied over her 
"interests" in Morocco she would not have insisted on the 
conference. To avoid this public discussion, France had 
been willing to cede to Germany much more of the spoils 
than Germany could claim any "right" to — much more 
than she could hope to get from a European conference 
which would have, in principle, to treat all equally. 

Whoever tries to write history must have an especial 
gratitude towards the Germans — they are so amazingly 
frank. The interview from von Billow, quoted above, 
shows that in his mind the Moroccan affair was primarily 
a matter of Weltpolitik. The concrete commercial "inter- 
ests" at stake were secondary. And other German utter- 
ances — too numerous to quote — show clearly that they 
had two more important but indirect objects in insisting 
on this conference. (I) The public humiliation of France 
and (II) the testing — and if possible the breaking of the 



THE ALGECIRAS CRISIS 93 

entente cordiale. And . . . "Pride goeth before destruc- 
tion and a haughty spirit before a fall." They were signally 
defeated. The Germans themselves admit that they are 
poor diplomats and almost every time, since the passing of 
Bismarck, when they have risked their prestige on the 
diplomatic "terrain" it has been diminished. 

During the months which had preceded the conference 
French diplomats had been exceedingly and successfully 
busy in preparing their case and in enhsting the sympathy 
of the other nations. The Germans accused the French of 
planning to annex or at least to declare a protectorate over 
Morocco which meant quite the opposite from the open door. 
Judged by the French methods in Tunisia these suspicions 
were justified. (And the events which have passed since 
give further justifications.) But the French denied any such 
intentions. 

In the very first session of the conference (February, 
1906) M. Regnault, the chief of the French delegation, took 
the fire out of the German guns by proposing that the 
basis of the discussion should be the reaffirmation of the 
sovereignty of the Sultan, the integrity of his realm, and 
the poHcy of the open door. It was clever, even if insincere 
diplomacy. Besides, the French delegates were court- 
eous and they knew their subject. The German delegates 
were offensively brusque and — as the affairs of Morocco 
were for them of only secondary interest — they were ig- 
norant of the highly technical questions which came up. 

The first vote — it was only a detail, a question of pro- 
cedure — was the test. Of the thirteen nations represented, 
nine voted with the French and only Austria and Morocco 
voted with Germany. All the little states, instead of obedi- 
ently doing as the Kaiser told them, showed signs of an 
heretical independence. Even the ally, Italy, voted against 
Germany. The jury of Europe instead of condemning 
France for her independent attitude, by a vote of 10 to 3 
blamed Germany. Evidently Bismarck was dead. 

Germany also hoped by this conference to break the 



94 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

accord between England and France. Before the delegates 
had begun work (3d Feb., 1906) the Count von Tatten- 
bach, one of the German delegates, approached Sir Arthur 
Nicholson, the chief of the British mission, and urged him 
to abandon France and join the Germans in "saving" 
Morocco. His argument took this form : The bare fact that 
a European conference has assembled to regulate the fate 
of Morocco wiped off the slate all merely private agree- 
ments between two Powers; England had already reaped 
all the gain she could expect from the entente, France had 
withdrawn from Egypt; Germany was ready to recognize 
English rights there; the conference gave a technical excuse 
to declare the entente dead. If the British deserted France 
at this moment they and the Germans could divide up North 
Africa at their leisure. But to the great chagrin of the 
German diplomats, Albion refused to be perfidious. 

Sir Arthur Nicholson's instructions were very simple. At 
the opening of the conference and whenever the German 
newspapers spread the rumor that England was about to de- 
sert France — it happened more than once — the government 
at London let it be known that the only instruction given to 
their mission at Algeciraswasto act in accord with the French 
delegates under every condition and in all circumstances. 

In so far as the Germans insisted on the conference in 
order to test the strength and meaning of Ventente cordiale, 
they secured the information they sought. This Anglo- 
French agreement was more than a simple colonial deal, it 
was more than a compact the one to the other, it also united 
them in European politics against Germany. Whether or 
not they were pledged to give each other mihtary help was 
still unknown, but England was evidently prepared to live 
up literally and loyally to the phrase "diplomatic support." 

All that Germany had gained was the personal over- 
throw of M. Delcasse. His policy — the ententes with Italy, 
England and Spain — was greatly strengthened by the Con- 
ference of Algeciras. 

Those who were opposed to the domination of the 



THE ALGECIRAS CRISIS 



95 



Deutschtum were greatly heartened. There had been 
successful, open resistance. The prestige of Germany, 
especially in the secondary states, was lessened. It is 
probable that the trend of Belgium away from Germany 
and towards friendship with France and England dated 
from that vote of lo to 3 at Algeciras. 

But a more tangible symptom of the new state of things 
in Europe was given — by the international comedy of the 
Spanish marriage. For a long time European princes had 
been in the habit of marrying German princesses. Young 
Alphonso had been feted from one end of the Empire to 
the other, he had passed in review the Royal Gretchens of 
all the courts of the Deutschland. And when he returned 
to Madrid and wrote his bread-and-butter letters of thanks 
for all their lavish hospitality he announced his engagement 
to a niece of King Edward. A Prince of the House of 
Hapsburg preferred an English girl! German women are 
among the things listed as ^'uber alles^' in the famous song. 
Not long afterwards a Norwegian prince followed the ex- 
ample of Alphonso and chose an English bride. German 
prestige was falling. 

The Conference of Algeciras — although everyone politely 
said that "no one was victor, no one vanquished" — was a 
very real diplomatic defeat for Germany. France had not 
been condemned by Europe. The entente was stronger than 
ever. And for almost the first time in history, English and 
Russian diplomats had worked together in a European 
assembly. 

Official Germany made the best of a bad job, and claimed 
victory. It had been demonstrated that England and 
France could not divide up the map without consulting 
Germany. The conference was the German reply to their 
effort to ignore her and run the world to suit themselves. 
They had not wanted the conference but had had to accept 
it. And Germany had forced from France a pledge to 
respect the independence of the Sultan and the principle of 
economic equality — the open door. 



96 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

The first claim was true. France had come reluctantly 
to Algeciras. But it could hardly be called a diplomatic 
victory. France had accepted the conference under the 
direct menace of war. In this department Germany was 
undoubtedly strong. 

But the second of these official claims was pure falsifica- 
tion. France had promised repeatedly before to respect 
the sovereignty of the Sultan and the equal rights of all 
commerce. It was not necessary to set all Europe upside 
down to get that pledge repeated. The Germans — with 
considerable justification — had doubted the sincerity of 
this promise. Its renewal at Algeciras under threat of war 
was not any better. The German diplomats did not get 
anything in the way of commercial concession in Morocco 
at the conference which they could not have secured by 
direct negotiation a deux. There is every probability 
that they would have received much more by the less noisy 
method. 

In spite of the chants of victory from the government 
very few Germans were fooled. Forcing France to sacrifice 
her Minister of Foreign Affairs, dragging her against her 
will to the conference had been good. But something had 
gone wrong at Algeciras. The result had been bitterness 
and humiliation. 

The conference had been a victory for France. Her 
gains were great and manifest. The Republic had not held 
so favorable a position in Europe since the Terrible Year 
of 1870. After endless humihations, she had been able 
to enter the arena against her old conqueror and win. 
Powerful friends had ralHed beside her loyally. The little 
countries of Europe had lost their awe of Germany. Every 
Frenchman was proud of the result. 

But it was not an undiluted victory. There was a fly 
in the ointment. For all this new feeling of dignity — of 
being once more one of the Great Powers — France had to 
pay by pledging her word to Europe. And these promises, 
if they did not seem onerous to the mass of the nation, who — 



THE ALGECIRAS CRISIS 97 

I repeat — cared as little about Morocco as we do about 
Nicaragua, were decidedly distasteful to the various ele- 
ments of France who may roughly be called "the Colonial 
Party." 

The question of whether or not France was sincere 
in signing racte d'Algesiras can not be answered simply. 
Some of the French were sincere about it, some were not. 
M. Tardieu in his book "La Conference d'Algesiras" (the 
best on the subject) takes the attitude that France had never 
intended to "Tunisify" Morocco, really hoped to maintain 
the sovereignty of the Sultan, did not seek any special 
commercial nor financial advantage. And while he — and 
many other people at home — may have been surprised by 
"the course of events" which later led to the establish- 
ment of the protectorate, a great many Frenchmen — es- 
pecially those on the scene in Algeria and Morocco — were 
not surprised. 

They believed that France had a "manifest destiny" 
in Morocco, that a promise made under duress was not 
binding. They treated with open scorn this "scrap of 
paper" and went on bhthely, as they had been doing in the 
past, undermining the authority of the Sultan, fostering 
the kind of disturbance which would give a pretext for 
armed intervention and by all sorts of discreditable tricks 
trying to drive out their commercial rivals. And the 
"Colonial Party" at home, grouped about le Comite Maro- 
cain, encouraged them by maintaining a powerful "lobby" 
in the corridors of the Chamber of Deputies, and by carry- 
ing on a very clever and thorough-going campaign of mis- 
representation in all the "venal" press. 

The central government at least tolerated the conspiracy 
by which it was being forced to "tear up" its solemn prom- 
ises. I have chanced to read some of the reports of our 
consular force in Morocco. It is hardly conceivable that 
our government did not bring these complaints to the at- 
tention of the French government. Certainly the Germans 
knew what was going on — their commerce fared worse 



qS the struggle of a generation 

than ours— and it is impossible to the point of absurdity 
to believe that they did not protest: the French government 
knew that it was not loyally observing its promises. 

The history of colonial enterprise is seldom fit reading 
for children. Christendom has spread its civilization to 
the four corners of the world by devious and shameful 
means. We are not proud of the way we despoiled and killed 
off the Indians. Very few European nations can find much 
to be proud of in their colonial records. And France cer- 
tainly has weakened her claim to be the Apostle of Light, 
the Defender of the Rights of Man by her record in 
Morocco, Murder, rapine, broken promises, the fanning 
of old vices among the natives, the introducing of new 
ones, intrigue and bribery were among the means used to 
overthrow the independence of Morocco. Women — poor 
wrecks of the Paris gutters — have been taken to Morocco 
and "married" to native chiefs to act as spies. It is a sorry 
story and all one can say in the way of extenuation is that 
there are so many others every bit as bad or worse. 

It is necessary to stop the narrative a moment and philos- 
ophize a bit on the nature — the as yet imperfected nature — 
of democratic political institutions. Nothing is more 
clearly established than the fact that the French nation 
as politically organized, took the promises of Algeciras 
seriously and wanted to live up to them. At least once a 
year the Moroccan question came up for attention before 
the French Parliament. Every time a large majority of 
the Deputies rallied to a resolution in which the govern- 
ment was specifically instructed to keep its agreement. 
In 1908 such a resolution was passed at least four times — 
24th January, 28th January, 19th June and 23d December. 
During all these years any minister who had even hinted 
to the Chamber that the Algeciras treaty should be torn 
up would at once have been hissed out of office. The peo- 
ple of France did not have their heart in the Moroccan 
adventure. 

That was just the trouble — they were too much interested 



THE ALGECIRAS CKlSIS 99 

in internal problems to really worry over what was being 
done in their name in Africa. 

This is the crux of the problem — as yet unsolved — of 
how to develop a democratic diplomacy. The tradition 
of secrecy is bad. It breeds suspicion and encourages 
aggression. It is essentially aristocratic. But the real 
difficulty hes deeper. It is that the democracy tends to be 
self -centered, absorbed in domestic problems, indifferent 
to foreign affairs. 

The Algeciras crisis gave a striking example of how this 
general truth of poHtics appHes to us in the United States. 
We are accustomed to congratulate ourselves on our free- 
dom from the evils of "secret diplomacy." None of us 
knew at the time how important a role our government 
was playing in this crisis. But some of the diplomatic 
conferences which went on in the White House — and on 
the tennis court behind it — were quite as important as 
those held in the Kttle town hall of Algeciras, or in the 
porches of the Hotel Reina Cristina. 

Our government has not even published a special "White 
Paper" on the subject: but it was the most important 
departure made from our "traditional poHcy" of non- 
intervention in European politics which has happened in 
recent years. And it is idle to turn to the publications of 
our government to discover what part we played. In the 
Congressional Record there is nothing about the Algeciras 
crisis beyond a bare account of Senator Bacon's vain at- 
tempt to get information on the subject laid before the 
Senate. In the State Department's pubHcation on foreign 
relations there is very Httle more. It is necessary to turn 
to a French book — Andre Tardieu's "La Conference d'Al- 
gesiras" — to get an inkling of what our diplomacy was 
about. In his index there are more references under Mr. 
Roosevelt's name than under Sir Edward Grey's — almost 
as many as under Delcasse. Our delegate, Mr. White, 
in every instance, voted on the French side. 

One result of the conference was to greatly strengthen 



lOO THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

the War Party in Germany. Those who really beheved 
in the sacred mission of their race, those who put the ideal 
of the Deutschtum above mere peace, felt and loudly said 
that a grave mistake had been made in allowing the con- 
test to take place in the field of diplomacy, where they 
were manifestly weak. There is Httle doubt that future 
German historians will blame the Kaiser for not having 
drawn the sword at this time. 

If, for a moment, we grant the official German doctrine 
that they are called of God to spread the reign of the 
Deutschtum — this beneficent ideal of freedom in the realm 
of the spirit, and discipHne and duty in the world of matter, 
this "system" of ordered and organized progress — it was 
a fatal mistake to keep the peace at the epoch of Algeciras. 

The Kaiser, again and again, had professed this doctrine. 
At many times — although he apparently preferred to suc- 
ceed in his mission by peaceful means — he had clearly 
told his people that they must be ready for war. Here 
was his chance. 

Russia — France's one ally — was practically ehminated as 
a military power. The revolution was paralyzing what the 
Japanese had left of her army! And Russian public opinion 
had not then turned against Germany. The entente 
between France and England was still new. Whatever 
the diplomats thought about it, the people of the two 
nations were not ready for mihtary cooperation. The 
idea of going to war to help France over a Morocco squabble 
would have been most unpopular in England. Great 
Britain might have — probably would have — come in, if 
Germany had attacked France. But there had been none 
of the moral preparation which lent great strength to their 
united action in 19 14. 

And in 1906 the breach between Italy and Austria had 
not become acute. The Franco-Italian entente had not 
developed the strength it has shown since. Even if she 
had not joined in an attack on France — as she was pledged 
not to do— she would probably have remained neutral. 



THE ALGECIRAS CRISIS loi 

And Turkey, then, as now, under German influence, had 
not been weakened by revolution and the defeats of the 
Balkan War. 

Never again would there arise so favorable an oppor- 
tunity for the German crusade. The Kaiser missed it. 



CHAPTER VIII 

EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION, 1906-I914. A. MOROCCO — BOSNIA. 

The period which followed the Algeciras Conference 
was one of diplomatic insincerity. There were eight years 
of ever increasing tension. The storm-center swept back 
and forth from Morocco to the Balkans, but the issues 
were always fundamentally the same. Everyone talked 
of maintaining the status quo and conspired to alter it. 
Everyone gave lip-service to the balance of power and 
tried to upset it. Everyone preached peace and coveted 
the spoils of war. 

Great Britain was the most outspoken defender of the 
status quo. But in these heated days it is a rare rule which 
works both ways. With Russia she sweepingly upset the 
status quo in Persia. She made no protest at changes in 
the map which benefited her other friend, France. But 
whenever Germany showed dissatisfaction with the exist- 
ing frontiers, British statesmen were deeply shocked. 
"What we have, we hold," became a sort of watchword 
for a large class of Enghshmen. It gave them a comfortable 
feeling of being real lovers of peace, who only kept their 
guns loaded out of fear of a German aggression. The 
Germans — rather fantastically — compared this attitude 
to that of a highway robber who refuses to give up his 
ill-gotten gains. It is hard for an outsider to reach a con- 
clusion as to the validity of the British title to some of 
their possessions. They have always refused to discuss 
the matter. "Possession," according to their legal maxim, 
"is nine points of the law." And their fleet — their power 
to hold — was the other tenth. But the German case against 
Great Britain went much deeper than the attack on the 
validity of her title to all the seas and much of the earth. 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 103 

They were able to point out with entire truth that the 
Powers of the Entente had extended their realms and their 
influence ten times as much in the last ten years as had the 
Powers of the Triple Alliance. Quite naturally the Ger- 
mans refused to take the Enghsh sermons about the status 
quo with any seriousness. 

And each side felt that the balance of power was iniqui- 
tous unless it fell more and more in their favor. France 
and England cooperated actively in reestabhshing the 
mihtary and naval power of Russia. They worked hard — 
and the event has proved successfully — to weaken the 
Germanic group by seducing Italy from her alliance. Rus- 
sian and Austrian diplomats were exceedingly busy in the 
Balkans trying to turn the balance of power down there 
in their favor. German diplomacy everywhere was trying 
to break up the unity of the Entente. 

And everyone talked of peace. The Kaiser — unless he 
was absolutely and superhumanly insincere — meant that 
he wanted victory for the Deutschtum without having 
to fight for it. The Tsar also wanted peace — if the power 
of Slavdom could go on increasing without war. France 
wanted to escape definitely from the humiHatingly sub- 
ordinate position in which Germany tried to keep her. 
Her colonial enthusiasts wanted to carry out their ambi- 
tions in Morocco without fighting anyone but the natives. 
And Great Britain— of course it is only figurative to speak 
of any of the nations as units. Many men have many 
minds. 

Some Englishmen wanted to see Germany submit with- 
out fighting to their theory that they had a right to domi- 
nate the seas. Some Englishmen were more affected by 
the bitter trade rivalry and wanted their government to do 
something to reestablish their former easy-going supremacy 
in the world's markets. They did not want war — certainly 
not if their profits could be protected by some peaceful 
means. Many of them believed that they could overcome 
the superior e£S.ciency of German industry by a high tariff 



I04 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

regime. And some Englishmen read the writings of Homer 
Lea and von Bernhardi and were convinced that Germany- 
was planning to annihilate them. They did not want war 
either, they wanted an army and navy so strong that Ger- 
many would be afraid to attack them. The great mass 
of the people did not worry much about foreign relations 
or imperial risks. Some few of the Liberals took such 
matters seriously and worked hard to lay the foundations 
of peace. Nobody wanted war. The British statesmen 
also wanted peace. As long as quarrels could be kept on 
the field of diplomacy, victory was so much surer and 
cheaper. 

They all wanted something to which they quite sincerely 
believed they had a right. But it was highly improbable 
that the adversary would acknowledge that "right" with- 
out a fight. And on all sides there was a good deal of faith 
in bluffing. There were a good many threats of war by 
statesmen who did not really want to fight. Not everyone 
of them put certain considerations above peace. There 
were very few Tolstoists in the diplomatic service. 

International politics have not furnished a very lofty 
picture of late — but no more have internal politics. There 
are not many Tolstoians in private Hfe. Perhaps some 
future historian of a mathematical turn of mind will deduce 
for us a formula by which we can determine the ratio be- 
tween the ethics which govern the actions of individuals 
and the moral standards which regulate the conduct of the 
nations to which they belong. We cannot reasonably 
expect diplomats to observe a higher standard of morality 
than members of Parliament and business men. 

"Competition" is still the rule of life in the internal 
affairs of Christendom. "Mutual aid" is as yet only a 
pious ideal. In industry everywhere we see this bitter 
spirit of conflict. One group of "oil-interests," to take one 
example — and it is just the same with the trade in milk or 
corsets — tries by hook or crook to get an advantage over 
its rivals, to gain supremacy in its particular world. We 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 105 

see manufacturers uniting in powerful fighting ententes 
to resist in common the aspirations of their employees. 
We see the working men everywhere binding together in 
offensive and defensive alhances to fight for what they 
consider their "rights." With such rivalry and bitter 
conflict between neighbors it is hardly surprising that there 
has been Kttle which could be called "peace" in the rela- 
tions between nations. 

The whole tangle of recent diplomacy has been im- 
mensely complicated by secrecy. Very few of the men, 
who are now fighting so desperately throughout the length 
and breadth of Europe reahzed during these years of ten- 
sion how httle they knew of what their governments — and 
often inner circles of their governments — were doing in 
their name. In each Foreign Office of Europe there was a 
man of mystery! To some degree at least, all of them were 
supposed to be responsible to the people, but none ever 
rendered a frank report of his activity. 

Most — if not all — of the foreign ministers were honorable 
gentlemen, who would not steal a penny from a blind 
beggar, nor be cruel to a dog. And none of them wanted 
war. But all, without exception, had a very definite idea 
of the "manifest destiny" and "legitimate ambitions" of 
their country — all had "patriotic" ideals which seemed 
to them more sacred than peace. 

So well-estabHshed was the tradition of secrecy in these 
matters that very few outsiders protested. Other honor- 
able patriotic gentlemen assumed ministerial responsi- 
bihty without thinking it necessary to inquire about what 
their colleague in the Foreign Office was doing. And when 
at last war broke out, three members of the British Cabi- 
net resigned — committed political suicide in the face of a 
popular war — because they were horrified and surprised 
to discover where Sir Edward Grey and the inner circle 
of the ministry had brought the nation. And if Cabinet 
members did not know what the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs was doing, it is evident that the people at 



lo6 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

large were led — perhaps wisely, but certainly blindly — 
like sheep to the slaughter. 

Nothing which can be written about the diplomacy of our 
generation can claim the dignity of history. Almost every 
event of international politics is susceptible to diverse 
interpretations and is the subject of violent and bitter 
controversy. Many points will remain hopelessly uncertain 
until the archives are opened to future students. 

During the last two years quite a number of secret treaties 
in regard to the intricate Balkan situation have been pub- 
hshed, and no one knows how many have been signed during 
the course of this War. Any moment one government or 
another may pubKsh a new collection of documents, or 
some minister out of ofi&ce may write "indiscreet memoires" 
which will force a new interpretation of events. 

No one outside the Holy of Holies of the French and 
British Foreign Ofl&ces could pretend to define the nature 
of the agreements between these two governments, which 
have influenced their action during tjie last ten years. Was 
there a "second annex" to the Anglo-Russian accord similar 
to that known to have been added to the Entente Cordiale? 

But in spite of these unknown quantities it is possible to 
trace through this period between the Conference of Alge- 
ciras and the Great War a certain rhythm of events, a 
swinging back and forth of the pendulum of power, a 
tendency towards more daring bluffs — an increasing tension. 

Nothing succeeds Hke success and the diplomatic victory 
at Algeciras encouraged the anti-German forces to new 
efforts. There was the Spanish marriage and a general 
strengthening of the Mediterranean understandings, be- 
tween France, Italy, Britain and Spain. And this grouping 
was soon strengthened by the Anglo-Russian Entente. 

This document (signed 31st August, 1907) was in its 
form and substance similar to that between France and 
England. It was a colonial arrangement, eminently pacific 
in its phraseology. The two contracting parties Kquidated 
their quarrels in Asia, where for so many years they had 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 107 

been bitter rivals. They came to terms over their disputes 
in Thibet and Afghanistan and they divided Persia into 
"spheres of influence." But of course even the partition of 
Persia was a side issue. The main object of the agreement 
was to avoid useless and dissipating friction over incidentals 
so that the two governments could work in harmony in the 
great European conflict, which was not mentioned. 

If there was a secret annex to this convention it probably 
dealt — among other things — with the Balkans, and perhaps 
with the fate of Constantinople and the Straits. 

A new crisis suddenly arose over an insignificant and 
vulgar brawl between some French ofiicers and the German 
vice-consul in the Moorish port of Casablanca. On the 
25th September, 1908, Herr Just tried to help six deserters 
from the French Foreign Legion to escape to a German ship 
in the harbor. The deserters were recognized by a police- 
man and in the row which followed their arrest, Herr 
Just's cane was broken. For a month Europe was en crise 
over this petty affair and for a week it looked as if war was 
inevitable. 

The French government was so sure that it had right on 
its side that it wanted to arbitrate ! The Germans said that 
if France would apologize for the vice-consul's broken cane 
they were willing to arbitrate on the amount of "damages." 
Great Britain and Russia "demonstrated" diplomatically. 
France stood firm on her original offer to arbitrate the 
whole incident. For several days the crisis was acute. 
Abruptly — as abruptly as she had precipitated the crisis — 
Germany gave in. (The Hague Tribunal did its duty 
gracefully, rendered a conciliating, Scotch verdict and sen- 
tenced both nations to apologize mutually for the undue 
zeal of their subordinate officers.) 

Once more — according to the German explanation — the 
affair had been indirect. The Kaiser and his chancellor 
had not been especially interested in the fate of these de- 
serters nor of the cane of Herr Just. France, they said, was 
not loyally observing the treaty of Algeciras and this 



lo8 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

incident served as a pretext to rap on the table and recall 
France to order. 

But France was no longer so weak as when she had 
sacrificed M. Delcasse. The cohesion among the non- 
German states of Europe had grown stronger. The French 
army was more nearly prepared. The Algeciras Conference 
had given them confidence in England's loyalty: France 
was not going to throw over another foreign minister just 
because the Germans happened to disKke him. 

And once more French diplomats had put their case with 
cleverness. It was an exceptionally good incident for 
arbitration. It would have been rank aggression for 
Germany to have insisted on war. The Kaiser had to give 
in. Another diplomatic defeat ! There were wild denuncia- 
tions of his peace-policy in the more rabid pan-Germanic 
newspapers. 

There followed a period of diplomatic comings and 
goings which is hopelessly obscure. This Casablanca crisis 
had had a sobering effect. The matter at issue had been 
so trivial and war had been very near. No one except a 
few mihtary lunatics wanted war. There were attempts at 
conciliations from all sides. All through these years of 
tension there were in each country fairly well organized 
groups who were working for peace. Momentarily at least 
they seem to have been told to go ahead and see what they 
could do. 

King Edward visited the Kaiser and hopeful, friendly 
toasts were exchanged. There were "conversations" 
between Downing Street and Wilhelmstrasse. We do not 
know what went on in all these private conferences. But 
nothing definite was accomplished. The negotiations seem 
to have come to grief over the naval question. The Ger- 
mans would not consent to recognize the validity of the 
British claims to sea-rule. And unless Germany would be 
good and stop building warships, it was not to be expected 
that the English would be friendly. 

The "conversations" between France and Germany 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 109 

had a more tangible result. A Moroccan agreement was 
reached. 

" 9th February, 1909. 

"The Government of the French Republic and the 
Imperial Government of Germany, animated by a mutual 
desire to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras, 
have agreed to define the meaning which they give to its 
clauses, in order to avoid all cause of misunderstanding 
between them in the future. 

"In consequence 

"the Government of the French Republic, entirely 
attached to the maintenance of the integrity and independ- 
ence of the Moorish Empire, is resolved to safeguard in 
Morocco economic equality, and therefore not to hinder the 
commercial or industrial interests of the Germans there; 
"and the Imperial Government of Germany, pursuing 
only economic interests in Morocco; and on the other hand 
recognizing that the particular political interests of France 
there are closely connected with the consolidation of order 
and internal peace, is decided not to hinder these interests : 

"They therefore declare that they will not continue nor 
undertake any measure of a nature to create in their favor 
or in the favor of any other power an economic privilege; 
and that they will endeavor to associate their citizens in the 
business for which they may obtain concessions." 

The news of this accord was a great rehef to the French. 
They did not want to go to war with Germany over Mo- 
rocco, they wanted to give their undivided attention to their 
internal problems. And it looked as if this quarrel was over. 
But the matter was not so simple. This public declaration 
of good will was supplemented by some financial agree- 
ments, which were to give to German bankers a share in the 
exploitation of Morocco. The most important points were 
in regard to the railroads. 

The French colonial authorities had planned a railroad 
which, connecting with their already developed system in 
Algeria, would enter Morocco across this eastern frontier 



iro THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

and reach the inland capitals of Fez and Morocco City. 
Such a line would have for them two great advantages: 

(I) Strategic. The French regularly maintained large 
garrisons in Algeria. Such a system would permit them at 
any time to throw their troops into the heart of Morocco. 

(II) Economic. According to the Acte d'Algesiras, all 
nations were to have trade equahty in the Moroccan ports. 
By estabhshing economic routes from central Morocco to 
Algeria all this rich commerce would be diverted to the 
Algerian ports where the regular French tariffs were in 
force. 

The Germans, from economic reasons, and also no doubt 
to hinder the French strategic plans, wanted the railroad 
to have a terminus in a Moorish port where the rule of the 
open door applied. In this mood of conciliation which 
followed the affair of the Casablanca deserters the French 
conceded this point, and promised not to build any other 
railroads in Morocco until the line from Fez to Tangier 
was opened. 

Perhaps, when the diplomatic archives of this period are 
opened, we will find that somewhere, somebody was making 
a sincere effort to lay the foundations of peace. From the 
scanty information now available it seems that everyone 
was saying: "If you let me have what I want I am wilhng 
to be your friend." 

These half-hearted efforts towards conciliation might 
possibly have borne fruit in time, but suddenly all the 
foreign offices of Europe were thrown into confusion by the 
emergence of the Near Eastern question. Here again the 
most interesting point is obscure. Who financed the Young 
Turk Revolution? 

An oriental despot cannot reign without making enemies 
among his own people and as Abdul Hamid had reigned a 
long time his enemies were legion. They fell into three 
groups. The most numerous were his personal enemies; 
typical "Old Turks," who felt that they had been mis- 
treated. They were the "outs" who looked enviously at 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION HI 

the crooked profits which were being made by those who 
were "in" on the remunerative business of government. 
There was a second group of army officers who had been 
trained in western military schools, mostly in Germany. 
They were young men, intensely Nationalists and bitterly 
opposed to the Sultan's policy of "selling Turkey to the 
foreigners." And there was a third group, — the real Young 
Turks — who were sincerely stirred by the ideas of the 
French Revolution and believed in the rights of men. 
But none of these groups had enough money to accompUsh 
anything. 

Suddenly these various elements centered about the 
Committee of Union and Progress in Salonika which had 
somehow gotten hold of the sinews of war. No one, who 
knows where this money came from, has told. Some people 
claim that it was in rubles, others that it was in twenty- 
mark pieces or francs, or pounds sterling. At all events it 
came from "the outside." 

The Committee of Union and Progress was able to buy 
the allegiance of a couple of army corps by paying their 
back wages. They marched on Constantinople and the 
rotten old regime of Abdul Hamid fell to pieces. The 
idealistic element seems to have been in control at first. 
They made a large number of impressive speeches about 
brotherhood. They issued a number of resounding proc- 
lamations about liberty. But before they had time to 
begin to realize their high promises foreign aggression played 
into the hands of the military clique. Turkey was "at- 
tacked" by Austria and Bulgaria. Reforms had to be 
postponed in the face of danger. The hopeful element was 
shoved into the background and the revolution fell into 
the control of the army ofiicers, — of whom Envers Bey 
has proved himself strongest. 

The money which financed the first step in the movement 
probably was not in marks. The Germans had no interest 
in starting trouble, they were on the best possible terms 
with the old Sultan. They had their best diplomat, the 



112 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, at Constantinople. He 
had succeeded in displacing the British ambassador in the 
favor of Abdul Hamid. Under his management, the Kaiser 
had made his pilgrimage to Jerusalem, at Damascus had 
proclaimed his protection over the Mohammedans, at 
Constantinople had disfigured the old race-course of the 
emperors with an art nouveau fountain, and had secured 
the concessions for the famous Bagdad Bahn, The most 
hopeful future for the advance of German industry was in 
Turkey. Abdul Hamid had given them all the concessions 
they wanted. Germans were building railroads and harbors, 
opening mines and furnishing the army; everywhere their 
commerce was entering new Ottoman markets and pushing 
out all competitors. They had no reason to upset the old 
regime. 

The Young Turks, in the first enthusiasm of their victory, 
were hostile to all the Sultan's friends and so were anti- 
German. Naturally the Germans were convinced that 
this unexpected set-back was caused by English gold. But 
von Bieberstein stuck to his post and soon won the Young 
Turks away from the influence of the Entente Powers, as 
he had previously won Abdul Hamid. 

It was clever diplomacy on his part but most of the trumps 
were in his hand. If there is such a thing as "logical 
enmity" the Turks must inevitably hate the Russians. 
The English claim to have been "true friends" of Turkey, 
and they have in fact protected her from Russia in the past, 
but the price they put on their friendship — C5/prus and 
Egypt — was too high to encourage gratitude among the 
Turks. And all patriotic Moslems naturally tend toward 
friendship with the Germans. They do not know the 
Germans as well as they do the British and French, and 
Russians. These three Powers — the Entente — are those 
the Mohammedans think of when the conversation turns 
to "alien domination." The Germans have never had a 
chance to oppress the Moslems. 

But the most important element of the recent politics 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 1 13 

of the Near East is that no one any longer thinks that Eng- 
land will protect them from Russia. When Great Britain 
signed the Entente with the Tsar in 1907 she lost all in- 
dividuaHty in the affairs of Persia and the Balkans. We, of 
the United States, are likely to think of Britain and France — 
as their own citizens do — as the principal element in the 
Entente group. But the people of the Near East always 
think of Russia first when the Entente is mentioned. The 
Roumanians, for instance, would not hesitate a moment 
if they had to choose between France and Austria. Perhaps 
the Bulgars would put more rehance in the pledge of Eng- 
land than in that of Germany. But as England and France 
are "disinterested" in the Balkans and have recognized 
the peninsula as a "zone of Russian influence," they have 
lost the benefit of the respect which went to them as in- 
dividuals. They have become satellites of the Tsar. It is 
exceedingly improbable that any Turkish government — 
old or young- — will hve on good terms with the Russians, 
who so openly covet their capital. Von Bieberstein did 
not have a difficult time in persuading the Turkish revolu- 
tionists that their national interests were in accord with 
those of Germany. 

The most formidable reverberation of the Turkish Revolu- 
tion was the affair of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Before starting her campaign against Turkey in 1877 
it had been necessary for Russia to assure herself against 
attack from the flank. By an "agreement" signed at 
Reichstadt she secured from Austria a pledge of neutrality. 
The text of this treaty has not been published. But the 
terms of the deal are known. Russia promised to confine 
her activities to the eastern half of the Balkan Peninsula, 
and recognized the preponderant interest of Austria in 
the western half. It is probable, although this is not def- 
initely known, that the two provinces of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina were specifically mentioned as coming within the 
Austrian sphere of influence. 

At the Congress of Berlin, the next year, all the other 



114 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

Powers were trying to minimize Russia's gain in the Bal- 
kans. As the Bulgars were a Slavic people, and had been 
"liberated" by the Tsar, it was generally thought that they 
would be a docile protectorate of Russia. So the Powers 
cut Bulgaria to pieces and gave more than two-thirds of it 
back to Turkey. And to further offset this diminished 
Russian gain, her rival, Austria, was given special rights in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were left under nominal 
Turkish sovereignty, but the rights granted to Austria 
were not unlike those we hold on the Canal zone. Our 
treaty with the republic of Panama says that we are to 
enjoy the same privileges and responsibilities on this strip 
of land as if we were the real sovereign. The Congress of 
Berlin estabhshed a very similar regime in this case. It was 
veiled annexation and no one doubted that in due time the 
veil would be removed. 

The Young Turks had the disastrous daring to act on the 
letter and not the spirit of the Berlin treaty. They tried 
to treat Bosnia and Herzegovina as if they were really part 
of the Turkish empire. The statesmen at Vienna had be- 
come so used to ruling this territory that they had almost 
forgotten the technical flaw in the deed. They were 
startled by the news that this new government at Con- 
stantinople was asking these two provinces to elect deputies 
to the Turkish parliament. To put a stop to such foolish- 
ness, Franz Josef announced the formal annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina which he had been governing 
for thirty years. 

This action was technically a violation of international 
law — a treaty signed by the Great Powers of Europe was 
slightly altered by one of them without the consent of the 
others. But the Austrians were probably sincerely surprised 
by the ruction this little misdeed caused. The Berlin 
treaty was already old and decrepit. In diplomatic history 
such a document becomes of age in ten years, at twenty 
it has passed its prime and begun its decHne. Everyone 
who had cared to, had already broken the treaty, some of 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 115 

its clauses had never been enforced. Austria had watched 
most of her neighbors take greater Hberties with "inter- 
national law" without protesting. 

But Bosnia and Herzegovina were inhabited by Slavs 
of the Serb branch. No one had thought that mattered in 
1878. But the "theory of nationahty" had been growing 
popular of late. The Serbs, having "removed" a king of 
Austrian sympathies, had given the throne to the present 
dynasty, which is pro-Russian. They had projects of in- 
corporating Bosnia-Herzegovina in a Greater Serbia. And 
while they could have reasonable hopes of sometime con- 
quering this territory from the Turks, nobody in 1909 
dreamed that Serbia could fight a successful war with Aus- 
tria. So the Serbs appealed to Russia to prevent this 
transfer which stood in the way of the pan-Serb dream. 

The Tsar does not sit any too firmly on his throne. He 
needs the support of every reactionary element in his realm, 
he cannot with impunity offend any of them. And the pan- 
Slavs — or Slavophiles, as they call themselves — are one of 
the important elements in his internal pohcy. During the 
revolutionary movement of 1905-1907 the Society of the 
True Russian People had been one of the pillars of loyalism. 
These reactionary organizations were insistent that the Tsar 
should protect the orthodox Slavs of the Balkans against 
the catholics of Austria. So the Russian Foreign Office 
protested against the Austrian action and precipitated a 
new crisis. 

Once more the affair was compHcated by secret diplomacy. 
There is strong reason to believe that before starting out 
for the Japanese War, Russia had again — as before her war 
with Turkey — taken action to insure Austrian neutrality. 
She had probably renewed the treaty of Reichstadt and 
again acknowledged Austria's "rights" in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina. So, being in a weak position to protest against the 
annexation, Russia took the attitude that the entire Near 
Eastern question needed attention and demanded a new con- 
gress of the six Great Powers to revise the treaty of BerHn. 



Ii6 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

In such a congress, Russia was sure of the support of 
Great Britain and France. At Algeciras Italy had voted 
against her allies. And Italy was especially afraid of Aus- 
trian advance in Albania where she had "legitimate am- 
bitions" of her own. She was nearly sure to vote with the 
Entente Powers in a Balkan dispute. Naturally Germany 
and Austria did not want to go to a congress of six Powers, 
where they were sure to find three hostile votes and prob- 
ably a fourth. 

The Tsar, to satisfy his pan-Slav supporters, insisted. 
The Kaiser "donned his shining armor." In the speech 
in which he used this famous phrase he made it clear that 
he was ready to fight beside his ally rather than consent to 
the congress. 

The situation was strikingly similar to that which arose 
in the summer of 19 14 — only in 1909 the Tsar was bluffed 
out. If it came to war France was prepared to stand by her 
alKance and back Russia to the utmost, but she was not 
enthusiastic about going to war over the Balkans. And as 
far as she could, without seeming to try to escape from theob- 
Hgation of her treaty, she urged Russia to make concessions. 

But the most important aspect of this crisis was that 
England was evidently reluctant to fight on behalf of 
Serbia. The Balkans were not mentioned in any of her 
Ententes. The British Foreign Office worked feverishly for 
peace. 

There were very cogent arguments which her friends 
could bring to bear on Russia. She was in no condition 
for a great war. She was in the midst of a vast military 
reorganization — necessitated by her Japanese defeat. Under 
English advice — as France was helping her with her army — 
she was laying the plans for a new fleet. She would not 
begin to feel the advantage of this great effort till 191 2 or 
1913, it would not be completed till 1916 or 1917. If it 
was necessary to fight Germany — as most people hoped it 
was not, but feared it might be — it was manifestly wise to 
postpone the clash. Every year was a great gain in strength 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 117 

for Russia. And it was also better to wait for a casus belli 
which would inspire the people of all three of the Entente 
nations with enthusiasm. 

Also every year weakened the Triple Alhance. The 
internal affairs of the dual monarchy were in a bad way. 
All this agitation over the rights of nationahties was im- 
mensely weakening to the realm of the Hapsburgs. Such 
agitation is one of the principal articles of exports from 
Russia. No idea is more unpopular to the pan-Slav socie- 
ties at home, but they spend a great deal of money fostering 
it in Austria. It was generally beHeved that the death of 
the moribund Franz- Josef would be the signal for wide- 
spread disorders. Also Italy's allegiance to the Triple 
Alhance was visibly weakening. The mere passage of time 
strengthened the Powers of the Entente. 

It is not necessary to suppose that Sir Edward Grey 
(and I mention him as a type of the Entente diplomats) 
had no other considerations in mind when he talked of 
peace, but the cjinical conviction that it would be easier 
to crush Germany a few years later. This is the German 
estimate of his character, and it is in all probabiHty historic- 
ally and humanly false. 

But it is certainly true that every statesman of Europe 
was famihar with these considerations. They were dis- 
cussed in the newspapers of all languages. Never a year 
passed when books were not written in English, German, 
French, Russian and Japanese, to show how month by 
month the balance of mihtary power was tending to turn 
against Germany. A deputy in the Reichstag, who was 
denouncing the peace pohcy of the Kaiser, shouted, as the 
peroration of his speech: "Every year that passes in peace 
is for us a battle lost." 

The pacifists of France and England did not have this 
feehng. They were not faced by a now or never problem. 
Every crisis which was solved for them without war was, if 
not a battle gained, added strength for the possible fight, 
which many of them sincerely hoped could be avoided. 



Il8 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

In this crisis over Bosnia and Herzegovina English and 
French diplomats urged Russia to concede. And Russia 
did — to the great disgust of the Serbs and of her own pan- 
Slavs. One of their papers pubKshed an article, which 
caused much comment: "Why did the true Russians sup- 
port the Autocracy against the Revolution?" And it an- 
swered this question with brutal clearness. "True Rus- 
sians" (the pan-Slavs) " supported autocracy because it is 
the God-given institution of the Slavs, because it alone 
of all forms of government fits the Slav temperament and 
offers a rallying ground for all the dispersed branches of 
the race, which still suffers under the yoke of foreigners. 
But it is an institution, not a person, which the Slavophiles 
support. Autocracy is divine, the autocrat human." If 
a particular tsar failed in his duty to the tsardom it was 
legitimate — they argued — to look about for a more tsary 
tsar. 

It was a very grave warning to Nicolas II. If he put 
the ideal of peace above the prestige of the Slavic race, 
he might lose the allegiance of those who had been his 
most fanatic and loyal supporters. 

This Bosnian crisis was some consolation to the Germans 
after their fiasco at Algeciras and their discomfiture over 
the Casablanca affair. It was a victory for the diplomacy 
of the "shining armor!" It was a bitter humihation to 
the Tsar. He had been bluffed out. 

In 191 1 came the next crisis — Agadir — this time in 
Morocco. In spite of the Franco-German agreement of 
1909 the friction between the two countries had grown 
more and more acute. Each side accused the other of bad 
faith. 

At the time of the Algeciras crisis Germany had not had 
any great economic interests in Morocco. But the promise 
of an open door policy had led many Germans to settle 
there. Their interests, encouraged by the colonial societies 
at home, were growing rapidly. Much of this development 
was sound. The best modern buildings in Tangier were 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 1 19 

of German construction. Their traders had, by bona-fide 
commerce, estabhshed themselves in the various ports. 
Some of their enterprises, however — Hke the mining ven- 
tures of the Mannesmann Brothers — were highly specula- 
tive. These German merchants did not get on well with 
the French officials. They claimed — a claim borne out 
by all other non-French merchants — that the promise of 
economic equality was being violated. 

And France had not lived up to her railroad agreement. 
"Circumstances over which she had no control" had forced 
her to commence other hnes before work was begun on the 
Fez-Tangier system. All Europeans in Morocco believed 
that France was preparing to tear up the Algeciras treaty 
and proclaim a protectorate. And this, in spite of the fact 
that the French Parhament, at every opportunity, was 
solemnly voting to observe the treaty. 

The matter came to a head in April, 191 1. The European 
telegraphic news agencies began to tell of disorders — or 
threatened disorders — in Fez. The Germans in this city re- 
ported that no trouble was visible to the naked eye. But a 
certain section of the Parisian newspapers — those especially 
favored by the Comite Marocain — began to clamor for a mil- 
itary expedition to protect the lives of the European resi- 
dents in Fez. The stage was being set for the last act of 
the comedy. ("Comedy" of course appHes only to the 
European aspect of the case. It was pure "tragedy" for 
the Moors who loved their independence.) 

The curtain was rung up on this last act by a note sent 
out from the Quai d'Orsay to the various Foreign Offices 
announcing that — with heartfelt regrets — it had been 
decided to despatch an army into the interior to protect 
the lives of Europeans. " Circumstances over which . . ." 
etc. 

The expedition to Fez was the "last straw" as far as 
German patience was concerned. However, the German 
government did not act abruptly. The chancellor told 
the French minister at Berlin that he could not regard 



120 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

this expedition with indifference: he was, however, wilhng 
to give the French the benefit of the doubt. If the mihtary 
expedition to Fez performed the mission promptly and 
returned to the coast without infringing on the sovereignty 
of the Sultan and the independence of Morocco, he would 
still consider the Acte d'Algesiras in force. If, however — 
his warning was formal — the French army estabhshed it- 
self in the interior or went beyond its avowed intention 
of protecting European Hves, he would consider that France 
had torn up the treaty, and that Germany would act as 
though no treaty had existed, according to her own interests. 

The responsibility of the French people in this shabby 
affair is not very clear. The case illustrates one of the 
unsolved problems of democracy. How many of us, Ameri- 
cans, are sure of the ethical justification of our own "action" 
in Nicaragua? We read in the papers one morning that 
our marines had been landed and that there was some 
fighting. Most of us were busy that morning, we know that 
we did not know what it was all about — so we forgot it. 
What happened? Are our marines still there? So it was 
in France. The great mass of the people did not know 
what was happening in Morocco. Few had read the text 
of the railroad agreement. They did not have the facts 
at hand to know that this military expedition was only the 
most flagrant of a long series of violations of the pledged 
word of the republic. They had entrusted — just as we 
have — their foreign relations to a department of the govern- 
ment, which worked in secret. 

It is in just such matters that the French form of govern- 
ment is weakest. Between the signing of the Algeciras 
Treaty and this expedition to Fez, dozens of different 
ministers of foreign affairs had been estabhshed at the 
Quai d'Orsay. Some of them had held office several months, 
some a few days. Some of them were bitterly anti-German, 
some of them were in favor of a rapprochement with their 
old enemies. Some of them were the tools of entirely un- 
patriotic financial interests. The result was a hodge- 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION I2i 

podge. Abruptly a minister who blew hot was followed 
by a minister who blew cold. The methodical Germans 
could hardly be expected to understand this merry-go- 
round. The change in the point of view of the French 
Foreign Office was often quite as sharp as the changes in 
our poHcy towards Latin- America, — Root, — Knox, — Bryan. 

The miHtary expedition settled down in Fez and pushed 
out in all directions. The German government decided 
to "act." And here again we have — parenthetically — a 
point of especial interest to Americans: Did Germany ask 
our government to join her in a protest against the violation 
of this Algeciras Treaty, which we had signed five years 
before? There are many indications that they did — but 
our government has not taken us into its confidence. 
At all events, Mr. Taft, remembering our "traditional 
poKcy" of non-intervention in the affairs of Europe — 
which Mr. Roosevelt had momentarily forgotten when 
he sent delegates to Algeciras — made no protest. 

The average Frenchman did not know any more about 
the diplomacy of this country than the average American 
knows about ours. 

So they were sincerely surprised and deeply outraged 
when they read in their newspapers that the German 
warship "Panther" had cast anchor (ist July, 191 1) in 
the Moroccan port of Agadir — by way of protest. As 
they did not know why the Germans were protesting, this 
action looked Kke an unwarranted aggression. 

But the German position was very clear. It is doubtful 
if they ever had a sounder ethical basis for pounding the 
table. "If," they said, "you are going to conquer Morocco, 
in violation of your repeated promises, we want our share. 
It is you who are upsetting the status quo, not we." 

But if Germany — noticing the reluctance of Great 
Britain to being drawn into the quarrel over Bosnia and 
Herzegovina — had concluded that the Entente was weak- 
ening, she was sadly mistaken. Mr. Lloyd George, in a 
speech in the Mansion House in London, "donned his 



122 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

shining armor." The British home fleet cleared for action. 
The Germans discovered that when they touched any of 
the interests mentioned in the Ententes, the three Powers — 
England, Russia and France — were shoulder to shoulder. 
The crisis lasted several months, all through a very hot 
summer, and at last Germany gave in. On 4th November, 
191 1, a new Franco- German agreement was signed by which 
the Kaiser recognized the French protectorate over Morocco 
and received as "compensation" a large but unhealthy sHce 
of Congo swamp. 

It was the most serious blow the Deutschtum had yet 
received. The bitterness in Germany was great; it was 
much worse than the Algeciras fiasco. The Kaiser's gov- 
ernment certainly ought not to have made its rude and ag- 
gressive protest unless it was prepared to follow it through. 
This time they had been bluffed out. But their troubles 
were not over. 

From this time on events followed each other so rapidly 
that it is hard to distinguish one crisis from another. Ten- 
sion became chronic. 

Before the Agadir affair had been concluded, Italy 
declared war on Turkey (September, 191 1). 

By the Delcasse entente, Italy had recognized France's 
"rights" in Morocco and France had recognized Italian 
"rights" in the TripoHtan. (The text of this agreement 
has not been published, but there is little doubt that this 
deal was included.) And Italy grasped the opportunity — 
afforded by the fact that everyone's attention was centered 
on the Franco- German quarrel — to reahze this section 
of her "legitimate ambitions." 

Her move was decidedly distasteful to the Germans. 
First, because the Kaiser was posing as the friend of Turkey 
and the protector of Islam. He was not only unable to 
protect the Mohammedans of Morocco from his enemy, 
the French — but he could not even keep his ally from 
declaring war on Turkey. It very seriously threatened 
to compromise the work of the Deutschtum in the Near 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 123 

East. And secondly — of more importance in the general 
politics of Europe — this independent act of Italy showed 
that the bonds of the Triple Alliance were weakening. 
Italy's harmless flirtation with France, which von Biilow 
had called un tour de valse, was becoming serious. Italy 
had dared to work, not only without the consent of Ger- 
many, but contrary to the interests of the Germans. De- 
cidedly the prestige of the Deutschtum was in a decline. 



CHAPTER IX 

EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION. B. THE BALKANS 

While Turkey was signing away to Italy her last province 
in Africa — October, 191 2 — the Balkan alHance declared war 
on the Sultan and raised a new crisis — the last which passed 
without a general European war. 

It is almost hopeless to try to untangle the immensely 
intricate and obscure problems which have given to the 
Balkan Peninsula so tragic a role in the affairs of Europe. 
There are the age-old conflicts between the christian victims 
and their Turkish oppressors. There are the more recent 
but equally bitter conflicts between the christian nationah- 
ties themselves. There is the intense struggle between the 
two groups of Great Powers. And to confound confusion 
there is the fact, often ignored, that the members of each 
group — both the AlHance and the Entente — have conflicting 
interests in the Balkans. The ambitions of Italy and Austria 
in Albania are exactly opposite. Great Britain and France 
have had to sacrifice their own interests as weU of those of 
civilization in general in order to give the Tsar a "free hand" 
in this zone of influence. 

However, the importance of the Balkans in the cause and 
course of this War has been so great that it is necessary to 
try to compress some of the main elements of the problem 
into a special chapter. 

One fact stands out firm from all the confused and con- 
flicting legends of the past. The Balkan Peninsula is the 
threshold of Europe. The narrow waters of the Dardanelles, 
the mountains of Albania, have watched the passage of al- 
most every invasion which has come out of Asia. Very 
likely in the shadowy days of pre-history, ape-like men with 
broad foreheads broke their stone axes on the longer skuUs of 

124 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 125 

other ape-like men they called barbarians. It is probable 
that Hittite adventurers invaded the land. The Persian 
army passed that way towards its defeats in Greece. History 
begins with the coming of the Roman soldiers who con- 
quered the country. They stayed long enough to leave a 
marked strain of their blood and the memory of their lan- 
guage to their half-breed descendants. 

The Slavs first appeared in the Balkans near the beginning 
of the second century. Some tribes came by the shores of the 
Black Sea, others came down from the north by the passes 
of the Carpathians. They grew in number and in military 
power. In 512 the Basileus Anastasius had to build a wall 
twenty feet high around Constantinople to keep them out. 
They had raided even into the suburbs of the Imperial 
City. 

Most that we know about them comes from the old Byzan- 
tine chronicles, which refer to them parenthetically, between 
more detailed accounts of ecclesiastical disputes. These 
Greek historians were not ethnologists. Sometimes they 
called the raiders Huns, sometimes Gepides, or Serbs or 
Bulgars or Avars. They were more likely to describe the 
clothes of these barbarians or their method of fighting, than 
the shape of their skulls or the peculiarities of their dialects. 

Apparently they all came from the steppes — and no his- 
tory was written in those days in the country which is now 
Russia. As far as there was any real difference between these 
invaders, it may have been that some, coming by the Black 
Sea coast, had the habits of lowlanders, and some having 
come down from the mountains wore more fur. This is one 
of the highly speculative hypotheses put forward with a 
great show of erudition to explain the differences between 
the modern Bulgars and Serbs. It is quite as plausible as 
the rival theories. At all events, out of all the successive 
tribes which came by the coastal route and naturally settled 
more to the east — the Bulgars imposed their name on the 
rest. And gradually the tribes which came down from the 
north and settled in the more mountainous country of the 



126 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

western Balkans and along the littoral of the Adriatic, ac- 
quired the habit of calling themselves Serbs and Croats. 

Durihg the centuries before the coming of the Turks, there 
was a constant flux and flow. Sometimes a strong man, like 
Justinian, ruled at Constantinople and reduced the Slavs to 
allegiance even beyond the Danube. Sometimes a western 
chief, who called himself a Serb, conquered his neighbors and 
founded a short-lived dynasty. And a few years — or dec- 
ades — later the great chief of the Slavs called himself a 
Bulgar. 

Every shred of evidence we have supports the common- 
sense supposition that the mixing of races was intense. 

The fastnesses of the mountains were centers of a sort of 
brigand cosmopolitanism. It is a fact well known to ethnol- 
ogists that the more inaccessible the mountain districts, the 
more mixed is the breed. In the face of each new invasion of 
the low countries, the irreconcilables flee to the mountains 
and there, in new and hard conditions, they strive to main- 
tain the old customs and the familiar tongue. So we find 
Gaehc still spoken in the Highlands of Scotland, Basque 
in the Pyrenees, Berber in the Atlas. And before the Slav 
inundation some of the old language of the Caesars was pre- 
served in the mountains of Albania and Transylvania. But 
although the dialect is preserved in such circumstances, the 
purity of the blood is soon lost. To the mountains flee all 
the excommunicated of the lowlands, those who dislike 
civilization and those whom civilization dislikes. And the 
men of the mountains, when they raid down into the plain, 
take back with them such women as they chance to lay 
hands upon. 

In the fourteenth century the Turks crossed the Dar- 
danelles into Europe. In 1361, Murad I. captured Adriano- 
ple and made it his capital. Dissensions among their victims 
made conquest easy for the Turks. Sofia was taken in 1382. 
The battle of Kossovo, which overthrew the western Slavs, 
was in 1389. And Constantinople fell on the 29th of May, 
1453- 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 127 

Until the beginning of the last century the christian popu- 
lation led a Hfe of passive submission. But by the middle 
of the century the Greeks, the Serbs, and the Roumanians 
(who had come down from the mountains of Transylvania 
and had occupied the lower valley of the Danube) had 
estabhshed semi-independent principaHties on the fringes 
of the Ottoman empire. The Serbs of the small mountain 
top of Montenegro had never entirely lost their independ- 
ence. But none of these races had been able to extend 
their national organization to more than a small percent- 
age of the people who spoke their language. 

In 1877 there came the Russo-Turkish War, followed by 
the Congress of Berlin. The independence which these 
little states had already gained was formally admitted by 
the great Powers, a fraction of Bulgaria was added to their 
number and the concert of Europe solemnly announced 
that the status quo so created, should never be changed. 
But of course all these Httle incompleted states at once 
set to work to accompHsh their national unity and bring 
in the "unredeemed." No one who applauds the move- 
ment for national unity in Italy or Germany can blame them 
in the least. 

These Httle states were not strong enough to hope to 
hberate their oppressed brothers single-handed. They had 
to look for help to the great Powers and so "foreign in- 
trigue" — the curse of the Balkans — was introduced. 

The first political grouping of the great Powers grew out 
of the treaty of Reichstadt, mentioned above, whereby 
Russia claimed predominating interests in the eastern half 
of the Balkans and recognized Austria's similar claim in 
the west. So at first the Tsar had no interest in Serbia 
and centered his attentions on Bulgaria. England and 
Austria — at the Congress of Berlin — had been very hostile 
to the Bulgars, who, as they thought, would form a Russian 
advance post. They had insisted on giving most of the 
Bulgars back to the Sultan. 

When Bulgaria made her first step towards the realiza- 



128 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

tion of national unity by absorbing eastern Romnelia, 
which the Congress of Berlin had made a Turkish province, 
Austria — and in those days the EngHsh were hand in glove 
with the Hapsburgs — persuaded Serbia to declare war 
(September, 1885). But Austria has always proved a 
bad guesser in the Balkans. She backed the wrong horse. 
The Bulgars defeated the Serbs at SKvnitza — 18 November, 
1885. 

But the Bulgars had suffered so much from servitude, 
had fought so hard for Uberty, that these words had taken 
deep root in their consciousness. It took them some time 
to reahze that the Tsar hberator was only a new oppressor, 
that the big Slav sister could be just as tyrannical as the 
Turk. But once they made up their mind to it, they 
acted promptly. Under the leadership of an uneducated 
but enterprising patriot named Stamboulov, they ousted 
the Russians and the figure-head king who had been im- 
posed on them. 

Through an interregnum Stamboulov reigned as dictator. 
His methods were not unhke those of Diaz in Mexico. He 
was ruthless, but above all determined that Bulgaria should 
not become a Russian province. Of course in this attitude 
he was cordially supported by England and Austria. In 
those days any enemy of Russia was sure of encourage- 
ment from London. Under the leadership of Stamboulov 
and of their new sovereign Ferdinand of Saxe Coburg- 
Gotha (on his mother's side a grandson of Louis PhiHppe of 
France), who ascended the throne in 1887, the work of 
making a nation out of the newly liberated Bulgar peasants 
went on with progressive success. 

Constitutionally Bulgaria, with its single legislative 
chamber, is the most democratic monarchy in Europe. 
Almost entirely agricultural, it is free from the curse of land- 
lordism. Most of the population is composed of peasant 
proprietors who are very generally prosperous. And — as is 
inevitably true in a democratic community — they are 
greatly attached to pubHc education. There were prac- 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 129 

tically no schools when the Turks were driven out in 1877. 
Today ahnost all the young recruits in the army can read 
and write. In their primary schools forty-five per cent of 
the children are girls. And female education is practically 
unknown in the other countries of southeastern Europe. 

Aside from these problems of internal organization, the 
one thing which passionately interests the Bulgars is the 
Hberation of their brothers in Macedonia. Roughly fifty 
per cent of the leaders of Bulgaria — cabinet ministers, army 
officers, school teachers, and clergy, are of Macedonian 
origin. I happened to be in Sofia one day which was the 
anniversary of some special Macedonian massacre. It was 
the custom for all those who came from Macedonia or had 
relatives there, to hang out a flag bound in crape. There 
was hardly a house in all the capital which did not display 
the symbol of mourning — and of hope. 

The Serbian problem has had a different character. In 
the first days of her "independence" she was a sort of 
feudal appanage of Austria^ The Tsar was "disinterested" 
in her fate. While much of her traditions tended to draw 
her towards Macedonia, where some of the heroes of her 
legends had ruled, her aspirations turned inevitably towards 
the north. As the national spirit which was fomenting all 
over Europe awoke in Serbia, her patriots discovered that 
it was the house of Hapsburg which stood in the way of 
their "legitimate ambitions." The language spoken by the 
peasants of the Austrian provinces of Dalmatia, Herze- 
govina, Bosnia, Slavonia, Croatia, and Istria, was the same 
as — or very near to — their own. As their savants dug up 
the forgotten traditions of the past they discovered that 
all this mass of southern Slavs had come down into the 
Balkans from the north by the same passes over the Car- 
pathians that had been the road of their own ancestry. 
Some of these tribes had at one time or another given 
allegiance to their medieeval kings. Here to the north lay 
their "manifest destiny." 

It was a dream no more presumptuous than that of 



I30 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

Garibaldi or Fichte. Its realization was rendered the more 
possible by two factors, — (i) the Hapsburg misrule — (2) 
the growing Slavophile movement in Russia. The Slav 
population of the Dual Monarchy had ample reasons for 
discontent. And the Russian government was only too 
glad to encourage private societies — and unofi&cially their 
consuls — who carried on an agitation so embarrassing to 
their traditional enemy, the Austrians. 

However, Serbia was very small and Austria-Hungary 
very large and quite as unscrupulous as large. The house 
of Hapsburg, warned by the rise of their rivals of Savoy, 
smarting under the loss of their fair Italian provinces, 
did not intend to tolerate more of such nonsense on a new 
frontier. They had two classic methods of statescraft — 
bribing and bullying. They bought up the Obrenovitch 
dynasty, which then reigned at Belgrade, and also a con- 
trolhng interest in the "court." Whenever the Sobranje 
showed signs of discontent at the arrangement, Austrian 
troops were mobilized across the frontier or recourse was had 
to the less spectacular but more efficient "pig-disease diplo- 
macy." Serbia had no outlet to the sea. Her principal 
export was live-stock, driven across the frontier to the 
Austrian markets. Whenever the foreign office in Vienna 
disapproved of Serbian politics, the health authorities dis- 
covered cholera among the Serbian pigs and commerce 
was interrupted until the Serbs became docile again. 
Long acquaintance with such economic strangulation has 
given the Serbs a subsidiary aspiration. They wish, not 
only to unite all their race under one flag, but also to have a 
commercial outlet on the Adriatic. 

Russia, having lost the game in Bulgaria, turned to Serbia. 
And at last with the connivance if not the actual coopera- 
tion of the Russian legation at Belgrade, a band of Serbian 
officers broke into the palace and killed the Obrenovitch , 
king and queen. (The more one studies the Kves of this 
kinglet and his consort, the less reason one finds to regret 
their sudden death.) The rival dynasty, Karageorovitch, 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 131 

was called to the throne. Peter, the present king, under- 
stood which side of his bread was buttered, and has been 
consistently pro-Russian in his poHtics. 

So there was a complete turn in the pohtical whirlgig. 
Russia, in a pet against Bulgaria, became the protector 
of the Serbs. Austria and England, outraged over the 
Belgrade regicide, became backers of Bulgaria. Few, if 
any, of the Balkan people, were so naif as not to see the 
small value of such vacillating friendships. The great Pow- 
ers only cared for them as pawns in the all absorbing game 
of balancing power. General disregard for the wishes or 
welfare of these people struggKng up from Turkish op- 
pression towards civiKzation had been clear enough at the 
Congress of Berlin. And scarcely a year has passed since, 
when some new lesson on this point has not been given 
them. 

Few things have been more grotesque than the way some 
of the great Powers have — in the course of this War — ap- 
pealed to the "gratitude" of the Balkan people in an effort 
to get them to fight their battles for them. If there is one 
thing about this War to make the great gods grin it must be 
the idea of a British minister at Sofia asking the Bulgars 
to drive the Turks out of Constantinople in gratitude for 
the EngKsh friendship. It was DisraeH at the Congress of 
BerHn who threw back to the Unspeakable Turk two- 
thirds of the Bulgar people. To be sure, the EngUsh en- 
couraged Stamboulov in his struggle against the Tsar, but 
that burst of friendship only lasted until 1907 when, by 
her entente with Russia, Great Britain withdrew from the 
Balkans and left her "friends" to their fate. The Bulgar 
memories of their Russian Kberators are equally painful. 
They have about as much reason to be grateful to the En- 
tente Powers as the United States of Colombia has to be 
grateful to us. 

The other states of the Balkans have as little reason to 
put faith in the fair promises of the great Powers. 

Roumania stands quite apart from the other Balkan 



132 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

nations. She was Latinized by the Roman conquest. 
They came by their language in much the same way that 
the Goths of Gaul developed the present French speech. 
It is doubtful if there ever were 50,000 Roman citizens in 
Gaul, but none the less France was Latinized. And so, 
although there is probably very Uttle Italian blood in the 
Roumanian veins, they are Latin in speech. 

The historical development of this country has not been 
parallel to that of her neighbors. In the first place, being 
on the outskirts of the Ottoman empire, she was never 
thoroughly brought into the Turkish system. The Sultans 
ruled her indirectly by tribute-paying governors, generally 
christians of Greek origin. Most of the mediaeval aris- 
tocracy was of this aHen stock and a feudal system of land 
tenure was developed. 

Roumania was freed from Turkey more by diplomatic 
intervention than by insurrection. The gentry was natu- 
rally interested in the Greek struggle, but the Roumanian 
peasants never learned those lessons in national conscious- 
ness which come from fighting for liberty. The liberal 
ideas of '48 had their reverberation in Roumania and a 
group of young radicals, momentarily in power, arranged 
a parlor revolution. The titles of nobihty were abolished 
and the word "serf" removed from the law books. But 
the mass of the people did not know what was going on and 
nothing happened to show them that the words were 
changed. Roumania remains today the most feudal 
country in Europe. 

Its people are exceedingly rich or dolefully poor. The 
alluvial wheat lands are divided up into great estates. 
For generations the landlords have reaped large and easy 
profits from the soil. Some years ago oil began to bubble 
up through the wheat fields, and Roumania has become 
one of the great oil producers of the world. This facile 
wealth has built palatial manor houses throughout the 
country-side, it has made Bucharest one of the gayest and 
gaudiest capitals in Europe. The habitual stakes in 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 133 

"bridge" at the casino of Constanza are said — it is a fre- 
quent boast — to be the highest in the world. 

The mass of the people are the poorest and most illiterate 
in Europe. 

PoKtical Hfe centers in Bucharest. It is the picturesque 
poHtics of personalities. Each of the parties has a high 
sounding name — National Conservative, Constitutional 
Liberal, or the like — but they are generally called by the 
name of their leader. There are no popular poHtical or- 
ganizations, no pubHc opinion outside of the capital. In a 
broad way the half dozen parhamentary groups fall in 
"the party of the pure and simple wheat-growers" and 
"the party of wheat-growers who also own oil wells." 

It is hardly possible to find a sharper contrast in Europe 
than to cross the Danube from the mediasvalism of Rou- 
mania to the very modern democracy of Bulgaria, with its 
universal education, up-to-date sanitary laws, its small 
farmers and cooperative societies. 

In 1877 when Russia attacked Turkey, it was necessary 
to march through Roumania as, in 1914, Germany found 
it necessary to march through Belgium. Roumania did 
not resist and so did not get hacked through. But not 
content with this "benevolent neutrality" Russia, after 
her first defeat at Plevna, demanded active help. Their 
country occupied by the Russians, the Roumanians could 
not refuse. Their army reached Plevna in time for the 
unsuccessful general attack of nth September. The af- 
fair settled down to a siege. Osman Pasha had 60,000 men 
and 77 cannons. The christian alHes mustered 150,000 men 
and 600 cannons. But it was not till the loth of December 
that they starved the Turks out. 

At the Congress of Berlin the hostile European coali- 
tion forced Russia to disgorge most of her Turkish spoils. 
In revenge she annexed the Roumanian province of Bes- 
sarabia. Naturally the Roumanians do not feel any tradi- 
tional gratitude towards Russia nor to the other Great 
Powers who permitted this brutal spoliation. 



134 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

Roumania has — or theoretically ought to have — an aspir- 
ation towards "national unity." The Austro-Hungarian 
provinces of Transylvania and Bukovina are largely in- 
habited by peasants of the Roumanian tongue. There is 
also the "lost province" of Bessarabia. But the mass of 
the Roumanians are too ilHterate to have any pubhc opinion 
on such a subject. Most of the peasants never heard of 
these unredeemed brethren. And even if they had national 
aspirations, the landlord pohticians of Bucharest would 
pay no attention to them, unless they saw some way to 
utiHze "pubhc opinion" to their own profit. 

In the first year of this War, it was manifestly to their 
advantage to stay neutral and sell their grain and oil to 
the central empires. They did. 

The Greek struggle for independence was centered in 
the decade from 1820 to 1830. To an even greater extent 
than with the other Balkan nationahties, this movement 
towards unity was incomplete. A large part of the main 
land which was indisputably Greek, in language, traditions 
and sentiments — northern Thessaly, Pinde and Epirus — 
and most of the Greek isles, were left under Turkish mis- 
rule. So httle did the Great Powers in the Congress of 
BerHn care for the Greek nation that Great Britain was 
ahowed to take Cyprus. So far as the Greek aspirations 
were Hmited to these territories of undoubted Greek popu- 
lation, they were quite as sound as those of Garibaldi for 
Venice. Those Greeks who fought for independence have 
no reason to be grateful to the Great Powers. The story 
of Crete is typical of the whole disillusioning affair. In 
spite of the lyric Hellenism of Byron and Shelley, Vene- 
zelos and his Cretan comrades know that it was not the 
Turks they had to fight so much as the concert of Europe. 

However, many of the Greek ambitions were inflated 
beyond measure. Their pretence of being the heirs of and 
the legitimate successors to the Byzantine empire of Jus- 
tinian was pure phantasy. 

The Greeks are a sea-side people; this is one of the main 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 135 

determining factors of their history. It must always be 
borne in mind in considering their problems. And sea- 
going people — like mountaineers — are always hybrid. In 
the mainland it is impossible to get a hundred miles from 
the coast. In the great days of Pericles, it is probable that 
ninety per cent of the Greeks Hved within walking distance 
of the sea. The majority of those who speak the language 
have hved in islands. They are a sea-faring, colonizing, 
trading people. It is typical that Venezelos, their leading 
poHtician, is a Cretan. 

Alexander of Macedon led the Greeks, whom he had 
conquered, on an inland adventure. And in the Hteral 
sense of the word every Greek you find beyond the smell 
of salt water is an adventurer. They are an adventurous 
race. They "leave home" as easily as the English. The 
analogy could be pushed much farther without exaggera- 
tion. In every sea-port in the world you will find Greeks. 

In the days of their glory their civihzation and language 
was supreme in all the islands of the eastern Mediterranean. 
They had colonized southern Italy and the Ionic coast 
of Asia Minor. Long after their armies had ceased to 
exist their culture was still winning victories. It was after 
Athens had fallen under the Roman impact that the Greek 
school of Alexandria reached its flower. And it was at 
Constantinople, not at Athens, that the Greek church had 
its origin. 

Their role in the Balkans was typical. A Macedonian 
chieftain, PhiHp, conquered them; his son Alexander led 
them to their greatest military glory. The Romans con- 
quered their homeland, but their language overcame Latin 
in Constantinople. They were able to change the name of 
the eastern capital to Byzantium. How many native 
Greeks there were, who accompHshed this cultural revolu- 
tion, is a vexed question. There is little evidence of any 
great migration, but Greek trading colonies had long been 
established in all the ports of the Jigean and Black seas. 
It is not necessarily numbers which win in such conflicts. 



136 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

Government in those days was largely a matter of adminis- 
trative bureaucracies. The Greeks were soon the predomi- 
nating element in the civil service of the eastern empire. 
And Byzantium became Greek in the same sense that Gaul 
became Latin. It is interesting to note how English is 
gradually replacing Turkish in the administration of Egypt. 

While the number of Greeks in the capital was probably 
large, there is no evidence that the inland races of the 
Balkans were affected by the change in language. 

This cultural predominance by a small numerical minor- 
ity was intensified by the Ottoman conquest. The Turks 
overthrew all political institutions in the conquered terri- 
tory but respected the rehgious organizations. Infidels 
were, in theory, outlaws; the Turkish government had 
nothing to do with them as individuals and dealt with them 
only through the channels of the estabhshed church. So 
the Greek patriarch of Constantinople became the sole 
protector of the Balkan christians. 

Through the long centuries of Turkish domination this 
arrangement made rehgious unity the one rallying point 
of the oppressed natives. In the early days and specially 
in times of tribulation the Greek prelate often took his 
position with great seriousness and performed his danger- 
ous functions with nobleness. However, the hierarchy was 
not entirely composed of saints; some of the patriarchs 
fell below their duty. 

With the last century this religious arrangement became 
intolerable. The spirit of nationalism was in direct opposi- 
tion to the cathohc and cosmopolitan theory of the church. 
Serbian or Bulgarian patriotism was considered heresy 
against christian brotherhood. And all too often the pa- 
triarch at Constantinople became the chieftain of Greek 
nationalism. Ill advised efforts were made to force the 
flock to become Greek in nationality as well as in religion. 
The desire for a national church on the part of the Slavs 
of the Balkans became intense. 

According to canon law, only an independent nation 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 137 

could have an autonomous church organization. As soon 
as the Greeks and Serbs won their independence, they 
escaped from the control of Constantinople by establishing 
patriarchs of their own. The Bulgars, unwilling to stand 
the continued effort to de-nationalize them, created a 
schism and organized — 1870 — an heretical church called 
the Exarchate. There was no noticeable question of doc- 
trine involved, it was only a nationahst movement. The 
Turks encouraged it as they did not object to divisions 
among their subject races. The new arrangement — three 
churches instead of one — did not lead to more amiable 
communion among the saints. 

This triangular religious conflict, complicated as it was by 
secular nationaHstic rivalries, bore its most bitter fruits in 
Macedonia. It is a very hard district to define. Roughly it 
is the central portion of the Balkan Peninsula. It has a 
large frontage on the Aegean Sea from the Gulf of Salonika 
to the mouth of the River Struma and extends back into the 
hinterland until districts are reached where the population is 
indisputably Serb or Greek. I have never found any two 
maps of Macedonia which exactly agree in frontiers. But as 
a general proposition "Macedonia" is the territory stretching 
from the Struma on the east to Lake Okrida on the west, 
from the undetermined border of Greek Thessaly on the 
south to the Serb frontier on the north. 

To complete a description of Macedonia it is necessary to 
add that in all the ports on the Aegean — as is true of the 
harbor towns throughout the eastern Mediterranean — there 
are large Greek settlements, which even in those cases where 
they do not constitute a majority of the population, pre- 
dominate in influence. Most of the commerce is carried on 
in the Greek language. But the cases are few where the 
Greek population has spread back into the interior. In 
Macedonia as elsewhere, the Greek civilization has kept its 
essentially sea-side character. 

Much of eastern Macedonia, considerably more than half, 
is indisputably Bulgar. Central and western Macedonia is a 



138 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

"no man's land " or more truly an "everybody's land." The 
population is hopelessly mixed. 

The religious struggle tore this unhappy district to tatters. 
The more exalted patriots of the three bordering states felt 
that it was the "manifest destiny " of their flag to fly over all 
of Macedonia. Bulgar and Greek and Serb bands held 
revival meetings at the point of the sword in an effort — 
nominally rehgious, really nationahstic — to make the Mac- 
edonians join their church. Now and then these bands 
joined hands to fight the Turkish oppressor, but most of the 
time they fought each other. Not infrequently they sacked 
the opposition churches and crucified the rival priests. 

It is idle to try to partition the responsibility for this 
hideous condition. It was about as bad as it could be and it 
would be very much harder to find anyone who was really 
innocent than to collect any number of people who had some 
of the blood on their hands. 

The capacity for such devastation is undoubtedly great 
among the native populations, but whenever any of these 
bands ran out of ammunition they could generally secure the 
sinews of war from the nearest consulate. Russia of course 
wanted Serbia to get Macedonia and Austria was backing 
Bulgaria. Before the Entente of 1907 the British news- 
papers were horrified at the Russian intrigues in the Balkans. 
Since that date they have denounced the activity of the 
Austrians. 

It is also idle to try to get at the rights of the case by 
reading the official "propaganda " literature. The conflicting 
parties have shown themselves every bit as capable of pad- 
ding statistics as they have of the cruder kinds of atrocities. 

One fact is beyond dispute. There is no such thing as a 
pure race in these parts. Neither the Serb, nor Greek, nor 
Bulgar are, in any biological sense "pure." The population 
of Macedonia is a mixture of these hybrid stocks. Another 
certainty is that the great preponderance in the mixture is 
Slavic. Greek culture has greatly outspread the actual 
number of Greeks in the population. But in spite of the 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 139 

fact that up till 1800 all the schools and churches were 
Greek, the common tongue of the district is Slavic. 

It is much more difficult to distinguish between the claims 
of the Serbs and Bulgars as the difference between their 
dialects is not great. However, whatever the ethnological 
affinities of the Macedonians, it is pretty well established that 
most of them think of themselves as Bulgars, rather than as 
Serbs. It is a noticeable fact that the fugitives from the 
misery of Macedonia go for shelter to Sofia to a much greater 
extent than to Belgrade. And the treaty of 1912, to which 
I will refer later, shows that the Serbs recognized this fact. 

Although there are sound reasons to think that the great 
mass of the Macedonians are in their present sympathies 
pro-Bulgar, it is impossible to maintain that they are ail 
Bulgar. The fringes towards Serbia and Greece become 
gradually less Bulgar until they are indisputably non- 
Bulgar. Salonika, the port of Macedonia and necessary to 
its economic life, is more Greek than Bulgar, more Jewish 
than either. Here and there, scattered about the country 
are settlements — often clustered about a fortified Greek or 
Serbian monastery — which are violently anti-Bulgar. 

It is my opinion that the Macedonians themselves and a 
strong if not always a majority element of the Greeks, Serbs 
and Bulgars, have for many years recognized this situation 
and have reaHzed that the annexation of Macedonia by any 
of the rivals would surely cause war and that any partition 
of the country would be necessarily artificial, arbitrary, and 
dangerous. In the last twenty years the best judgment of 
those outsiders who know the country well has been in favor 
of an autonomous province of Macedonia under Turkish 
Sovereignty with a guarantee of substantial reforms, or an 
independent principahty. 

This solution of the problem would have ralhed to its 
support a larger number of the Balkan peoples than any 
others. But the Great Powers were too busy with their own 
jealousies to pay any serious attention. It became more and 
more evident that if Macedonia was ever to be freed from 



I40 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

Turkish misrule, the people of the Balkans would have to do 
it themselves. 

There is much dispute over who deserves the credit for 
having originated the negotiations which led to the Balkan 
alKance of 191 2. The situation was not unlike those which 
led to the signature of the treaties discussed in previous 
chapters. None of the Balkan statesmen were strong enough 
to have forced through such an entente, if the ground had not 
been plowed. "Circumstances" did most of the conspiring. 
The various prime ministers — Guechoff in Bulgaria, Pachitch 
in Serbia, Venezelos in Greece — rode the current. 

The Young Turk Revolution had seriously weakened the 
common enemy. The course of European diplomacy had 
not been such as to inspire much respect for the Great 
Powers in the Balkans. Russia had not been strong enough 
to protect Serbian interests in the Bosnian crisis. Germany, 
with the Agadir affair on her hands, had not been able to 
protect the Turks from her ItaHan ally. A hon mot was 
current in the Near East: "Le5 Grands Puissants? Dites 
plutot, les impuissants.^' 

This mot was attributed to Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria. 
Whether or not he was its author, that idea seems to have 
been the key-note of his policy. The jealousy between the 
Great Powers was so keen that they were impotent in the 
Balkans. No one of them could send an army into the 
peninsula without precipitating a general war. He had 
plenty of historical evidence to back up this point of view. 
The concert of Europe had never been able to enforce the 
treaty of Berlin. How often had they solemnly threatened 
the Turks if they did not reform! How often had they 
preached sermons on the status quo! Bulgaria had annexed 
eastern Roumelia in spite of their fuhninations. The king of 
Montenegro had thumbed his nose more than once at the 
Great Powers from the fastnesses of his Black Mountain. 
The Great Powers were impotent. They were too much 
afraid of each other to do more than protest. It was their 
only weapon. 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 141 

If the Balkan states acted together, they had nothing to 
fear from the concert of Europe. And the moment when 
Italy was at war with the Turks was a good time to 
begin. 

Some of the secret treaties signed before the War broke out 
have been published. The most important is that between 
Bulgaria and Serbia — 29th February, 191 2. It shows clearly 
that Bulgaria's principal interest was the Hberation of 
Macedonia and that the main desideratum of Serbia was an 
access to the Adriatic. All lands won from the Turks were 
to be held in common until after peace was signed. Northern 
Albania down to the Adriatic, the Sandjak of Novi Bazaar 
and "old Serbia" were to go to the Serbs, the Aegean coast 
to the east of the Struma to Bulgaria. Autonomy was to be 
given to Macedonia. 

If however both parties agreed that it was impracticable 
to create an independent regime in Macedonia, it was to be 
divided between them. The principles on which the division 
was to be made — if such division became necessary — were 
laid down with precision. Serbia conceded that the popula- 
tion to the east of a Hne running roughly northeast from 
Lake Okrida was predominantly Bulgar and made no claim 
beyond that line. The northwestern half of Macedonia, 
between this line and the Serb frontier, was contested. It 
was to be divided by the arbitrament of the Tsar of Russia. 
Neither claimed that all of this contested zone was indis- 
putably theirs, both claimed that a fair arbitration would 
give them more than half. 

An equally vital part of the treaty was the paragraph 
where they pledged each other to bear aid with "the totality 
of their forces" in case either was attacked by one or more 
other nations. This clause had especial reference to the 
possibility of an Austrian aggression against Serbia. 

After this dual alliance had been signed, Greece was 
brought into the coalition. If there was any secret treaty 
by which Greece defined her territorial claims, it has not yet 
been published. It is probable that the necessity for haste. 



142 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

caused by rmnors of an approaching peace between Italy and 
Turkey, prevented the drafting of such a treaty. 

In the actual course of the war which broke out in Octo- 
ber, 191 2, all the members of the alliance were more successful 
than they had dared hope, much more successful than their 
allies had anticipated. The Serbs for instance did not expect 
the Bulgars to succeed in driving the Turks through Thrace 
to the very walls of Constantinople. The Bulgars did not 
expect the Serbs to penetrate so far south into Macedonia. 
And both the Slav alHes had very much underestimated 
what the Greek army would accomplish. They had sought 
the help of Greece primarily to secure her naval assistance. 
The Slavs had no fleets and the Greeks were stronger at sea 
than the Turks. They had expected that the main Greek 
effort would be the naval campaign to liberate the isles. 

All these military provisions went wrong. It was a comedy 
of errors — of successful errors — too successful. A Bulgar 
general explained the campaign of the first war in words 
something like this: "We expected our hard fight at Kirk- 
kilisse. We surprised the Turks and they ran. We sent our 
cavalry south in pursuit, but the fools retreated east. Our 
big battle was at Lule Burgos. Before the Serbs, the Turks 
retreated south instead of west as they should have done. 
But the Greeks gave us the greatest surprise. Their army 
was so badly beaten in the last war that we did not expect 
much of them this time. We thought they might have 
trouble defending Athens. Their mission was to engage the 
Turkish army of Epirus and keep it too busy to follow our 
flank. They jumped the frontier the first days of the war, 
caught the Turks napping, defeated them. And the crazy 
Turkish general instead of retreating on his fortified base at 
Janina, ran to the open town of Salonika." 

But more disastrous than the fact that all the allies had 
won more than they expected, was the fact that the Great 
Powers were displeased with their victory. The status quo, 
which the diplomats had sworn to maintain — although they 
all admitted that it was iniquitous — had been shot to pieces. 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 143 

Their delicate game of balancing power had been disar- 
ranged. 

Every true Liberal in Europe, no matter what his na- 
tionality, wanted to see this Balkan alliance develop into a 
strong and stable federation. It was the only hope for the 
Balkans, 

But a Balkan federation between Turkey and Austria 
stood square in the way of the pan-Germanic Drang nach 
Osten. The temptation for the Austrian Serbs to have' 
joined such a federation would have been irresistible. It 
threatened the very existence of the Dual Monarchy. And a 
stable Balkan federation capable of self-defence, stood also 
square in the way of the Russian ambition to reach the 
Dardanelles. A Serbian victory was contrary to Austrian 
policy. A Bulgar victory was contrary to Russian policy. 
So in each camp of the Great Powers there were currents in 
favor of wrecking the alliance. 

The division of spoils is always a ticklish business. The 
ancient hostilities — ^poKtical and religious — were bitter. 
Each of the Balkan states was inclined to feel that its effort 
had been greater than that of its allies. Victory rather went 
to their heads. It is doubtful if — even left to themselves — 
they could have solved the problem peacefully. But with 
both groups of the Great Powers — led by Austria and 
Russia — bent on causing trouble, there was no hope at all. 

Austria threw the first bomb. It was her policy to humil- 
iate Serbia, to keep her in economic bondage, to demon- 
strate to her own Slavs that the Serbs were helpless, so the 
statesmen of Vienna suddenly developed a passion for the 
rights of nationalities and proclaimed their intention of 
protecting the Albanians from Serbian oppression. In other 
words, Austria refused to allow the Serbs to have their 
window on the Adriatic and, mobilizing her army, ordered 
the Serbs to evacuate Durazzo and the other ports which 
they had occupied. From an ethical point of view this 
attitude on the part of Austria is quite as hard to justify as 
her ultimatum to Serbia in 19 14. But Italy, having "his- 



144 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

toric claims" and ''legitimate aspirations" on the Adriatic 
littoral which are hostile to the Servian interests, supported 
Austria in this matter. Germany in her shining armor, took 
her stand beside her allies. 

The two western members of the Entente have no direct 
"interests" in the Balkans. From their point of view, it is 
"a zone of Russian influence." Aside from the intricate 
combinations of diplomacy, it was manifest that civilization 
had "interests" in the Balkans, which were contrary to the 
Austrian contentions. But civilization is not officially repre- 
sented in the concert of Europe. Neither England nor 
France wanted to fight over a mere Balkan issue. As during 
the Bosnian crisis in 1909, France was prepared to fulfil her 
treaty obhgations towards Russia, but was unenthusiastic. 
Sir Edward Grey worked earnestly for peace — that is to 
avoid war between the two groups of Great Powers. 

The critical point in the affair — so far as the Balkan states 
themselves are concerned — is still veiled in mystery. By 
their treaty of February, 1912, Bulgaria was pledged to lend 
the "totality of her forces" in case Serbia was attacked. 
Did she live up to this obHgation when Austria mobilized 
along the Danube to browbeat Serbia into withdrawing from 
the Adriatic? We have nothing but unofficial and conflicting 
assertions. 

Suppose that Serbia had stayed at Durazzo in spite of 
the Austrian threat. It was the theory of Tsar Ferdinand — 
before the war — that in such a case the Great Powers would 
once more prove their impotence. If Austria had attacked 
Serbia, Russia could not have stayed out. Germany 
would have stood by her ally. The general war would have 
begun. And with the two groups of Great Powers at each 
other's throats, the Balkan people would have had a fair 
chance to settle their own affairs without interference. It 
is my opinion — although there is no real proof — it is the 
most plausible conclusion — that the Bulgars urged the 
Serbs to refuse to submit. I was in Sofia at this moment 
and my Bulgar acquaintances were expecting a war with 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 145 

Austria. It was manifestly to their interests that Servia 
and Greece should get what they wanted in Albania. 

The Serbs retired from the Adriatic. They were cer- 
tainly urged to do so by Russia, who in turn was being 
urged by her friends to give in. Somewhat later the Serbs 
began to claim that the Bulgars had refused to back them 
up if they stayed. They at once demanded a revision of the 
treaty of 191 2. They asked for as much territory in Mace- 
donia as they had been forced to give up in Albania. They 
and the Greeks were in actual occupation of Macedonia. 

Only a very small fragment of the diplomatic correspond- 
ence of this period has been pubhshed. Where the perfidy 
began is hard to tell. The Serbs and Greeks refused to 
evacuate the territory which by treaty went to Bulgaria. 
They proposed that the whole matter should be left to 
Russian arbitration. The Bulgars — rightly or wrongly — 
felt that they had reason to doubt the disinterestedness of 
Russia. Some at least of the Russian diplomatic and con- 
sular agents in the Balkans were encouraging the Serbo- 
Greek conspiracy. Austria, wanting above everything 
the downfall of Serbia, urged Bulgaria to attack. ^ 

With so much inflammatory material about, with so many 
interests anxious to touch it off, the second Balkan war was 
inevitable. On both sides the high command had issued 
preparatory orders for the attack on the former allies. 
What are called "frontier incidents" — small unauthorized 
skirmishes — had been going on for weeks. But the first 
definite order for attack came from the Bulgars. Alto- 
gether it was a striking case of undemocratic politics, who- 
ever ordered the first shot it was the work of secret diplo- 
matic combinations and relatively irresponsible army 
officers. On neither side did the representatives of the 
people, or even the responsible cabinets authorize this 
second war. 

The issue between Serbia and Greece on the one side 
and Bulgaria on the other hung in the balance, when Rou- 
mania, with no plausible pretext, attacked Bulgaria from 



146 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

the north and the Turks coming to life once more, sallied 
out from Constantinople and reoccupied Adrianople. 
Caught between four fires, Bulgaria threw up her hands 
and appealed to the justice of Europe. 

But Russia was too much pleased by the downfall of 
Bulgaria and the discomfiture caused to the Hapsburgs 
by the Serbian victory to allow the Entente to intervene. 
There was little Austria could do to help Bulgaria — once 
more she had backed the wrong horse in the Balkans. So 
Bulgaria was left to the mercy of her despoilers. They all 
took a slice from their victim. The treaty of Bucarest — 
6th August, 1913, which "ended the hostilities" was one of 
the most iniquitous ever contrived. Austria — from in- 
terested motives no doubt — was the only one of the Great 
Powers to protest. 

This peace of Bucarest was a heart-breaking affair to 
everyone who had hopes of a happier future for the Balkans. 

It will perhaps interest historians of a judicial frame of 
mind to untangle the snarl of evidence — and much of it is 
not yet available — and to determine who was most to 
blame for the second Balkan war and, if it was Bulgaria, to 
decide how much she ought to have been punished. But 
everyone else — except those who have an unavowable 
interest in disorder — will be more interested in the problem 
of restoring peace. 

For more than a century the Balkan Peninsula has been 
the sore spot of Europe. (The infection has now spread to 
the entire body). There could be no greater problem of 
statesmanship than the healing of this center of inflamma- 
tion. In no other department has European diplomacy 
shown itself more impotent than in deahng with the Near 
Eastern problem. Never has their impotence been more 
marked than when they permitted the signing of the treaty 
of Bucarest. There were no statesmen in Europe who had 
the qualities necessary to deal with the situation — the 
imagination to see the danger nor the moral authority to 
convince anyone that their advice was disinterested. 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 147 

The foreign ministers of the Great Powers were so worried 
over the possibiHty of a general war, so anxious to count 
up the score in the diplomatic contest which had been raging 
at the Conference of London between the Entente and the 
Alliance, that they were ready to welcome any ''settle- 
ment" of the Balkan problem — no matter how illogical, 
no matter how temporary, no matter how unjust. 

The Balkan problem will not be solved by ignoring it, 
nor by postponing it. Sooner or later it will have to be 
faced. And the men who could not find any solution for it 
in the calm of peace, were not to be expected to do better 
in the heat of war. The diplomatic fiasco of the Entente 
in the Balkans, which among other things has caused the 
fall of M. Delcasse, was not surprising. 

But ignoring (as is the habit of European diplomacy) 
the interests of the people most nearly involved, the effect 
of the two Balkan wars on the struggle between the Entente 
and the AlKance is worth consideration. 

During the course of the crisis a diplomatic conference, 
under the presidency of Sir Edward Grey, sat at London 
and, while real blood was flowing in the Balkans, they 
tried to preserve the peace of Europe and keep anyone else 
from hooking a large fish in these troubled waters. The 
result was in the nature of a drawn game. Both sides 
caught some fish. 

From a purely diplomatic point of view the honors went 
to the AlKance. Austria had vetoed Serbia's desire to have 
a window on the Adriatic. Once more the Slavophiles of 
Russia called on the Tsar to protect these orthodox chris- 
tians from cathoHc oppression. Once more the Kaiser 
donned his shining armor. Once more Great Britain showed 
a marked reluctance to fight over a Balkan quarrel. The 
arguments in favor of peace which her friends had brought 
to bear on Russia in 1909 were even stronger now. As the 
Russian military reorganization was nearing completion, 
there was even more reason to wait. The British attitude 
at this time, as it had been in the Bosnian crisis, was 



148 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

markedly more pacific than it had been during the tension 
of 191 1 over the Agadir incident. So once more Russia 
had to sacrifice the interests of her protege in the Balkans. 
Once more she had to give in before the German bluff. 

It was a new victory for the diplomacy of the rattling 
sword. But it was solely a victory of amour propre — of 
prestige. From a mihtary point of view the Alliance lost 
much more than they gained. 

The Turkish army, always counted as a German asset, 
had been crushingly defeated. Austria's hold on her Slav 
provinces had been seriously weakened. Any growth of 
the Serbian kingdom threatened her existence. She had 
hoped to strengthen herself by sowing dissensions in the 
Balkans, but once more she guessed wrong. Serbia, in- 
stead of being crushed by Bulgaria, had come out of the 
second war with added prestige. The Serb-turn was by so 
much the more threatening. 

Roumania, traditionally hostile to Russia, had always 
been counted as a satellite of the Triple Alliance. Her 
king was a Hohenzollern. But in this crisis the poKticians 
of Bucarest found that their interests clashed with those of 
Vienna. They bhthely broke the treaty which bound them 
and deHvered the coup de grace to Austria's protege. 

To an even greater extent, the Triple Alliance was 
weakened by the fact that the ambitions of Italy and Austria 
in the Balkans had come into sharp conflict. Both of them 
were nursing "manifest destinies" in Albania. The re- 
lations between these two "allies," never cordial, had 
become more bitter than usual. 

When the dust of the Balkan conflicts settled, everyone 
knew that the fighting power of the Deutschtum had been 
decreased — the chances for a successful war had dimin- 
ished. This conclusion was reached — with a wealth of 
statistics and close argument — in the military magazines 
of half a dozen countries. 

That the Germans realized this was proved by their 
gigantic army increase law, 30th June, 19 13. To this, the 



EIGHT YEARS OF TENSION 149 

Russian Duma replied by a vote of extraordinary military 
credits, and the French Chambre des Deputes by a law — 7th 
August — to increase the term of military service from two 
to three years. 
A year later — August, 1914 — all bluffs were called. 



CHAPTER X 

THE FATAL YEAR 

So far I have tried to avoid statements which are not 
based on ample evidence. But no judgment on the more 
recent diplomatic events can claim to be real history. 
What little evidence there is, is conflicting. 

The official documents about the crisis are within every- 
one's reach. It is safe to say that no one interested in 
the subject has not read them. The various belligerent 
governments have been so anxious to persuade the neutrals 
of the justice of their cause that we have had Blue Books 
and White Papers thrust down our throats. And I have 
not had access to the secret documents. I can cite no evi- 
dence for my beliefs. They are only personal impressions 
based on a considerable study of the roots — rather than 
the immediate incidents — of the present crisis. 

As I have read into the immensely complicated diplo- 
matic history of Europe since 1878 it seems to me simpli- 
fied by considering it a conflict between ideals. It is easy, 
almost too easy, to give it a materialistic interpretation; 
to show the conflict of economic interests. But that in- 
terpretation does not suffice. Business interests, within 
each country, conflict; for a while competition is bitter; 
then a " combination " or trust is formed. The whole mean- 
ing of the various Ententes is that when two countries set 
their mind to it and bring a little good will to the task the 
oldest and most intense economic and colonial disputes 
can be liquidated. But why did not Great Britain — for 
instance — reach an understanding in these matters with 
her old friend Germany instead of with her traditional 
enemies, France and Russia? Why did not the EngHsh 
divide Asia Minor with the Germans to keep back the 

ISO 



THE FATAL YEAR 151 

Slavs, instead of reaching a "gentlemen's agreement" 
with the Tsar to squeeze out the Kaiser? I fail to find 
economic arguments which apply to one combination and 
not to the others. It seems to me that the ideal of the 
Deutschtum frightened the non-German people of Europe 
more than any mere threat to their economic interest. 

Both sides accuse the others of intentional bad faith. 
There was bad faith on both sides, but misunderstanding 
seems to me to have been a greater factor in their hostihty. 
To take one example out of thousands, there is a funda- 
mental conflict between the two words recht and le droit. 
We translate both by the same English word, "law." 
But the German when he uses his word has in mind 
quite a different concept than the Frenchman when he 
uses his. A German may be acting in complete accord 
with his idea of "rectitude" and seem most unrighteous 
to a Frenchman. 

I cannot see that this War was in any sense inevitable. 
It had its origins in the way the people of Europe thought 
in the stage of evolution they had reached in what we ar- 
bitrarily call the Twentieth Century. But it was not 
inevitable that they should have had such habits of thought. 
Everyone who hopes that the next generation will be better 
educated, better equipped for and adapted to the complex 
environment of our civihzation is working on the assump- 
tion that human nature does change and can be changed. 

The War was not inevitable, — but no more was it sur- 
prising. As long as we base our civilization and our habits 
of thought on the idea of competition among individuals 
there will be competition between the groups of individuals 
which form nations. As long as we allow the competition 
within the nation to work out the manifold injustices which 
are the commonplaces of our daily life, there will be injus- 
tices between nations. The War was "inevitable" only 
in the sense that it was in accord with the spirit of our 
time. If that spirit is unchangeable — which is not proved — 
war is inevitable. 



152 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

One of the interesting psychological problems of modern 
times is: Did the Kaiser deserve the Nobel peace prize? 
Undoubtedly he thought he did. Undoubtedly his people 
thought he did. No ruler of modern times has been so 
often and so violently attacked by the patriots of his coun- 
try on the charge of being too enthralled by the idea of 
peace. Personally, I do not think that he deserved the 
prize. Disraeli, after the Congress of BerHn, returned to 
London announcing that he brought "Peace with honor." 
He was glad to have peace as long as he could preserve 
what he was pleased to call "honor." I think the pacivism 
of the Kaiser was of the same brand. He wanted: "Peace 
with victory." As long as he felt he was winning he did 
not want to fight. And victory meant for him the con- 
tinued growth in power and grandeur of the Deutschtum. 

I have intentionally avoided a frequent use of the term 
"pan-Germanists." Their role in the present crisis can be 
compared to that of our AboHtionists before the Civil War. 
They certainly had an influence, but it was a Hmited one. 
The pan- Germanic societies were only a crude expression 
of a mystic faith. The Deutschtum was a very much more 
respectable ideal than mere territorial aggrandizement. 
To be sure it implied the extension of the Deutschreich 
beyond the chance frontiers of the moment. And there were 
always some sincere apostles of the Deutschtum who be- 
lieved that talk of peace was sentimental nonsense. The 
German "race" had come into its own by war, only by 
war could it thrive. But there were some of them — among 
whom was the Kaiser — who beheved that their mission, 
the spreading of their creed of orderly and beneficent dis- 
cipline, could be accomplished by peaceful means. During 
the first years of his reign there could be no doubt that 
the German idea was growing. As the German merchants 
conquered ever new markets, the idea of organization 
which they preached as the foundation of their success, 
caught in a growing degree the imagination of the world. 

But about 1900 — an approximate date — a more and more 



THE FATAL YEAR 153 

successful resistance to this peaceful propaganda of the 
Deutschtum became manifest. It became evident in diplo- 
matic correspondence. It was just as clearly writ in trade 
statistics. The competitors whom the Germans had 
caught napping began to wake up. I have told in Chap- 
ter V. how the English Royal Mail had begun to build 
ships to cut in on the easy profits of the Kosmos Line. 
Great Britain was evidently resolved to resist the spread 
of the Deutschtum at sea. 

By 1 9 10 this resistance had taken concrete shape in the 
network of ententes. And especially in the realm of diplo- 
macy the prestige of Germany had fallen. It is the weakest 
spot in the otherwise remarkable organization of the Ger- 
man Empire. The Kaiser, by thumping the table, by 
rattling his sword, by "donning his shining armor," had 
constantly increased the anger of his enemies. Sometimes 
at least he was justified in making a serious diplomatic 
protest, but his method was bad. He cried "Wolf, wolf," 
too often. Half a dozen times, notably during the Algeciras 
crisis of 1906, he might have really drawn his sword with 
the best of chances. But having scared aU the world by 
drawing it only halfway, he thrust it back with a swagger. 
His effort to browbeat Europe defeated his purpose. It 
only increased his reputation for maladroit rudeness, the 
number and the anger of his enemies. After every crisis — 
most of which might not have been so bitter except for 
the crudity of the Kaiser's method— Germany had fewer 
friends. Anger and fear and hatred are closely associated 
frames of mind. And the fact that the non-German na- 
tions of Europe — whether they were anti- German or not — 
were drawing together diplomatically, decreased the mili- 
tary power of Germany. 

And so, during the early years of this century, more and 
more Germans of intelligence and peaceful preferences be- 
gan to realize that the power and prestige of the Deutsch- 
tum was not growing but dechning. This conviction 
immensely strengthened the arguments of the military 



154 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

party. And at last — apparently — the Kaiser was con- 
verted. 

For a moment leave aside the question of whether or not 
the Germans were insane to beheve that they were called 
of God to regenerate the world, and accept the fact — to 
which all evidence points — that they did sincerely beheve 
it. What were they to do about this situation — this impious 
rebellion against the Divine Will? 

I translated above some sentences from Rudolph Gotte's 
"Deutscher Volkesgeist." "To Kve and expand at the 
expense of other, less meritorious peoples finds its justifica- 
tion in the conviction that we are of all the peoples, the 
most noble and the most pure, destined before others to 
work for the highest development of humanity." He con- 
tinues: "and that makes it obligatory for us to be the 
strongest military power both on land and sea." If one 
admits the first part of the quotation — the assumption — 
one cannot quarrel with the deduction. If you are — or 
believe yourself to be — called of God to build the Temple 
in Zion, you must make yourself stronger than the Philis- 
tines — and of course it is fooKsh to consider the "rights" 
or the feelings of the PhiHstines. 

But the assumption of a Divine Mission was just the 
point the non- German people of Europe did not accept. 
Most really serious quarrels can be reduced to a disagree- 
ment over primary assumptions. 

The anti-German forces of Europe had no such cohesive 
ideal. Against this single concept of the Deutschtum were 
marshalled half a dozen national aspirations. But they 
can all be grouped under one sentiment: a reluctance to be 
reformed against one's will. As far as I can discover any 
ethical conflict in this War, it is here. Is one race, because 
of its conviction of its superiority, justified in trying to 
impose its degree of civilization on less meritorious nations? 
Or, to put it more accurately: Has such a superior people 
a right to impose its culture on less deserving white races? 
(For of course all the Great Powers, ourselves included, 



THE FATAL YEAR 155 

do not consider black, brown or yellow peoples in such 
arguments.) And are nations, accused of inferiority, 
justified in defending themselves diplomatically, and with 
arms, against compulsory upHft? On this general issue 
there is a fairly clear ethical division between the two war- 
ring camps of Europe. 

I find it hard to see any moral distinction between pan- 
Germanism and pan-Slavism. I can see Httle ethical dif- 
ference between mihtary power on land or on sea. France 
has Httle in common with her alHes. She more than either 
of them is fighting consciously in this moral issue of freedom 
to be yourself, even if others call you inferior. It is for 
her — Rights of Man against the Divine Right of Kings. 
But even in her case the issue is bleared by the fact that 
both of her alHes are empires and that her own colonial 
poKcy has been smirched by all the vices of imperiahsm. 

Some of the orators of the Entente tell us that it is a con- 
flict between a civilization based on the rights of the individ- 
ual and a civihzation of state control. But there is no 
inevitable conflict between such theories. No one can deny 
that a great deal can be said for both ideals. "Individual- 
ism" bears one kind of fruit, "collectivism" another. 
Neither has reached the limit of its development. As long 
as each was wilHng to let the other alone there was no in- 
herent quarrel between them. But as soon as either tried 
to convert the other by force, trouble was sure. 

So the question at issue — or rather, the main question, 
for it is impossible to reduce the poHtics of nations to a 
simple formula — was: Will Germany preserve the peace 
at the cost of abandoning her large claims to leadership? 
Will the rest of Europe preserve peace even at the cost of 
accepting the overlordship of the Germans? 

In the summer of 1914 both these questions were an- 
swered by an emphatic "No." 

But before discussing the events of the Fatal Year, there 
is one other point to deal with, one other obscuring con- 
tention to be cleared up. 



156 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

The Germans claim that they are fighting a defensive 
war — a claim echoed by all their opponents. Once more 
it is rather a quarrel over words than a rank hypocrisy. 
If you are accused of kilHng a man it is not sufficient to 
say that you did it in defence. The judge will ask what 
you were defending. The only vahd plea is ^e//-defence. 
It is not permitted in law to kill in defence of your opinion. 
Although it was once not only good form but highly pious 
to kill in defence of your religious beliefs, it is no longer legal. 

When a Belgian speaks of a defensive war he means 
that he is fighting to defend the poHtical existence and ter- 
ritorial integrity of his country. 

In the summer of 19 14 neither the poHtical structure 
nor geographic frontiers of Germany — the Deutschreich 
nor the Deutschland— were in danger. England certainly 
did not want to dismember the German Empire, it would 
have been hard to recruit a corporal's guard for such an 
enterprise. France was not preparing to attack Germany, 
not even to recover Alsace-Lorraine^ The Germans had 
more reason To"fear Russia. If the Tsar and his mystical 
reactionary pan-Slav friends stayed in power, there was 
certainly a possibility that when they had completed their 
military reorganization they might have attacked Germany. 
But there was no immediate danger. All the Liberal ele- 
ments of England would have repudiated a Russian attack. 
It is very doubtful if France would have joined such an 
aggression. ^ 

Austria-Hungary, to be sure, was in a more difficult posi- 
tion. But the dangers which threatened her were as much 
internal as external. 

But this discussion of the extent to which the territory of 
the Central Empires was threatened would probably have 
seemed an insignificant quibble to most Germans. What 
they worried about was the prestige of the Deutschtum. 
There could be no possible question but that it was threat- 
ened — ^worse than threatened: it was doomed. Nothing but 
a successful war could revivify it. It is evident, from the 



THE FATAL YEAR 157 

German press, from the speeches of her statesmen — the 
Kaiser included — that it is not the German soil they are 
defending, but this German Ideal — this Mission in the world 
which God has laid upon them ! 

If it is assumed that rather reluctantly the Kaiser and the 
real rulers of Germany were convinced — largely by the re- 
sults of the Balkan wars — that it was necessary to draw the 
sword in defence of the Deutschtum and that, once con- 
vinced, they planned in cold blood to do so at the first favor- 
able opportunity, almost every event preceding and following 
the outbreak of the crisis, falls into orderly place. And 
facts, which in any other hypothesis, are inexpHcable, become 
simple. If for instance, one assumes that the Kaiser always 
wanted war, how is it possible to explain that he did not 
draw the sword before at more favorable moments? 

I will develop my hypothesis — repeating the warning that 
it is a personal opinion and that proofs are lacking. It is 
entirely possible that any day some new document — a 
secret treaty, for instance — ^may throw an entirely new light 
on the subject. 

The great mihtary law which passed the Reichstag in 
June, 1 9 13, contained several novelties besides the unprec- 
edented increase in the size of the standing army. The most 
interesting were the financial arrangements. The immense 
sum of money required was to be raised by a new and un- 
necessarily quick method. The technical working out of the 
law would require several years. In the ordinary course of 
events the money would be raised in instalments as it was 
needed. But this new war tax was to be realized at once. 
It was to be turned into the state coffers and held there — 
part of it inactive — till needed. Most mihtary writers com- 
mented on this novelty at the time. The event has proved 
the sagacity of their suspicions. Germany would have a 
very large war chest at the beginning of 19 14. And there is 
every indication that this money voted to be expended over a 
course of several years, was used at once for accumulating 
stores. 



158 THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

In choosing the moment and the manner of drawing the 
sword the German war-council must have had two con- 
siderations in mind. First, haste. Every month that passed 
was more than a mere waste of time. The Russian army 
reorganization was progressing apace. Towards the end of 
1 9 14 some of the new strategic railroads would be opened. 
And every year, almost every month would see new develop- 
ments along this line. So far in the actual progress of the 
war the Germans have owed their successes in the East very 
largely to their superior railroads. They certainly had this 
in mind in their pre-war theory. In France the law for three 
years' mihtary service was just going into force. There was 
difference of opinion as to how much eventual increase of 
force would come to France when this law began to work 
smoothly, but it was quite certain that its first effect would 
be a tangle of disorganization. And every delay meant that 
Franz Josef might die and a revolution break out in Austria. 

Secondly, the casus belli should be sought in the Balkans. 
Great Britain seemed ready to make any quarrel over 
Morocco her own, but reluctant to be drawn in over a dispute 
in the Near East. It is the first principle of diplomacy in 
preparing a war to isolate or divide the enemy. Bismarck 
had always done so successfully. The Germans believed that 
England would surely fight if any issue mentioned in her 
ententes was touched. There was at least a chance that 
she would stay out — or hesitate too long — if the row started 
in the Balkans. 

A further point in support of my theory is that in the 
spring of 19 14 for the first time the "conversations" in 
Berlin on the subject of an Anglo-German Entente took on a 
hopeful tone. Neither side has yet pubKshed any full ac- 
count of this diplomatic event. It is uncertain what hap- 
pened, but there are indications that the subject of barter 
was the Bagdad Railroad. For a long time the British 
government had been trying to reach some sort of entente 
with Germany, her proposals had generally centered on the 
naval situation and had seemed inadequate to the Germans. 



THE FATAL YEAR 159 

Suddenly Withelmstrasse took notice of the hand which was 
held out from Downing Street. It may be that the British 
offered new and more acceptable terms. It is more probable 
that Germany had made up her mind to a war, which she 
hoped to limit to Russia and France, and was trying to dis- 
arm British suspicion. 

So I believe that, even if the Archduke had not been 
assassinated at Sarajevo, there would have been ''trouble in 
the Balkans." 

These considerations were fully discussed in the European 
press. A great many well-informed people were holding their 
breath, expecting a new crisis in the months between the 
midsummers of 1914 and 1915. It was often said: "If 
Europe lives through this critical year in peace, Mr. Norman 
Angell will be proved right — that, after all, war is the great 
illusion." The supreme bluff was due. 

And although I beHeve that from 19 13 on the rulers of 
Germany were planning for war — in defence of the Deutsch- 
tum — I think it was largely in bluff. They knew it was to be 
a very critical bluff, the most serious they had yet tried. 
They were "prepared" to back it up, "prepared" for the 
"showdown." But I believe that in their hearts they hoped 
to get what they wanted without fighting. I think that 
Austria hoped Serbia would give in, that Germany hoped 
Russia would give in — that what they wanted was not war — 
but the spoils of war. 

It is impossible to believe that the Foreign Offices of 
England and France and Russia ignored these indications 
of an impending crisis. It is not probable that they were 
caught as unawares as they would Uke to have us believe. 
I think they saw that Germany was preparing for a new and 
more stupendous bluff. It is hard to believe that Sir Edward 
Grey and his colleagues in Paris and St. Petersburg were less 
well informed about the symptoms of approaching storm 
than the writers of newspaper articles. But many crises had 
passed without bloodshed— perhaps this one would. 

In the spring of 19 14 people, interested in the international 



l6o THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION 

situation, who believed in peace, based that belief on the 
fact that Germany had let slip so many better opportunities 
to fight. 

But it was obvious that if Germany was going to war, she 
could not postpone it much longer. 

On the 28th of June, 1914, the heir to the Hapsburg 
throne was assassinated. It was a better pretext for action 
than the warriors of the Deutschtum had had any right to 
expect. President Poincare of France, his prime minister 
and foreign secretary, were away from home on a visit to 
the Tsar. King George of England had failed to reconcile 
the hostile factions in Ireland. Civil war was imminent. 
Great strikes, which might develop into revolution, had 
broken out in Russia. The occasion was as good as the pre- 
text. 



BOOK II 
THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 



CHAPTER XI 

THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS 

In the last forty years several new ideas have been born, 
or have grown to maturity, which will influence the work 
of the diplomats. There will be many things discussed in 
the peace negotiations to follow this War, which were not 
mentioned at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Among others 
is the theory of the rights of nations. 

It is too new an idea to have become well defined. It 
has never been put into practice, so no "technique" for 
its application has been developed. The phrases used to 
express the ideal are vague and it is evident that its ad- 
vocates are even vaguer in their conceptions of what the 
ideal impHes. Nevertheless, it will be an important factor 
in the settlement of the War — if the Entente Powers win. 
All their statesmen refer to it in their speeches. One speaks 
of "The rights of small nations," another of "The legitimate 
aspirations towards national unity," and a third condemns 
Germany or Austria for their treatment of "subject races." 
It is rather hard to be sure what they mean and it often 
looks as if they did not quite know themselves. 

The phrase "The theory of nationahties," was first 
given governmental approval by Napoleon III. He saw 
that it was a weapon against his principal rival, Austria. 
The expression "pan-Slavism" had a very similar history. 
The man who popularized it at the Russian Court was not 
a Slav, but the Armenian Loris Melikov. By marked 
personal ability, in spite of his race, he had won his way to 
the favor of the Tsar. With a very reaHstic sense of poli- 
tics he saw that the pan-Slav idea was a valuable asset 
to the Autocracy. It was a fine-sounding slogan, like "Pa- 
triotism." It would rally to its support a great many high- 

163 



l64 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

minded men and behind it all sorts of scoundrelism could 
find refuge. It would increase the prestige and solidify 
the rule of his Imperial Master; it would foment discontent 
and insurrection in the rival realm of the Hapsburgs. So, 
Napoleon III. saw that if Italy and North Germany realized 
their ambition for national unity, it would be at the ex- 
pense of Austria. 

But at this period when the Germans were breaking 
away from Austrian predominance in the North and the 
scattered Italian States were uniting under the House of 
Savoy, no one spoke of this ''right to national unity" as 
inherent. In the official mind, such "rights" had no a 
priori foundation, they depended upon and grew out of 
"might." Individual idealists Hke Byron might enlist 
in the cause of Greek independence but the governments of 
the Great Powers did not recognize any "rights" in the 
case, until the Greeks had shown that they were strong 
enough to set all Europe by the ears. 

This attitude dominated the diplomats at Berlin in 1878. 
No one had a right to national unity unless they had won it, 
and to only so much of it as they had won. The diplomats 
recognized certain Jaits accomplis, fragments of several 
nations had won their independence, Turkey was not 
strong enough to re-conquer them. But aside from such 
cases, they drew frontiers to suit themselves without any 
concern for the facts of ethnology nor for the wishes of 
the populations so summarily disposed of. It would have 
seemed grotesque to Bismarck and his colleagues at Berlin, 
if anyone had suggested that Serbia — for instance — had a 
"right" to have all the people who spoke her language 
united under one government. And in 1878 no one was 
shocked at this attitude of the diplomats — except the poor 
people who were personally disappointed by being thrown 
back to the Turks. 

But in the last generation there has been growing in 
Europe a feeling that there is an "inherent right" — or at 
least a "manifest expediency" — in the matter. It is pretty 



THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS 165 

widely admitted by the younger generation that there is a 
grave tendency towards disorder wherever national aspira- 
tions are arbitrarily thwarted. We, in America, are so 
used to the idea that the "consent of the governed" is 
impHcit in any government, that it is hard at times to 
remember that it is a brand new idea in Europe and by 
no means universally accepted. 

It is necessary to remark parenthetically that the theory 
of national rights applies only to white men. The English 
do not approve of the nationaHstic aspirations of the 
Egyptians. The French do not apply the theory in 
Morocco. Nor have we shown any inclination to worry over 
securing the consent of the Porto Ricans or Filipinos. 

However, the idea as applied to "civiKzed" people has 
been gaining ground. The EngHsh have nearly made up 
their mind to apply it to Ireland and are quite united in 
the desire to impose it on Germany and Austria. Russian 
statesmen are very emphatic in their conviction that 
"oppressed nations" have a "right" not to be ruled by 
Germans. As the French were the first to formulate the 
rights of man, so they have been clearest in their state- 
ments of the rights of nations. Their statesmen and public- 
ists speak and write as if ethnological groups, with the 
same language, customs and traditions — even if they are 
too weak to assert it — have a right to independence or at 
least to a large degree of autonomy and self-government. 

Monsieur Arthur Chervin, formerly President of the 
Statistical Society of Paris, in his study of the race question 
in the dual monarchy — "L'Autriche et la Hongrie de De- 
main" gives as sharp a definition as I have found of this 
idea. "This phrase {le principe des nationalites) imphes 
the right which human groups, large or small, but united by 
a community of origin, of language, of customs, of tradition, 
of historic relations, of social and poHtical aspirations, 
have to group themselves in order to escape from a foreign 
yoke, and to constitute a nation, a fatherland in the most 
modern and elevated acceptation of these words." 



i66 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

The Germans do not accept this principle. They have an 
indisputable right to national unity because they can show 
the record of three victorious wars which they waged to 
win it. But the people they conquered, Danes, Poles, and 
the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, just as manifestly have 
no such right. Of course the admission of such a theory 
as that proclaimed by the French would be suicide for 
Austria-Hungary or Turkey. 

So, if the non-German forces win in this War, they will 
be influenced in the redrawing of the map by this theory 
of the rights of nations. 

The problems raised by this theory are far from simple. 
First of all, there is the question of fact. If an entirely 
disinterested Census Commission studied the disputed dis- 
tricts for ten years they might be able to reduce the prob- 
lem to something Hke scientific terms. But all "official" 
statistics are suspect. The Austrian census is notoriously 
faulty. All sorts of intimidation is used to secure "favor- 
able" figures. In a land of such mixed races the number of 
people who speak more than one language is large. The per- 
sonal preferences — or the "instructions" — of the census 
taker inevitably falsify the results. The Roumanians 
lay claim to the Province of Bessarabia on the ground that 
seventy-five per cent of the population is Roumanian. 
The Russian census states that less than fifty per cent 
speak the Roumanian language. One figure is quite as 
Hkely to be true as the other. The most notorious instance 
of conflict in the statement of "fact" is furnished by 
Macedonia. The Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian govern- 
ments have been for years "cooking" statistics to prove 
their claim to this territory. 

The more thorough-going advocates of the rights of 
nations propose to decide such uncertain cases by means of 
referendum. But even if a large corps of trained and honest 
election officials were at hand, it would often be found hard 
to apply this solution. In the best of circumstances the 
diplomats will have a very thorny problem on their hands in 



THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS 167 

determining which of the conflicting claims it is wisest to 
accept as true. 

Secondly, it frequently happens that ethnological claims 
to national unity come in direct conflict with other considera- 
tions equally as important. In the old days, the drawers of 
frontiers gave great weight to strategical considerations. In 
1870 the Germans annexed part of French Lorraine in order 
to secure the fortress of Metz. Today the region inhabited 
by Poles stretches westward dangerously near to Berlin, 
and to the northward the Poles — on the basis of ethnological 
rights— would cut Prussia in two. Economic considera- 
tions — as I will show in the next chapter — are also often in 
hopeless conflict with the rights of nations. 

Thirdly, ethnological and language frontiers are rarely, if 
ever, sharply drawn. If on a map of the world you painted 
black every acre where ninety per cent of the population is 
Polish, you would get four or five fairly large but not con- 
tiguous spots around Warsaw, Posen and Cracow, and spots 
in Paris, London, New York City, and Buffalo. If you 
painted red every acre which contained Poles to the extent 
of seventy-five per cent, you would probably join the black 
spots in eastern Europe. But there would be many blank 
spaces left and the result would not look like a country — the 
outline would be fantastically jagged. If you then painted 
blue the acres with fifty-one per cent Pohsh population, it 
would give you a territory twice or three times as large, it 
would color some, but not all of the blank spaces in the midst 
and the outline would still be too irregular to serve as a 
practical frontier. It would be impossible to decide on a 
boundary which would include afl the Poles without including 
a great many non-Poles. 

The same problem of racial mingling is encountered every- 
where the attempt is made to apply the theory. In the 
Tyrol, the Italian population shades off gradually into the 
German. Along the dividing line there is a broad strip 
where it would be difficult to find a single family which was 
not a hybrid of both races. And the ethnological map of 



l68 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

south eastern Europe — ^Austria-Hungary and the Balkans — 
is tremendously confused. 

Remembering that if the Germans win they will ignore 
this theory of national rights, let us take up the ethnological 
problems the diplomats of the Entente will have to face in 
case they win. 

"Italia irridenta " has played so large a role in popularizing 
the idea that people of the same race have a right to the same 
rule, that it naturally comes first. Italy was not able to com- 
plete her unity in her wars of independence. About a mil- 
lion — here again the statistics are uncertain, the Austrian 
census of 1910 gives the figure 768,422 — Italians were left 
under the Hapsburg yoke, principally in the province of 
Tyrol and on the Istrian Peninsula at the head of the Adri- 
atic. There is also a scattering of unredeemed ItaHans up 
and down the eastern coast of the Adriatic. The Austrian 
census of 19 10 gives these figures for the Province of Dal- 
matia: Total, 645,666; Serbo-Croat, 610,669; Italian, 18,028, 
or Slav, 96.0%; and Italian, 2.8%. In the days of Venetian 
greatness all this coast was imder Italian rule. The language 
is still current in the ports but the Hinterland, as these figures 
show, is overwhelmingly Slav. 

The ItaHans, in case of victory, hope for much more than 
in the way of spoils. But the neighborhood of Trieste and 
the Province of Tyrol is all they can claim on the basis of 
the rights of nationalities. 

There is also an "oppressed Latin race" in southeastern 
Europe. In Austria-Hungary — mostly in the Provinces of 
Transylvania and Bukovina — there are many Roumanian 
peasants. The Austrian census admits somewhat more than 
three millions. The Roumanians claim more. There is also 
the Roumanian problem in Bessarabia. But only the most 
ardent advocates of the theory of nationalities suggest 
applying it to the victors. If the Entente wins, there is small 
chance of Russia giving up her Roumanian subjects. 

According to the "theory" all these "unredeemed" 
Roumanians ought to want to be united to the kingdom. 



THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS 169 

There is, however, wide and bitter difference of opinion as to 
their real desires. In Transylvania they are certainly dis- 
contented with Hungarian rule, but the lot of the peasantry 
in Roumania proper is far from enviable. It is quite possible 
that if the unredeemed Roumanians were allowed to do as 
they please, they would form an independent government of 
their own. 

In the same neighborhood there is the equally complicated 
question of the Southern Slavs. The population of Austria- 
Hungary is divided roughly into three groups: Germans, 
eleven millions; Hungarians, ten millions; and Slavs (includ- 
ing the Bohemians and Poles of the North), twenty- two 
millions. The Southern Slavs— between six and seven mil- 
lions — are more nearly related to the Serbs than to anyone 
else. A large section of them came under Venetian rule in the 
Middle Ages and were converted to the Catholic Church and 
write their Slavic language in Roman letters like ours. Cul- 
turally, they are more closely related to the Bohemians and 
Poles than to the Serbs. The rest of the Southern Slavs 
belong to the Orthodox Church and use the Russian alphabet 
like the Serbs. It has always been the Austrian policy to 
fan these religious discords in order to divide their subjects. 
It is an open question whether the rehgious or racial principle 
is stronger among these people. And the economic life of all 
this Southern Slav group looks towards Austria rather than 
towards the Balkans. All this great plain is agricultural and 
drives a thriving trade with the industrial districts north of 
the Danube. The economic interests favor the status quo. 

A project has long been current of transforming the Dual 
Monarchy into a Triple State, that is, to create a Southern 
Slav Kingdom which would have the same sovereign as the 
other two nations, Austria and Hungary. Undoubtedly a 
great many of the Southern Slavs would prefer to be in- 
corporated in a greater Serbia. But undoubtedly some of 
them would have preferred to form a separate kingdom within 
the far more prosperous Austrian Empire. Which, if either, 
of these tendencies is in a large majority is at present imcer- 



I70 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

tain. The progress and outcome of the war will undoubtedly 
influence the public opinion of these Slav populations. 

It is fairly certain that at least a minority of the Croats 
will be opposed to any union with Serbia which did not give 
them a very large degree of autonomy. And unless Austria 
is so badly defeated that it becomes decidedly unfashionable 
to belong to it, the Slovenes farther north will almost cer- 
tainly object to Serbian rule. Even the most exalted advo- 
cates of the rights of nations — the pan-Serbs excepted — do 
not beHeve in forcing national imity on people who do not 
want it. 

These problems of national unity affect directly the Dual 
Monarchy. The German Empire contains three groups of 
''subject people," — the Danes of Schleswig-Holstein, the 
inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and the Poles. 

To a certain extent the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein 
by Prussia in 1864 was in accordance with this theory of 
national unity. A very large part of these two Danish 
Provinces were inhabited by Germans — approximately 
eighty per cent. All the southern section of this annexed 
territory, well up above the present line of the Kiel Canal, 
has spoken German for many centuries. But Bismarck was 
not content to stop at the ethnological frontier and annexed 
close to a million Danes. 

The memory of that war is as remote as that of our Civil 
War. Few of the generation which saw the conquest are 
still alive. There has been a steady emigration of Germans 
into the Danish section — especially the towns — and the 
digging of the Kiel Canal has brought an immense stimulus 
to business — which has been shared even by the Danish 
element. A strict application of the ethnological rule would 
return Northern Schleswig to Denmark. It is probable that 
the population of this territory would vote for the change, 
but it is not certain. Certainly the German population of 
Holstein and Southern Schleswig would bitterly resist being 
separated from Germany. The Danish government would 
probably not welcome any such gift. Those who propose it 



THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS 17 1 

are not influenced by the theory of national rights, but by a 
desire to punish Germany by taking from her the strategic 
and economic advantages of the Kiel Canal. 

Alsace-Lorraine presents a different problem. In 1870 the 
people of Lorraine were indisputably French. But the 
peasants of Alsace spoke German and were ethnologically 
closely related to the Teutons. However, they were a 
Hberty loving people and had enthusiastically embraced the 
political principles of the French Revolution. They were as 
much opposed to the annexations by Germany as were the 
French speaking people of Lorraine. 

Ever since the treaty of Frankfort the victors have tried 
to change the nature and constitution of the population. 
In the early years of the new regime a great many inhabitants 
of keen French sympathies were driven out of the district by 
carefully planned persecutions. Strenuous efforts have been 
made to Germanize those who remained. The government 
has encouraged Germans to emigrate into this Reichsland 
and colonize it. How far they have succeeded in changing 
the composition of the population is a subject of bitter dis- 
cussion. In some places, notably the new industrial centers, 
the Germans seem to be in the majority, and other sections, 
especially the countryside, are vehemently anti-German, 

The French are not willing to allow the matter to be de- 
cided by a referendum. They are certainly right in saying 
that if the Germans who have come into Alsace-Lorraine 
since 1870 were disfranchised, and if all those French sym- 
pathizers who have fled from the conqueror were allowed 
to go home to vote, the result would be overwhelmingly 
in their favor. They have a plausible argument that there 
is no reason to allow a burglar to keep his spoil, simply be- 
cause he has frightened away the original owner. If a 
referendum were taken the actual population would, in 
some places, vote in favor of Germany. 

Here, as in Schleswig-Holstein, the Germans have brought 
a great prosperity — such as Alsace-Lorraine never knew 
under French rule. This is partly due to the German 



172 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

genius for organization and intelligent, forward-looking 
state help in developing industrial life. And it is very 
largely due to the fact that the annexation of these prov- 
inces gave Germany control of both banks of the Rhine. 

There are many considerations which make a river a 
poor frontier. Valleys tend to unite, while mountain 
chains divide. From a purely geographical point of view 
the crest of the Vosges — or the mountains of the Schwartz- 
wald — form a better frontier than the Rhine. There is 
always communication between the inhabitants of the 
two banks of a river. A glance at an ethnological map 
shows that peoples of similar civilization tend to group in 
valleys. 

For the technical development of a river as an economic 
unit — a trade route — it is evidently better to have both 
banks under one authority. (With us, the central govern- 
ment has charge of all water routes. It is easy to imagine 
the haphazard and inefficient results we would get if we 
entrusted the development of the Mississippi to the states 
which border it.) The Germans have made of the Upper 
Rhine a model of economic development. A good many 
of the old stock of Alsace-Lorraine would, for sentimental 
reasons, prefer French rule, but would at the same time 
regret to lose the prosperity which the Germans have 
brought. 

As among the Southern Slavs, so here, there are a great 
man}^ who would prefer to estabhsh an independent gov- 
ernment. And there is at least one committee which is 
advocating a union with Switzerland. 

Nowhere is the German rule of a "subject race" so 
entirely unsatisfactory as in Prussian Poland. The pro- 
gram of Germanization had failed completely. After more 
than a century of administration here, the Germans are 
more hated by their Polish subjects than by their Danes 
and French. As so often happens the worst accusations 
against the Germans are to be found in their own apologies. 
Prince von Biilow, the former chancellor, in his book 



THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS 173 

"Imperial Germany" discusses the Polish problem at 
length. His argument boils down to this very simple 
proposition: If the Poles are allowed to enjoy prosperity 
their women bear too many children. The Prussians 
have been installed in Poland for a long time, but the 
proportion of Poles in the population of these provinces 
increases. One of the grounds on which the Germans 
base their claim of racial superiority over their neighbors — 
especially the French — is their fecundity. They cannot 
tolerate being surpassed in this matter by a "subject race." 
But unless something strenuous is done, Prussia is doomed 
to become Polish. 

After a period of relative tolerance under the Chancellor 
Caprivi (which the ungrateful Poles utihzed in restrained 
breeding) the Prussian policy has changed to one of ruth- 
less — and scientific — repression. Just as some of our more 
rabid Southerners have advocated the checking of the 
negro birthrate by surgical operations, so similar means 
have been suggested against the Poles. But von Billow 
believes that the same results can be obtained by eco- 
nomic pressure. In 1888 the Prussian Landstag created 
an Ausiedielung-kommission (Board of Colonization) to 
buy out the Polish landlords and resell their estates in 
small plots to German colonists. As the Poles generally 
refused to sell, a new law was passed in 1908 which gave 
the commission the right to buy land without the owner's 
consent. Pohsh children were flogged in the pubHc schools 
if they spoke their mother-tongue. Everything was done 
to break the spirit of nationality. Everything was arranged 
with Prussian thoroughness to make it not only very un- 
pleasant but also very unprofitable, to be a Pole. The 
fight has been bitter in the extreme. How long the Poles 
could have kept up their resistance in the face of over- 
whelming odds is uncertain. Few people in Europe deserve 
more pity than the Poles of Germany. 

But the Polish "nation" was not even permitted to be 
oppressed in common. When their independence was 



174 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

overthrown — by a combination of external intrigue and 
internal dissension — there was a series of "Partitions" 
between Prussia, Austria and Russia. 

The Poles of Russia are Httle more fortunate than those 
of Germany. The phrase "Bleeding Poland" has gener- 
ally referred to the Tsar's share of the spoils. And, if his 
rule has been preferable to that of the Kaiser, it was not 
because he was more tender towards his "subject races," 
but only because he was less efficient. The process of 
Germanization has been orderly, scientific and inexorable, 
that of Russofication has been brutal, bungling and hap- 
hazard. The Russian Poles have always felt that there was 
some chance of a successful revolution. But it is hard to 
convince either a Russian or a German Pole that anything 
could be harder than their present lot. 

The Austrian Poles have been in a very different position. 
They are better off than either of the other two sections 
of their brothers and also in a much more tolerable position 
than the other "subject races" of Austria-Hungary. After 
the Hapsburgs had been crushed in 1866 by the rising 
power of Prussia a reorganization of their empire was 
necessary. A compromise called the Augsleich was 
reached between the German and Hungarian elements 
which resulted in the constitution of the present Dual 
Monarchy. This arrangement has been called "a con- 
spiracy between the two strongest nationalities in the 
Hapsburg empire for the concerted oppression of the 
rest." While the Hungarians could claim very near, if 
not quite, a majority of the population of Hungary, the 
German element was in a decided minority in Austria. 
The census of 1910 gives them 35.58 per cent of the popula- 
tion. And "official" statistics are nearly always padded. 
The rest of the "Austrians" belong to one or another of 
the Slav families: Bohemians (or Czechs as they call them- 
selves) Poles, Ruthenes, Slovenes, etc. It is evident that 
the German element could not hope to govern Austria 
unless they made accomplices of one or another of these 



THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS 175 

Slav groups. They chose an alliance with the Poles. The 
province of Galicia was given a large measure of home rule. 
The Polish language was put on a par with German. 

At least one of the reasons why the German politicians 
of Vienna selected the Poles for their allies in internal 
politics was that they could count on them as "reaction- 
aries." The Austrian Poles are, to a large extent, feudal 
landlords. They form a privileged minority of the popula- 
tion and are sure to oppose any such subversive ideas as 
universal suffrage. The mass of the people in Austrian 
"Poland" are Ruthenians of the Uniate ReKgion, an hereti- 
cal, hybrid sect, which bears some resemblance to the 
Greek Orthodox Church but recognizes the Pope at Rome. 
The House of Hapsburg very cleverly won the loyalty 
of the Catholic PoKsh nobihty by allowing them to oppress 
their "subject race" to their hearts' content. The land- 
owning class of Galician Poles would much prefer to retain 
their favored position in the Dual Monarchy rather than 
to enter into a reconstituted Poland which implied any 
democratic Kberties for their peasants. 

The problem of Poland represents several of the difficul- 
ties which will arise in any attempt to apply the theory of 
nationalities. In the palmy days of their national glory 
the Poles were among the worst offenders against the 
"rights" of other races. They conquered and embodied 
in Poland large sections of Ruthenia, Russia, Lithuania 
and Prussia. Never in history have their poHtical frontiers 
coincided with their ethnological frontiers. Poland cannot 
be "reconstituted" without violating the rights of some 
other national group. 

I have already referred to the difficulty of establishing 
any absolute ethnological frontier for the Poles and to the 
fact that strategic and economic considerations are likely 
to seem quite as important to the peace negotiators as 
the theoretic rights of nations. 

The only thing one can hope from its application — pro- 
vided that the Powers who believe in the theory win — 



176 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

is a rough approximation to ethnological justice. With 
the best will in the world there will inevitably be unsatis- 
fied minorities. But such difficulties are very much re- 
duced if they are frankly faced. Large facilities for cross 
migration could be easily arranged. If, for instance, the 
Italian frontier in the Tyrol is to be changed, those Ger- 
mans contained in the newly acquired territory who did 
not like the new regime, could emigrate and the Italians 
left out by the new frontier could immigrate. Many other 
practical expedients to reduce the inevitable friction of 
change will suggest themselves. And every sincere effort 
to give people the form of government they covet will tend 
to make Europe a more orderly and livable place. It 
may be accepted as a maxim of statescraft, that trouble 
is threatened wherever one group considers itself oppressed 
by "foreigners." It is Utopian to hope to eradicate all 
the discontent which has grown up about these aspirations 
for national unity, to satisfy everybody, but an immense 
amount might — with sincere effort — be accomplished. 

The extent to which any effort towards the application 
of this theory will be made, depends of course on the out- 
come of the War. Neither Germany, nor Austria-Hungary, 
nor Turkey accept the theory. In case of their defeat, 
we may expect Great Britain, as she has few claims on the 
continent, to be the most disinterested advocate of the 
rights of nations. She would probably think it was over- 
doing the "theory" to apply it to her island possession in 
the Mediterranean or to Gibraltar, but aside from these 
cases her vote will probably be cast in this sense. 

France, aside from Alsace-Lorraine, where she puts 
historic above ethnological considerations, will probably 
support this theory in every case where it is not prejudicial 
to her ally, Russia. If the German defeat is overwhelming, 
she may be able to free her foreign policy from Russian 
influence and give unqualified support to this theory. In 
general the French are more interested in such abstract 
principles than their allies and the idea of the rights of 



THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS 177 

nations has undoubtedly caught a firmer hold on public 
opinion in France than elsewhere. 

Russia will certainly believe in freeing all subject races 
from German or Austrian rule. She may, if pressed by her 
more Kberal aUies, hve up to her promise to give some sort 
of autonomy to the Poles. But — unless there is a funda- 
mental revolution in her poKtics- — it is improbable that 
she will extend this theory of the rights of nationalities to 
her internal affairs. The fact that her other subject races 
will certainly clamor for all the concessions she gives the 
Poles, will influence her — if her reactionaries stay in power — 
to reduce the autonomy of Poland to a minimum. 

Italy and Serbia can be counted on to favor the theory 
wherever it means an increase to their territory. There 
is no reason to beHeve that either of them would show any 
loyalty to the theory if it stood in the way of their "legiti- 
mate aspirations." 

The rights of nations was not even mentioned at the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878. The idea has grown to the 
point where it has forced itself on the attention of "prac- 
tical" statesmen. Some of them, with every show of 
sincerity, have accepted it as a watchword. But it has 
not yet grown to full maturity. No government of Europe 
accepts it without qualifications. Some reject it absolutely. 
But if the Powers of the Entente win, we may expect to 
see the theory given official sanction. Violations of it by 
the diplomatic map-drawers, instead of being the rule, will 
be the exception. 



CHAPTER XII 

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 

At the Congress of Berlin very little was said about 
"business." A generation ago such considerations were 
beneath the dignity of diplomats. Today every embassy 
has its "commercial adviser" — quite as important a per- 
sonage as the military attache. La diplomatie des chemins 
de Jer — the French equivalent for Dollar Diplomacy — 
has now become respectable and ambassadors are expected 
to know something about "tariffs" and "cost of produc- 
tion" and "trade development." 

The two main economic considerations of modern di- 
plomacy are (i) access to raw materials and (2) trade 
routes. 

Russia, with her immense expanse of territory, holds a 
favored position in Europe. She is an almost complete 
economic unit. As her industry develops and— largely 
under German leadership — it has been developing rapidly, 
she finds most of the raw material she needs within her own 
borders. Such tropical products as rubber are all she lacks. 
She has a wealth of minerals and timber, exceedingly fertile 
farm lands, great grazing expanses which furnish meat and 
hides and wool. In the Transcaspia fine cotton is being 
grown. For fuel she has abundant coal and oil — and almost 
limitless waterpower. In regard to natural resources her 
position is as promising as was ours at the beginning of the 
last century. Her immense territories are under-populated 
and under-developed. 

The situation of Germany is the reverse. Her lands are 
already over-populated, her fields do not normally produce 
enough food to feed her, and her birth-rate is dangerously 
high. Her population increases about 800,000 a year. 

178 



DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 179 

This increase must be absorbed by industry. If there are 
no jobs for her children in the factories they must emigrate 
or starve. And industry, always expanding to meet this 
increase, demands an ever larger supply of raw material. 
The actual frontiers of the Empire do not contain enough 
to meet the present need. 

Their deservedly famous steel industry is an example. 
The Krupp armament works at Essen, of which we hear 
so much these days, are only a small part of the immense 
and steadily growing metallurgic industry of the West- 
phahan Rhine. The supply of German ore is notably in- 
sufficient. Across the neighboring frontier in eastern 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and northeastern France are great 
fields of low-grade iron ore. The Germans developed a 
process of working this ore profitably. And there, in the 
heart of French Lorraine, are little villages, like Saint- 
Pierremont, which German brains, German money, and 
German labor have turned into thriving mining towns. 
The ore goes to feed the great iron mills of the Rhine. 

The French did not need this raw material. Their own 
iron industry had naturally centered around their older and 
richer mines. It had not begun to run short of raw material. 
If the Germans are kept from their source of wealth by 
exceptional laws or by tariff barriers— if the price of steel 
rails is arbitrarily increased by a chance political boundary — 
they and all the world are suffering an economic wrong. 

France on the other hand lacks oil. Italy lacks both fuel 
and mineral wealth. There is hardly any industry in 
England — except coal mining — which is not dependent on 
imported raw material. 

Russia and the United States stand quite by themselves in 
this matter. But in both these countries the importance 
of foreign trade tends to grow. The situation in regard to 
dye-stuffs is typical. I am told that even our government 
Bureau of Engraving was embarrassed for lack of red ink 
to print our postage stamp. The other countries less for- 
tunate in the possession of natural resources are to a very 



l8o THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

much greater degree dependent on imported raw ma- 
terial. 

In times of peace it would seem that free trade would 
greatly ease the situation. It would matter very Httle to 
the German ironmongers where their ore came from, if 
poHtical frontiers did not tend to increase its cost. But 
much of the discussion on this point is vitiated by the as- 
sumption that it is simply an economic affair. Almost 
all professors of poHtical economy are in favor of free trade, 
but their scholarly arguments have as little practical re- 
sult as those of the enthusiasts for disarmament. As a 
matter of fact other considerations are at stake besides 
those of "pure economy." We, in America, know that 
often one of the considerations in tariff discussions is simply 
"graft." The high tariff regime in Russia was primarily a 
financial measure. Count Witte wanted to put the Empire's 
currency on a gold basis so as to improve Russian credit in 
foreign banking circles. He pushed up the custom charges 
in order to gather the necessary "gold reserve." He was 
relatively uninterested in the effect on the economic Hfe 
of the country. 

The principal motive of high tariff in Germany has been 
political, in a narrower sense dynastic. As Professor 
Veblen very clearly indicates in his "Imperial Germany 
and the Industrial Revolution," the ruling class in Germany 
has intentionally manipulated custom barriers — from the 
days of the Zollverein to the present — in order to weld 
together the German "race" and to sharply differentiate 
it from its neighbors. The German universities have de- 
volved a "school" of patriotic economy, which is not "econ- 
omy" at all, but a most uneconomic industrial nationalism. 

As long as — from various reasons — tariffs remain in fashion 
this question of access to raw material will be a serious con- 
cern to statesmen. And a diplomat who was inspired by the 
desire to reorganize Europe with the sole intention of facil- 
itating the greatest industrial production at the lowest 
possible cost, would advise endless changes in the map. But 



DOLLAR DIPLOMACY i8l 

of course he could not realize his ideal without violating the 
rights of nations and many other sacred interests. 

However, when the soldiers finish their job, and the 
diplomats begin work, the ''commercial advisers" will make 
themselves heard and the phrase "access to raw materials" 
will come up frequently in their discussions. 

The second economic consideration of diplomacy — 
"trade routes" — is of far greater importance. This is pri- 
marily a matter of the sea. Almost every important trade 
route leads to salt water. Easy circulation — cheap trans- 
portation — is the most vital need of modern life. In spite of 
the marvellous progress in the means of transport by land, 
water traffic is cheaper. It is slower, to be sure, but the 
larger and heavier the produce, the greater is the saving in 
carrying it by sea. 

Before we opened the canal, most heavy freight from 
New York or Europe to Panama City on the Pacific was 
shipped clear around the Horn, although a very good rail- 
road — only forty miles long — existed across the Isthmus. 

Much of the prosperity of England is due to the fact that 
it is so small an island. Land transportation — the bringing in 
of raw material, the exporting of the finished product — is 
reduced to the minimum. It is typical that even in inland 
commerce we speak of goods as "shipped" not "trained." 
No matter how highly a nation has developed its railroads, 
its canals and rivers, it is at a very real disadvantage if these 
routes do not lead to the ocean. 

Russia and Germany both suffer from the economic 
wrong of not having sufficient access to the ice-free seas. 

All the great rivers of Russia run to the South. And the 
Black Sea is landlocked. Its commerce is at the mercy of 
whoever holds the Dardanelles. The insufficiency of the 
Baltic and Antarctic Seas has been demonstrated by this 
War, and Vladivostok is a long way off from the center of 
Russian fife. 

The Germanic peoples are grouped geographically about 
the upper waters of the Rhine and the Danube. They have 



l82 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

given these rivers immense industrial importance by the 
most modern and scientific development, but the mouths of 
neither of them is in German control. The Danube, like the 
Russian rivers, empties into the Black Sea. The mouths of 
the Rhine are Dutch. 

During the last generation half a hundred treaties have 
been signed in regard to trade rights on these important 
waterways. It has been accepted— in principle — by inter- 
national legists that no single state can exercise unlimited 
sovereignty in such cases. "Geographical accidents" of so 
great importance belong to Europe as a whole. An inter- 
national commission has been estabhshed to regulate traffic 
on the Lower Danube. (It has not worked very well, be- 
cause the hostility between the various governments of the 
Balkans has been too great to allow them to cooperate 
whole-heartedly on anything. But in spite of this ill-will a 
good deal has been accomplished in improving the traffic 
route and the principle of such control has been clearly 
enunciated.) Holland has escaped this "international 
regime" by making large and frequent concessions to all 
interested parties. The German trade rights in the Dutch 
Rhine have been continually expanded. 

But still all the Rhine-borne traffic suffers vexatious hand- 
icaps. German industry has brought great prosperity to the 
Dutch ports. An arbitrary pohtical frontier forces the 
Germans to share the normal profit of their labor with 
foreigners who have not cooperated in its production. The 
Dutch — rather like "absentee landlords" — get rich by 
sitting still. 

The Germans have tried to persuade the Dutch to enter 
the Empire voluntarily. They offered them a position on a 
par with Bavaria, second only to Prussia. It was rather 
Uke offering the landlord a job on the farm. The Dutch re- 
fused. 

Even if Holland should be absorbed by the Empire, Ger- 
man industry would still be handicapped in comparison to 
that of England or France or Italy. Even the mouths of the 



DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 183 

Rhine, while a great advantage over all her present water- 
gates, could not equal the exceptional facilities of her trade 
rivals. That this situation should be irksome to the Germans 
is natural, but it is hardly possible to remedy it without 
sweeping reforms in the geological formation of the earth. 

Austria-Hungary was in a more fortunate position. She 
had fine ports on the Adriatic, at Trieste, Fiume, Pola and 
Cattaro. These harbors, especially Trieste, have been very 
important factors in her industrial development. The 
Austrian Lloyd, the finest fleet in the Mediterranean mer- 
chant service, carries most of the Adriatic trade, runs an 
express service to Constantinople and the Black Sea ports 
and another to Egypt, Suez and the Red Sea. Trieste is the 
window through which all the Germans and Slavs of the 
Upper Danube look out on the world. But the possession of 
Trieste and these other ports, while entirely justified by 
economic considerations, is in rank violation of the rights of 
nationalities. 

"Trade strategy" has taken on a new and vast importance 
in this War. The closing of the Dardanelles has paralyzed 
the grain and oil trade of the Black Sea — to the immense 
advantage of Austria and Germany. The Russian Caucasus 
and Roumania are the two principal petroleum centers of 
Europe. The output of these two oilfields is now lying idle 
or going to the Germans. This is certainly true of the Rou- 
manian oil, and some at least of the Russian oil is probably 
going to the enemy. The immense quantities of grain which 
normally come down the Danube and the great Russian 
rivers to the Black Sea and out through the Dardanelles, are 
now rotting on the wharves — or going up the Danube. The 
Germans with this easy access to grain and oil can afford to 
laugh at the "impotent" blockade of the Entente. The 
desperate effort to force the Dardanelles — condemned as 
foolhardy by most neutral military and naval authorities — 
is motived by the desire to open the sea route to Russia and 
also the hope of intimidating the Roimianians into stopping 
their trade with the Germans. 



i84 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

Italy, in the early months of her "neutrality," seized the 
harbor of Avlona on the Albanian coast, and so, by con- 
trolling both shores of the narrow straits of Oranto, can 
close the Adriatic. The British at Suez and Gibraltar hold 
both outlets of the Mediterranean, and by their geographical 
position across the mouth of the North Sea can "bring pres- 
sure to bear" on all the sea-borne commerce of northern 
Europe. The possession of these strategic points is of great 
importance quite aside from the old and well-estabHshed 
principles of naval strategy, i. e., the interfering with and 
sinking of the enemy's warships. 

Unfettered, cheap transportation — free use of the sea — is 
as important to modern industrial Hfe as the circulation of 
blood to the body. The nations like the United States and 
Russia which can Hve without international commerce are 
rare exceptions. The industrial revolution — the invention 
of steam power, and the division of labor which followed — 
has completely changed the manner of life of the nations. 
It has put them at the mercy of anyone who controls the sea. 
It is no longer necessary to send an army to devastate the 
enemy's country. It is possible to lay waste its industry by 
closing its sea-gates. It is not even necessary to declare war. 
By a judicious scattering of mines and by declaring fresh air 
contraband, it is possible to smash the industrial life of a 
"neutral" nation. This War has demonstrated that bellig- 
erents will do all in their power to crush the enemy's indus- 
try; that, in this effort, they will ignore the rights of neutrals, 
that they will use the economic power given them by sea- 
control to force neutrals to join them, and that in the heat 
of the conflict the goverrmients will not have time to restrain 
their own citizens from reaping private and not very honor- 
able profits from the situation. The EngUsh shippers, for 
example, have utilized the opportunity of the War and the 
extraordinary rules of their admiralty to cut in on the carry- 
ing trade of Holland to an extent they never were able to do 
in what is called "fair competition." 

To pretend — as the English do — that Germany had no 



DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 185 

reason to be uneasy over British navalism, that the rest 
of the world should have trusted them unquestioningly 
with this great power, is a proposition hardly worth dis- 
cussing. The dominant sea power will always be able to 
collect any tax it cares to on the water-borne commerce of 
its rivals. And year by year civilization becomes more 
dependent on world-wide exchange. The Enghsh claim 
that they have never abused this power. They are sin- 
cerely convinced of this themselves. But it is hardly a 
question to be left to the decision of the person who wields 
the power. There are very few people in the world who 
agree with them in this matter. 

The German criticism of the British position would be 
unanswerable, if there was any reason to believe that they 
objected to such arbitrary power per se. But their record 
on land indicates that it is not the ding an sick to which 
they object, but to the fact that their rivals, the English, 
possess it. They do not want to abolish sea-dictatorship, 
but to wield it themselves. Their talk about the ruthless- 
ness of the British sea-tyranny is not very convincing. 
However, most of the neutral nations which are pro-German 
in their sympathies have taken that side because they 
would — or think they would — suffer less from German 
sea-rule than they do from that of the Enghsh. 

But no matter whether there is any justification for 
sea-rule or not, it is certain that in the hquidation of this 
War — whichever side wins — great stress will be laid on 
the possession of these strategic points which dominate 
the sea-routes. And, as old-fashioned naval warfare seems 
to be going out of fashion, the diplomats will consider these 
points not so much as "bases" for the revictualing and 
repairing of warships but rather as gates which in the event 
of a new war can be closed to the detriment of the enemy's 
commerce. 

We may hope, however, that the diplomats will not en- 
tirely subordinate their economic discussions to the point 
of view of war. After all — at the very worst — there will be 



l86 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

intervals of peace, and the needs of civilization in such 
times will deserve some consideration. And this brings 
us back to the problem of ocean gateways. The freedom 
of the seas will be of srnall value to a nation without ports. 

Neither Germany or Russia can be given sufficient 
access to the sea, nor Austria allowed to retain her present 
harbors without violation of the theory of the right of 
nationalities. The conflict between these two principles — 
economic and ethnological — can be intensified or mitigated 
by tariff arrangements. 

The industrial life of a community can be thrown en- 
tirely out of gear by customs regulations. A striking ex- 
ample of this was furnished by the Balkan Wars. Salonika 
is the one really good harbor between Athens and Constan- 
tinople. It is the natural water gate for import and export 
for Macedonia. Under the Turkish rule it fulfilled this 
function and enjoyed a large prosperity. The treaty of 
Bucarest divided Macedonia into three sections. The 
northern part went to Serbia. Salonika and a narrow strip 
of hinterland went to Greece: eastern Macedonia and the 
undeveloped harbor of Dedeagatch went to Bulgaria. 

At once customs houses were erected along the new 
frontiers. Goods imported into Bulgarian Macedonia 
via Salonika had to pay two taxes, the Greek tariff when 
it was landed and the Bulgarian tariff at the frontier. 
Produce brought out had to pay the Greek tax before it 
reached Salonika to be shipped. Inevitably all the trade 
of Bulgarian Macedonia was diverted to Dedeagatch to 
avoid the Greek tariff. Salonika, now a port only for a 
narrow strip of Greek territory, is doomed to lose much 
of its former prosperity. A new town is growing up in 
the swamps around Dedeagatch. This dislocation of estab- 
lished trade routes, the ruining of one city and the building 
of a new one, is pure economic waste. It has no excuse 
but reverence for the hoary tradition of customs houses. 

In theory, free trade would completely solve the problem. 
If there were no custom barriers, it ought not to make any 



DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 187 

difiference what flag flew over a port. And there is no doubt 
that every reduction in such medieeval trade restrictions — 
and they may take the form of freight rates, clearing-house 
charges or harbor dues — tends to unify the economic Kfe 
of the world and to remove the causes of friction. But 
even if all tariffs were abohshed — a most unUkely proceed- 
ing in the face of such ancient traditions — the problem 
would not be entirely solved. In practice "human nature" 
is not yet perfected. And "good will" is quite as important 
as "free trade" in equalizing economic opportunities. 

Some years ago, on a long sea trip I chanced to have 
many conversations with a German merchant who, after 
twenty years, had given up his business in Hong Kong — 
"chased out," as he said. His story illustrates a frame of 
miH which is almost, if not quite, as important as tariff 
laws.^^He had gone out as a youth to act as clerk in a Ger- 
man importing and exporting company in the EngHsh 
"open doC/;;) colony of Hong Kong. At that time — twenty 
years ago — there was only one other German firm in that 
port. 

He had small respect for EngKsh traders. They drank 
too much whiskey, he said, and wasted time playing games. 
They did business by means of native middlemen. He and 
his countrymen took the trouble to learn Chinese. He 
had prospered and in time estabhshed a business of his 
own. Other Germans had come to Hong Kong and had 
followed his example of hard work and had also prospered. 
About 1900 half of the business of this British port was 
in German hands. Then there was a change. 

"At first," he said, "the English treated us pretty well. 
They would not have anything to do with us soC'lUly, but 
they were fair enough in trade. But at last they became 
scared, they woke up to the fact that we were beating them 
in every department of business — and then things changed. 
They did not alter any of their laws — no — they did nc' 
have to. If a British and a German ship came into the 
harbor together, the British ship was docked first. You 



l88 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

see, the harbor master was an Englishman. I have seen 
German ships, with consignments on board for me, held 
up for two weeks, waiting for a chance to unload. They 
have good sanitary laws in Hong Kong. They ought to be 
carefully observed, although they cost money. Well — 
German merchants in Hong Kong have to live up to the 
letter — to the dot on the i's. The English inspectors are 
not so severe on their countrymen. One day the representa- 
tive of the electric company — an Englishman — called on 
me and said he would be unable to renew my lighting con- 
tract. He was polite about it — very sorry and all that — 
technical difficulties. But it was a lie. We, German mer- 
chants, had been trying, for a long time, to get a franchise 
to install a rival electric plant, we could have furnished 
light and power at a big saving — their system was ^pti- 
quated. But of course we could not get the f ranch'"'" -^ri ^fe 
had to go back to oil lamps. The thing which fipa^'^" drove 
me out was that my lease expired. The owr\fcfi''^'-'Lild not 
renew it; no one who owned a decent busmess place would 
rent or sell to a German. The English c j not like competi- 
tion. Of course I subscribe to our Navy League." 

Later I talked this over witii an Englishman, who had 
been in Hong Kong, and he admitted the substantial ac- 
curacy of this story, but his reply to it was fairly plausible. 
The English have expended an amount of blood and money 
on developing thdr colonial markets which is quite in- 
calculable. They resent outsiders coming in to reap where 
they have not sown. "Why," he asked, "did not your 
German go to his own colony of Kiau Chow? No! They 
much preff^j'.ours where all the most dangerous and expen- 
sive pior^Cr work has been done." 

It is the same elsewhere. Legally a regime of equal 
opportunity for all nations has been established by the 
French in Morocco. But everywhere the non-French 
merchants are closing up their businesses and leaving. 
Once upon a time — not so very long ago — there was a 
considerable export of goat skins from Mogador to our 



DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 189 

glove factories in Philadelphia. Now, a native who sells 
to an American buyer is not well looked on by the French 
officials of the port. This trade has been diverted to Mar- 
seilles. The central government at Paris and the French 
people as a whole would undoubtedly disapprove of this 
interference with American commerce (especially as we 
stood beside them loyally at Algeciras and refused to pro- 
test when they tore up that treaty), but what can they do 
to restrain the petty officials? The French in Morocco, 
colonists, civiHan administrators and soldiers, reason as 
did the EngUshman about Hong Kong, "Here, we are 
spending our money and blood to open up Morocco to 
commerce. Why should foreigners, who bear none of the 
expense, get the profit?" 

If, as a result of this War, Trieste is given to the Italians, 
German and Austrian trade, no matter what the tariff laws 
are, will be at a disadvantage in this port. 

Although "free trade" will not entirely solve the prob- 
lems of this conflict between economic and nationalistic 
interests, it will certainly tend to lessen them, high tariffs 
will as certainly embitter them. 

The considerations of economic interest, of access to 
raw material and open trade routes, will occupy a large 
share of the attention of the Peace Congress to come. If 
the diplomats are inspired by a desire to heal as quickly 
as possible the wounds of this War, to give to the industrial 
development of Europe the best facilities, a great deal can 
be done by commercial treaties. But, on the other hand, 
the victors can, if they wish, use economic measures as 
weapons to further abase and paralyze the vanquished. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE COLONIAL WORLD 

More and more European diplomacy becomes occupied 
with non-European subjects. Of course the idea of colonies 
is as ancient as history. But at the Congress of Berlin in 
1878 there was hardly any reference in the official sessions 
to territory outside of the Continent. Russia was pushing 
her frontiers beyond the Caucasus into Asia, but this was 
expansion, not colonization. In the corridors Disraeli was 
offering Tunisia to France but there is nothing about this 
or similar deals in the official records. 

Times are changing. At the Conference of Algeciras in 
1906 it was just the opposite — European frontiers were not 
even mentioned. It is a typical fact that while all we know 
of the Triple Alliance (the complete treaty has not been 
published) indicates that it is exclusively continental, all 
the published texts of the ententes — the newer forms of 
diplomacy — are exclusively colonial. 

There are few points where the political ideals of Europe 
and America are more sharply differentiated. We are not a 
colonizing people. The few colonies we have we acquired 
more by accident than by reasoned design. We do not 
enjoy them. When we boast of our national riches, the 
colonies are the last thing we think of. The great mass of 
our people would rack their brains in vain to discover any 
way in which they were better off because our flag flies over 
Porto Rico or the Philippines or Alaska — or Guam. We all 
pay taxes for their support and very few of us profit by 
them. 

It is entirely different in Europe. In each country one 
finds colonial societies organized by people whose liveli- 
hood directly depends on the colonies and who continually 

190 



THE COLONIAL WORLD 19 1 

urge their government — even at the risk of war — to in- 
crease the overseas domain. 

Very few of us receive letters which bear one of our colo- 
nial stamps. The colonial mail of Great Britain, France, 
Holland, and Germany is immense. 

We have no grounds to pretend to a high morality on 
this subject; when we wanted Panama we took it. But as 
a general proposition the forces which push the Old World 
into colonial adventure do not operate in the New World. 
We have no need of colonies. 

There are three main causes for the European poKcy of 
colonial expansion. (I) Surplus population. (II) Hunger 
for raw materials. (Ill) The need for sales-markets. 

We may be sure that this War will greatly stimulate 
the scientific study of the "laws" which govern the birth 
rate. About all we know of the subject now is the depth 
of our ignorance. 

Parts of the world which are today almost uninhabited 
once supported dense populations. Not so many centuries 
ago central Europe was a vast forest which hardly knew the 
sight of man. Today it is overcrowded. Evidently the 
number of inhabitants per square mile does not depend on 
locality — geographical environment. 

Occasionally, to one tribe or another — to some branch 
of the great human family — there comes a spawning im- 
pulse. And just as inexpHcably this impulse suddenly dies 
out. Some nations, which for centuries have fairly balanced 
their deaths and births, begin to grow, some nations, which 
were once prolific, begin to dechne. The matter does not 
seem to be determined by race. 

It certainly is not a matter of political organization or 
material prosperity. For several generations the Germans 
have had a noticeably high birth rate. The ups and downs 
of fate do not seem to have influenced it at all. The dev- 
astation of the Thirty Years War and the Napoleonic 
adventure marked the lowest ebb of their national pros- 
perity, but apparently the degree of their fecundity was 



192 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

not affected by hardships. Since they founded their em- 
pire and have achieved wealth they continue to increase 
and multiply tremendously. On the other hand, in spite 
of centuries of persecutions, poverty and dispersion, the 
Jews have grown apace. They are immensely more numer- 
ous now than in the days when they Kved in the Land of 
Milk and Honey under the rule of Solomon the Magnificent. 

The English had a period of great fecundity which coin- 
cided with their burst of colonial enterprise in the seven- 
teenth and eighteenth centuries. Whether one of these 
phenomena caused the other, or whether they chanced to 
come together we do not know. While the great excess 
of births over deaths has diminished, the acquisitive in- 
stinct persists. Surplus population cannot be given as an 
explanation of the British "forward" poKcy in South Africa 
or Persia. 

That colonial enterprise does not depend solely on the 
pressure of population is also proved by the case of France. 
The great colonial empire which was lost by the kings 
before the Revolution, had not been built up nor accom- 
panied by any large emigration from France. Only parts 
of Canada and a few points along the Mississippi show signs 
of French colonization. And certainly surplus population 
is not the explanation of the new colonial empire which has 
been founded by the Third RepubHc. No other country 
of Europe is in so marked a period of population decHne. 

The reasons for such a decrease in the birth rate — which 
may lead to national extinction and may be only a beat 
in the mystic rhythm of life — are obscure in the extreme 
and certainly complex. The causes of excessive fecundity 
are equally unknown. But the "balance of population" 
has seemed to be of importance in this tragedy of War. 
As soon as scientists can spare time from high explosives 
and asphyxiating gases they will give this subject of the 
birth rate, and its control, new and more intense study. 

In the Europe of our day three branches of the family are 
especially prolific: the Slavs, the Italians, and the Germans. 



THE COLONIAL WORLD 193 

For Russia this is not a disturbing phenomenon, but on 
the whole a marked advantage. She has three ways of 
absorbing this increase of population: (I) the opening up 
of undeveloped territory, (II) the improvement and in- 
tensification of her agriculture, and (III) the growth of 
industry. 

There are vast expanses of Siberian steppes which have 
never been ploughed, provinces as big as Texas, which are 
practically fallow. The degree of farm culture in the 
"developed" districts is very low. The land already under 
exploitation could, with irrigation, farm machinery, greater 
capitahzation in the way of live stock and scientific methods, 
support twice or thrice the present population. And every 
sign points to an imminent and immense industrial awaken- 
ing. When Russia begins a serious effort to work her 
national resources — her fields, her mines, her forests and 
waterpower — she will need to triple or quadruple her supply 
of workers. At the present rate of increase her population 
will not press on her frontiers for a hundred years or more. 

The situation of Italy is the reverse. There is hardly 
an acre of her soil which has not been tilled and over-tilled 
since the days of Romulus and Remus. There is practically 
no fallow territory. The degree of culture varies from dis- 
trict to district. In some places it could be improved, but 
on the whole ItaHan agriculture cannot be counted on to 
support much more population than it does at present. 
The raw materials of modern industry are scant in Italy. 
There has been considerable development of this kind in the 
northern provinces. But the ItaKans have to import most 
of their coal, all of their fuel oil and a great part of their 
mineral ores. To at least as great an extent as in England, 
their industry depends on the importation of raw material 
from overseas. Italy is a poor country and there are prob- 
ably more people living on these meager resources than 
at any time in recorded history. But the number of births 
greatly exceeds the number of deaths. There is nothing to 
do but emigrate! 



194 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

The emigrant may find a larger and more satisfying life 
for himself under a new flag, but he is lost to the Father- 
land. And those Italians whose patriotism is racial rather 
than geographic, who think of their nation in terms of 
Italian blood and not in expressions of frontiers, regret this 
loss. They see the Httle British Isles creating new Englands 
in Canada and AustraUa. In this War they see these other 
Englanders rushing to the defence of the Mother Country. 
They regret the milHons of Italians capable of bearing arms 
who — citizens of other countries — will not come home to 
help in the present crisis. So for many years there has 
been a colonial party in Italy which demanded a colony to 
absorb their surplus population. They have hoped to turn 
the current of emigration from the Americas to their new 
domain in North Africa and to build up there on the southern 
shores of the old Roman Sea a new Fatherland, where 
Itahans could be Italians still. 

This argument of surplus population which has pushed the 
Itahans into their Tripolitaine adventure appHes with even 
greater force to Germany. 

Central Europe also is relatively poor in natural resources. 
Agriculture is more highly developed than in any other large 
country, but its product does not suffice. In the first decades 
of the last century the high birth rate served to fill the gaps 
made by the Napoleonic wars, but in the 'forties and 'fifties 
the Germans could not find enough food at home and this was 
the period of greatest emigration to the United States. Then 
came Bismarck, the economic unity of the ZoUverein, success- 
ful wars, national unity, the great French indemnity and 
industrial development. Emigration to America practically 
stopped. The birth rate had not fallen — in fact the popula- 
tion of Germany has nearly doubled since 1870 — but industry 
absorbed the increase. 

However, this marvellous industry has its monstrous side. 
It has a terrible law of hfe — it must grow. If it stops for a 
minute, if it declines or even if its rate of growth decreases, 
the population problem at once becomes acute. In the years 



THE COLONIAL WORLD 195 

before the outbreak of this War, this was a constant pre- 
occupation of thinking Germans. What would happen in 
case of an industrial depression? Thousands — ^perhaps 
millions — ^would have to starve or emigrate. By heroic 
means the government has to a large extent prevented such 
economic crises as have been known elsewhere. But there 
was a hectic tendency towards overexpansion in German 
industry which has worried many observers. It was mort- 
gaged to the knobs on the office doors. They were playing 
for immensely high stakes, but if luck went against them their 
loss would be catastrophic. Always of late the need of a 
reservoir into which they could pour their surplus population, 
in case of a crisis of imemployment, has been one of the bases 
of their colonial policy. 

It is of course evident that we do not have this motive for 
colonial expansion. Our situation is more like Russia's. 
We have need of immigration to people our undeveloped dis- 
tricts. 

Colonies also have a definite value to European countries 
as a source of raw material. The higher the industrial devel- 
opment of a country — the larger the proportion of its popula- 
tion engaged in manufacture — the more imperious becomes 
the need for a regular supply of the products which feed its 
machines. British industry would be wiped out if access to 
its colonies was interrupted. It is often said that Great 
Britain must control the sea in order to assure her food sup- 
ply. But even if there were plenty of food for her people, a 
shortage in raw material for her factories would starve her 
just as surely. 

During the interruption to the cotton trade caused by our 
Civil War, the textile districts of England suffered immensely. 
Since then the empire has experimented in cotton growing 
in all its domains. The regular supply of raw cotton is so 
important to her, that she cannot trust it to the good will of 
foreigners, she must control the source. The British govern- 
ment has spent a great deal of money in developing the 
cotton fields of India and Egypt. 



196 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

German experiments— for Germany also imports her raw 
cotton — have shown great promise for cotton production in 
Mesopotamia, along the route of the Bagdad Railroad. At 
this moment the cotton spinners of England are watching 
with especial interest the progress of the British army in 
the Euphrates campaign. The "cotton interests" of any 
country would be glad to know that their flag was flying over 
these promising plantations. 

We see exactly the same rivalry for the control of the 
petroleum supply. The perfection of the "gas-engine" is 
almost as revolutionary as the development of steam-power. 
Especially since oil has been successfully appHed to land and 
sea locomotion, the demand for it has gone up by leaps and 
bounds. The world's supply is limited to a few scattered 
localities. The oil wells of the United States, the Russian 
Caucasus, GaKcia and Roumania are at present the most 
productive, but their ownership is fairly well established. 
Potential oil-fields, whose present owners are weak, are 
storm centers. An immense amount of international in- 
trigue—a hopeless tangle of finance and diplomacy — has been 
caused by the discovery of oil in Mexico and Colombia. 

But probably the richest undeveloped oil-bearing district 
today is that of Persia. The Bagdad Railroad would have 
taken the Germans very close to it. It is quite as much for 
oil as for cotton that British soldiers— who might be, from a 
military point of view, more profitably used in European 
battlefields — are fighting in the deserts of Mesopotamia. 

The Italians and French hope to grow cotton in North 
Africa. Germany, perhaps more than her rivals, is hunting 
for mineral resources. Aiid all the world is hungry for rub- 
ber. The governments of Europe have scientific missions at 
work in their various colonies studying the mineral and 
vegetable products and developing practical means to in- 
crease the output of such raw materials as can be used by the 
home industry. 

Hardly one of our big, vital trades in the United States is 
dependent on imported raw material. 



THE COLONIAL WORLD 197 

Of equal, if not of greater importance, is the fact that the 
colonies offer a favorable sales-market for the products of 
industry. Almost without exception the industrialized 
states of Europe manufacture much more than their citizens 
can consume— or rather, more than their citizens can afford 
to buy. This is a phenomenon which the professors of 
political economy mis-name "overproduction." It is an 
absurd term. France, for instance, never manufactures 
more lace and ribbons than her women-folk would like to 
wear, but normally she manufactures more than they can 
buy. The wages of the German toy-makers of the Schwartz- 
wald are so pitifully low, that they cannot afford toys for 
their children. Even the children themselves must work 
long hours to gain a bare living for the family. So there is 
"overproduction" — a need for foreign markets. 

Some years ago I was told by an American automobile 
manufacturer that his trade was suffering from "over- 
production." I found his statement hard to believe as I had 
always wanted a motor car and knew no end of people who 
did not feel that they were suffering from owning too many. 
I was greatly pleased to read later on of the exploits of 
Mr. Ford. The trouble with the trade had not been that too 
many automobiles were being made, but that too few people 
could afford to pay $5,000 for one. 

This technical term "overproduction" does not mean that 
more of a given article is beuig made than the community 
could use, but more than the community can buy. As wages 
are uniformly low in Europe the per capita buying capacity is 
small, and "overproduction" is chronic. Unless external 
markets can be found the factories must close down. This 
has been especially true in England, where, in times of peace, 
the problem of unemployment has reached tragic proportions. 

There are three classes of foreign markets: {a) at one ex- 
treme is the relation between one industrial community and 
others. It is not very profitable. The ironmongers of the 
Rhine do not make great sales in Pittsburg, {h) At the 
other extreme is the relation between an industrial center and 



igS THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

a savage community. It is not very profitable either. The 
same German ironmongers cannot sell much of their wares to 
the negroes of equatorial Africa. To savages you can only 
sell grog, and bibles and glass beads and silk hats, (c) For 
an industrial nation the most profitable markets are in 
semi-civilized countries. In China, India, North Africa and 
Turkey there are railroads and bridges to build, harbors to 
equip, armies to furnish. It is a trade proverb that you can 
sell anything to a Turk. 

Here again it is evident that the situation of the United 
States is quite different from that of the European coun- 
tries. Of all the wealth our industry produces in normal 
times, less than lo per cent goes abroad. The sum total 
of our agricultural export seems gigantic, but it is very 
small in comparison with the amount of food stuff we con- 
sume at home. In only a few highly specialized industries 
do we find our home market insufficient. All over the 
world you find our Kodaks, and fountain pens, American 
harvesters and sewing machines. Even in these products 
the foreign trade is very much smaller than the home con- 
sumption. Many of these things with American names 
are actually made abroad. Northampton in England is 
the center of a large shoe trade. On the main street there 
are half a dozen factories which turn out "American" 
shoes. They have bought our shoe-making machines and 
imitated our "trade-marks." 

Even given the largest definition to our foreign trade 
it is a mere bagatelle compared with our internal commerce. 
At the outbreak of this War our sea communications with 
Europe and Asia were reduced by more than one-half. 
But the industrial depression which hit us was very much 
more due to the disturbance of finance than to the paraly- 
sis of the sea routes. The various new forms of "naval 
blockades" which the belligerents invented so busily hurt 
the neutral countries of Europe — Holland and Scandinavia 
and Switzerland — infinitely more than they did us. 

Wages are relatively high in America, and our "buying 



THE COLONIAL WORLD 199 

power" is much greater per capita than in Europe. One 
trivial, but striking, example is furnished by baby-carriages. 
An American visiting the parks of the popular quarters of 
London, Paris, Vienna or Berlin, is struck with the number 
of women and men who carry babies. The wives of work- 
ing men and small shopkeepers would think a baby-carriage 
was a frightful extravagance. The kind of people, who 
consider a porcelain bath tub a necessity in America, re- 
gard it as a luxury in England. These are small indications 
of a big fact. Man for man, the Europeans probably pro- 
duce more than we, but they buy less. To an extent which 
we can hardly realize European industry depends for its 
existence on foreign markets. And, properly managed, a 
colony offers especial profits. 

In judging the value of a colony it is necessary to take 
into consideration much more than its mere size. Does 
the climate permit of a large scale immigration from the 
home-land? Does it produce needed raw material? Will 
it buy the surplus product of the home factories? 

Germany — compared to her principal industrial rivals, 
France and England — is noticeably poor in colonies; she 
gets httle value from her immense African territories. The 
chmate is deadly to Northerners, they do not to any great 
extent — rubber is the one exception — supply her lack of 
raw material, and they are not heavy purchasers of her 
principal products. An analysis of the custom returns for 
Southwest Africa and Cameroon shows that most of the 
articles brought out from Germany were on government 
orders, for the pubhc works and for the needs of the garrison. 
Germany's best colonial enterprise was Kaiu Chow. It 
gave her access to minerals and silk and tea, it was a door- 
way by which she could pour into China the surplus of her 
"overproductions." But it was far away and entirely at 
the mercy of her enemies any time they wanted to exert 
their "sea-power." 

Quite aside from poHtical designs, it was economically 
logical for Germany to seek trade outlets in Turkey. Here — 



200 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

at no great distance — she found immense resources of raw 
material and an eager market. Anton Sprenger in his book 
on Babylonia speaks of Asia Minor as "the one part of 
the globe which has not been seized by the nations am- 
bitious to own the earth. But it is also the most favored 
zone for colonization; and if Germany does not let this 
opportunity sHp before the Cossacks put their hands on 
it, she will have the best part in the partition of the world." 
Paul Rohrbach, one of the mildest and sanest of the German 
writers on such subjects, has also pointed out the excep- 
tional advantages which Asia Minor offers as an ideal field 
for German enterprise, especially emphasizing the fact 
that none of the other nations had a prior claim. There 
were also those in England— I have referred above to the 
writings of Sir Harry Johnson — who advocated a policy 
of friendly cooperation in the German efforts in this direc- 
tion. But the British government did all in its power to 
thwart the Bagdad Railroad project. It was not till too 
late — the spring of 19 14 — that they decided to get out of 
the way. 

The colonial problem has been one of great and growing 
interest to the Germans in recent years. They are at a 
marked disadvantage as they entered the field late. For 
this their national hero — Bismarck — is largely to blame. 
He was a Prussian junker, a landlord, a magnified peasant. 
He had no feeling for modern industry, and when at the 
height of his power he failed to foresee the approaching 
importance of colonial markets. There were long years 
when he could — if it had occurred to him — have secured 
for his people all the colonies they could want. But he 
was a "European," he thought in terms of "the conti- 
nent." Colonies appealed to him as apples of discord to 
keep his enemies divided. It was only reluctantly that 
he gave heed to the clamor of the growing group of "ex- 
porters" — the German Colonial Society was founded in 
1882 — and gave his consent to over-seas adventures. And 
by this time there was Uttle left worth taking. 



THE COLONIAL WORLD 20I 

In face of their increasing need for foreign markets there 
has been a growing discontent in Germany over their 
meager share in the colonial world. Inevitably their atten- 
tion has turned enviously towards the prosperous colonies 
of their weaker neighbors. Little Holland and Httle Bel- 
gium are more fortunate in these matters than great Ger- 
many. 

It was not only the mouths of the Rhine which the Ger- 
mans were trying to get when they asked Holland to come 
into the Empire. They also wanted to share in the rich 
Dutch colonies. They have also tried by honorable offers 
of purchase to get hold of the Portuguese and Belgian 
colonies. The most common criticism of Bismarck is that 
he did not take Algeria from France instead of Alsace- 
Lorraine. And the Germans have been quite frank in saying 
that if they win in this War the main compensations they 
will demand will be colonial. 

That they should covet their neighbors' wealth is not 
surprising. No. country of Europe suffers so acutely from 
overproduction — of manufactured goods and babies. No 
country is in such real need of raw material. With con- 
siderable reason they can claim that they would make 
better use of Walfish Bay, Portuguese Angola or the Bel- 
gian Congo than their present owners do. And the "official " 
German doctrine teaches that "needs" and "abiHties" — 
and "might" — give them a "right" to the goods of their 
weaker and less deserving rivals. 

There are two systems of colonization. The one, ex- 
emplified by the old Spanish regime in America, was frank 
monopoly. The colonies existed for the benefit of the mother 
country. Trade with outsiders was absolutely forbidden. 
Royal edicts forbade the manufacture of hats in Mexico, 
so that the hatmakers of Madrid could charge what price 
they liked. Another edict forbade the wine-growers of 
Peru to sell their product in Panama, because the Spanish 
merchants did not want competition. 

The French practice is derived from that of the Span- 



202 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

iards, it presents a modernized and mitigated monopoly. 
Here and there — as, for instance, in Morocco — the French 
have been led to a reluctant promise of the "open door." 
But they are hostile to the idea, and in general French trade 
has a real advantage — legal or extra-legal — ^in the French 
colonies. 

The other system is that of free trade — or at least of 
allowing the colonies to arrange their tariffs to suit their 
own interests. In some of the British Crown Colonies there 
is practical free trade. The self-governing dominions of 
the Empire are permitted to decide on their own financial 
poKcy. As a general rule the merchants of the home 
country do not enjoy any trade privileges — beyond a vague 
"good will" — over their rivals of other countries. 

There has, however, been a noticeable tendency of late in 
the British Empire towards a sort of economic "national- 
ism" — very similar in theory to that of the same school of 
German economists. The "tariff reform movement," 
led by the Tories, is an effort to estabhsh a Zollverein of 
the various units of the Empire and to "protect" British 
industry by a high customs wall against the foreigner. 
This tariff reform agitation was frankly a weapon against 
Germany. Whether or not it would have materialized 
(the dominions had nothing to gain by subordinating their 
interests to the mother country) the Germans considered it 
a serious threat. Their own colonial markets were not 
nearly sufficient, and if they had been shut out of the 
British Empire it would have been ruin. 

However, there is a large school of writers on economics 
and poHtics who maintain that the "rage for colonies" 
is unjustified. And nowhere else have I found such tren- 
chant and thorough-going attack on the theory of colo- 
nization as among some German writers. Perhaps Bis- 
marck was more right in this matter than those to whom 
he gave in. Certainly the faction in Germany who are 
opposed to colonial enterprise are an unpopular minority, 
but their argument is worth summarizing. 



THE COLONIAL WORLD 203 

The English are the classic example of successful colo- 
nizers. Their ventures fall into several classes. First there 
are the colonies they have peopled with their own stock. 
At the end of the eighteenth century her most promising 
colonies in America revolted. Taught by this bitter lesson, 
she has conceded and conceded to her other English speak- 
ing dominions until their actual value to the homeland is 
at least problematic. In this War, for instance, Canada 
has rallied nobly to the mother country. But it is hardly 
conceivable that the help she will bear in this European 
War will be commensurate to the energy, — money and 
men — ^which England has spent in Canada. In times of 
peace, Canada has not shown any self-sacrificing incKnation 
to favor England in economics. As a source of raw ma- 
terial and an outlet for the products of industry, Canada 
is more of an asset to the United States than to England. 

When you leave out the Enghsh speaking dominions, 
the British Empire is — from a commercial viewpoint — 
an even more doubtful investment. Of what value is the 
piece of Central American swamp which is called British 
Honduras? The Island of St. Helena made a good jail for 
Napoleon, but does it pay a modern state to hold such 
possessions? Great Britain, these Germans say, is over- 
weighted with such dead wood. 

A great deal can be said for the commercial value of 
Egypt and India. But remember the Sepoy Rebellion. 
In both of these territories, the EngUsh are sitting on* the 
crater of a volcano. The "nationaHst" movement is well 
developed. The English will have to use a mailed fist 
poKcy, definitely crush the revolutionary movement — a 
policy which for years on end will stop all commercial 
profit from these colonies — or, by gradually granting ever 
new concessions, give away all the advantages she has 
spent so much to win. 

Next in order as ''successful colonizers" come the French. 
They began their second colonial period with the annexa- 
tion of Algeria in the thirties. Now, after more than eighty 



204 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

years, a small band of territory along the coast has been 
organized into a "civil zone"; it has recently reached the 
self-supporting stage and is no longer a drain on the Re- 
pubhc. But back of this civil zone, way down into the 
barren desert, is the military zone where it is all outlay and 
no profit. The very expensive conquest of Algeria entailed 
that of Tunisia and more recently launched the nation on 
this Moroccan adventure. The best that can be said of 
this North African colonial empire is in the future tense. 
It may — possibly — ^pay in the distant future. But for the 
next few generations it means an immense drain on the 
French treasury. In a report on the colonies which M. 
Pauhat presented to the French Senate in 1901 his figures 
showed that as recently as 1897, in all the colonies — Algeria 
and Tunisia excepted — there were 4,327 French colonists 
and 10,097 "fondionnaires." That is, there was a little 
more than one government official for every half of a colo- 
nist. It would not take a great deal more colonial expansion 
of that kind to ruin even so rich a country as France. 

Certainly a small — a very small — section of French busi- 
ness men have made fortunes out of the colonies. But all 
the nation has paid excessively for this gain to a few in- 
dividuals. This is also true of "our" enterprise in the 
Philippines. It is impossible to get accurate figures, but 
it is evident that if you could find a record of all the profit 
which has come to Frenchmen — or to "us" — from the colo- 
nial policy it would be much less than the vast amounts 
which the government has sunk in colonizing. It is like a 
high tariff to protect "infant industries," all the citizens 
are heavily taxed to make a few individuals rich. 

Germany actually has developed profitable markets imder 
other flags. Their colonial trade was infinitesimal compared 
to their total external trade. The Englishman in an English 
colony certainly has some advantages over the German 
trader, but German trade is not being taxed for the expenses 
of the colony. 

The same school of anti-colonial economists argues that it 



THE COLONIAL WORLD 205 

is no loss to have Germans emigrate and become citizens of 
another country. Every German who settles in a foreign 
land — whatever his business — is a sales agent for German 
commerce. The very profitable export trade in Munich 
beer is an example often cited. 

From a military point of view — for even the anti-colonial 
economists of Germany always have considered the possibil- 
ity of war — a far flung colonial domain presents positive 
disadvantages — which are not counterbalanced by the few 
colonial troops it is possible to bring to Europe. In this War 
the Germans did not have to worry about a pan-Islamic 
revolt. They did not have to suppress a rebelKon in South 
Africa nor send troops to defend the Suez Canal. Their 
lack of colonial dispersion allowed them to centralize their 
efforts. 

These writers sum up their case with the statement that 
the development of international finance and industry tends 
surely to break down all trade monopoHes; that gradually 
but inevitably all countries will be forced to give up their 
special commercial privileges at home and abroad; that the 
epoch of high tariffs is only a passing phase in the develop- 
ment of civilization and that as free trade increases the 
nations which find themselves burdened with the expense of 
colonial administration will be to that extent at a disad- 
vantage. 

It is idle to prophesy, but it is at least possible that future 
generations will decide that Bismarck was right in not want- 
ing colonies. But in the midst of the industrial stage, which 
our civilization has at present attained, there are certainly 
strong arguments in favor of colonial expansion. And every 
argument which Italy or France or England uses to justify 
their colonial policy, applies with double or triple weight to 
Germany. The peace congress to follow this War will give a 
great deal of attention to the colonial world. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE GROWTH OP PUBLIC OPINION 

Very few people in Europe followed with interest the 
proceedings of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. There is 
scarcely a word in the compte rendu of the sessions nor in the 
memoires of the delegates to indicate that the diplomats 
gathered there gave any heed to public opinion. 

There was a journal pubHshed in VSiXVs,— Memoires diplo- 
matiques, which reported such events, but it was a technical 
review and its editors no more thought of influencing the 
opinions of the general public than do those of the Journal of 
the Society of Physiological Chemists. The regular news- 
papers had Httle to say on the subject. The better informed 
people knew that Russia had defeated Turkey, that Austria 
and England wanted to keep the Sick Man alive a little 
longer, that hostiHty was running high and that a great war 
was possible. 

At the Conference of Algeciras, one of the delegates pro- 
tested angrily: "There are more newspaper men here than 
diplomats." It was true. And the newspaper men were 
nearly — if not quite — as important as the diplomats. All 
the great daiHes of Europe were publishing long — if not 
always truthful — accounts of the proceedings. Most of 
them went to the trouble of sending highly paid men as their 
correspondents, men who had been trained in the diplomatic 
service. The public was interested. The French diplomats 
could not have held so firmly to their position — a firmness 
which brought them very close to war — if they had not known 
that public opinion at home was back of them, that the posi- 
tion they had assumed seemed just to the people. 

At the Peace Conference to follow this War there will be 
more newspaper men than diplomats. 

206 



THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC OPINION 207 

Crispi has left an interesting account of one of his inter- 
views with Bismarck. The Italians, worried over the threats 
of the French catholics to restore the temporal power of the 
Pope, wanted a Dual Alliance with protestant Germany. 
Bismarck wanted Italy to join his existing alliance with 
Austria. Crispi objected that public opinion in Italy would 
be opposed to any rapprochement with Austria — the hered- 
itary enemy. Bismarck gave him a scolding. No govern- 
ment, he said, could successfully fight against public opinion, 
but a statesman was culpably careless who allowed public 
opinion to oppose him. He advised Crispi to go home and 
"prepare" — nowadays we would say "fix" — ^pubHc opinion. 

The force of public opinion, which the Iron Chancellor 
recognized a generation ago, has grown immensely. All the 
governments of Europe, by various means and with various 
degrees of success spend considerable energy in "preparing" 
it. The governments could be divided with some precision 
into two classes: those who tell the newspapers what they 
must print, and those who only tell them what they must not 
print. 

The Ballplatz — the Austrian foreign office — has the repu- 
tation of emplo3dng the crudest and most unscrupulous 
means in imposing its point of view on the public. This is so 
true, that intelligent Austrians, who want to know what is 
happening in Europe, subscribe to foreign newspapers. Le 
Journal de Geneve, pubKshed in Switzerland, circulates aU 
over Europe. It gets news from all sides and is almost en- 
tirely free from governmental pressure. So it is a good 
standard by which to check up the truthfulness of the home 
papers. 

Public opinion is much more skilfully handled in Germany. 
Most of the important newspapers boast of their "official" 
connections. One is known as the organ of the Navy Depart- 
ment: another of the Agrarian League. Several regularly 
print articles on foreign affairs which are edited in Wilhekn- 
strasse. But the effort to make the people "think govern- 
mentally" goes much further than the elaborate control of 



2o8 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

the press. The children in the primary schools, the young 
men in the universities and in the barracks, the godly when 
they go to church, rarely heard a word which would displease 
those higher up. The same precise discipline which makes the 
Germans march so well, also rules their thinking. The school 
teacher, the drill sergeant, the professors and pastors, share 
with the newspaper editors the work of "forming" pubHc 
opinion. 

But, if the German press is thoroughly "harness-broken," 
the British newspapers "stand without hitching." The 
pohtical genius of the Enghsh consists in governing without 
seeming to. To take one instance : The organizing Germans, 
the systematizing French, long before this War broke out, 
would have had done on paper something about the exact 
number of soldiers Canada would be required to send to 
Europe in case of war. There was no document which bound 
the British Colonies to send any troops to defend the mother 
country. But during the spring of 1915, there were at times 
more colonial troops than English in the first line trenches 
of Flanders. 

In the same way the British press, although there is no 
formal machinery for its control— the military censorship 
under the Defence of the Realm Act is a special war measure 
and only preventive — has always been proverbially docile. 
No one can explain exactly how it is done, but the British 
Foreign Office can always count on the newspapers following 
its suggestions. The German government, with all its 
elaborate "press laws" is not able to get such results as 
Sir Edward Grey has done in the last few years. 

With impressive unanimity the London papers have 
threatened war with the United States and have thrown 
us bouquets. At one moment they were all agreed that 
the Dutch people were a nation of heroes, and with equal 
unity of thought they suddenly decided that the Dutch 
were the scum of the earth — who had the turpitude to 
sell food to the enemy. Almost every English newspaper 
man I have talked to during the War is convinced that the 



THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC OPINION 209 

Italian policy has been one of crude blackmail. But they 
do not say this in print. The daily "leaders" call them 
noble descendants of JuHus Csesar. 

It was by watching the newspaper comment on the 
Balkans that it was most easy to see how Printing House 
Square takes its tips from the Foreign Office. As the British 
fleet cannot get through the Dardanelles to threaten 
Roumania, the pohcy of Downing Street has been to coax 
her into refusing to trade with the Germans. The press 
has not been as violent towards her as towards the other 
small nations which are exposed to naval action. Bul- 
garia was first ignored, then flattered, now cursed. The 
Greeks do not know when they go to bed whether the 
London papers in the morning will be calling them cowards 
or comrades. 

There is not a foreign minister in Europe who does not 
wish that the press of his country was as well-behaved as 
that of England. 

In France complete freedom of the press is the peace- 
theory. During the Algeciras crisis it was "common 
knowledge" that M. Andre Tardieu in his daily articles 
in Le Temps was an unofficial spokesman of the Quai 
d'Orsay. But his position was exceptional. As an extreme 
comparison one could say that while there are a few news- 
papers in Germany and Austria which claim to be inde- 
pendent, there are one or two in France which are sus- 
pected of being official. Even in the midst of this War, the 
French newspapers are relatively free. The censor fre- 
quently forbids the discussion of certain subjects — slashes 
out columns of interesting news — but there is no visible 
effort to force the papers to publish articles which will 
please the government. 

But in no country — not even in England — is the effort 
to control pubKc opinion entirely successful. Never in 
history has there been a period when the general public 
has been so keenly interested in foreign affairs. The gov- 
ernments do not want a discussion of the diplomatic situa- 



2IO THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

tion. It is in such matters that the censor is most severe. 
None of the governments are giving to their people the 
information on which a really enlightened public opinion 
could be based. No one in France, for instance — outside 
of the government — knows on what terms Italy joined 
the Entente. The diplomats do not Hke to commit them- 
selves to anything definite in the way of terms — some lucky 
chance may permit them to ask for more than they ex- 
pected. So, whatever enlightenment pubHc opinion may 
have, on the problems involved in the peace proceedings 
to follow this War, will have been gained in spite of, not 
because of, their diplomats. 

But in this matter, the diplomats are waging a losing 
fight. Even the military censor cannot suppress the dis- 
cussion. The various governments can expand false in- 
formation, suppress disagreeable facts, but they cannot 
repress the curiosity of the public. It is harder to censor 
books than newspapers. Even in England books and 
pamphlets circulate which the foreign office would hke to 
suppress. "Nationahty and the War," by Arnold Toynbee, 
is one of a hundred volumes intended to enhghten public 
opinion. The noticeable weakness of this book is that the 
author evidently did not get any help from his foreign office. 
It is a weakness which any book written today must share. 
The diplomats do not want the public to know what they 
are trying to do. 

It is hard to censor books, it is harder to censor the 
spoken word. In spite of the diplomats, the discussion 
goes on — not so healthily as it would in the open — under- 
ground. As the months lengthen out, just as happened in 
our Civil War, the people are getting a clearer and clearer 
vision of the issues at stake. It is certain that the moment 
the War is over — perhaps before — these discussions will 
break all artificial bonds. A public opinion will not only 
be formed but it will make itself heard in the hall of the 
Peace Conference. There will be more newspaper men 
than diplomats at the Congress. Whether they like it 



THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC OPINION 2il 

or not, the diplomats will know that every important 
word they say, every important vote they cast, will be 
reported in the home papers within a few hours. 

The governmental effort to mislead public opinion — to 
trick it with false news — is in itself an admission of the 
force of pubhc opinion. The most remarkable thing about 
this War, to me, is the way in which all the governments 
involved recognize the necessity of convincing their citi- 
zens of the justice of their cause. It never occurred to 
Frederick the Great to tell his subjects where he was lead- 
ing them. Napoleon began his campaigns with resounding 
proclamations in which eloquence took the place of rea- 
soned arguments. Today the various governments are 
spending milHons and infinite pains on a detailed presenta- 
tion of their case. None of them have shown any dis- 
position to tell the truth of the whole-and-nothing-but 
variety. But all this "campaign literature" — even the 
official falsehoods — is added proof of the immense interest 
which the pubhc of Europe is taking in the causes, the 
progress and the outcome of this War. 

The press censorship will probably go by the board as 
soon as the fighting stops. The official newspapers will go 
on publishing the truth as their governments see it. The 
independent press will discuss things more freely. Myriad 
pamphlets will appear on every phase of the subject. 
Wherever the Peace Conference is held there will be a 
swarm of newspaper men. The state of public opinion at 
home will influence the delegates throughout their labors. 
And, when they have signed their names to a new map of 
Europe and return home, they will have to report not to 
kings but to ParHament. 

Pubhc opinion, as it strives to form itself — in spite 
of the censorship — is evidently very much preoccupied in 
the problem of peace^a permanent peace. 

Most professional diplomats will say that the ideal of 
permanent peace has nothing to do with their trade; that 
they must be "reahsts" deaHng only with actualities; 



212 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

that they must not even try to look down the dim vistas 
of the future. Such an attitude is entirely in accordance 
with their traditions. Bismarck and his colleagues about 
the green table at BerHn in 1878 scoffed at the idea — it was 
something to interest a theological seminary — not serious 
minded statesmen. And few European diplomats today 
will admit that the laying of the foimdations of permanent 
peace is any of their business. 

But it is quite certain that pubhc opinion has very differ- 
ent views on the subject. Whatever the diplomats may say 
about it, almost everyone else thinks that it is one of their 
main duties to work for peace. 

This new ideal about the business of diplomacy has re- 
ceived sanction from the highest quarters. It would be hard 
to find a single recent speech by a king or a prime minister 
which does not definitely promise his people that the object 
of this War is to end war. "Not peace, but the peace " was a 
phrase which made the rounds in the summer of 191 5. 

A very interesting collection of reports from the school 
teachers in a mountain district of France has recently been 
pubhshed. The Minister of Education has instructed all 
his staff to keep diaries of these stirring times. It will 
furnish rich material for future historians. The first section 
to be printed contains the reports of the "mobilization" 
in the province of Dauphine. The school teachers tell how 
the news of the declaration of war reached their Alpine 
villages and how the "reservists" set out "to join the 
colors," and what the villagers had to say about it. It is 
impressive how often the same phrases came to the lips 
of these peasants as they sought words to comfort the wives 
they must leave to bring in the harvest and care for chil- 
dren. "It is best so," they said, "we will finish it up, so 
the children will not have to fight." 

If — as some prophesy — this War is only a prelude to a 
long series of wars, there will be a profound disillusionment 
all over Europe. MilHons of men, from one end of the con- 
tinent to the other, are fighting bravely, uncomplainingly, 



THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC OPINION 213 

but on the whole, regretfully. More or less clearly they 
feel that the men they trusted with this business of di- 
plomacy did not measure up to their duty. And every states- 
man, who Kstens to the voice of his people — whatever his 
theories in regard to permanent peace — knows what is 
expected of him. 

The diplomats have considerable justification in main- 
taining that it is not their business to estabhsh peace. 
They are very much in the position of the lawyer, and no 
one is so optimistic as to expect lawyers to abolish litiga- 
tion. The diplomat is only an agent. He follows, accord- 
ing to his abilities, his instructions. He cannot abolish 
war as long as his cHents want to fight. 

There are two conceptions of peace, and in neither case 
can the diplomat do much about it single-handed. The first 
is the pax Romana. It is victorious warriors who erect 
that kind of peace. Today, a sort of pax Britannicae reigns 
on the Seven Seas. Except in a few clearly defined areas 
there is no naval warfare. Such a peace is of course quite 
satisfactory to the English. But no one has been able to 
establish anything hke such a predominance on land since 
the Fall of Rome. It is even doubtful if England can — 
in case of victory — maintain her undisputed rule of the 
seas. It is entirely improbable that any such peace of 
domination will result from this War. 

The only other kind of peace, which is not a mere truce, 
an arming for a new war, must be based on mutual justice. 
Peace, for instance, is a mirage between the Tsar and his 
people. There may be armistices now and then, but when 
a hundred million people feel themselves the victims of a 
raw and blatant injustice — typified in one man — there can 
be nothing but war. There can be no hope of peace between 
capital and labor as long as either side smarts under a 
manifest injustice. It is the same between nations. If 
the ideal of justice is unreahzable, war is inevitable. The 
diplomats by themselves cannot eliminate the injustices 
which are at the roots of conflict. 



214 THE NEW ELEMENTS OF DIPLOMACY 

It is quite fantastic to expect peace to grow out of war. 
War inflames the passions — with vile lusts as well as with 
noble enthusiasm — and justice must be the work of cool 
blood. About all we can hope for from the congress to 
come after the War is that the diplomats will avoid the 
obvious mistakes which will render it difi5cult or impossible 
to do real work for peace in the years to come. 

It is fairly obvious that there is something too real to 
be ignored back of this theory of the rights of nations. 
People with the same language and traditions tend to de- 
velop a sense of nationality and an aspiration to group 
themselves in an independent political organization. The 
denial of their "right" to realize their aspirations seems to 
them an injustice — -a casus belli. Any flagrant violation of 
this principle on the part of the diplomats will be planting 
the seeds of a future disaster. 

It is also evident that economic considerations have a 
great deal to do in precipitating war. Any attempt to 
crush the industrial life of the vanquished — any effort 
to cut them off from raw material or markets, to smother 
them by tariffs or to interfere with their free use of the 
trade routes of the sea — will be planting the seeds of new 
discords. 

It is also fairly well demonstrated that no people are so 
cowardly as not to fight to preserve their existence. In 
the reactionary circles of France and England people talk — 
and even write articles — about how to annihilate Germany. 
The Tories of Germany say that Belgium no longer exists 
and that France and England must be rubbed off the map. 
Any effort to annihilate the vanquished — unless it is done 
thoroughly by preventing the production of a new genera- 
tion — will make peace impossible. 

But it is not too much to hope that the statesmen of 
Europe may have learned this lesson. Russia and Germany 
have both tried to eliminate the Polish question and both 
have failed, just as England has failed to dragoon Ireland 
and as our first "reconstruction" poHcy failed in the South. 



THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC OPINION 215 

If half the threats which are commonplaces in the European 
press are carried out — no matter which side wins — we can 
bid good-bye to the idea of peace. 

The British experiment in South Africa gives us reason 
to hope. If the governments of Europe, when they give 
their instructions to their delegates at the peace conference, 
have that lesson in mind, the future of Europe may be 
better than most of us dare to expect. 

It was the most remarkable example in the records of 
practical politics of what can be done for the peace of the 
world. The Boer War itself gave England very Httle to 
be proud of. But the Tory Government which had en- 
gineered and conducted it — misconducted it — gave place 
to a Liberal Ministry, which earnestly — and as the event 
has proved, wisely — set to work to heal the wounds of that 
conflict. There is very Httle in the history of the world of 
which Liberals have more right to be proud than of this 
settlement. It is one of the most shining examples of 
British political genius. In very much less time than it 
took the United States to rewin the loyalty of the confed- 
eracy, the British empire won a surprising degree of loyalty 
from the defeated Boers. 

If the European Congress, which is to liquidate this 
War, is held under the auspices of governments which are 
inspired by an equally wise liberalism — for the diplomats 
will obey instructions — there is reason to hope that no 
cause for immediate hostilities will be left and that the 
friends of peace will be able to go on working for their 
ideals untrammelled by diplomatic blunders. 

This is the one real basis for the hope of better times. 
The issues will not be fought out solely by the diplomats 
grouped about their "green table." The real decisions 
will depend on public opinion at home. 

No diplomat, returning from this congress, will ride up 
the avenue of his capital, waving his silk hat to an uni- 
formed, admiring crowd, who shout approbation to such a 
vague and bombastic phrase as "peace, with honor." 



2l6 THE NEW ELEMENTS Of DIPLOMACY 

The coachman will turn about in his seat and say: "Your 
Excellency, why did you annex all that African swamp?" 
A newsboy from the sidewalk will cry: "Why did you 
abandon that railroad concession in China?" The papers 
of the opposition, and hostile members of Parhament will 
ask similar and more searching questions. The diplomat 
who cannot answer them will be in a bad way. 

It is a tradition among the diplomats — a tradition shared 
by M. Delcasse and Sir Edward Grey among others — 
that the people are not intelligent enough to understand 
foreign poUtics. But the gory head of more than one states- 
man has decorated a lamp post because its owner did not 
understand the people. 

It is rather dangerous business to ask men to leave their 
farms and workshops, their wives and children, to fight 
for peace and then, when the war is over to say, "We were 
only joking. You are so stupid we had to lie to you. Peace 
is a mirage, an illusion. Now you must go home and pay 
heavy taxes to arm for the next war. And you must begin 
at once to teach your children how to fight." 

There can be no doubt that the people of Europe — on 
both sides of every frontier — have taken their statesmen 
seriously when they promised to lay the foundations of 
permanent peace. "Not a peace, but the peace." 



BOOK III 
THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 



CHAPTER XV 

THE MILITARY OUTCOME 

Obviously the diplomatic settlement of the War depends 
first of all on the fate of the armies in the field. And no 
phase of life is more proverbially uncertain. Of the myriad 
factors which determine the success or failure of a cam- 
paign, a large share are so confused and obscure that they 
are generally called "luck." Napoleon is said to have lost 
the battle of Waterloo because of a bad map and a fit of 
indigestion. 

^"~There""are two extreme possibilities, (i) A complete 
triumph for the Deutschtum. (2) A crushing defeat for 
the Germans. But nothing is more improbable than an 
extreme decision. All things are possible, but it is hardly 
likely that the Germans will dictate peace in Paris or Petro- 
grad or London, or that the armies of the allies will enter 
Berlin. 

There is a chance of a drawn game, resulting from mutual 
exhaustion. But this assumes a perfect equilibrium of 
force — like that of the two Kilkenny cats. The balance 
will probably swing definitely to one side or the other. 

If we figure these possibilities graphically, as though 
represented on a globe like our earth, with a complete allied 
victory for the North Pole and a German triumph for the 
South Pole, and the equator for a dead-lock, we can say 
with some certainty that the future peace congress will 
meet in one of the Temperate Zones, that the War is more 
likely to end in the Tropics than in either the Arctic or 
Antarctic circles. 

To discuss the diplomatic problem to be met after the 
War, we must arbitrarily assume a decisive outcome. The 
more definite the victory of one side or the other, the 

219 



220 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

simpler these diplomatic problems become. It does not 
matter very much which side we choose, for if we guess 
wrong the considerations at issue will not be changed, 
only the method and direction of their application will be 
reversed. 

Although the memoirs of all great generals tell us that 
we must always leave a large margin for chance, it is possi- 
ble to state some of the factors of the military struggle — 
the factors which appear to be the dominating and de- 
termining ones. 

In the spring of 19 14 — just before the outbreak of the 
War — the resources of Germany were less than those of 
the coalition which opposed her. Aside from her own forces, 
Germany could count with certainty only on the help of 
the tottering empire of the Hapsburgs. Their combined 
strength was notably less in men, in money, in industrial 
resources, than those of Great Britain, France, and Russia. 
Her disadvantage at sea was even more striking. But 
because of immensely superior organization, she could 
utilize a larger percentage of her strength at once; she 
entered the campaign very much stronger than her enemies. 

The Powers of the Entente were stronger — on paper. 
But no one of them was organized for war. Marcel Sembat 
was right in the book to which I referred above. A republic 
cannot compare with such an organization as the German 
empire in creating a fighting machine. France and England, 
because of their more liberal regime, — Russia because of 
her mediaeval reactionary autocracy and system of Grand 
Ducal corruption, could not throw anywhere near as large 
a percentage of their strength into the first clash. It was 
little short of miraculous that France was able to concen- 
trate enough force at the Marne to win that battle and 
check the first drive of the Germans. 

The Allies suffered another serious handicap — what is 
called la maladie des coalitions. They had no centraHzed 
command. While the German war council had all of its 
forces obedient to a single will, the Allies, before any serious 



THE MILITARY OUTCOME 221 

decision, have always had to waste time coordinating the 
views of Petrograd, Paris, and London. 

On the whole, during the first year of the War this lack 
of coordination was more manifest in diplomatic than in 
military matters. Great Britain, following her own naval 
poKcy, did much to ahenate the sympathy of the neutrals. 
She so angered the Swedes that the railroad which connects 
Russia with the Atlantic across Scandinavia was some- 
times closed. The French, Russian, and EngHsh diplomats 
between them succeeded in bringing in Italy. But this 
has been more than offset by the entry of Turkey on the 
side of Germany. Italy has not as yet accomplished any- 
thing for the Entente Powers to compare with their loss of 
prestige at the Dardanelles. And the entry of Italy into 
the coaHtion made it necessary to consult Rome as well 
as the other three capitals. 

But it was in the fall of 1915 — the beginning of the second 
year of the war — that this lack of coordination in the councils 
of the Allies became most apparent and most disastrous. 
Their diplomatic fiasco in the Balkans bids fair to be followed 
by a military disaster. And of greater seriousness than this 
is the marked tendency of the AlKes to say that the others 
are to blame. Such recriminations at the very best weaken 
the coalition — at the worst, they may ruin it. 

But the resources of the coalition are so much greater than 
those of the Germans that they can afford a certain amount 
of bungling. Even if the German drive toward.s Constan- 
tinople is entirely successful, even if all the Balkan States 
join the Germans, even if Egypt and India revolt, the odds 
are still in favor of the Entente Group — provided they stick 
together, provided they improve their fighting organization, 
provided their will to conquer is as strong as that of their 
enemies. 

Undoubtedly these "ifs" are big. It would take a bold 
prophet to answer "yes" decisively to all of them. 

However, it is not probable that the Entente Coalition will 
break up during the course of the hostilities. Modern war is 



222 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

a great national effort. It develops a national enthusiasm 
which acquires a sort of momentum. As recently as the 
Napoleonic wars it was customary for nations to change 
sides on the eve of a battle and go over to the enemy. Such 
bold treason is not likely today. The danger is rather that 
one or another of the members of the coalition may think 
that it is doing more than its share and content itself with a 
"platonic war." There is a very common belief among the 
French that they are doing more than their share. With a 
large part of their own country invaded, there was in some 
quarters a strong feeling against sending troops to the Bal- 
kans to protect the British colonies of India and Egypt. But 
all of the Entente Powers have so much to lose by defeat, 
and their hope of victory is so dependent on common action, 
that there is Httle chance of any of them playing their aUies 
false. 

They are improving their organization. In this field 
France has immensely surprised her alhes. There are even 
some neutral observers who say that she has as large a 
percentage of her potential force in the field as Germany. 
This is an exaggeration. But she is gradually climbing up 
towards an equahty with her rival. If one could grade the 
German organization at one hundred per cent — and it was 
certainly the best the world has ever seen — the French were 
perhaps at fifty per cent at the outbreak of the war and have 
now attained seventy-five per cent. In some developments — 
such as the organization of the munition industry — she has 
possibly reached one hundred per cent. 

In regard to Russia there is very little accurate informa- 
tion. They have never even dreamed of utiHzing in war as 
large a proportion of their men as Germany has. In mere 
numbers they are richer than anyone else. The problem 
with them is the efficiency of their officers and the adequacy 
of their supply of munitions. Their command was generally 
poor at first. But they have shot a good many traitors and 
have disgraced a great many incompetents and are un- 
doubtedly much better commanded today than at the 



THE MILITARY OUTCOME 223 

outbreak of hostilities. As their industries are hardly 
more than rudimentary, their munitions problem depends 
mostly on their transportation facilities. As long as the 
Dardanelles are closed, these will be very hmited. But 
they can always put as many men in the field as they can 
equip. 

Reliable information is also hard to secure about Great 
Britain. The large optimism of some of their official spokes- 
men is disproved by the meager results they have obtained on 
land. They were prepared for naval work and have done it 
well. They have probably increased their predominance over 
Germany in this matter. Their mobilization of industrial 
resources was very slow. Few people in England were pre- 
pared for the idea that modern warfare is a national affair. 
In previous conflicts the navy and army had done the work 
and the mass of the people carried on business as usual. 
But "business as usual" is a slogan in direct antithesis to the 
needs of a modern war. The nation which can get the great- 
est amount of sacrifice out of the greatest number of its 
citizens is best prepared for war. A realization of this fact 
grew slowly in England. By a strange paradox the British, 
while reluctant to adopt compulsory mihtary service or to 
interfere with business, have gone farther than their allies in 
the compulsory mobilization of finance. France has relied 
mostly on voluntary loans "Le5 Bons de la Defense Na- 
tiottaleJ' The English have commandeered private wealth 
by heavy direct taxation. While they have not yet put into 
the field anything like as large a percentage of their potential 
strength in men as Germany or France, their army is cer- 
tainly stronger than at first and can still be increased. In 
short, their "organization," far below that of the enemy at 
the outbreak of hostilities, has improved and it is to be ex- 
pected that a larger and larger proportion of their strength — 
industrial, financial, and military — will appear in usable 
form. 

The overcoming of the lack of coordination between the 
Allies is a more difficult and delicate matter — and in this 



224 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

problem no visible advance has yet been made. But in these 
days of wireless telegraphy, it is not an insolvable problem. 
While the AlHes will never enjoy the great advantage of a 
centralized command in the affairs of war and diplomacy, 
they must, through bitter experience, learn to amehorate the 
situation. 

Questions in regard to the will to conquer are too subtle to 
be given any definite answer. However the defence is 
generally more grim in its determination than the aggressor. 
As long as the Allies are fighting on their own soil for its 
Hberation they are more likely to have the "superiority in 
morale." The French soldier in Champagne or Artois is 
more likely to fight furiously than the Bavarian soldier in the 
heart of Poland. To the Germans, with their amazing record 
of victory, peace must look more tolerable than to the Allies 
whose territory is invaded. It is hardly possible to imagine a 
Belgian wanting peace at present. For the Entente Powers 
to stop fighting short of victory — or a crushing defeat — 
would be to admit German superiority, while they still have a 
chance of disproving it. 

Considered from a purely military point of view the out- 
look for the Allies is good. In this sense time fights for them. 
If they stick together, if they learn from experience to over- 
come the faults of their organization, if their will to win does 
not weaken, they get stronger with each passing month. 
The Germans will be doing marvels if they keep up their 
present power. It took the North four years to discover 
Grant — i. e., the organizer of effort, the centralized com- 
mand, the grim determination to fight it out on this Hne if 
it took all winter. 

It is a race between superior organization and superior 
resources. And while it is not possible to increase resources, 
it is possible to improve organization. If the Allies stick 
together — and do not throw it away — victory is theirs. I 
think they will win. 

So — disclaiming any pretence of prophecy — I will first 
assume the definite defeat of Germany. This is of course an 



THE MILITARY OUTCOME 225 

arbitrary assumption. It is quite possible that the outcome 
will be the reverse. I will discuss that possibility separately. 
But it is necessary to assume one conclusion or the other in 
order to simplify the diplomatic problems. 

I assume that the armies of the Allies cross the Equator 
(which is, of course, "an imaginary line" and does not corre- 
spond with any existing frontier) and fight a victorious battle 
in the German tropics and are pressing on towards the 
Temperate Zone. They cannot hope to advance much 
farther without a series of bloody battles, they cannot in- 
crease their advantage without great effort and expense, and 
in the army and at home everyone is tired of war. But the 
generals and statesmen are confident that — in spite of the 
cost — they can press onwards towards the Arctic regions and 
even to the Pole, The last victory has heightened their 
confidence. 

On the other side, the German General Staff, the Kaiser 
and his ministers, know that they are not completely beaten, 
that they are still in a position to organize a stubborn defence 
and can make the enemy pay a frightful price for every 
advance, but they have given up hope of a complete victory. 
They know in their hearts that the enemy has the upper 
hand, and that — if the war goes on — their only hope of 
escaping hopeless defeat Lies in some chance collapse of the 
enemy's will. But the reports from home speak of increasing 
poverty in the means of Kfe and the munitions of war, while 
their spies tell of the determined enthusiasm of their op- 
ponents. They know that they will be able to get better 
terms of peace now, when there is much fight left in them, 
than they could hope for at a later period when they had 
reached the end of their resistance. Under such circum- 
stances they would, in all probability, let it be known that 
they would listen to a proposal for an armistice. 

The history of recent wars shows that the old idea of an 
armistice is dead. No one, any longer, is willing to trust the 
word of his opponent. They will not even grant a few hours 
truce to bury the dead. The Allies will be reluctant to stop 



226 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

their military operations for fear that the Germans would 
use the interval to reorganize their force. At the time of the 
first Balkan war, this problem was met by one of the AlKes — 
the one with naval power — refusing to sign the armistice. 
Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro stopped fighting, but 
Greece kept up the war right through the peace proceedings 
at London and, by her control of the sea, was able to keep the 
Turks from importing coal or bringing troops from Asia 
Minor by water. So, in the situation I have suggested, it is 
probable that England would refuse to sign the armistice and 
would maintain her blockade. 

At all events the AlHes would not agree to a cessation of 
hostilities, except on terms which would grow more and more 
onerous for Germany with the passage of time and so prevent 
them from dragging out the proceedings indefinitely. What- 
ever the terms of the armistice, this will be their main pur- 
pose — to put the enemy in a position which will automatically 
get worse and worse and so bring increasing pressure on him 
to accept the demands of the victors. A naval blockade is 
an obvious means towards this end. 

Among the terms of the armistice will be the choice of a 
place for the Peace Conference. This may seem at first 
thought a small matter, but there will be a tense struggle of 
will on this point, and the result will be something of an 
indication of the relative strength of the two parties. 

Some of the enthusiasts of the Entente — confident in an 
overwhelming victory — say that the Peace Conference must 
be in Brussels, or Louvain. There is, probably, no spot on 
earth where the defeated Germans would feel themselves less 
among friends. If they consent to come to a Belgian city to 
discuss the definite terms of peace, it will mean that they are 
very thoroughly beaten. They will probably suggest Stock- 
holm — a place where the Russians are feared and the English 
are hated. The Allies, if victorious, certainly will not accept 
a city where the British policy of blockading Europe has 
made them so unpopular. 

Some place in the United States is a possibility, but 



THE MILITARY OUTCOME 227 

hardly a probability. It is generally felt in Europe that our 
influence will be towards compromise, that we will try to 
make the victor moderate in his terms. We are supposed to 
have a penchant for the under-dog. So, while the defeated 
may suggest Washington, the victor will probably insist on a 
European city. Also all the more democratic elements in 
Europe will want to keep the proceeding as close to home — as 
nearly in touch with public opinion — as possible. A com- 
promise on Switzerland is probable and again the choice be- 
tween German speaking Zurich and French speaking Geneva 
will be indicative. 

The augurs will also draw prognostics from the interval 
between the signing of the armistice and the date set for the 
opening of the congress. It is a fair assumption that the 
victors will arrange the terms of the armistice in such a way 
that from a purely military point of view delay will weaken 
their enemy and strengthen them. So, if the diplomats of 
the Allies show haste or the German statesmen try to delay 
the proceedings, it will indicate that non-military forces are 
at work. It would probably mean discord among the Allies. 



CHAPTER XVI 

DIPLOMATIC TACTICS 

If the German armies are destroyed — or threatened with 
destruction — the future of the German people will be in the 
hands of the Imperial Diplomatic Corps. And they will 
center their efforts on trying to sow discord among the 
victors. 

This is the one "defensive" tactic of diplomacy. The 
classic example of what can be accomplished in this manner 
was furnished by the activity of Talleyrand, the French 
delegate to the Congress of Vienna, after the crushing defeat 
of Napoleon. This most astute diplomat saved much more 
out of the wreckage than anyone dreamed could be saved and 
he did it by fanning jealousies and stirring up disputes be- 
tween Russia and England and Prussia and Austria. The 
fundamental maxim of diplomacy — at which Bismarck was 
quite as clever as Talleyrand — is "Separate your enemies." 

The German diplomats were signally unskilful at this in 
the years before the War. The grouping of their enemies 
became closer after every crisis and the only "separation" 
they managed to achieve was that between their friends, 
Austria and Italy. But as soon as war broke out they tried 
openly — rather too openly — to regain the ground they had 
lost. In the first days of September, 19 14, when the German 
armies were threatening Paris, tentatives were made to 
separate England and France and to make a separate peace 
with the latter. Continuous efforts have been made to bribe 
or frighten Russia and Servia into deserting their friends. 

The Allies responded to these "tactics" by the Declaration 
of London, in which Great Britain, France, and Russia 
pledged themselves to prosecute the War and to make peace 
in common. It is interesting to note that the Balkan Allies 

228 



DIPLOMATIC TACTICS 229 

before attacking Turkey — in 19 12 — reached an agreement 
similar in spirit, if not in wording. They kept it throughout 
the First War, but, as soon as Turkey was disposed of, they 
began to quarrel among themselves. 

It is no longer probable — as happened so often in the 
Napoleonic period — that a nation will suddenly change sides 
in the midst of a war. It is, of course, still a possibility, but 
the chances are that the signatories of the Declaration will 
live up to their word. But the momentum which tends to 
keep them united during the war will slow up when the 
fighting stops. As the exaltation of conflict subsides the 
common interests seem relatively less important than in- 
dividual interests. It is after the war that these tactics of 
sowing discord have the greatest chance of success. 

Every historic crisis which has any resemblance to this 
War indicates that the success of such tactics is well within 
the realms of possibility. To reduce these risks of discord to 
the minimum is the present preoccupation of all the more 
broad-minded diplomats of the Entente, and, doubtless, how 
to use the fear of such discord to the advantage of their own 
government is the present preoccupation of the more nar- 
rowly patriotic diplomats. 

There are many joints in the armor of this anti- German 
Alliance. None of her AlHes, for instance, have any interest 
in seeing Great Britain increase her naval supremacy. The 
English seem to find it hard to realize why anyone objects to 
their ruling the waves. But, as a matter of fact, ahnost 
everyone does. If the neutral nations have a voice in the 
Congress they will all side with Germany in a seditious de- 
mand for freedom of the seas. 

The American attitude on the matter is typical. In times 
of peace, when the British did not bother us by abuse of their 
sea power, we hardjy noticed that they had it, we had no 
objections to their pretensions of "a divine right." But 
when, at the outbreak of this War, they began to violate all 
the accepted ideas of international law and to interfere with 
our commerce in non-contrabands with neutral nations, we 



230 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

began to ask: "Why should the EngHsh rule the waves? 
How much effort on our part would it take to dispute this 
high-handed domination?" 

The discomfort which British navalism, and their bizarre 
blockades have caused us is very small compared to what 
Holland and the Scandinavian countries have suffered, and, 
as far as we are concerned, it is Hkely to grow less. For 
nothing could be more senseless than for the English to 
drive us to dispute their sea-rule. We are in every way 
better situated to do so, if we really set our mind to it, 
than Germany was. Every argument points to the proba- 
bility that Great Britain will seek our friendship on the sea 
rather than our hostility. But the smaller nations of 
Europe would all — if allowed a vote — support a naval code 
which would limit the arbitrary power of the English fleet. 

While her present allies are glad that Great Britain is 
strong at sea — for the first months of the war it was the 
only help she could bear them — they have no interest, 
once Germany is defeated, to see that power grow. Russia 
is, to a large extent, disinterested in the fate of the seas. 
It was mostly due to English influence — after the Anglo- 
Russian Entente — that she began building her anti-German 
fleet. Her future is manifestly on land. France and Italy, 
however, are maritime, colonial nations. Once this War 
is over they have no interest in seeing British navalism 
strengthened. 

On the other hand Russia, France, and Italy have inter- 
ests which are opposed to the traditional policy of the 
British empire. Nothing is more clearly indicated by his- 
tory than that it is instinctive for British statesmen to 
oppose the expansion of their neighbors in the direction of 
EngHsh colonial possessions — and they have colonies in 
every direction. For a long time, especially since the cut- 
ting of the Suez Canal, the English have considered it a 
vital necessity to dominate the Mediterranean. The 
" regularization " of their situation in Egypt has not les- 
sened their stakes in this neighborhood. The EngUsh also 



DIPLOMATIC TACTICS 231 

expect to inherit all the German developments in Asia 
Minor and especially the famous Bagdad railroad. They 
have already occupied the shores of the Persian Gulf and 
are pushing up into Mesopotamia. 

Now the Russians lay claim to Constantinople and the 
Straits. The French intend to "protect" Syria and Leba- 
non. The Italians claim Alexandretta. This means the 
establishment of three — possibly rival — powers in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, three places where European 
armies can be concentrated at the gates of Egypt. It 
also means sharing the profits of the Bagdad railroad, for 
the Mediterranean terminus will be in Russian, French or 
Itahan hands. Great Britain fought one war (the Crimean) 
and threatened another (The Congress of Berlin) simply 
to keep Russia away from this district. If her allies get 
what they expect from victory British naval dominance 
in the Mediterranean is over. 

Now, these considerations are not secrets, they are 
commonplaces. The German diplomats know them by 
heart. It is evidently a field for defensive tactics. They 
will offer to back French and Russian and Italian claims 
at the expense of Turkey, if they, in turn, will promise 
to vote against England in naval questions — if only they 
will vote to make it a World Congress, including the neutral 
as well as the belligerent powers, i. e., to increase the number 
of anti-English votes on naval matters. There are oppor- 
tunities for endless intrigues on this subject. 

No one knows, with any certainty, what is going on in 
the diplomatic councils of the Alhes. And it is one of the 
most obvious arguments against such secrecy that it en- 
courages all sorts of rumors, invites all the most sinister 
forms of intrigue. The Germans are, of course, taking 
advantage of this and are doing their utmost to shake the 
confidence of their enemies in the loyalty of their Allies. 

One such rumor was current in Paris in June, 19 15. 
There was a very detailed story going the rounds that a 
secret accord had been signed at London between Italy 



232 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

and Great Britain by which they bound themselves to vote 
together in the future Congress against France and Russia 
in the Near East questions. So definite an "entente" is 
highly improbable, but unfortunately it is a possibility. 
And this story — very possibly started by a German agent 
to demoralize the public opinion of France — had as a sort 
of sequel all the history of the British diplomatic contro- 
versy with Portugal over their conflicting claims in South 
Africa. I heard this rumor in Paris from two quite dif- 
ferent sources. In both cases, when I said that I did not 
believe the British government would be quite so base, 
the reply, in almost the same words, was: "Do you know 
about their ultimatum to Portugal? (nth January, 1890.) 
I thought the Austrian ultimatum to Servia was pretty 
bad till I read this EngHsh ultimatum." 

An inexplicable mystery has surrounded the entry of 
Italy into the War. First she declared war on Austria- 
Hungary. Months later she declared war on Turkey. 
Whether or not she is at war with Germany is uncertain. 
That intrigue is rife over this equivocal situation is certain. 
The lack of frankness lends itself to the most sinister sus- 
picions. Such mal-ententes are promising soil for German 
diplomats to plant the seed of discord. 

Unfortunately diplomatic history is only too full of 
rank treacheries and brutalities, and some — Kke this Anglo- 
Portuguese affair — are so recent that it takes a very large op- 
timism to hope for a complete reformation in so short a time. 

All that can be said with certainty is that no disloyalty 
between allies would be so raw as not to find ample prece- 
dent in history, that the interests of the Allies — aside from 
waging this War to victory — are far from identical; that 
there are manifest tendencies towards discord which in- 
crease with time, and may become acute as soon as the 
fighting ceases; and that it is the obvious thing for the 
German diplomats to study these tendencies towards dis- 
sension and encourage them. It is their one hope to save 
something out of the wreckage in case of defeat. 



DIPLOMATIC TACTICS 233 

And if the military outcome should be the reverse of 
what I have suggested the situation would be the same. 
The diplomats of the defeated Entente would attempt to 
sow discord between Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey, and, by sacrificing their former friends, try to 
make better terms for themselves. 

As the "tactics" of the defeated are obvious, so the 
"tactics" of the victors are clear. It will be to the interest 
of the diplomats of the Entente to divide the peace pro- 
ceedings into two sharply separated sections; first, the 
presentation of their united demands on the Germanic 
alliance; second, a conference of the victors to divide the 
spoil — a conference from which the defeated will be ex- 
cluded. In no other way could they so effectively counter 
German intrigues. If Talleyrand had not been allowed to 
sit at the Congress of Vienna he could not have saved so 
much from defeat. 

Nor could the Allies, by any other means, so strikingly 
demonstrate the importance of their victory. From one 
point of view the cause of this War is typified in the Ger- 
man challenge: "Nothing can happen in Europe without 
our consent." It would be a triumph — perhaps senti- 
mental, but certainly impressive — if the victors could ar- 
range a new map of Europe without even consulting the 
Germans. 

Nothing is more unlikely than that the actual peace 
proceedings will follow this formula, but, in so far as they 
depart from it, it will be a diminution of the Allies' victory. 
Unless they can do things in this way there is grave risk — 
even a probability — of disastrous dissension in the face of 
a half-defeated enemy. Nothing less than a most improb- 
ably overwhelming success on the field of battle will allow 
them to arrange things so simply as I have suggested. 
The chances are here — as in the past — that the diplomats 
of the defeated will regain a good part of what the soldiers 
have lost. 

But it will simpUfy the discussions of the diplomatic 



234 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

problems involved if we assume an extreme issue — having 
suffered some notable reverse, the Germans sue for peace, 
an onerous armistice is signed and two weeks later the 
plenipotentiaries of the belligerents meet at Brussels: as 
soon as the opening formalities are over, the Allies present 
their united demands in the form of an ultimatum, re- 
quiring within a specified time a "yes" or "no" answer: 
A negative answer breaks the armistice, and the allied 
armies are ordered to continue their march towards Berhn. 
Sooner or later— unless the military tide turned — the Ger- 
mans would have to submit. Then the diplomats of the 
Entente could meet by themselves about a green table in 
some other hall to divide the spoil with less fear of German 
intrigue. 

There never has been such a solution to a previous war. 
No matter which side wins, it is improbable in this case, 
but I assume it for the sake of simpHfication. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE DEMANDS OF THE ENTENTE 

A WELL-KNOWN proverb advises against counting one's 
chickens before they are hatched, but the statesmen of the 
Entente are convinced of their ultimate victory and have 
begun to discuss among themselves the terms they will 
demand of the Germanic alliance. They have not, how- 
ever, taken the pubhc into their confidence. They are 
probably far from agreeing among themselves. 

In their speeches and statements to the press, the prime 
minister and diplomats have agreed on only one clear-cut 
proposition. Alsace-Lorraine is to go back to France. 
The inhabitants of this district are not to be consulted. 
It has been decided for them at London, Petrograd, and 
Paris. 

The other formulae on which they have publicly agreed 
are vague — as for instance reparation for the Belgians. 
They have pledged themselves to make the first condition 
of peace, the evacuation of Belgium and restitution for all 
the damage done. But whether they mean an indemnity 
in money or territory, colonial or European, has not been 
announced. 

The former Commander in Chief of the Russian armies, 
the Grand Duke Nicolas, issued a proclamation to the 
Poles, promising them reunion in one political group under 
the Russian scepter, and certain vague liberties. This 
proclamation has not received the public sanction of the 
Tsar nor of his government. But the French and English 
statesmen seem to have taken the Grand Duke's promises 
seriously, and have frequently spoken as if the victory of 
their arms meant the creation of a united and autonomous 
Poland. 

235 



236 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

Russian officials have been reticent in the matter — and 
the reason is not far to seek. There was a certain grim 
logic in the old autocratic regime of oppressing everybody. 
It will be inconsistent to give "liberties" to the Poles 
which are denied to the Finns, the Letts, the Ruthenes, 
the Georgians, and even the Russians themselves. But the 
public opinion of the Tsar's hberal allies will be sadly dis- 
appointed if the Grand Duke's promises are not kept. If 
they are kept it will mean new hope for all the peoples of 
all the Russians. 

But there has been no published statement as to the 
frontiers of this proposed national unit, nor as to the theory 
on which they are to be drawn. A military strategist 
would draw the frontiers in one way; a political economist 
would certainly give the Poles an outlet to sea along the 
lower Vistula and so cut Prussia into two separate parts; 
an ethnologist would draw quite another shape on the map; 
a historian, who tried to "reconstruct" Poland would reach 
still another result. 

On this deUcate question of what territory they mean by 
"New Poland" the diplomats have observed a discreet 
silence. When the time comes for them to draw the frontiers 
they will be influenced by the extent to which they want to 
hit Prussia. If they decide every disputed point against the 
Germans, Poland will be very large. 

Servia has also been assured that her "legitimate national 
aspirations" will be realized. But there is a large difference 
of opinion as to which of her national aspirations are "legit- 
imate." The Serb race, like the PoHsh, has vague outlines. 
On all sides it melts into and mingles with other races: 
Roumanian, Bulgar, Greek, Albanian, Italian, Hungarian. 
But the expression "realization" of her "national aspira- 
tions" can hardly mean less than that Austria will have to 
abandon to her Bosnia and Herzegovina — perhaps all her 
southern Slavs. The Serbs also expect to receive an ample 
coast line on the Adriatic. 

If the Roumanians decide to join forces with the Entente 



THE DEMANDS OF THE ENTENTE 237 

Group — and her action is very uncertain — she will be en- 
couraged to claim all the provinces of the Dual Monarchy 
where her language is spoken. 

Italy is offered her "unredeemed" territory in the Aus- 
trian provinces of Trentino, Istria, and Dalmatia. And it is 
probable that she has been promised territories in this last 
province — the coast of the Adriatic — where her language is 
not spoken. 

Italy — and Greece, if she decides to join the Entente — are 
also offered large shares in the spoils of Turkey. 

It is generally agreed that Turkey is to be cut to pieces. 

In these territorial changes the German Empire would 
suffer less than its allies. The Powers of the Entente will 
ask Turkey to cease to exist and Austria-Hungary to abandon 
many rich provinces. Bulgaria will be heavily penalized. 
This last cannot be done without violation of the theory of 
the rights of nationalities. But if the Powers of the Entente 
owe their victory to Greek help they will probably allow 
them to annex even more Bulgarian population than they 
took by the Treaty of Bucarest in 19 13. Their territorial 
demands on Germany would be limited to Alsace-Lorraine, 
Poland (an elastic term), possibly Schleswig to the Danes, 
and some of the Rhine provinces as an indemnity to Belgium. 

But the statesmen of the Entente have agreed on another 
very vague formula. German militarism must be destroyed. 
It is said that three times in the last fifty years Germany has 
disturbed the peace of Europe and that it must be made 
impossible for her to recommence. How this result is to be 
achieved has not been disclosed. 

No one seems to put much confidence in arbitrary limita- 
tion of armaments. No one feels bound to keep promises 
made under duress. Even her enemies would feel that 
Germany would be justified in trying to get around any such 
regulations which might be imposed on her. 

All of Germany's enemies have an especial hatred for 
Prussia. There is a very general feeling that the other Ger- 
mans are not — naturally — so bad and would not be so strong 



238 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

in military organization, would not be so hard to defeat, so 
hard to keep in order, if it were not for Prussian leadership. 
There may be some effort to break the Hohenzollern domina- 
tion in the German Federation. The Powers of the Entente 
would like to see the imperial crown pass to the less able 
dynasties of Saxony or Bavaria. It is probable that an 
effort will be made to exaggerate the differences between the 
North and South Germans and, while treating the latter with 
some consideration, to make the cost of defeat fall heaviest 
on the former. It has even been suggested that it might be 
well to refuse to recognize the Empire and to deal separately 
with the half-hundred sovereign states which existed before 
the Union. 

The Prussia of Frederick the Great was a very small affair 
compared to the Prussia of today. The Allies, if victorious, 
would like and possibly may try to reduce it in one way or 
another to its former size and importance. A number of 
articles have been written in France — and allowed to pass the 
censor — which advocated separating the Rhine provinces 
from Prussia and making them into a "neutral" buffer state, 
or giving them to Belgium. Many similar schemes, all having 
the intention of decreasing the importance of Prussia in the 
structure of the Empire have been unofficially suggested. 
Perhaps something will be attempted in this sense — possibly 
something accomplished — but success would depend mainly 
on the frame of mind of the Germans at the end of the war. 
Some people prophesy that in case of defeat the Germans 
themselves would throw out the Hohenzollerns and repudiate 
Prussian ideals. But there are no symptoms of such a rever- 
sion of feeling as yet. It is at least probable that the hope of 
revenge would make the defeated Germans more inclined to a 
military dictatorship than ever. 

The more liberal writers of France and England are in- 
clined to let the German people solve their own internal 
problems. If Toryism is triumphant in the home poUtics of 
the coalition, it is more probable that some such effort to 
impose "constitutional reforms" on Germany will be made. 



THE DEMANDS OF THE ENTENTE 239 

But in this commercial age it is probable that the most 
important elements in the terms of peace will be economic 
and financial rather than geographical and political. There 
is much talk in the English, Russian, Itahan, and French 
newspapers of "the other war," the war on German industry. 
There is little doubt that the Germans hoped to demand 
commercial advantages if they won, and if defeated they will 
have to suffer similar disadvantages. 

First of all Germany will have no colonies except those the 
victors care to give her. By the middle of 19 15 she had lost 
all her overseas domains except parts of her African colonies, 
where small forces of her troops — without hope of reinforce- 
ment — were still keeping the field against rapidly growing 
odds. But the German colonies were more significant as a 
future asset than as present wealth. The oldest dated from 
the early eighties and such enterprises always have to pass 
through a long, barren period of development. The loss of 
her colonial possessions will hurt the next generation much 
more than this one. 

However, if the diplomats of the Allies are ordered to 
strike at her industrial life — to break her "militarism" by 
rendering her too poor to buy arms — they will find many 
other weapons at hand besides confiscating her colonies. 
They may turn against Germany the weapon she used against 
France with such cynical cruelty in 187 1 and inflict on her a 
crushing war indemnity. Bismarck made no secret that in 
demanding five milKard francs (a thousand million dollars) 
he intended to "bleed France white." And he expressed his 
regret to his friends that he had underestimated the amount 
of blood there was in French veins. He was disgusted tiiat 
they were able to pay the indemnity so quickly. The Ger- 
mans will be in a poor position to protest if they are similarly 
treated. If the Allies decide "to bleed Germany white" 
they are not likely to repeat Bismarck's mistake by fixing 
the indemnity too low. 

They will have other economic arrows in their quiver. 
A tendency to boycott things "made in Germany" will be 



240 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

an inevitable result of the hatred engendered by this War. 
The diplomats can intensify this tendency if they want to. 
They can encircle Germany with prohibitive tariff walls. 
They can take the German merchant fleet as part of the 
war indemnity; they can arrange railroad agreements which 
will stop, or seriously slow up, German trains at their fron- 
tiers, they can revise the treaties which govern navigation on 
the Danube and the Rhine. 

But, of course — and it is not an altogether Utopian hope — 
the Allies may be sincere in their statements that they intend 
to lay the foundations of a permanent peace. Instead of 
despoiling the vanquished to the limit, they may instruct 
their diplomats to moderate their demands so that the 
Germans can develop in the paths of peace. 

But there is very little hope for a peaceful future unless the 
diplomats of the victors can reach a substantial agreement on 
the terms to be imposed on the vanquished and so be able to 
present their demands in a coherent form and with at least 
the appearance of unity. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE DIVISION OF THE SPOILS 

Keeping to our arbitrary assumption that the armies 
of the Entente have forced the Germanic alhance to sue 
for peace, it is evident that their diplomats will have only 
begun their task when they have agreed on what they will 
take away from the vanquished enemy. They will have 
endless thorny questions to settle among themselves about 
the division of the spoils. 

There is a very delicate problem involved in the sharing 
of the war indemnity. Whether they decide to moderate 
their demands in the hope of future peace or decide to use 
the indemnity as a punitive measure, there will be trouble 
in dividing it. No sum which Germany and her friends 
can pay will be large enough to repair the devastation of 
the War. It is extremely doubtful if any indemnity can 
be squeezed out of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, or Bulgaria. 
If the War lasts a few months longer, no matter which 
side wins — these countries will be "bled white." And real 
money will be rare in Germany. 

If a commission of experts went through Belgium, the 
invaded districts of France and Poland, and made a modest 
estimate of the cash value destroyed, as the agents of an 
insurance company visit the scene of a fire, and if to this 
sum was added the extraordinary expenses which have 
been forced on the AlHes by the War, the figure reached 
would be staggering — past any possibility of Germany pay- 
ing it with the wealth of the present generation. And for 
the immediate reparation of damages the taxes which the 
Allies may decide to inflict on the generations of Germans 
yet unborn will hardly count. 

So the creditors — the victors — will have to accept the 

241 



242 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

fact that their debtor is bankrupt. They will have to 
content themselves with a few cents — a very few cents — on 
the dollar. But how is this sum to be divided among the 
creditors? Will Great Britain, France, and Russia keep 
their pledge and fully indemnify Belgium before they enter 
their own claims? And to what extent has Belgium a first 
lien over Serbia? If there is anything left after these two 
claims are settled, how are the Great Powers to divide the 
remainder? Will this financial plum be shared according 
to needs or according to service rendered? Certainly 
Great Britain has put more money into the war chest of 
the Entente than Russia. But the Russians have more 
freely poured out their blood. 

The theory of the rights of nationahties is not easy of 
application. Even if the three original Powers of the En- 
tente — Great Britain, France and Russia — have agreed 
on a frontier and a form of government for the New Poland, 
there remain a number of obscure and intricate problems 
in southeastern Europe. 

Assuming that the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic is 
to be freed from the yoke of the Hapsburgs, it has to be 
divided between the ItaHans and the Slavs. Italy, not 
content with redeeming the province of Trent and the 
purely Itahan districts of the Istrian peninsula, makes 
large claims in Dalmatia. She bases these claims partly 
on historic tradition. But the fact that once upon a time 
the Venetian flag floated on all the coasts of the Adriatic 
is no more firmly estabUshed than that the British flag — 
and before it the Dutch — floated on Manhattan Island. 
The Italian claims are partly — and more reasonably — 
based on present desires, economic and strategic. She 
insists on indisputable predominance in the Adriatic — in 
short she wants to make it an Italian lake. 

This ideal cannot be realized without gross violation 
of the theory of the rights of nationalities. The amount 
of pure Italian blood on the Dalmatian coast is small, the 
number of the inhabitants who show some trace of Italian 



THE DIVISION OF THE SPOILS 243 

parentage is large, but the great proportion is Slavonic. 
It is the same with the language test. The number who 
speak only ItaHan is very small, the bilingual population 
is large in the ports, but back from the coast the great mass 
of the people speak only one or another Slav dialect. 

The Italian government has made no official statement 
of its claims in this district. Their minimum is probably 
four out of five of the practical harbors, and all the islands 
which can be turned into naval bases. Judging from un- 
official newspaper articles and the poems of d'Annunzio 
their maximum claims will be the reestablishment of the 
Venetian domain and the Latinization of a large section 
of Slav hinterland. Their claims will be largely influenced 
by the success of their army and they will certainly ask 
for more than they expect to get. 

The Slavs of this district are divided into three main 
groups, Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. They are already 
protesting wildly because there are indications that the 
Powers of the Entente have promised Italy — when they 
were trying to persuade her to declare war on Germany — 
parts of this Adriatic coast which the Slavs think is theirs. 

The conflict of interests in the Adriatic is not confined 
to Latins and Slavs, The Teutons, who are weak in these 
parts on "historic" and ethnological claims, have very vital 
commercial interests at stake. Their problem is typified 
in the case of Trieste. Nearly 75 per cent of the population 
of this busy harbor is Italian, close to 20 per cent is Slav 
(Slovene) and less than 5 per cent is German. But this 
small number of Germans and Austrians — and very cor- 
dially hated they are by the great majority of the popula- 
tion — represent the economic force which has transformed 
Trieste from a half-dead Italian town into one of the world's 
great mercantile ports. It is not only that the Germans 
to the north, who use Trieste as the outlet for their com- 
merce, would suffer, if they were shut off from it by pohtical 
frontiers, but the Dalmatian coast would suffer too. What 
Uttle civilization these Slav populations have, they owe 



244 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

to Germanic business enterprise at Trieste. If the Aus- 
trian Lloyd Steamship Company stopped its mail service, 
they would drop back into the lethargic isolation which 
marked their history in the centuries before the Teutons 
came to the Adriatic. 

It will be a serious misfortune to a great many people 
who do not speak German, if the German speaking people 
are shut out of Trieste. 

The claims of the Serbs are likely to be quite as hard 
as those of Italy to reconcile with common sense. First 
of all the Serbs think that all the southern Slavs of Austria- 
Hungary should be united to their monarchy. But it is 
very uncertain if all these Slavs want the union. The 
Bosnians will probably welcome the chance to come in 
under one flag. The chances are about even in regard to 
the cathoHc Croats. Both of these racial groups have been 
suffering heavily under the Hungarian yoke and any change 
will probably be welcome. But there is an independence 
party in Croatia. However, the Slovenes have not had 
such a hard time. Their economic interests are closely 
tied up with Austria. If they are given an opportunity 
to vote they will have to choose between a sentimental 
attachment to their "race" and the dollar and cents ad- 
vantages of being part of a paying partnership. 

The Serbs also have "historic traditions" (quite as good 
as the Italian claim to Dahnatia or the Dutch to New York) 
which they feel justifies them in violating the theory of 
the rights of nationalities. The "Greater Serbia" of their 
dreams includes a large sprink&g of "subject races": 
Bulgars, Albanians, Greeks, and Roumanians. 

The Roumanians — if they decide to come in on the side 
of the Entente — will also advance embarrassing claims. 
Their problem is intricate. Their people are massed in an 
irregular group, densest in the rich grain lands of the lower 
Danube, scattering out on both sides into the mountains 
and gradually mingling with their Slav and Hungarian 
neighbors. 



THE DIVISION OF THE SPOILS 245 

If they join the Entente — and nobody knows which 
side they will join — they will be told to go ahead and re- 
deem their brothers of Transylvania (the Hungarian Prov- 
ince) but the problem of Bessarabia remains. Both the 
Russian and Roumanian statistics in regard to this district 
have been falsified, but it seems that much of the lower 
valley of the Pruth which is now the boundary, has Rou- 
manians on both banks. The Allies may try to persuade 
Russia to cede this territory to Roumania. In other words, 
her "legitimate aspirations" imply the giving up of terri- 
tory by both sides. To further complicate matters — prob- 
ably as an excuse to remain neutral — Roumania is formulat- 
ing "demands" in return for her intervention which far 
exceed the territory inhabited by Roumanians. However, 
it is quite possible that she may remain neutral — and so 
simplify the diplomatic problems. 

The theory of the rights of nations is a new idea: it has 
not progressed to the point of working both ways. After 
all it is no more fantastic for the Roumanians to want to 
annex a few million Tartars, Russians, Ruthenes, Hun- 
garians, Germans and Serbs in the name of this right to 
free their "unredeemed" brothers than it is for the Italians 
to claim the Slav populations of the Adriatic or for the 
English, French and Russians to demand territory in 
Turkey. 

A problem, almost equally difficult, will face the diplo- 
mats of the Entente as soon as they have succeeded in 
dividing the indemnity and the territory they will have 
taken from Germany and Austria-Hungary — the colonial 
world. I will take Africa as an example. Of course the 
theory of the rights of nations does not extend to black 
folk. At the outbreak of the War the German flag flew 
over two and a half million square kilometers, with a 
population estimated at 11,000,000. It is probable that 
most of the heritage will fall to France and Great Britain. 
All forecasts would be thrown out if Russia suddenly showed 
a desire to become an African power, but her traditional 



246 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

policy is to annex her neighbors, to push out her frontiers, 
not to seek far-away colonies. 

Great Britain "needs" parts at least of German East 
Africa in order to build her "all red railroad" from the 
Cape to Cairo. The forces of the South African Union 
under General Botha have conquered Southwest Africa, 
and it is improbable that the imperial government will 
intervene. The Union will do what it likes with this terri- 
tory. A German official coming from this colony summed 
up his impression of it by saying: "If a dog saw it he would 
howl." But diamonds have recently been discovered in 
the southern part. The government of the Union would 
like to operate these mines in order — by competition — to 
break the dictatorial influence of the De Beers Diamond 
Company in their internal politics. There is also talk of 
trading off the northern part — the part a dog would howl 
at — to Portugal in exchange for southern Mozambique 
and Delagoa Bay, a deal to which the Portuguese will 
never consent if they feel strong enough to resist it. As 
France has adjacent territory she will probably lay claim 
to Togoland and Cameroon. The Belgian Congo may also 
benefit by some "frontier rectifications" at the expense of 
German East Africa. 

The Liberal element in the Entente Powers will oppose 
any annexation of German colonies. It will prove that 
the Tory Imperialists are in power if Germany is driven 
out of Africa. 

But while, in Liberal circles, one hears a good deal of 
argument against depriving Germany of all colonial out- 
lets, hardly a voice is raised in behalf of Turkey. Far and 
away the most delicate problem in the division of spoils 
is furnished by the remnants of the Ottoman empire. The 
Turks are not quite "white," in the European sense of the 
word, so no one will feel restrained by the theory of the 
rights of nations. Everyone is planning to take a share 
of the Sick Man's inheritance. The conflicts are so acute 
and so numerous between what each nation calls its "legiti- 



THE DIVISION OF THE SPOILS HI 

mate aspirations" and its allies call its "exaggerated am- 
bitions," that the subject deserves a chapter by itself. 
It typifies to a greater extent than any one other problem, 
the danger which will threaten the Entente Powers in 
the moment of their victory. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE FATE OF TURKEY 

All the Powers of the Entente — and some of the neu- 
trals — have staked out claims in Turkey. If they win, 
the Ottoman empire will pass away. The Turks will prob- 
ably be driven back into the mountains of Asia Minor and 
lose not only their last province in Europe but all their 
coast line. Sic transit gloria mundi. No one who believes 
in a reasonable organization of the world will regret to see 
the irrational Turkish adventure — the most amazing epic 
of rapine the modern world has seen — come to an inglorious 
end. 

Even as the northern barbarians overthrew the civiliza- 
tion of Rome, so the hordes of Pagan Mongols swarmed 
down from the steppes of Central Asia and overwhelmed 
the brilHant culture of the Caliphs of Bagdad. For a 
hundred years or more there was tense competition among 
the three religions of the East as to which should convert 
the invaders. The Jews and Christians failed, and the 
horde became Mohammedan. 

One of the lesser chiefs of the Mongols — Osman or Ot- 
man — founded an independent dynasty in Asia Minor. 
His tribe increased: it enjoyed a large endowment of what 
M. Bergson has called the elan vital. The Otmanli 
were nothing but warriors; at this trade, however, they 
had no rivals. They crossed the Straits into Europe, gave 
the death-blow to the moribund Greek empire, conquered 
Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Arabia, and all the northern 
coast of Africa to the borders of Morocco. They won the 
Greek Isles, most of the coast of the Black Sea, all of the 
Balkan Peninsula and they twice besieged Vienna. 

The Turks have never lost their essential quality of 

248 



THE FATE OF TURKEY 249 

"invaders." Even in Constantinople they have lived as a 
strong garrison in a conquered city. Suleimon, the Magnif- 
icent, was magnificent only in the amount of his spoil. 

In "the good old days," when muscle and individual 
daring and lust for conquest won victories, they were a 
Great Power. Their decline began when it was discovered 
how to fight with machines and chemicals. When, before 
the Pyramids, in sight of forty centuries, French infantry 
with muskets defeated the Mamelukes, who charged with 
scimitars, the military power of the Sons of Otman was 
broken. The Sick Man has been left aHve these hundred 
years — to the shame of Europe — because the christian 
nations were too jealous over his heritage to allow him to 
die. But now — if the Powers of the Entente win — his 
estate must be probated. 

Great Britain, without waiting for the final settlement, 
has begun to cash in, by "regularizing" her situation in 
Egypt and Cyprus. Her troops — which her allies would 
nke to see in the main campaign — are conquering Mesopo- 
tamia and so approaching the precious oil and cotton dis- 
tricts and tightening their grip on the Bagdad railroad. 

Her naval forces have already occupied some of the 
Greek Isles. Tenedos, commanding the mouth of the Dar- 
danelles, is the most important from the point of view of 
naval strategy. No official statement has been issued as 
to the British intentions in regard to Tenedos. But in 
spite of the best intention the English found insurmountable 
difiiculties in the way of observing their promise to evacu- 
ate Egypt, and Tenedos is too valuable to be abandoned 
lightly. 

The fact that Great Britain has so large a number of 
Mohammedan subjects gives her "special interests" in 
Arabia. She cannot tolerate any other Power gaining 
control of the Holy Cities of Islam. An ounce of prevention 
is worth a pound of cure. A stitch in time, etc. She al- 
ready "protects" certain points on the Arabian coast: 
Aden, Muskat, Koweit. So she may decide to "regularize" 



2SO THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

her position here and change this "zone of influence" into a 
protectorate. 

The British diplomats will come to the peace conference 
with a certain number oi fails accomplis — which cannot be 
discussed. They can hardly ask for much more of the 
Turkish spoils than they have already so thriftily taken. 
What further demands they make will probably be limited 
to the Bagdad railroad. 

There is a wide difference of opinion in England as to 
the best policy in Mesopotamia. Those Liberals who 
before the War were in favor of encouraging German enter- 
prise in this district, probably think still that it would be 
wise. But to say so at present would lay them open to 
unpleasant suspicions of being friendly to the enemy. 

One section of opinion wants to annex the valleys of the 
Euphrates and Tigris and the Mesopotamian desert up 
to the confines of Syria, which is to be French, and to push 
forward the construction of the Bagdad railroad under 
British auspices. This would mean the rapid economic 
development of one of the most promising sections of the 
earth. The rails from the Mediterranean to the Persian 
Gulf would shorten the route to India and so draw the em- 
pire closer together. 

But another section of the public — led by the "shipping 
interests" — are opposed to the opening of the railroad. 
It would compete with the Suez Canal. With the German 
merchant marine crippled by the War, the Oriental trade 
will be a practical monopoly for the English. If they keep 
railroads out of the Near East, the growing commerce of 
Mesopotamia will follow its natural course down the great 
rivers to British ports on the Persian Gulf, and so to Eu- 
ropean markets in English bottoms. If the railroad is 
built, much of this trade will be diverted to non-English 
ports in the Mediterranean, and non-English traders and 
shippers will cut in on the profits. But when the interests 
of political reaction conflict with those of economic re- 
action, the former generally win. It is probable that the 



THE FATE OF TURKEY 251 

"railroad" party will defeat the "shipping" party and 
that Mesopotamia will be annexed. 

The French claim a protectorate over the undefined 
territory inhabited by the native christians of Syria and 
the mountains of Lebanon. Their "interests" here are 
derived from some industrial developments such as rail- 
roads and the work done by their catholic missionaries. 
While bitterly fighting the church at home, the republic 
has been jealous in protecting the rights of her Jesuits 
abroad. It was Gambetta who said that "Anti-clericalism 
is not an article of export." The other Powers of the 
Entente will hardly question French claims here, as, having 
borne so much more than their share of the War, they 
are plainly destined to reap the smallest territorial gains 
from victory. 

Italy wants some of southern Asia Minor. Her claims 
are on a par with those of other nations in such colonial 
matters: they are solely economic. In recent years some 
Italian financial groups have secured concessions from the 
Sultan in and about Alexandretta, and considerable Italian 
money has been invested. No official statements have been 
issued in regard to the extent of their claims, but it is prob- 
able that definite treaties have been signed with some or all 
of her Allies. The Italian government took rather more 
pains than were necessary to assure the world that it was 
being guided by "Tegoisme sacre." And Egoism, no matter 
how sacred, is hardly hkely to be contented with vague 
promises. Italy probably hopes to control the coast from 
Alexandretta to the new Russian frontier somewhere south 
of the Dardanelles. This would include the rich and im- 
portant city of Smyrna. How far inland her claims go is 
uncertain. 

The Greeks also have large claims in these parts. Once 
upon a time Greek civilization was supreme along the 
Ionian coast. But there seems little chance that Greece 
will have any voice in the councils of the Allies. 

Ethnologically the Greek clauns in Asia Minor, while 



252 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

slight, are very much better than those of any other Euro- 
pean nation. But economically Greece is in no position 
to administer this territory. Smyrna is very largely Greek, 
and it promises to become a more and more important 
commercial center. But Turkish misrule has largely dev- 
astated all this territory. Greece itself is a poor coun- 
try; the large increase of territory due to the Balkan Wars 
was more than the home country could stand. The new 
provinces in Epirus and Macedonia are not yet assimilated. 
The annexation of any large territory in Asia Minor would 
be a disaster. But there is a party in Athens who talk 
seriously of reestablishing the Glorious Greek Empire of 
Byzantium, forgetting of course — as is generally the case 
in such "historic arguments" — that the eastern empire 
was scarcely glorious after it ceased to be Latin. However, 
neither one of the groups of Great Powers — although they 
are bidding heavily for Greek support in this War — want 
to see the Greeks at Constantinople. There is no immediate 
prospect of the creation of a new Byzantine empire. The 
Greeks will be fortunate if they live through this War 
without losing territory. 

The entrance of Turkey into the War on the side of 
Germany, and the closing of the Dardanelles — a great 
victory for the German diplomacy — was a very sad blow 
to the Powers of the Entente. It was much more serious 
than the purely military result of closing the route by which 
munitions could best be sent to Russia. It also made a 
desperate confusion in Russian finance, for in normal times 
she pays for her imports by the grain and oil she exports 
by the Black Sea and the Straits. There is a large element 
of poetic justice in the present predicament. If Britain 
and France and Russia had loyally stood by the Balkan 
alliance in 191 2, it might not have broken up. Turkey 
would not have dared to enter the War in the face of such 
a united bloc. As a result of this Balkan diplomacy in 
recent years the Entente had only one sure friend in the 
Peninsula, Servia, the weakest of them all, and the most 



THE FATE OF TURKEY 253 

exposed. For, not having had the imagination and moral 
authority to solve the Balkan problem, Britain and France 
and Russia find themselves drawn into a war on behalf of 
Servia. 

Russia is pushing her army of the Caucasus down into 
Persia (with whom she is not technically at war), into 
Turkish Armenia and along the Black Sea coast towards 
Trebizonde, and it is her hope to reach by this route the 
Bosphorus. She lays claim to all this coast and an unde- 
fined hinterland. 

There are endless opportunities for disputes over these 
ill-defined, sometimes conflicting claims. French Syria 
will have EngHsh Mesopotamia to the east and Italian 
Asia Minor to the north. Italy and Russia will probably 
have a common frontier somewhere along the coast. Per- 
haps in the interior Britain and Russia will meet — for the 
first time in their history. This is the best hope the Turks 
have in case of defeat. England and Russia have always 
disliked the idea of being neighbors, so perhaps they will 
be inclined to make a fairly large nation out of the remnants 
of Turkey, to serve as a buffer between them. 

But of course all these problems, intricate as they are, 
and serious as they may become, are the merest bagatelles 
compared to the question of the Straits. 

Many books have been written about the Dardanelles. 
Their importance in the history of Europe can hardly be 
exaggerated. From the time when people fought with 
stone hatchets till today, when the mightiest guns of the 
world's mightiest armada are thundering there in vain, 
the Dardanelles have been the strongest naval base on 
earth. From a military point of view neither Gibraltar nor 
Heligoland even compare with Galhpoli. 

The economic importance of the Straits is even larger. 
The greatest rivers of central and eastern Europe feed the 
commerce of the Black Sea, and the nation which holds Con- 
stantinople is not only sure of free passage for its own fleets 
but can lay whatever tax it pleases on the fleets of others. 



254 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

The Turks realized the surpassing value of the situation, 
and to a larger extent than anywhere else in Europe they 
settled in and about Constantinople. In the five centuries 
they have been there they have taken root and today no 
one but the Turks can rule the Straits without flagrant 
violation of the rights of nations. But, as I said, most 
Europeans feel that the Turks are not really white, so 
their rights will not be considered. If, in spite of victory, 
the Powers of the Entente allow the Turks to remain in 
Constantinople, it will be for other reasons. 

It is generally believed that the English and French have 
formally promised Constantinople to Russia. But there is a 
Latin phrase much used in diplomacy to crawl out of em- 
barrassing promises — rehus sic non stantibus. It means: 
"things have changed." It would not have much weight 
as a defence for violation of contract in civil laws but it 
still is in usage in international relations. The last time 
the EngHsh and French fought side by side (the Crimean 
War) it was to keep Russia back from the Straits. Neither 
of them would really welcome Russian war-ships in the 
Mediterranean. Circumstances may arise which will lead 
them to champion the right of the Sick Man to stay alive 
a bit longer. 

There can be no doubt that if the guardianship of the 
Straits is to be given to any one of the European Powers, 
Russia has the first claim. Any regime at Constantinople 
which does not give the Russians a "most favored nation" 
guarantee, which does not amply assure her against having 
her commerce in grain and oil smothered by a closing of 
the Straits, is iniquitous and contains the certain germ of 
future trouble. Russia's need for free access to a warm 
sea is so great as to equal a "right." But Roumania cer- 
tainly has an equal "right" to a "most favored nation" 
clause. 

It is probable that if the Entente wins, we will see Russia 
installed at Constantinople. The situation has changed 
in many ways since the Crimean War. The long alliance 



THE FATE OF TURKEY 255 

has greatly decreased the French distrust of Russia. The 
digging of the Panama Canal has somewhat lessened the 
value of the Suez route to the British. Even if they have 
to give up their predominance in the Mediterranean (and 
it is already a fiction in the face of the combined Itahan 
and French fleets) they will still have a sea-route to the 
Pacific and India. And if the British estabhsh themselves 
permanently at Tenedos, the concession to Russia would 
be greatly mitigated. 

But, looking at the question in a broad spirit — not merely 
as a part of the tactics of carrying on this War — it is to 
be hoped that Constantinople will not be given to Russia 
nor any other nation unconditionally. The Straits are of 
too great a pubhc importance, they belong to the world at 
large. With every industrial development of the Near 
East their importance will grow. It is not only the nations 
with a frontage on the Black Sea who have an interest that 
free trade shall rule over this water-way, but also every 
nation that buys t-heir grain and oil and sells their goods in 
exchange. No nation should be given unlimited sovereignty 
and so be allowed to favor its own commerce at the expense 
of its rivals. 

Here more than anywhere else the diplomats will be faced 
by an economic problem. It will be most unfortunate if 
they allow their decisions to be swayed by considerations 
of naval strategy or political expediency. 

No one who has passed through the Straits — the Dar- 
danelles and the Bosphorus — can have escaped the impres- 
sion of great natural wealth utterly undeveloped. The 
last time I was there I was fresh from a winter in Panama. 
The difference was appalling. Even so important a thing 
as the upkeep of proper Hghthouses was neglected. At this 
great shipping center there was no adequate wharfage, no 
modern dry docks, no sufficient warehouses, no well equipped 
marine repair shops. The coaling facilities were mediaeval. 
Nothing better could happen for the great interests cen- 
tered in the Straits than to have them administered for ten 



256 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

years by a board of civil engineers, like our late Isthmian 
Canal Commission. It will be unfortunate to see them en- 
trusted to the most corrupt and backward of the Great 
Powers. Of all the European nations Russia is the least 
prepared to do such necessary engineering work. 

If the armies of the Allies prove victorious, their dip- 
lomats will deserve great credit if they can reach an ami- 
able and workable settlement of the intricate affairs of 
Turkey. 



CHAPTER XX 

IF GERMANY WINS 

The war will not be over till the last cannon is fired. And, 
while from a purely military point of view the odds seem to 
be heavily against the Germanic forces, any serious dis- 
cord among the Powers of the Entente would assure their 
victory. With the best of luck they can hardly hope for an 
overwhelming triumph. But once more in order to simpHfy 
the diplomatic problem, I will assume a decisive victory 
for their armies, which carries them through the Tropics 
and well into the Temperate Zone of their enemies. 

In that case we can ignore the theory of the rights of 
nations, which has no place in their diplomacy. The other 
problems of economic and colonial considerations would 
be the same in substance as those discussed above on the 
hypothesis of their defeat. They would also face the same 
problems of tactics. 

The fact that the German Empire dominates her alHes 
has been a great asset during the war, as it has resulted in a 
unification and coordination of military action which the 
Entente coalition did not enjoy. To an almost equal ex- 
tent this will be an advantage— in case of victory — in the 
solution of the diplomatic problems. Orders will go out 
from BerHn. Vienna, Sofia and Constantinople will prob- 
ably have as Httle to say in the formulating of the terms of 
peace as they have had in controlling the actions of their 
armies. 

Still it will be the defensive tactics of the defeated Entente 
Powers to try to sow discord among their victors. While the 
Germans can afford to offend any one, or even any two of 
their allies, they cannot safely offend all of them. Discord 
with Austria-Hungary is most likely to arise over the divi- 

2S7 



258 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

sion and treatment of Poland. Bulgaria and Turkey 
have sharply conflicting interests : it will be hard to content 
both of them. But any dissatisfaction among her former 
Allies can probably be counterbalanced by hitching to the 
chariot of the Deutschtum one or more of the defeated 
nations. Germany might decide to spare Russia and crush 
France and Italy and Britain. Or she might decide to save 
Britain for an ally and smash the rest. 

Germany would probably not annex any territory on the 
continent of Europe except on specifically economical 
grounds. Such considerations would lead her to push out 
her frontiers on both the West and the East. 

She would probably annex Belgium and the North of 
France with a coast line on the North Sea and the Channel 
at least as far south as Calais, — perhaps down to Boulogne. 
She would justify this with two economic reasons, (i) 
It would give her access to the rich mineral deposits of this 
territory, which she needs for her metal industry. (2) 
It would give her much-desired sea-gates. 

The fate of Holland would be uncertain. Some of the 
more rabid pan-Germans are for frank annexation. Almost 
all the industrial population of western Germany would 
like to control the mouths of the Rhine. A rather interest- 
ing alternative to such brutal annexation of Holland has 
been suggested. It has been proposed to break Belgium 
in two, to combine the French speaking section with the 
to-be annexed territory of northern France, and form it 
into a Reichsland — the regime devised for Alsace-Lorraine 
when it was annexed, — and to offer the Flemish speaking 
section of Belgium to Holland on consideration that Hol- 
land voluntarily enters the empire, or at least comes into 
the German Zollverein. Whatever the formalities are, if 
Germany annexes Belgium, the "independence" of Holland 
will be little more than a fiction. 

There are two quite distinct and generally hostile eco- 
nomic groups in Germany. And the industrial group, 
which would be most interested in this expansion towards 



IF GERMANY WINS 259 

the West, was not in power when the War broke out. It is 
not their War. The Junkers, who were in supreme control, 
are agriculturalists. Far from loving the "industrials" 
of the Rhine they will be bitterly jealous of any increase 
in their power. They will demand for themselves com- 
pensating annexations to the East. It is the "Conserva- 
tive" and "Agrarian" newspapers and speakers who have 
come out most openly in favor of annexations, and their 
eyes are turned towards the agricultural lands of Poland, 
Lithuania, and the Baltic provinces of Russia. 

During the course of the War there has been much talk 
in the German papers — and there was a special commission 
appointed to study the matter — of a unification of the 
German and Austro-Hungarian tariffs. The advantages 
of such an expansion of the Zollverein idea would be great 
from an economic point of view, but it would also have 
a large poHtical significance. It would stop the rivalry 
between these nations over the ownership of Trieste. The 
Germans want this access to the Mediterranean: the Aus- 
trians have been reluctant to give it up. If a customs union 
is reached this cause of jealousy disappears. 

The Hapsburgs — in case of victory — will demand a 
large share of Russian Poland and perhaps some of the 
Ruthenian provinces of Little Russia. They will also feel 
justified in taking back some of the North of Italy. Hun- 
gary will take Servia, Montenegro and Albania at least as 
far south as Durazzo. 

Bulgaria will insist on Macedonia. Her imperialistic 
poHticians will ask for much more. It is rumored that the 
Germans have offered them a strip of Albania with the 
Adriatic coast from Durazzo to Avlona. And it is also 
said that they are to be given Constantinople: — Turkey to 
be compensated by regaining Egypt. This last suggestion 
seems fantastic to me as it is probable that the Germans 
would prefer to have the most feeble of their allies at the 
Dardanelles so as to enjoy a more dictatorial influence 
there. And it is hardly probable that they would repay 



26o THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

Turkey — the most valuable and docile recruit they have 
yet found — by asking her to abandon her capital. 

There would probably be a new and tight alliance of these 
four victorious states. They would control, even if they 
did not annex Holland, the North Sea coast from the 
Channel to Denmark, all the southern coast of the Baltic, 
a broad strip of territory from the northern seas narrowing 
gradually through central Europe to the Straits. And in 
this immense imperial combine Germany would be supreme. 

The effect on the colonial world of a German victory 
would be even more sweeping. Just what the changes 
would be it is idle to guess. Germany could take what she 
wanted and have a great deal left to distribute to her Allies. 
In Africa, Germany would certainly annex the parts of 
French and Belgian Congo which she needs to connect up 
her east and west coast colonies. She would very prob- 
ably take a large share of French North Africa. She might 
take India. The amount she took would depend largely 
on the size of the indemnity she could extract. As a general 
proposition colonies are expensive playthings. Germany's 
appetite would probably be limited by the amount of re- 
sources she could find to exploit the colonies. 

What the world would be like if the Germans win is an 
interesting but futile speculation. Probably neither side 
will win so overwhelmingly as to be able to realize one-half 
of its "aspirations." But keeping to the assumption of a 
complete German victory we can hazard one statement and 
one query. 

The German solution will not bring peace. It would 
satisfy nobody but the Germans. Aside from the conflict 
of will in the "annexed territories," there would be discon- 
tent — perhaps sullen, perhaps active — among her allies 
over their vassalage. The Egyptian nationalists — for 
instance — think they would like the Germans better than 
their present christian rulers. It is doubtful if they would. 
Islam, all over the world, looks to Germany for deliverance 
from French and English and Russian domination. But 



IF GERMANY WINS 261 

the Persians — as another example — will not find the Turko- 
German combine any preferable to the Anglo-Russian. 
The natives of Algeria and Morocco will find the Germans 
just as christian, just as foreign, as the French. 

And, to come back to Europe, the German solution of 
the Balkan problem will not bring peace to that unhappy 
district. The Austrians and the Hungarians, inflated with 
the pride of victory, will not be less arrogant and cruel to 
their subject races than they have been in the recent past. 

A German victory will not solve the "question of the 
southern Slavs." It will not solve the "PoKsh question." 
The "sore spots" of Europe will not be cured. Their 
number and size and infectiousness will be increased. 

A Germanized Europe will mean an armed Europe. 

The query deals with the psychological effect. What 
would it mean to the European mind to see the Deutschtum 
triumphant? And this no man can answer. 

There are elements of great vigor and great virtue in the 
German habit of mind. All the world could learn much 
from them. 

But more than once in the long history of the race it has 
happened that the conqueror has fallen victim to the ideas 
of the conquered. The Mongol hordes which overthrew 
the Caliphate at Bagdad fell under the spell of the civiliza- 
tion they destroyed. The Goths became Latinized in 
language and religion and in political idea. It is not im- 
possible that Germany — if victorious — might become 
Europeanized. 



CHAPTER XXI 

THE PROBLEMS OF POWER 

One of the gravest vices of the diplomatic tradition is 
exempHfied in the history of the Balkan Peninsula. 

No group of men take a greater pride in calling them- 
selves "reahsts" than do the diplomats. If you accuse 
them of some rank treachery, some violation of common 
decency, they shrug their shoulders and say complacently 
that they are *' realists." But no group of men — with the 
possible exception of priests and physicians — are more 
bound by "obscurantism," catch phrases and meaningless 
formulae. Their most sacrosanct dogma is the status quo. 
Listening to these gentlemen talk, you would think that 
they had never heard of Darwin and the theory of evolution. 

Every time the diplomats have come together to discuss 
the Near East, they have solemnly decreed a status quo. 
The one outstanding reaHty of the Balkans is political in- 
stabiHty, a constant bubbHng and boiling of development 
and change. 

At Berlin in 1878 the Great Powers were faced by the 
fact that the Russian armies had smashed up the status 
quo ante. They went through their ritual and decreed a 
new status quo. It was not simply a weak, negative, do- 
nothing poHcy — it was a vicious effort to avoid change, to 
stifle life. But the diplomats could not stop the process of 
growth — they could only impede and distort it. Hardly a 
decade passed when someone did not pull a prop from 
under their flimsy structure. But— ostrich-like — they 
stuck their heads in the sand and refused to look their 
enemy in the face. 

In 191 2 when Italy had annexed two Turkish provinces, 
the Balkan allies decided to settle their old scores with 

262 



THE PROBLEMS OF POWER 263 

the Sultan — the foreign offices of the Great Powers an- 
nounced that they would not tolerate any alteration in the 
status quo. These "realists" could not see that whether 
they liked it or not — things had changed. When at last 
there was hardly any Turkey left in Europe, they reluc- 
tantly admitted the fact and erected a new status quo. This 
time it was Albania! The Prince of Wied and his descend- 
ants were to rule at Durazzo forever and a day. 

When the Balkan states began fighting among themselves 
the next year and tore up this eternal and immutable 
scheme, the diplomats, undiscouraged, announced that 
they were really serious this time and intended to maintain 
the status quo created by the Treaty of Bucarest. 

We may be sure that if, at the Congress to come after 
this War, they try, as is their wont, to crystallize Europe 
into a rigid framework, their work will be, at best, laugh- 
able, — at worst, tragic. 

Sooner or later the diplomats will have to wake up to the 
reality, which everyone else has accepted, that life is 
growth and change. Even they admit that the war is 
going to alter the structure of Europe. The process of 
change will go on after the peace is signed. A wave of 
child-bearing — which the diplomats cannot control — may 
sweep over Spain and upset all their careful calculations. 
Some apparently trifling frontier alteration, some new tariff 
law, may completely change the economic relations of two 
countries — deaden one and give the other a great spurt 
of activity. No one of the nationalities of Europe will 
stand still to please the diplomats. 

In all the reams they have covered with their careful 
writing, have decorated with their ponderous seals, hardly 
a single treaty has ever had so long a life as this Belgian 
Neutrality Guarantee, signed in 1839, to be torn up in 
1914. The Triple Alliance, which Italy denounced last 
spring, was the oldest in Europe — thirty- three years old. 

The solutions they give to the problems raised by this 
War will be tentative. They will not be able to create any 



264 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

sort of permanent status quo. And their new Europe will 
be workable just in proportion as they recognize — as they 
never have before — that flux and flow is the law of life for 
nations, just as it is for amoebae. 

At all events the post-bellum Europe will be different 
from the old. The status quo is hopelessly dead. All 
values are being weighed in this War. Old ideas are being 
submitted to the test of fire — on both sides of every fron- 
tier. Very Httle will survive just because it used to be. 
Political institutions and prejudices, among other things, 
will have to stand the test, and "show reason" for their 
existence. This is equally true of "hereditary" enmities 
and friendships. 

There will be new groupings among the nations — new 
alignments, new alliances. The old pact between democratic 
France and despotic Russia is an anomaly which nothing 
but fear of Germany can explain. A French writer in Le 
Temps, speaking of the former alliance between Italy and 
the Germanic empires, described it with the indecent but 
forceful phrase, un accouplement contre nature. But this 
phrase from the penal code was even more applicable to 
the alliance of his own country with the Tsar. 

For more than twenty years now, France has been pouring 
her savings into the Russian treasury, and so has been 
buying the military aid of the Cossacks. While some of this 
money has been a good military investment, some of it has 
been spent in maintaining prisons in Siberia for all those 
Russians who have read and taken seriously the history of 
France. If the French are relieved of the pressing fear of 
Germany, they will stop sinking their money in the bottom- 
less pit of the Tsar's misgovernment. The Alliance, if it 
survives at all, will be greatly modified. 

The future of Europe depends very largely on the in- 
ternal politics of Russia. No one can ignore the possibility 
that a victorious war may strengthen and revivify the 
autocracy. With new prestige, with access to the warm 
seas, which will immensely strengthen her industrial life, 



THE PROBLEMS OF POWER 265 

Slavdom may grow — by itself — into a grave menace for the 
Liberal nations of Europe. But the more immediate 
danger — in case the Entente Powers win — is a new Holy 
Alliance, — a new Dreikaisershund. Austria and Germany, 
if defeated, will — as France did after 1870 — seek to form 
a new combination. A reactionary Russia would be their 
natural ally. With Prussian brains organizing and dis- 
ciphning the limitless resources of Russia, this combination 
of the three emperors would, within a generation, be an 
appalling force of reaction. 

It follows inevitably that all the Liberals of Italy, France, 
and Great Britain are casting up accounts, figuring out the 
chances of a successful revolution in Russia. There is 
much reason to hope for success. Finances are likely to 
be the key to the situation. 

The two classic examples of successful revolutions in 
Europe are furnished by the beheading of Charles I. of 
England and of Louis XVI. of France. In both cases the 
people won by controlling the purse. The popular party 
overcame the military power of the sovereign because, by 
refusing to grant him funds, they made it impossible to hire 
large armies. In 1905 and 1906 the Russian Liberals had 
quite as tight a grip on the Tsar. But their effort at revolt 
coincided with the period of international tension over the 
Conference of Algeciras. The threat from Germany was 
unusually acute. So, when the Tsar could not get money 
for his Cossacks at home, he could borrow all he wanted in 
Paris. It was international capital — largely French — 
which allowed him to win the victory over his people. 

The situation is not likely to be repeated. Once relieved 
from the immediate fear of Germany, the French will no 
longer have the same interest in supporting the Cossacks. 
And after the War — even if victorious — the Tsar will be in 
more pressing need of ready money than ever before. The 
Liberals of England and France and Italy — and in this 
matter they hope to find support in America — are resolved 
not to lend him a cent except on the condition that he 



266 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

grants to his country a real constitution. If the Tsar is 
left after the War face to face with his own people he will 
have to choose — quickly — between large concessions and 
sudden death. All that the Russian Liberals ask is that 
foreign capital shall maintain a "benevolent neutrality." 

This brings us very close to the center of the problem of 
peace. Europe will not be set free from war by any clever 
combination of frontiers or tariff laws. The theory of the 
rights of nations will not solve the problem. The diplo- 
mats are only "agents" — everything depends on the kind of 
government they represent. 

We must not expect them single-handed to regenerate 
the world. It is quite possible that the new treaty they 
will sign, perhaps at Brussels, if the AlKes win, will be quite 
like the Treaty of Frankfort which followed the Franco- 
Prussian War, a new starting-point for a generation of 
shabby intrigues and complicated coalitions — a new 
struggle for power. 

In forecasting the work the diplomats will do, it would 
be unjust to expect too much of them. Left to themselves 
they will follow their traditions — and their traditions are 
bad. It would be hard to put your finger on any spot on 
the map of the world where some diplomat has not been 
"decorated" by his king, or promoted by his government, 
for a piece of work he would not like his children to know 
about. Whether your finger chanced to fall on one of the 
great capitals of Europe or on some distant corner of the 
"uncivilized" world, China or South Africa, Teheran or 
Fez, Bangkok or Bogota — there in the archives of the con- 
sulates or the legations you could find the same sorry record 
of broken pledges, bribery, all too often of prostitutes on 
the pay-roll of the foreign office and not infrequently of 
murder — all for the greater glory and power of the home 
land. 

It is rather cheap to criticize these resplendent gentle- 
men in gold lace, their breasts covered with jewelled decora- 
tions, for having been involved in such scandalous affairs — 



THE PROBLEMS OF POWER 267 

cheap and useless. The important point is that the results 
they obtained were approved of by their governments — 
and they were not questioned as to the means they em- 
ployed. 

Black as they are, the records of diplomacy are not es- 
pecially black. Our "muckrakers" have told us similar 
stories about our internal politics and "big business," 
There is no reason to expect a higher degree of morality 
from diplomats than that which we find among the people 
at home. Just as long as one merchant or one gas com- 
pany strives for unfair advantages over his rival in the 
next street, as long as one political party is not over-scrupu- 
lous in the way it defeats the other, as long as hostile com- 
petition is our rule of life, it is manifestly unjust to expect 
diplomats to arrange a regime of mutual aid and good will 
among nations. 

The peace of Europe depends on the progress which is 
made towards enlightened and Liberal national govern- 
ment. The Tories, the Junkers, les hommes d'ordre, the 
pan-Slav bureaucrats, our Imperialists will not give us 
peace — they are not really interested in it. Russia is not 
the only country where there is danger of reaction. In 
every country at war today — in spite of all the talk about 
r Union sacree and the "civic peace" — a bitter, if silent, 
struggle is in progress over the question: "Who shall con- 
trol the War?" and above all, "Who shall control the peace 
negotiations?" An optimistic book has been written — to 
take one example — by Arnold Toynbee, "Nationality and 
the War." He has the courage to be logical — if not alto- 
gether wise- — and tries to apply the theory of the rights of 
nations to the victors as well as to the vanquished. His 
new map of Europe— in case Germany is defeated — implies 
an amount of self-sacrifice which has no precedent in inter- 
national history. He suggests that the people of Alsace- 
Lorraine should be allowed to determine their own fate by 
a referendum. He proposes that Russia shall not only 
keep her informal promises to the Poles, but also give some 



268 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

crumbs of liberty to the Finns and Ruthenes. And — being 
heavily logical — he says that Great Britain should give 
Cyprus to Greece — not as a bribe but as an act of justice. 
There is no doubt that there are very many Liberals in 
England, who are not only in favor of Home Rule for Ire- 
land, but can also be counted on to resist the old imperial 
tendencies of their government abroad. They accomplished 
marvels in the settlement of the South African War. 

But the Liberal ministry in England has already been 
undermined— a ministry which was not nearly so Hberal as 
Mr. Toynbee. Not able to carry the weight of the War 
alone, Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George have had to 
accept the collaboration of the Tories. How far this will 
affect the internal poKtics of Great Britain it is still im- 
possible to say, although it looks as if justice to Ireland had 
been indefinitely postponed. But the influence of this 
Cabinet change is already manifest across the Channel. 
All the reaction in France — Royalists, Bonapartists, 
Clericals — are taking advantage of this victory of their 
friends in England to demand that they also shall be given 
a share in the government. Their chance of success is rela- 
tively small, the Repubhc is firmly established on a liberal 
basis, nothing but a serious military catastrophe is likely 
to change the center of gravity. But liberahsm is not so 
sure of victory in England. 

Even in war, as in times of "peace," the bitter struggle 
goes on between the two theories of government: the one 
based on a will to power, the other based on a will to justice. 
If the more liberal elements win in the internal conflict and 
are in control of their governments during the peace nego- 
tiations the diplomats will be instructed to strive for jus- 
tice — and they will loyally try to rise above the traditions 
of their caste and to reaHze the ideals of those whose agents 
they are. But if the reactionary elements win out at 
home, the diplomats will be given instructions — more in 
accordance with their traditions (a very large proportion 
of European diplomats are drawn from the old nobihty) — 



THE PROBLEMS OF POWER 269 

to strive by all the usual and unscrupulous means for 
power. 

One of the strongest indictments which can be brought 
against war, is that it tends to strengthen the reaction. 

In order to be just to the diplomats it is necessary to 
picture them sitting about "the green table" with a tele- 
phone receiver at their ear. The other end of the wire goes 
to a mouthpiece on the council table of the ministry at 
home. Their will or their skill matters relatively Httle in 
these days of submarine cables and long distance telephones. 
They will be acting on orders. This is just as true on one 
side of the barricades as the other. The Germans are just 
as uncertain about what they are fighting for— what sort of 
peace they want — as the English or French. No matter 
which side wins in the War the question whether the tone 
of the peace proceedings will be Hberal or reactionary de- 
pends on the fluctuations of politics at home. 



CHAPTER XXII 

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 

The main hope for a better Europe — aside from the 
gradual elevation of our standards of morals — lies in the 
increase of democratic control over foreign affairs. 

Publicity will have the same salutary effect on diplomacy 
that we are finding it has on politics and business. In one 
realm of activity as in the others, the wicked love darkness. 
In so far as the public is allowed to know what is going 
on, their agents in European and colonial affairs will — even 
if they cannot be better than the ordinary citizen — at 
least observe the rules of common decency. But the diplo- 
mats have always enjoyed the privileges of secrecy, and, 
like every other group of which history tells us, they think 
that they have a right to the "privilege" and will fight to 
maintain it. 

They continually assert that democratic control of 
diplomacy — which implies publicity — would weaken the 
nation which practised it, in its relation with governments 
of a more antique and autocratic character. It is — they 
say — Uke this Utopian dream of disarmament. If every- 
body promised to disarm and everybody believed the others, 
it would be a beautiful arrangement. But unless it could 
be simultaneous, it would be suicidal. This is their main 
argument in favor of their special privilege of secrecy. And 
there is no gain in denying its force, nor refusing to see what 
they mean by it. 

It is as true of states as of individuals that every step up 
towards a higher ethical standard means giving certain 
advantages to the less scrupulous. The man who decides 
to tell the truth is evidently handicapped when dealing 
with liars. Honest trade methods have a hard fight against 

270 



DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 271 

"unfair" competition. The man who refuses to shoot his 
unarmed enemy, certainly runs a chance of getting himself 
killed for his ideaHsm. And, beyond question, a govern- 
ment which abruptly adopted a new policy of absolutely 
open and pubhc diplomacy would run a grave risk of being 
out-manoeuvered by its neighbors. 

But for the state, as in individual cases, it is necessary 
to decide which is the more worth while, the advantages 
which come from a reputation of truthfulness, or the ad- 
vantages of lying. The advantages of honesty and chivalry 
must be weighed against those of sneakiness and cowardice. 
The nations of the world will have to decide which ideal 
of diplomacy will profit them most. 

This issue has been raised with typical Latin clearness 
in the long debate between the French Royalist, Charles 
Maurras, and the Socialist (now a Minister), Marcel Sem- 
bat. Maurras has been attacking the Republic for many 
years in his newspaper V Action Franqaise. From the first 
he has seen that the Achilles' heel of the Republican form 
of government is its relations with other countries. It was 
very difficult, if not impossible, for Maurras and his friends 
to argue that the French would be better off — at home — 
with a king. It was correspondingly easy to criticize the 
Republican Ministers of Foreign Affairs. A king at the head 
of the diplomatic corps can follow a settled policy, but it 
is difficult to get any coherence out of a foreign office, when 
the chief may have to resign at any minute because of a 
cabinet crisis. Some French ministers have been in the 
foreign office less than three weeks. Hanotaux — the Mod- 
erate Republican — had been in office for some time, had 
steered the foreign policy in the direction of a rapprochement 
with Germany and a conflict with Great Britain. Just 
at the critical moment in his career, he was thrown out 
of office by the victory of the Radicals, In the very midst 
of the Algeciras conference a parliamentary crisis, which 
had nothing whatever to do with foreign policy, threw out 
the whole cabinet, and a new minister of foreign affairs 



272 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

had to take office in the midst of a crisis. More than once 
it has happened that a French ambassador has been work- 
ing in glaring opposition to his chief in Paris. Maurras 
had Uttle trouble in demonstrating that a repubUcan form 
of government was the worst possible foundation for what 
he called "a strong" external policy. 

Sembat replied to these attacks by a remarkable book, 
with the striking title : Faites un Roi, sinon faites la Paix. 
(Make a king — if not, make peace.) He took the wind 
out of Maurras' sails by admitting most of his criticism. 
He said that the Royalists were right in claiming that the 
republic was a weak form of government for an aggressive 
foreign policy. If the French cherished the idea of re- 
venge, of regaining Alsace-Lorraine, if they wished to 
press on in colonial adventures, they had best accept a 
king at once. He said that the army and navy were not 
in a condition for a war of conquest and that the Republican 
majority in the Chambre would not grant sufficient funds 
to make it fit for this task. The Republic, he said, could 
not endure on the basis of any but a pacific foreign poHcy. 
He asked the French to choose a king, who would lead them 
to a glorious war, or the republic which impHes peace. 

It is evident that the nation which harbors aggressive 
designs had best keep them secret. If the Germans are 
defeated in this War, it will be — to a large extent — because 
they were so naively frank about their ambitions. The 
''less meritorious" people of Europe had plenty of time to 
prepare their defence. The French would not have suc- 
ceeded in gobbhng up Morocco without a fight if they 
had not protested so convincingly that they had ''no 
intention of altering the political status of Morocco." 
Almost all the governments of Europe have succeeded in 
realizing their "manifest destinies," their "legitimate 
aspirations" — thanks to secrecy — in a way their own people 
would have refused to sanction. 

It is not possible to believe — in spite of all the German 
claims of British hypocrisy — that the English would have 



DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 273 

approved of the methods by which Uganda was added to 
the imperial domain, if their newspapers had pubHshed 
truthful accounts of the "pacification" of that African pro- 
tectorate. I, for one, cannot believe that the people who 
have protested so vehemently at the suffering of the Egyp- 
tian "fellaheen" when de Lesseps was digging the Suez 
Canal, at the Bulgarian atrocities, at the brutal slavery 
in the Belgian Congo and the Peruvian rubber plantation, 
would have silently allowed their government to carry 
fire and sword through Uganda — if they had known. 

I do not want to draw an exaggerated picture of the 
"crookedness" of European diplomats, nor of the "ruth- 
lessness" of colonial administrators, but I want to draw 
as close an analogy as the facts permit to some of the 
familiar phenomena of our own American Hfe. Unfortu- 
nately, it is not necessary to distort the facts in either case. 
In our home affairs we are realizing more and more keenly 
that secrecy is a dangerous privilege. The stockholder 
in a large corporation not only has a right — for his own 
financial protection — to know what his agents, the board 
of directors, are doing with his money, but it is also his 
social duty to know. We have found it inexpedient to 
trust the vast funds of an insurance or railroad company 
in the hands of men — no matter what their church-standing 
may be — who know that they will not have to render a 
detailed account of their stewardship. It is certainly true 
that it is harder for the "directors" to bribe the legislature, 
to hire thugs to burn the rival plant, or "private poHce" 
to shoot down the strikers and beat them into submission 
(and all of these operations tend to increase the dividends), 
if they cannot do it secretly. It is small justification for a 
person who receives such tainted dividends to say "I did 
not know." It is his duty to know; and a democracy can- 
not shirk its responsibihties in foreign affairs by the plea 
of ignorance. 

The analogy between business and diplomacy is strong. 
There are manifest advantages in secrecy. But we are 



274 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

finding more and more that the advantages of secrecy in 
business are socially inexpedient. Over against the imperial 
gains to the credit of secret diplomacy, we must weigh the 
millions of fresh graves in Europe. It is necessary to strike 
a balance. 

It is not probable that there will be any abrupt revolution 
in the technique of diplomacy as a result of this War. But, 
in spite of all the hoary traditions, "the old order changeth." 
Irrespective of the wishes of foreign ministers, without any 
formal changes in the rules of their department, the veil 
behind which they have always hid is wearing thin. 

One sure result of this War is that the various Parlia- 
ments of Europe will have a much keener appreciation 
of the importance of foreign affairs than their predecessors 
had. It was not "laws" which ensured to the diplomats 
their "privilege of secrecy": it was the indifference of the 
nations. The Parhaments to which they were supposed to 
report were preoccupied with internal problems. Like the 
nations they represented, they gave scant attention to 
international relations. 

At the outbreak of this War, we had the incredible 
spectacle of three members of the British Cabinet resigning, 
because they were surprised to discover what their col- 
leagues of the foreign office had been doing. One of them, 
at least, has said clearly that he had been deliberately 
deceived, that he would not have accepted a position in 
the ministry if he had not been formally assured that the 
foreign policy was different from what events proved it to 
have been. 

The significant thing is that the three ministers who 
resigned were advanced Liberals, men who had been giving 
their whole energy to the amehoration of social conditions 
within the empire. They had thought that old age insur- 
ance, factory legislation, etc., were more important than 
foreign affairs. There has been a marked tendency among 
the Liberals of all European countries to rather ignore the 
international situation. The Socialists everywhere — with 



DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 275 

their dream of internationalism — were more alive to the 
danger, but they also were busy with "local" questions. 
Now all their projects for reform — of the Sociahsts and 
Liberals alike— have been brought to a sudden stop by this 
catastrophe of war. The Liberals cannot again afford to 
be indifferent to diplomacy. It is a fairly safe prophecy 
that no foreign minister of England or France will ever 
again be permitted to enjoy such irresponsible power as 
was given to M. Delcasse and Sir Edward Grey. 

It is quite aside from the point to argue whether these 
gentlemen's policy has been wise or unwise. It is improb- 
able that those who want to impeach Sir Edward Grey 
will succeed. Apparently an overwhelming majority in 
England is convinced that Germany had been planning 
to attack them and that Sir Edward Grey and the "inner 
circle" of the Cabinet have saved the empire by foreseeing 
the danger. After the War they will probably give him a 
splendid monument. 

But, granting — as most Englishmen do — that Sir Edward 
Grey has used his extraordinary power with great clairvoy- 
ance and statesmanlike patriotism, the fact remains that 
it was extraordinary power. Even his most ardent sup- 
porters go a little pale, if you ask them: — "What if Sir 
Edward had been a fool?" It is possible that a "court of 
honor" might decide that Sir Edward has never technically 
lied to the House of Commons. But his closest friend would 
not deny that he has allowed the representatives of the 
people to deceive themselves. He knew that the great 
majority of the House of Commons had small interest and 
less knowledge of the international situation. He knew 
that the Tories, in so far as they understood his policy, 
approved of it. He was covered from attack from the 
Liberal benches because they belonged to their own Liberal 
ministry. 

In the past five years there have been a number of 
sporadic efforts on the part of various Liberal members 
to force the Foreign Secretary to give the country a frank 



276 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

expose of his policy. He has always been able to avoid 
doing so. At the first rumble of such an interpolation the 
party machinery was set to work. The Liberal whips — and 
the name the English give to these party agents is signif- 
icant—went about saying: "If anyone causes a cabinet 
crisis now over foreign policy it means the end of all the 
reforms on our program. The cabinet will stand or fall 
together. If you force out Grey, Asquith and Lloyd George 
go too. The Tories come in. It will be good-bye to Home 
Rule, Welsh Disestabhshment, and Budget Reform. Any 
Liberal who attacks the cabinet is a traitor. It is playing 
the game of the reaction." 

If the Liberal member, in spite of this whipping, dared 
to ask his question — as sometimes happened — Sir Edward 
Grey made an elegant speech which entirely dodged the 
issue. The ministry asked for a vote of confidence and got 
it. There was always some crisis in internal politics which 
seemed very much more important than Sir Edward Grey's 
foreign policy. And so, not only the country at large, but 
Parliament and even three of the cabinet were surprised 
at the War. 

It is not probable that Sir Edward Grey will be impeached. 
But once the need of union in the face of the enemy is past, 
he will certainly have to face a bitter attack. It is possible 
that certain resolutions will be read into the British con- 
stitution that will definitely limit the extent to which a 
secretary of state for foreign affairs can deliberately de- 
ceive his colleagues and the House of Commons because 
he thinks it is for the greater glory of the empire. Perhaps 
Sir Edward Grey's policy has been wise — but what if he 
had been a fool? 

There is an unfortunate tendency to dodge the real issue 
by making scapegoats of the diplomats. They are being 
unduly accused these days. It is unjust to blame them for 
not having preserved the peace. With the best will in the 
world they could have done very little better than they did. 
They are the product of the circumstances of their birth, of 



DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 277 

their training, of the conditions of their trade. They are 
agents of their governments. They are supposed to be 
patriots, not citizens of the world. Their instinct is to 
strive for a greater Britain, a more glorious France, a might- 
ier Russia, a prouder Austria, a more powerful Germany. 
They cannot become good Europeans faster than the na- 
tions they represent. The ultimate responsibility of this 
War is not theirs as much as it is that of those who hired 
them. It is idle to shirk our responsibilities in the matter 
by trying to shove them off on the diplomats. 

What then are the prospects of peace? An increase of 
democratic control over foreign affairs will reduce the risks 
of war, but it will not eliminate them. It depends on what 
kind of a democracy is to do the controlHng. 

A great many people are talking hopefully of the sweeping 
social changes, which will follow the War. This is a matter 
of speculation, a dangerous field for prophecy. About 
all one can say with any certainty is that the ancient, 
rigid structure of Europe is being melted in the great heat 
of this War. It will cool in time, and soHdify in new forms, 
which will probably be better, but may easily be worse. 

It will be during this cooKng process, before the structure 
of life has soHdified and crystallized again, that the greatest 
opportunity for work will be offered to all those who desire a 
better Europe. And this opportunity will be great beyond 
any possibility of exaggeration. 

The peoples of Europe have been shaken out of their 
ruts. Old prejudices and privileges have crumbled, new 
duties have been imposed. Everyone has been forced to 
think. To all has been offered a vivid example of the truths 
of the old proverb that there is strength in unity. "Co- 
operative effort" is the dominating note of the day. State 
socialistic measures are the present strength of Germany. 
They are being imitated everywhere. Masses of men, 
women and children — milUons of them — are being fed and 
sheltered and clothed, not as in the old days, by their in- 
dividual effort, but by the mutual aid of the community. 



278 THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR 

In the trenches the voting populations of all the great 
European states are learning daily lessons in pulHng to- 
gether. "Individualism" is at a discount. The old hi- 
erarchy is crumbling. A man who started life as a valet, 
is now Sir John French's Chief of Staff. The immense 
stress of the moment has forced all the world to realize 
that *'a man's a man." 

How much of this spirit of mutual aid, which has sprung 
up to meet this great crisis, will persist in the everyday life 
of Europe after the tension is relaxed, no one can prophesy. 
But of one thing we may be sure; in so far — and only in 
so far — as the ethics of our national life ameliorate, as the 
various nations in their internal relations gradually struggle 
up from the primitive abyss, we will gain in saner inter- 
national relations. When the individual citizen bases his 
acts in his family, towards his friends, towards his business 
rival, his boss or his employees, on a will to justice instead 
of on a will to power there will be no more any reason for 
war. The nearer we approach this ideal, the less war we 
will have. 



BOOK IV 
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 



CHAPTER XXIII 

OUR TRADITIONAL POLICY 

Being so young a nation we have few traditions. One 
of the oldest we have deals with diplomacy. It was our 
first President, with his warning against "entangling al- 
liances," who laid the foundation of our foreign poHcy. On 
the 2nd of December, 1823, President Monroe developed 
this idea in the Message to Congress, which has become 
famous as his "Doctrine." It cannot be too strongly 
emphasized that the Monroe Doctrine was a logical out- 
growth of Washington's policy. The two stand or fall 
together. 

The circumstances which led to Monroe's action were 
peculiar — and transient. The South American republics 
had fought their wars of independence without our help. 
We had been "neutral" in the struggle between Spain and 
her revolting colonies. When at last it was evident that 
Spain could never reconquer these young republics we — 
rather tardily — recognized them as free and sovereign 
states. Spain, reahzing her own inability to regain her 
colonies, appealed to the Holy Alliance — the reactionary 
European coalition which had grown up after the defeat 
of Napoleon and which was busily engaged in stamping out 
republicanism in Europe — to help her re-impose her yoke 
on South America. 

It was to this Holy Alliance that Monroe spoke. He 
said that any effort to extend their "system" on our hemi- 
sphere would endanger our tranquillity and that the inter- 
vention of any European Power would be the manifestation 
of an unfriendly disposition to the United States. 

The Monroe Doctrine is rather like the British Constitu- 
tion. It has never been reduced to a formal written docu- 

281 



282 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

ment. The Holy Alliance against which it was aimed has 
passed away, but the doctrine, changing with circumstances, 
has shown remarkable vitality. 

The people of the United States believe that their in- 
terests and security would be seriously threatened if any 
European Power, especially a monarchical government, 
extended its political organization to this side of the world. 
We are on record as determined to fight if necessary to 
protect this hemisphere from foreign aggression. 

We have no legal precedent on which to base this doc- 
trine. In international usage such a proposition must be 
based either on precedent or force. The Monroe Doctrine 
has lived nearly a century because we have had — -or have 
been thought to have — sufficient strength to counter- 
balance the temptation to violate it. The temptation has 
not been great. The French effort to conquer Mexico — at 
the unusually favorable moment when we were occupied by 
the Civil War — was so disastrous to them that it did not 
encourage others to try. Whenever the temptation to 
launch an adventurous American poHcy has grown strong 
in one or another of the European countries it has always 
happened that other European Powers were so jealous that 
the threat has never been translated into action. As no 
monarch since Napoleon III. has tried to extend his realm 
in America, our ability to maintain the Monroe Doctrine 
has never been put to the test. 

The justice of our claim is not accepted by Europe. 
Various governments have assured us that they had no 
territorial ambitions on this side of the world. Comforting 
as such statements are, they are not a recognition of our 
contention. The general attitude of European statesmen, 
and of writers on such subjects is that the Monroe Doctrine 
is a bumptious Yankee bluff. They deny its legality and 
smile at our pretence of power. They do not believe that 
we would or we could defend it. But few, if any of them, 
seriously think of challenging us. 

This is the real virtue of the Monroe Doctrine. It is not 



OUR TRADITIONAL POLICY 283 

a question of whether we are the military equal of Great 
Britain or Germany. At the very least we could greatly 
increase the difficulties they would have to overcome in 
any attempt to acquire parts of Latin America. It is 
cheaper for them to seek colonies elsewhere. The English 
for instance would not be frightened at the prospect of a 
single conflict with us. But they would not deny that 
it would have very seriously embarrassed them if we had 
joined the Boers in the South African War. It would not 
be a light undertaking — for example — for even the strongest 
European nation to attempt the conquest of Brazil. The 
certainty of having us to conquer too at the very least 
doubles the difficulties. The Monroe Doctrine — whether 
it is accepted by Europe or not — has had the result of 
separating this hemisphere from the colonial world. The 
path of least resistance has led the modern conquistador es 
to Africa and Asia. 

But there are two sides to the Monroe Doctrine. America 
for the Americans and — the inevitable corollary — Europe 
for the Europeans. Monroe formulated in 1823 the positive 
proposition which grows out of Washington's negative 
advice. In his message to Congress, Monroe was careful 
to recall the policy of his illustrious predecessor. He in- 
sisted that it had always been our practice not to intervene 
in Europe and this was the foundation on which he based 
his contention that European intervention in America 
would be an unfriendly act. 

While the "Great Powers" are only scornfully tolerant 
of Monroe's thesis, they are inclined to be insistent in re- 
gard to the Washington doctrine. It has been a maxim of 
modern diplomacy that the United States is "disinterested," 
in European politics. We are not expected to intervene. 
The exceptions when our intervention has been solicited 
are amusing. The nations which have from time to time 
invited us to the council table of Europe have done so be- 
cause they thought we would vote on their side. They 
have become advocates of a strict interpretation of the 



284 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

Washington-Monroe Doctrine if we threatened to vote 
with their opponents. 

There has never been a time when the British press has 
been so friendly towards the Monroe Doctrine as when at 
the Hague our delegates supported the German conten- 
tions in regard to the rules for naval war. At that time the 
English would have been willing to recognize our protec- 
torate over all the Americas, if we would only have gone 
home and abstained from voting on this "purely European" 
issue. Fortunately our diplomacy has never consented to 
the proposition that the seas are a "purely European issue." 

More amusing and. more typical was our participation 
in the Algeciras Conference. Our interests in Morocco 
were almost invisibly small. Germany, among other 
things, wanted to get some real guaranty that all the world 
would be given equal economic and commercial oppor- 
tunities. As we had said so much about "the open door" 
in the Far East, they naturally expected us to vote with 
them, and so they welcomed us to the conference. The 
cordiality of the Kaiser's telegrams to Mr. Roosevelt in 
the early days of the crisis indicate that he was sure of our 
support. Great Britain and France having received "as- 
surances" from us — apparently on the tennis court behind 
the White House — were also cordial in their welcome. 

A few years later when France decided to proclaim a 
protectorate over Morocco, in spite of her repeated promises 
not to, Germany tried to get the other signatories of the 
Algeciras Treaty to join her in a protest. Britain and 
France abruptly remembered that we were a "purely 
American " power and had no business mixing in a European 
and African dispute. 

The governments of Europe expect us to live up to the 
Washington-Monroe Doctrine except when they think it 
will help their game to have us depart from it. 

For more than a century our statesmen, with hardly an 
exception, were also convinced that we ought to avoid any 
interference in European affairs. In the 'fifties one of our 



OUR TRADITIONAL POLICY 285 

senators introduced a resolution inviting the nations of the 
world to establish an international court of justice to do 
away with the crudities of war. He was voted down by 
an overwhelming majority. Half a century ago we were 
unwilling to negotiate even arbitration treaties with Europe. 

With the beginning of this century — primarily as a re- 
sult of the Spanish War — a new tendency became visible 
in our poHtics. The conditions on which our "traditional" 
policy was based have changed with the shrinking of the 
earth. Steamships, submarine cables, wireless telegraphy, 
are drawing in the ends of the earth. It is an entirely safe 
prophecy that the time is coming when a "purely Euro- 
pean" poHcy or an "American" or "Antarctic" policy 
will be provincial. Local interests are fated to grow smaller 
and smaller in the face of greater politics of the race. Sooner 
or later the "Monroe Doctrine" — "American particu- 
larism" — will lose all meaning. And with the birth of the 
new century the problem of our foreign policy was clearly 
posed : Are we, or are we not a World Power? 

As was to be expected our answer was hesitating. There 
was considerable opposition in the Senate and in the public 
to our accepting the Tsar's invitation to the Hague Con- 
ference. It was overcome by assurances that we would 
not bind ourselves to anything — that we would remember 
the advice of Washington. At this First Hague Conference 
our delegates — acting on their instructions — made it very 
clear that we were not a World Power. 

They abstained from voting on the disarmament resolu- 
tion on the ground that it was a "purely European issue," 
and when they voted for the arbitration arrangement, 
they read into the records this ponderous qualification: 

"Nothing contained in this convention shall be so con- 
strued as to require the United States of America to depart 
from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, inter- 
fering with, or entangling itself in the political questions 
or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; 
nor shall anything contained in the said convention be 



286 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States 
of America of its traditional attitude towards purely Ameri- 
can questions." 

The advent of Mr. Roosevelt to the White House brought 
the question more sharply to our attention. He believes 
that we are a World Power. One of the most outstanding 
features of his long administration was his insistence that 
the time had come for us to play a role on the stage of 
Weltpolitik. More infractions of our "traditional policy" 
occurred while he was at the helm than in all the previous 
history of the country. We — or he — called the second 
Hague Conference. We mediated between Russia and 
Japan. And we were "among those also present" at 
Algeciras. It is an open question if we accomplished any- 
thing for Europe by these interventions which could not 
have been done quite as well by Switzerland. But we did 
get ourselves and the world accustomed to hearing our 
name at roll-call. 

It is difficult, if not impossible, to combat the argument 
that sooner or later we must accept world-wide responsi- 
bilities. But even if we admit that proposition we are 
faced by the more debatable question: Do we stand to 
gain anything for ourselves or others by a hurried entrance 
on the stage? It seems to me that the more we succeed 
in putting our own house in order, the more we can hope 
to exert an uplifting influence on benighted Europe. Un- 
fortunately we have been rather slack in arranging our own 
affairs. 

There is much to be said in favor of withholding advice 
and assistance until it is asked for. In a score or more 
phases of life the people of Europe do accept us as models. 
They copy our shoes, our dentistry, our juvenile courts, 
and our hospital organization; but they do not copy our 
municipal governments nor our administration of justice. 
They have heard more of our lynchings than of the small 
parks and playgrounds of our progressive cities. On the 
whole, they think of us as rather uncivilized; but as fast as 



OUR TRADITIONAL POLICY 287 

we give them something worth copying, they copy it, and 
much more quickly than we have copied their good points. 
If we are able, in our dealings with our neighbors on our 
side of the world, to develop a new scheme of international 
relations which is as much superior to their antique methods 
as our. sanitary plumbing is superior to the traditional Eng- 
lish " tub," they will copy that, too. If in our own bailiwick 
we practised the "peace of justice" more, and talked about 
it less, it would be better. 

Mr. Roosevelt has not converted a majority of our 
people to his way of thinking in this matter. His protege, 
Mr. Taft, was noticeably less " imperialistically " minded 
than he. In the elections of 191 2 — while foreign policy 
was not an issue — it was certainly no disadvantage to 
Mr. Wilson that it was notorious that he would incline to 
*' traditionalism" in international relations. 

For us to claim rank as a World Power is clearly an 
abandonment of our oldest diplomatic tradition. We 
stand pledged to Europe. In return for their abstention 
in American affairs, we have promised not to mix in theirs. 
There can be no other meaning to the declaration of our 
delegates to the first Hague Conference (quoted above). 

Even Mr. Roosevelt had to make concessions to this 
traditional point of view. When Mr. White, our delegate, 
to the Algeciras Conference, signed that treaty, he made 
a similar qualifying statement. Our Senate would not have 
given it their sanction on any other condition. The United 
States acquiesced in the changes in the status of Morocco 
which the conference agreed upon, but expressly refused 
to assume any responsibility for the enforcement of the 
treaty. 

Again and again our government has with extreme care 
made it clear that we do not consider that the policing of 
Europe is part of our job. In signing the various Hague 
Conventions in regard to the methods of war, we have 
virt lally said : If the misfortune of war falls on us we will 
live up to these rules. We will not use dum-dum bullets, 



288 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

we will not sprinkle floating mines, we will not bombard 
unfortified cities, we will not interfere with the non-contra- 
band trade of neutrals, we will not violate the territory of 
neutral nations. We have most solemnly pledged our 
honor in these matters. 

But there is nothing in the records of the Hague con- 
ferences to warrant Mr. Roosevelt's contention that we 
are bound to make other people live up to their pledged 
word. In fact, the official records and common sense point 
in the opposite direction. The doctrines of Washington 
and Monroe would be stripped of all justification if we 
claimed to be a World Power. We peremptorily tell the 
Europeans that they have no police responsibihties in the 
Americas. It is a poor rule that does not work both ways. 

In spite of Mr. Roosevelt's excursions into Weltpolitik 
it is beyond dispute that our traditional policy is to keep 
alive the Doctrines of Washington and Monroe. However, 
there is no virtue in mere age. Very many traditions are 
bad and the older they become the more likely they are 
to prove inadequate. Sooner or later I believe we will 
have to give up — or at least seriously modify — these old 
doctrines. It would be most unfortunate to regard them 
as dogmas. While the "imperialists" and advocates of 
world politics were undoubtedly growing in number among 
us, they had not, before the outbreak of this War, seriously 
undermined the attachment of the nation to the "tradi- 
tional" policy. 

There is one phase of our diplomatic tradition which is 
often overlooked or misstated in discussion. We are not 
in any way pledged not to go to war with any one or all 
of the powers of Europe. Our tradition is not Tolstoian. 
Monroe made his position very clear in the message which 
made him famous. He expressed the sincere desire of our 
government to live on terms of amity with the rest of the 
world, but with equal emphasis he said that if our security 
was endangered or our rights infringed, we were determined 
to defend them. And in this, as much as in announcing 



OUR TRADITIONAL POLICY 289 

that we would resist foreign intervention in the Americas, 
he was formulating the sentiment of our people. 

It would be just as much contrary to our "tradition" 
to abandon the "rights" which we have always claimed 
and which have received the sanction of general consent, 
as for us to enter a European alliance or to acquiesce in a 
European conquest of South America. 

The old revolutionary "snake" flag, with the motto 
"Don't tread on me," is typical of our traditional foreign 
policy. I doubt if any citizen of the United States has 
ever advocated any sort of an armed aggression in Europe. 
But the great mass of the people would whole-heartedly 
support the government in a war which was forced upon 
us — no matter by whom. 

Through the dozen odd decades of our national life we 
have been slow to anger. War has seemed to us not only 
immoral but unreasonable and stupid. 

A few days after this War broke out some of my friends 
were discussing the situation, and one of them in a very 
informal and homely phrase summed up the American 
attitude towards such matters as aptly as any more erudite 
commentator could have done. We had been talking of 
von Bernhardi. "The trouble with those Germans," he 
said, "is that they think War is right. We don't. We put 
War in the same class as lying. We don't like to do it, but 
sometimes it is necessary." "When we do have to lie," 
he added, "we try to get away with it. And we fight in 
the same spirit." 

Far and away our most profitable war was that with 
Mexico. It was also peculiarly unjust. But we gained 
more by it than Frederick the Great gained by any of his 
campaigns. It was more profitable than any of Bismarck's 
wars. It is typical that we never boast of it. 

For a generation and more we tried to settle our civil 
conflict, by compromises. But compromises would not do. 
At last — regretfully — we had to fight it out. 

Our facile victory against Spain went to the heads of 



290 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

some of us. But in spite of our amateur war lords we are 
not a bellicose people. It would be difficult to recruit an 
army corps for a frankly aggressive war. But even less 
are we Tolstoians. Of the ten million men in the United 
States capable of bearing arms there are very few who are 
hungering for military glory — very few who would shirk 
their duty if war was necessary. 

In short, our "traditional foreign policy" has been in 
keeping with our democratic institutions. Now and then 
we have departed from it — as in our aggression against 
Mexico. But on the whole it has been based on a very 
small offensive strength and great resources for long and 
determined defence. If we want to be a World Power — if 
we want to say with the Kaiser that nothing could happen 
in Europe without our consent — it will necessitate a sweep- 
ing revolution in our concept of life. We could not throw 
an appreciable armed force into an overseas battlefield in 
less than a year. Before we could live up to such respon- 
sibilities we would have to stop work on our internal de- 
velopment and create a large army. Very few of us think 
it would be worth while. Most of us are content to con- 
tinue in our traditional policy. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

THE PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 

We, in America, were immensely surprised by the War. 
They had cried "Wolf! Wolf!" too often. I remember 
writing ten years ago that a general European war was 
inevitable. There did not seem to me any other solution of 
the feverish race in armaments, the hectic diplomatic 
crises. But year after year passed without a "breach of 
the peace" and I had begun to think with Mr. Norman 
Angell, that war was "the great illusion." And then — 
one summer day — the war cloud broke. 

It did not take any special initiative on the part of our 
government to declare neutrality. It was an almost auto- 
matic act, the traditional routine of the State Department. 

As a whole the nation approved of Mr. Wilson's attitude 
in the matter. The opposition came from three sources, 
(i) The Entente- Americans. (2) The Alliance-Americans, 
and Mr. Roosevelt. 

The sudden development of the hyphenated-Americans 
was a shock to all of us. It is perhaps the most serious prob- 
lem for us which has grown out of this War. We have 
always boasted of our power of assimilation and suddenly 
we are confronted by the fact that our ritual of naturaliza- 
tion contains very little mystic value. It does not sud- 
denly convert a European into an American any more than 
a marriage ceremony is certain to make everyone Hve 
happily ever after. 

The matter was complicated by the fact that you cannot 
tell whether a man has been naturahzed by looking at him. 
Our loyal American citizens of foreign descent have had 
to suffer for the misdeeds and tactlessness of people who 
were not citizens at all. It should always be remembered 

2gi 



292 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

that there are many thousand aliens who Hve in America, 
who have never become naturalized, have never sworn 
allegiance to our government. Most of the men who have 
been arrested under the common law for seditious activity 
are not American citizens. The most un-neutral speeches 
and writings have been the work of "foreigners." 

Because of their difference of language the Germanic 
element of our citizenry has suffered most. The Anglo- 
American and the Enghshman, no matter how disloyal, 
passes among us unnoticed. It is difficult to tell whether 
a news item in our English papers comes from an American 
correspondent or from London. The source of the "news" 
in the German papers is always evident. 

One thing is worth noting. However frantic some of the 
Germans in America have been, however misguided some 
of our citizens of German descent have been, they have not 
urged us to abandon our neutrality and attack the enemies 
of their Fore-Fatherland. The Entente-Americans have 
been more often guilty of asking us to sacrifice our national 
interests on behalf of lands of their origin. 

On the whole, this "hyphenated" trouble has been vastly 
exaggerated. The Delbruck Law, which encourages per- 
fidious naturalization, is something we cannot tolerate. 
Unless the Germans repeal this insulting law we will have 
to make it exceedingly difficult for Germans to receive our 
citizenship. It is probable that our naturalization laws will 
be revised all around as a result of this War. If the trouble 
gets out of hand we could reduce it immensely by expelling 
all citizens of belligerent countries. On the whole our nat- 
uralized citizens are loyal. But the real problem is one 
of assimilation, much more a social than a legal question. 
Above all, it is a problem of education. It is the second 
generation which matters most. And it is our schools, not 
our naturalization courts, on which we must rely. 

The attack on the President's policy of neutrality led 
by Mr. Roosevelt is quite another problem. It is — so far 
as it is not simply an incident of our internal politics, an 



THE PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 293 

effort to influence "elections" — based on the considerations 
exposed in the last chapter: Are we or are we not a World 
Power? Has the time come for us to abandon our "tradi- 
tional poHcy"? We will not be able to count noses on this 
question till the coming elections. Mr. Roosevelt seems 
bent on making foreign affairs a presidential issue. It is 
to be hoped that he will succeed, for the country ought to 
be given a chance to speak clearly on this point. Any- 
thing which increases the interest of the electorate in inter- 
national affairs increases "democratic control." 

But there is Httle indication at present that a majority 
can be found in favor of Weltpolitik. Is there any pre- 
dominating sentiment in our nation in favor of taking sides 
on the European issues of the War? I think not. We are 
all distressed over the fate of Belgium, full of admiration 
for the plucky resistance of this little people, all profoundly 
shocked that civilization has proved to be so weak a reed. 
There is among us an almost equal sympathy for France. 
On the battlefields of Artois, Champagne, the Meuse and 
the Vosges we feel that a form of government which is 
dear to us is fighting heroically in self-defence. Many of 
our more recently European citizens are on the other side. 
The Jewish refugees from Kishineff can hardly be expected 
to wish success to their butchers. Most of our citizens 
from the smaller European states are bitter against Great 
Britain. There is hardly one of us who does not know 
quite definitely which side he wants to win. But there is a 
long step from such personal partizanship to the desire to 
see our government identify itself with, and give unquali- 
fied support to either the Germanic Alliance or the Entente 
Group. 

The issues involved are far from clear. They visibly 
change as the War progresses. All the belligerent countries 
are divided internally over the vital issues of the War. In 
Germany they discuss the question : Is it a War of offence or 
defence? In England are we to believe the liberal Man- 
chester Guardian or the frankly reactionary London Morning 



294 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

Post? Both try to tell us what Britain is fighting for, but 
their conclusions are worlds apart. After the War are we to 
find Russia revolutionized or more deeply retrograde? 
There are too many unknown quantities— "unweighables," 
in Bismarck's phrase — for us to form a really united pubHc 
opinion on the purely European issues of the War. 

If we are to fight whole-heartedly, we must be convinced 
that we have chosen the side of progress. We admire im- 
mensely the scientific achievements and social ameliora- 
tions of Germany. In the last generation we have borrowed 
more of value from Germany than from any other European 
country, but few of us care to risk our lives for the greater 
glory of Hohenzollernism. We have a century-old tradi- 
tion of peace with England, but more than once official 
relations have been sorely strained, and we are often shocked 
at the callous commerciaHsm of the present ruHng class of 
England. In our home politics we are fighting against, not 
for, such people. We have several penal laws against the 
sellers of opium. We would be utterly untrue to our own 
ideals if we were not keen to help the Russians to their 
freedom, but it is not our business to pull the Tsar out of 
a hole. 

The issues involved in this War are intricate in the ex- 
treme. We would resent any European power taking sides 
in the Mexican muddle. Our intervention in Europe over 
the moral issues of this War is equally uncalled for. 

Unenlightened public opinion in the nations of the En- 
tente would like to have us protest over Germany's action 
in Belgium. It is doubtful if their statesmen would. The 
British Foreign Ofiice is glad that by not protesting on be- 
half of Belgium we established a precedent which has made 
it logical for us to turn a deaf ear to the protests of Holland 
and Sweden and the other neutrals. The French diplomats 
certainly remember that we did not join the protest when 
they tore up the Algeciras Treaty. And it is highly im- 
probable that the Russian government would want any 
neutral nation to begin investigations of " atrocity diarges." 



THE PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 295 

The material effects of the War were at once disastrous. 
But "the hard times" of the fall and winter of 1914 were 
mostly of a financial origin. Our foreign trade is so small 
in relation to our internal commerce that the interruption 
of sea trafiSc, while ruinous for our exporters and importers, 
ought not to have seriously influenced our general industry. 
But "credit" went to pieces. The closing of the stock ex- 
changes everywhere was a desperate measure to prevent a 
panic. Its result was to allow people to be panic-stricken 
in private. Perhaps the greatest element in retarding the 
re-estabhshment of confidence was the uncertainty as to 
how long the War would last. This disarray in our financial 
circles was the result of war per se. It could not be blamed 
on any one of the belligerents. 

But before many months had passed a new problem be- 
gan to clamor for solution. Quite aside from the issues 
involved between the European groups, there arose the 
more intimate question of what we were to do to protect 
our own interests. Philosophically the discussion takes 
this form: which deserves the more respect, the "rights" 
of neutrals who are keeping the world's peace, or the 
"rights" of belligerents who are breaking it? In times of 
peace, most philosophers take the side of the neutrals. 
But in times of war the belHgerents always claim — as we 
did in the 'sixties — that their "rights" are superior and the 
neutrals cannot reply effectively except by ceasing to be 
neutrals. 

The first serious blow to neutral rights was given by Great 
Britain. The best discussion I have found of the British 
naval war against neutrals is in Professor Clapp's, "The 
Economic Aspects of the War." The British "Orders in 
Council" became the "law" of the seas. The trading 
rights which Great Britain had insisted on when she was a 
neutral in the Russo-Japanese War (and which by the 
way she asked us to help in maintaining) she bHthely denied 
to the neutrals in this War. An important element in the 
situation was the fact that the small neutral states of Europe 



296 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

— especially Holland — asked us to defend our rights and 
theirs, to back up international law at sea as against the 
British lawlessness. 

It is regrettable — to my mind — that diplomatic secrecy, 
which rules almost as much at Washington as in Paris or 
London, has prevented the administration from taking us 
into its confidence in this controversy. A White Book con- 
taining all the correspondence on this subject not only 
with Great Britain but also with the small neutral nations 
would be acceptable. 

In the ordinary routine of international law the procedure 
of protest is virtually automatic. If a citizen has plausible 
complaint against some other country, there is Kttle option 
left to his foreign office. The complaint must be registered. 
It is the duty of his government to see that his evidence is 
heard, and if his claims are established, to demand com- 
pensation. And the general practice is to err on the side 
of over-protesting. In a synopsis of all the international 
protests issued in 1910, a relatively peaceful year, it would 
be found that a majority was received, investigated, and 
settled without the least hard feehng. Trouble is more 
Hkely to arise from the hostile mood of the contending 
nations than from the gravity of the complaint. Doubtful 
and important issues, like our recent controversy with 
England over the Panama Canal tolls, may be settled by 
common good will. Insignificant incidents, like the break- 
ing of the cane of a German vice-consul at Casablanca, may 
lead to the verge of war. 

As a general proposition, it can be laid down that no 
liberal, democratic nation dreams of fighting over a com- 
mercial protest which can be arbitrated and settled by an 
award of damages. Most of our protests addressed to 
England since the outbreak of the war have been of this 
nature. If we had been spoiling for a fight, it would have 
been easy to start one over the bizarre British doctrine 
that they can, in order indirectly to hurt their enemy, 
play fast and loose with trading rights of neutrals — rights 



THE PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 297 

which they were the first to champion when they were 
neutral. The idea that, because they do not approve of 
the way the Germans fight, they can inflict reprisals on 
non-combatants is as untenable as it is original. At the 
first opportunity we shall certainly "go to court" about it, 
and have this amazing pretension threshed out. But if 
the English are ready to live up to their arbitration treaty 
with us, we do not want to fight about it. 

However, the midsummer of 19 15 found us tottering 
on the verge of a very much more serious conflict with 
Germany. Apparently it was hard for the Germans to 
understand our attitude. It is perhaps illogical for us to 
be more angry at German lawlessness than at that of the 
English, but there is no doubt that we are. 

The Roman church made a very convenient distinction 
between two grades of unrighteousness, between mortal 
and venial sin. There are many peccadilloes which, while 
technically wrong, cannot be taken with great seriousness. 
There are other acts, which — even if we cannot cite the 
chapter and verse where they are forbidden — seem at once 
shockingly wrong; there is something about them which, 
while it escapes logical definition, is evidently heinous. 

Great Britain and Germany have both violated their 
pledges of The Hague by armed invasion and occupation 
of neutral territory. Armies have settled down unwel- 
comed in the little Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and in the 
Greek Isles off the mouth of the Dardanelles. Necessity 
knew no law. In both cases the weaklings submitted sul- 
lenly to overwhelming force, and as far as one can dis- 
cover, in both cases, the aggressors respected all the "rights" 
of the invaded except their right not to be invaded. The 
American attitude towards both these affairs was that they 
were most regrettable. 

The case of Belgium was in a different category alto- 
gether. It was no more "illegal" for the Germans to 
enter Belgium than for them to enter Luxembourg. But 
it was horrible. Perhaps our outrage over the sack of 



298 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

Louvain was more sentimental than logical. It was none 
the less real. The ruthless conquest of Belgium, the bru- 
tahty of the "occupation," is much more serious than its 
mere illegality. The flames from the burning thatch of 
Belgian cottages have thrown a lurid light on the ideals of 
the governing elements in Germany. It is wasted time for 
them to talk to us of friendship. 

A British cruiser fires a shot across the bow of a Dutch 
or American ship : officers board her, go through her papers, 
find every evidence that she is bound for a neutral port 
on non-contraband business. Nevertheless they escort her 
to an English port and with exasperating leisureliness try 
to make up their minds whether or not they had a right to 
stop her. Meanwhile British ship owners profit by the 
predicament of their rival. 

A German submarine shoots a torpedo into a great 
transatlantic finer on the vague suspicion that she is carry- 
ing aid to the enemy. Of the hundreds of passengers aboard, 
many of whom are strictly non-combatants, women and 
children, a large number are quite uselessly drowned. 

Both acts are utterly illegal. It is impossible to justify 
the first, but it does not make us as angry as the second. 

Our real quarrel with Germany is that her statesmen 
cannot or will not see this distinction between venial and 
mortal lawlessness. An enlightened despotism might con- 
ceivably follow the dictates of logic. It might act on the 
basis that law is law, that one illegahty is as bad as another, 
and so expect the rest of the world to be just as indignant 
over the British immaterial blockade as at the sinking of 
the Lusitania. But democracies are not ruled by this 
process of mind which the Germans call "pure reason." 
Our newspapers — as good a mirror of the popular mind as 
we have — are remarkably unanimous. The British have 
lost heavily in our sympathy by a policy which has seemed 
to us stupidly illegal, arrogant and decidedly unsportsman- 
like. The German methods have seemed to us inhuman and 
horrible. 



THE PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 299 

The clash is more formidable than the immediate hard 
feeling caused by specific "incidents." The solution of the 
^'Arabic affair" — unless it indicates a very sweeping change 
in their poKcy — does not solve anything. The fundamental 
difficulty is a difference in the habits of mind of the two 
peoples. If we come to a rupture with Germany, it will 
not be because she has infringed on our rights — Britain 
also has done that — but because the way the Germans did 
it was unbearable. 

So, after a year of this European War, there seems small 
chance of our becoming involved in serious trouble with 
any of the Powers of the Entente. But there is a depress-, 
ingly grave possibility of continual friction with Germany. 

The export of munitions of war to the belHgerents has 
also been the theme of heated controversy. There are two 
arguments against it. The first is purely ethical. A literal 
interpretation of the Scriptures — such as that of Tolstoi 
or the Quakers — condemns the giving of any kind of as- 
sistance to anyone engaged in bloodshed. This is true 
beyond any dispute. But the same Hteral Christianity 
condemns riches, condemns the entire structure of our in- 
dividualistic, competitive civihzation. There is no more 
reason for us to obey the advice of Jesus in foreign affairs 
than in internal politics. 

A more practical argument against the export of muni- 
tions is offered by those who beheve that the manufacture 
of arms and armament should be a government monopoly 
and that no state should permit the fabrication of weapons 
within its borders, except such as it needed for its own 
military estabhshment. The scandals in regard to "arma- 
ment trusts" have broken out in every country. The 
individuals who make profits from the production of mili- 
tary equipment have so evident a pecuniary interest in 
"militarism," that it is not surprising to find Krupp agents 
buying space in the French newspapers to launch war- 
scares. The manufacturers of armor plate can always be 
counted on to subscribe heavily to the Navy Leagues of 



300 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

their own — and other countries. Every anti- Japanese 
speech in America is money in the pocket for our ''Krupps." 

If private profits in the machines of death were abohshed 
it would certainly knock one of the props out from under 
militarism. Those who argue in this sense have no better 
text books at hand than the writings of two EngHshmen: 
Mr. Wells and Mr. Brailsford. But it is doubtful if they 
would care to have their arguments applied to the American 
situation. 

The weakness of this argument is that it is desperately 
hard to define "munitions of war." Access to our markets 
for food and cloth and shoes and raw minerals has probably 
benefited the Entente Powers more than their purchases of 
things ordinarily ranked as contraband by civilized nations. 
Until the Socialists succeed in abolishing private profits 
altogether, it will be difficult to pass discriminative legis- 
lation against munitions of war. 

The arguments in favor of continuing the export of mili- 
tary supplies are stronger. First of all the trade is profitable. 
The great mass of our people are not financially interested 
in it. But the number and power of those who are making 
money out of this indirect slaughter is greater than of those 
whose consciences are shocked by it. Secondly, the prece- 
dent in international law is precise. The Austrian notes 
protesting against the export of munitions have asked us, 
not to observe established rules of neutrality, but to change 
them in their favor. In similar circumstances in the past 
they have sold munitions to belligerents. From a legalistic 
point of view their protest is unfounded. It is merely senti- 
mental and moral. They appeal not to law but to equity. 

Thirdly, — and this is probably the argument which 
appeals most strongly to our government — the sudden 
development of the war industries greatly strengthens 
our military position. If we should become involved in 
war today we could equip a respectably sized army in 
half the time it would have taken a year ago. Our General 
Staff can be counted on to oppose any measure which would 



THE PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 301 

tend to discourage the industries which are producing 
military suppKes. 

But of course the overwhelming argument against an 
embargo on the export of munitions is that most of us 
want the Entente Powers to win. 

However, the agitation in favor of the embargo will 
probably continue. It will be supported not only by the 
German sympathizers and the Tolstoians but also by those 
friends of the Entente group, who believe that even in the 
midst of a great war our voice ought to be raised in favor of 
law and the rights of neutrals. 

The situation of the British public in regard to the le- 
gality or illegality of their Orders in Council is peculiar. 
They know very little about it. The press censorship has 
prevented discussion. The great mass of the people be- 
lieve that they are fighting in the cause of international 
law. Any newspaper which pubhshed the facts would be, 
if not suppressed by the government, accused of German 
sympathies and wrecked by the mob. Their papers are 
allowed to pubHsh news to the effect that the Dutch are 
trading with the Germans, but a calm statement of the 
fact that the Dutch have the same right to trade with 
Germany that the English had to trade with both sides in 
the Russo-Japanese War, that we have to trade with Eng- 
land and France and Russia, would be regarded as seditious. 

This fact cannot be too strongly emphasized. Our con- 
troversy is really with a small group of naval officers. The 
sea lords are sailors, not international lawyers. They want 
to do Germany as much harm as possible, and the fact that 
it is rankly illegal for them to blockade Holland, rankly in 
conflict with the stand taken by their government before, 
does not appeal to them as important. It is rumored that 
there have been serious disputes in the British Cabinet over 
this matter. It is probable that Sir Edward Grey was per- 
sonally opposed to the poHcy of blockade which has thrown 
Sweden onto the German side and has alienated the sym- 
pathy of almost all the neutral nations. 



302 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

The British pubHc knows nothing about these questions: 
they do not believe that their government would give any 
honorable person a cause to protest. The majority of them 
believe that the German ambassador intimidates Mr. 
Wilson into writing his notes of protest. 

In a state of war the military element always comes into 
power. Just as von Tirpitz seems to have imposed his 
submarine pohcy on the civihan chancellor, Bethmann- 
Hollweg, so it is probable that the British admiralty has 
forced on their government a policy of illegality which the 
pubHc opinion of England would condemn as much as we. 

An embargo on the export of munitions — or even a 
serious threat — would probably bring the sea lords to a 
juster appreciation of the situation, 

Mr. Wilson's attitude in the German controversy re- 
sulted — temporarily at least — in the victory of the more 
moderate and law-abiding element in the governing circles 
of Berlin. If he can succeed in reestablishing a reign of law 
on the seas by continued pressure on Germany and by an 
equally firm attitude in the British controversy it will be a 
great triumph for the cause of human progress. 

The War has also forced upon us a consideration of our 
military situation. It is bad. Our army and navy appro- 
priations have not been wisely spent and we have very 
little to show for the money. There seems a very -general 
will to put through serious reforms in these departments. 

Here again, before anything profitable can be done, we 
must first of all answer the question proposed in the last 
chapter: Are we or are we not a World Power? It is evi- 
dent that our military needs in defence of our "traditional 
policy" are quite different from those we will have if we 
set out to reform the world. If we are going to declare 
war every time any nation tears up a scrap of paper we wiU 
need — at the very least — the largest army the world has 
ever seen. 

Let us face that problem frankly. It would be fright- 
fully expensive, but we are very rich. If we adopted the 



THE PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 303 

Swiss militia system we could mobilize ten million men 
within forty-eight hours. The per capita burden — in taxes 
and time lost from productive industry — would be no 
heavier than in Switzerland, and the Swiss manage to carry 
it and prosper. No nation but Russia could hope to rival 
us. 

If we decided to devote a large share of this money and 
energy to the navy we could dominate the seas. The 
German rivalry with England is illuminating. Single- 
handed they came near to reaching a par with Britain. 
We are much richer than the Germans. 

However, not even our armament manufacturers advo- 
cate so extravagant a program. The practical question 
raised by this War is: What could we do if we were forced 
to enter it? The answer depends very largely on the un- 
foreseeable action of popular psychology. If the nation 
was as deeply interested as it was in the Civil War — and 
public interest was often very slack in those four years — 
if we were prepared to face an equal sacrifice, we could 
recruit, drill and equip at least half a million men in the 
first year and could put a million new soldiers in the field 
annually as long as the bellicose spirit lasted. Such a 
calculation depends entirely on the material elements of 
the problem. 

It is quite impossible to tell whether we would want to 
send an army over seas. It would be difficult to recruit an 
army corps for an unpopular war. But if as a nation we 
made up our mind to enter this War with our entire power 
we could — while being slow to start — in all probabiHty be 
the determining factor if the present approximate equilib- 
rium of forces remained the same for a couple of years. 

But such a military effort would require for its success 
some motive of sufficient force to completely revolutionize 
our habits and our attitude towards life. The English 
intention to carry on "business as usual" has failed. The 
French ambition to maintain "democracy as usual" is 
threatened. We would have to give up all thought of 



304 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

progress at home and subordinate everything to the grim 
business of war. It might conceivably be necessary, but 
it would be desperately distasteful. 

Nothing could be more disastrous for us — morally or 
materially — than a half-hearted war. Nothing would be 
more out of keeping with all that is good in our traditions. 
The issue should be put clearly before us. We should 
choose fairly; keep the peace, or fight to the limit. No half- 
way warfare could be dignified. An American army of 
a few hundred thousand men and a half dozen battleships 
would be a disgrace. We should all go^or keep the peace. 

Sane statesmanship will bend every effort to maintain 
our neutrality. 



CHAPTER XXV 

NATIONAL DEFENCE 

The European War has not altered our problem of 
national defence — it has only brought it more vividly to 
our attention. As there can be none of the "life, liberty 
and pursuit of happiness" which our Constitution intends, 
if foreign armies are to overrun our soil, it is manifestly 
the first duty of our government to protect us from such a 
fate. 

It is possible that we may decide to send an expedition- 
ary force to overrun some of Europe, but this evidently 
is not a matter of national defence. 

Many of our "patriots" are using this War as a text 
to remind us that our navy is not so strong as that of 
Great Britain, that our coast defences are illogical and 
under-manned, that our army is small and ill-equipped. 
This, although it is quite true, does not meet the question 
of national defence. The assumption that the army and 
navy is our only hope of security is entirely unfounded. 
It is a tradition with us to maintain a military establish- 
ment but it is childish, or worse, to pretend that it is our 
soldiers and sailors alone who, these hundred years, have 
protected our frontiers. 

With the exception of a short period after the Civil War, 
when our army and navy was exceptionally large, there has 
been no time when the British Empire was not strong 
enough at sea to have sent to Canada a much larger force 
than our army. From a purely military point of view they 
could easily have invaded us. We have not been pre- 
pared to prevent it. In time we could have gathered 
strength to drive them out, but what we have had in the 
past, and want for the future, is security from initial in- 

305 



3o6 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

vasion. Driving the Germans out of Belgium will not 
bring Louvain to life again. 

Our northern frontier has been safe, not because of our 
military strength, but because of the mass of common 
interests between us and England. To a large extent, we 
understand each other. We have had our belHcose spasms 
— "Fifty-four forty or fight" and all that. But we didn't 
fight. Now and then the EngKsh have been mightily 
vexed at us, sometimes without reason. But we speak the 
same language and to a large extent wear the same cut of 
clothes. This has given us, if not a thick and thin friend- 
ship, at least a mutual confidence which renders war im- 
probable. The Enghsh knew that they could strip Canada 
of troops without fear of our trying to annex it. 

It is entirely possible to stimulate such "defensive" 
understandings between nations. This is the key-note of 
the foreign policy of M. Delcasse. When he entered the 
Quai d'Orsay, France was on exceedingly bad terms with 
Italy and England. He made friends. 

Sir Harry Johnson's "Commonsense in Foreign Policy" 
and Georges Bourdon's "The German Enigma" were efforts 
to lay the foundations of such an Entente with Germany. 
Neither of these men were "pacifists" but both dreaded the 
horror we now witness. Patriots, they foresaw the fright- 
ful cost of even a victorious war. They set to work earnestly 
to understand and to explain to their countrymen what 
the different nations of Europe wanted, wherein their 
aspirations conflicted, how their points of dispute could be 
compromised. Both believed that this war, which has been 
so long foreseen, might with better understanding be 
avoided. 

If the British and French and German governments 
had been truly enlightened and really pacific, they would 
have circulated these and similar books by the hundreds 
of thousands. Such a campaign of education would have 
had more "defensive" value than a score of army corps. 
But it is the hoary tradition of Europe that the only way 



NATIONAL DEFENCE 307 

for a nation to protect its citizens from war is to make 
them more war-like than their neighbors. 

But it is obviously more civilized to prevent war than to 
win at it. In the last few decades a noticeable start has 
been made in applying this very modern idea. The Rhodes 
scholarships, exchange professorships, the Interparliamen- 
tary Union, all such movements tend to facilitate pro- 
tective understandings. They threaten the vested interests 
of militarists, diplomats, and armament makers and of 
course meet with small encouragement in countries where 
these classes rule. But in spite of much discouragement, 
some progress has been made. 

The United States has, I believe, the honor of being the 
first nation to give official sanction to this form of national 
defence. The Bureau of American Repubhcs was created 
to stimulate cordial relations with our neighbors to the 
south. It is a step in the right direction of which we may 
well be proud — but it is a pitifully small step. The amount 
we spend on it annually is little more than the cost of one 
broadside from a battle ship. But in spite of the niggardly 
appropriation, this effort to manufacture good will has 
proved its protective worth. The "A. B. C." mediation 
which for a time at least relieved the strain in Mexico and 
was of even greater value farther south, was its first fruits. 

We ought to extend greatly the work and resources of 
this Bureau. It might well have branches in each of the 
Republics. Its personnel should not be confined to citizens 
of the United States, but every effort should be made to 
secure the collaboration of the Latin Americans. We have 
too often listened to the worst that could be said about 
them, too often we have shown them the worst of our life. 
The Bureau of American Repubhcs, if properly encouraged, 
may become of great value in our scheme of national de- 
fence. 

The only acute menace of war we have had in recent 
years has had to do with Mexico. It was not invasion by 
the Mexicans we had to fear. Here as elsewhere the danger 



3o8 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

is lack of understanding. We hope the Administration is 
well informed; the rest of us certainly are not. The news- 
papers contain absurdly contradictory statements, and we 
do not know which to believe. 

But one thing we do know: there are too few schools in 
Mexico. An ignorant population is an easy prey to un- 
scrupulous adventurers. It is the ilHteracy of the Mexi- 
cans, not their army, which we have to fear. 

Circumstances may arise which will persuade our govern- 
ment to conquer Mexico. The attempt will prove, if it 
comes, vastly more expensive than it would have been to 
have educated the country. But it is never too late to 
mend, and to allow the peons to remain longer illiterate is 
to invite the kind of complications most likely to lead to 
invasion. We do not have to fear that the Mexicans will 
sack St. Louis, but that we may be drawn into an aggres- 
sion against a weaker power, a shameful war which fore- 
sight could have prevented. For every dollar we spend to 
put soldiers on our southern border, we should spend ten 
on the purely defensive work of building up an educated 
public across the frontier with whom we can be friends. 

This is the logical work of the Bureau of American 
Republics. The results we could expect from it, given 
sufficient means, would be of lasting and immeasurable 
worth. The battle ships, which cost so much, very quickly 
become obsolete. 

Since the Civil War no one has feared armed invasion 
from any country but Japan. This menace has been grossly 
exaggerated, not always from laudable motives. But there 
is no gain in the ostrich policy of refusing to look at what 
danger there is. 

The thing which most sharply differentiates our relations 
with Japan from those with Great Britain is that while we 
are well acquainted with the English, the Japanese of all 
the great nations are the people we know least. The un- 
known is always fearsome. The English who have had 
the longest and closest contact with the Oriental races 



NATIONAL DEFENCE 309 

do not dread them. "The Yellow Peril" is a phrase attrib- 
uted to the Kaiser, a man who has never been east of 
Suez. And we, who are woefully unacquainted with the 
Japanese, are unduly disposed to credit every sinister rumor. 

This lack of understanding— and very dangerous it is — 
is not confined to us. The Japanese are as easily persuaded 
as we to believe fantastic and menacing stories from the 
other side of the Pacific. The day when Japan sent her 
ultimatum to Germany, the morning papers of Tokio 
contained what purported to be a despatch from Washing- 
ton to the effect that President Wilson had read a special 
message to Congress about "our manifest destiny and 
predominant interests" in the Pacific, and that our Atlantic 
squadron was being rushed through the Panama Canal. 

In a day or two this vicious canard was disproved. But 
for a day or two that kind of distrust which may so easily 
lead to worse was allowed free rein. If Japan ever does 
attack us, the chances are ten to one that the cause will be 
some such stupid misunderstanding. A government which 
does not strive earnestly to overcome such danger is wan- 
tonly neglecting the most obvious and simple form of de- 
fence. 

Of course, if we wanted to, we could build a fleet so much 
larger than Japan could afford — it is merely a matter of 
dollars and cents — that they would be afraid to attack us 
single-handed and would be forced to seek new alliances 
with other naval powers. It was so that the German gov- 
ernment understood the problem of national defence. But 
it would certainly be more civilized, less expensive, and 
very much safer, to estabhsh a sound basis of mutual 
understanding, the foundation of a real friendship. 

Any government of ours which allows us to be dragged 
into a war on a misunderstanding, no matter how effect- 
ively it has developed our army and navy, will deserve 
impeachment. Treitschke, a German professor of politics, 
has taught that there are inevitable conflicts between 
states which can be settled only by force. The people of 



310 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

the United States are loath to accept this theory, but 
they are determined not to go to war on any other basis. 
Few Americans are Tolstoians. But woe to any adminis- 
tration which involves us in an unnecessary war! 

Before a new battle ship is built for our Pacific squadron, 
before a new gun is planted on our western coast, Congress 
ought to spend ten times as much to prevent the chance 
of having to use them. Every expense for war should be 
preceded by a more generous investment in peace. Chinese, 
Japanese, and Filipino students should be brought to 
America as the guests of our government. We cannot 
leave so important a matter to the chance generosity of 
private citizens. We should make them acquainted with our 
colleges and also with our pohtics and press and the other 
phases of our national life. They should be encouraged 
to tell their impressions, not only to their own people, but 
also to us. If we knew what the Japanese think of us, we 
would probably be less worried about them than we are; it 
would certainly make it easier to remove any offence we have 
unwittingly given them. And our young men and women 
should be sent to the Orient on the same mission. 

Why not create a bureau of the Pacific, beside that of 
the American Republics? It was evident that our diplo- 
matic corps, inevitably tied up with the red tape of their 
profession, could not do in Central or South America the 
things we wanted done. And there is no more reason to 
trust them across the Pacific — or the Atlantic. 

Our General Staff is asking for an army of half a million 
men: 100,000 in active service; 400,000 in reserve. Their 
theory is that we should have immediately available a 
sufficient force to hold in check the first onslaught of any 
possible invader and to protect the vital part of the coun- 
try while a volunteer army is being equipped and drilled. 
Besides this "standing" and "reserve" army, their scheme 
includes the encouragement of state militia and military 
schools, increased facilities for training officers and the 
accumulation of large stores of munitions. 



NATIONAL DEFENCE 311 

It is the professional duty of Staff officers in times of 
peace to be excessively timid. They must plan to be on 
the safe side of the worst possible hard luck. Their scheme 
represents what they consider adequate protection against 
any threat of invasion which their imaginations — stimulated 
by their profession — can conjure up. 

The obvious criticism of this program is the difficulty 
of recruitment. Soldiering has little attraction in times 
of peace. Garrison duty everywhere — here or in Europe — 
is the consummation of boredom. It is difficult to per- 
suade the West Point graduates to stay in the army. It 
has always been hard to find volunteers for our former 
smaller establishment and the sheer tiresomeness of the Hfe 
makes desertions frequent. The common sense of man- 
kind makes it exceedingly difficult to arouse popular en- 
thusiasm for military service when there is no war in sight. 
It is very doubtful if we can build up a professional army 
in time of peace as large as the General Staff asks for. No 
one has yet discovered a middle ground between an ag- 
gressive militarism and a policy of peace. 

If we decide to accept the responsibilities of World Power, 
we will need a very much larger army than the General 
Staff asks for. The only way to make it popular and effi- 
cient is to keep it busy. And no one who is looking for a 
fight has to look far. But if we are to maintain our " tradi- 
tional policy" there is no reason to be quite so timid as 
our General Staff. The army should be only one element — 
and by no means the most important — in our scheme of na- 
tional defence. 

We must state the issue clearly if we wish to meet it 
intelligently. Such activities as I have suggested for the 
Bureau of American Republics are purely defensive. They 
could not serve for aggression. Therefore they will not 
satisfy our imperialists. To educate the Mexicans, for 
instance, would be a fatal blunder, if it is our intention to 
subjugate them. If we want to crush all rivals in the Pacific 
we will need more of a navy. But if such is our ambition, 



312 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

let us be frank about it and not talk of "defence." It is a 
strangely perverted logic for people who plead for national 
security to urge us to spend all, or even a large part of, 
our defence fund on the forms of "protection" which have 
not saved our European friends from the horrors of war. 

But our imperialists, despite their loud voices, are in a 
minority. On the whole, we are quite content with our 
present borders. The more the rest of the world is con- 
vinced that we have no aggressive designs, the greater 
will be our security. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 

Since the War broke out, I have been collecting peace 
projects. The pile on my desk grows daily. The most 
remarkable thing about them is their lack of variety. 
Almost without exception, no matter what part of the 
world they come from — and most of them come from 
America — the authors agree in basing their arguments on 
what they call "the lesson of history." 

Once upon a time men fought with teeth and claws when- 
ever they disagreed. After a long lapse of time fighting 
became formalized — the duel. At last a stage of civiliza- 
tion was reached when men submitted their disputes to 
tribunals — which, in theory at least — based their judg- 
ments not on the might of the Htigants, but on the rights 
of the case. This evolution is illustrated by diverse his- 
toric examples, but most generally by the unification of 
the French monarchy, the period when the lawlessness of 
the feudal lords was suppressed by the "king's justice." 

Arguing by analogy from this "lesson of history," these 
advocates of peace foretell a time when the nations of the 
world will reason together about their disputes before some 
high court of justice. So will the epoch of might give place 
to the era of right. Every nation in its historic evolution 
achieved internal peace, so the world can win to interna- 
tional peace. As this argument seems eminently plausible, 
the peoples of Europe are asked to lay down their arms. 
It is manifestly, and shockingly, stupid to allow questions 
of moment to be decided by the irrational chance of arms 
when they might be so much more reasonably determined 
by arbitration. The variations from this argument among 
these peace proposals are slight. 

313 



314 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

Their authors are equally in accord in ignoring or gloss- 
ing over the ugly side of their "lesson of history." The 
triumph of law in the various states of Europe grew out of 
violence and manifold injustices. Internal peace was estab- 
lished not by argument or reason or good will, but because 
one group in the community was able, durch eisen und hlut, 
to impose Us law on the rest. In France the court party 
won. The land was covered with gibbets on which out- 
laws, often better men than the kings, were hanged. In 
England, at Runnymede, it was the League of Barons; 
at Marston Moor it was the Parliament's army. More 
recently peace was brought to the German people by the 
mailed fist of Prussia. It was out of such desperate travail 
that law was born. 

There are those who believe that the evolution toward 
world peace must follow the same violent course. Numer- 
ous efforts have been made in that direction. The Roman 
Empire was the most nearly successful. There have been 
few forces in the history of civihzation more momentous 
than the pax Romana. Napoleon was always leading the 
French armies against those who disturbed his peace. If 
it had not been for the snows of Russia and the httle island 
with too many ships, he might have imposed a long tran- 
quillity on Europe. The British, after soakifig'Thdia In 
blood, have brought to that unhappy land the first peace 
it has ever known. Our soldiers have suppressed tribal 
wars in the Philippines. 

If the Germans win in this War, they promise to establish 
a compulsory peace. And no statesman of the Entente 
makes a speech without reaffirming that his country will 
fight it out until the bases of a permanent peace have been 
laid. 

While the authors of the peace proposals that I have 
gathered very generally ignore the unpleasant aspect of 
their "lesson of history," we may be sure that they wish to 
improve on the historic method. It was not only unrea- 
sonably brutal, it was slow. It took the kings centuries to 



THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 315 

disband the private armies of their unruly subjects. If we 
leave the work of peace to natural evolution, the thirtieth 
century may possibly see its realization. 

What we want to do — for I assume that all men, in their 
sane moments, hate war — is to speed up evolution and 
change its method. The "lesson of history" shows us what 
natural evolution accomplished between men in its slow, 
bungling, accidental way. We want to achieve the same 
thing between nations speedily, and with precision, by the 
conscious exercise of our will. 

Most people could be divided into two classes on this 
issue. Some are fatalists in such matters; they think there 
is nothing we can do about it, they beheve in "letting 
things take their course." The German chancellor, Herr 
Bethmann-Hollweg, is reported to have said that it was 
idle to talk of disarmament "as long as men are men and 
nations are nations." There are many like him, who say, 
"You can't change human nature." But there are others 
who believe that the will of man can influence his fate. 

Almost everyone belongs to the second class in smaller 
issues. No one doubts that we can exercise our wills profit- 
ably on inert matter. We dig wells, build bridges, and 
every year plant the seeds of the harvest. A large ma- 
jority of us believe that we can change human nature by 
exerting pressure on the minds and bodies of children. Our 
little red school-houses, our great universities, are nothing 
else but wilful efforts to improve on the happy-go-lucky 
scheme of evolution. We are not content to create the 
next generation after our own image; we are resolved to 
make it an improvement. 

But for some reason there are more fatalists about these 
problems of foreign relations. Perhaps the reason why 
they are wilHng to let these things alone is that they do 
not see what can be done. Perhaps the projects they are 
asked to support seem too grandiose to promise success. 

My criticism of these peace proposals is exactly that. 
They are dazzling — too dazzling. The substitution of 



3l6 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

reason for force, of right for might, throughout all the 
world seems an appallingly big undertaking to me. Per- 
sonally I believe that we can change human nature, I am 
not interested in any reform which does not have this for 
its goal. But I doubt if we can do much to change other 
people's natures till we have succeeded in changing our own. 

These American peace advocates ask the people of 
Europe to change their nations, gloriously, suddenly. They 
offer a wondrous picture of the commonwealth which is to 
come, but their propositions are too vague to take hold of. 
Archimedes was quite right when he said he could move 
the world if he could find a proper fulcrum on which to rest 
his lever. The peace movement needs a fulcrum. 

Past efforts to bring the nations of the world together 
under a rule of law have not been very successful. A sincere 
desire for peace, a readiness for mutual sacrifice to the 
common good, have not been generally manifested. There 
can be no peace without justice, and justice means the 
renunciation by the strong of the privileges of their 
strength. 

I do not wish to decry the work done at The Hague — 
at least some worthy ideals were given official sanction — but 
no real friend of peace can read the reports of the con- 
ventions without a heavy heart. The various nations were 
principally interested in getting or preserving advantages. 
The governments that had not begun to build air-craft 
wanted to prohibit, not war, but aerial warfare. The 
countries with weak navies tried, not to prevent war, but to 
put through an agreement by which the property of non- 
combatants would be protected on the sea as they were 
supposed to be in warfare on land. Our United States 
delegates made it clear at every opportunity that we would 
not even discuss the Monroe Doctrine. We were no more 
willing to submit that to an international court than Great 
Britain was wilHng to arbitrate the Boer War. 

International law, just like civil law, will have to clip 
special privileges. The two ideas are mutually antago- 



THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 317 

nistic. The concept of justice is a late achievement in the 
history of civiHzation. It is not yet fully realized in our 
internal relations. In international affairs the first step 
toward realization has hardly been taken. Justice does not 
happen; it is something which has to be created at the ex- 
pense of immense and persistent effort. 

Even in time of peace it was impossible to persuade the 
nations to give up their privileges — too often their plunder. 
They were not ready to put right above might. The War 
has rendered the situation vastly worse. A wave of rage 
is sweeping over Europe. This furor of hate is a matter of 
mob psychology: it is infectious. You can count on the 
fingers of one hand the men of note in any of the belliger- 
ent countries who are immune, who have kept their heads 
level through the crisis, who have preserved any objective 
sense of justice. 

The situation of Holland gives a striking example. This 
little state is being ground between the upper and the lower 
millstone. The Dutch are a commercial people; their whole 
economic Hfe depends on free communication with their 
distant colonies. Germany with her submarines. Great 
Britain with her battle cruisers, are both raining blows on 
Holland in the hope of indirectly hitting their enemy. 
Neither in the French nor the English papers have I seen 
any calm discussion of the rights of the case. The same 
statesmen who call down the wrath of Heaven on Germany 
because of her aggression on Belgium, find it quite natural 
to smother Holland. With naive cynicism people who in 
normal times would be quick to champion the rights of the 
weak now discuss how to force the Dutch to declare war on 
Germany. It seems impossible to fight and to discuss ethics 
at the same time, and both sides believe that for them to 
stop fighting means destruction. 

The pitiful spectacle of Europe gone mad is a very strong 
argument in favor of peace. When their blood cools, the 
combatants will see it themselves, and will doubtless re- 
pent of the extravagance of their hate. But to talk peace 



3i8 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

to them now, to urge them to the necessary mutual conces- 
sions, is the superlative of futiHty. 

Imagine offering a peace prize to Cromwell and Charles 
I. if they would disarm! The Roundheads believed that 
they were fighting for the right, and knew they were strong 
enough to get what they wanted, whether it was right or 
wrong. The king also was fighting for what he thought was 
right — a divine right. He might have consented to arbitrate 
at the foot of the scaffold, but not while his army was afield. 

It is just as futile to try to argue with the present bel- 
ligerents. They beheve very sincerely that their cause is 
sacred. Neither side will listen to mediation as long as 
they have a hope to win. And whichever side is defeated 
will find in its overthrow another proof that might triumphs 
over right. 

Their ideals of justice are worlds apart. It is unfortu- 
nate that we use the same word to translate droit and recht. 
What they mean is not only different; it is antagonistic. 
The French Academy of Sciences — and the same thing is 
happening in all the countries at war — is expelHng from its 
membership German scientists. There is small chance that 
these men, in their present frame of mind, would consent 
to sit on the same bench with a German jurist to determine 
some fine point of international law. 

Among my pile of peace proposals there are a few, a very 
few, from the pens of men of the belKgerent countries. 
They do not consider peace as possible or even desirable 
except on the basis of the defeat of the enemy. The Ger- 
mans say that the disturbing element in Europe is the British 
naval supremacy. That destroyed, and there is a chance of 
peace. The pacifists of England are agreed that German 
militarism must be destroyed. I cannot see any reason to 
believe that one point of view is more sincere than the 
other. 

Arbitration? Yes, between Liberia and Iceland. Perhaps 
even with the United States, after the War, over the com- 
mercial disputes arising from the various new brands of 



THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 319 

blockades each side is busily inventing. But arbitration 
over the Dutch complaints? Over the size of the German 
army or the British navy? Over France's interpretation of 
the Acte d'Algesiras? No; these are vital interests. "And, 
besides," say the belUgerents on each side, "we are going 
to win; so why arbitrate?" There will be no chance to 
mediate in Europe till both sides are utterly exhausted or 
one side knows that it is defeated. 

The only possible theater for a campaign of peace is the 
Western Hemisphere. And, after all, it would be quite as 
well, in fact, better, for us to make sure that we have healed 
ourselves before we set out to cure Europe. 

The A. B. C. mediation in the Mexican embrogHo was a 
step of the utmost importance. It did not solve the ques- 
tion at issue, but it planted a seed that, with proper culture, 
may grow into a Peace League of the American Republics. 

There is no more promising field for peace work. Suc- 
cess — and if we resolve on success, we can find the means — 
would have immediate and tangible advantages. There is 
no excuse for pessimistic fatalism here. But it is not a 
matter which can be arranged by diplomats in conclave 
behind closed doors. Our institutions are in absolute op- 
position to such secret combinations. A democratic govern- 
ment cannot suddenly change the foreign poUcy of its 
people; it can only work fruitfully toward ends that are 
consciously desired by the nation. There is little to be 
gained by sending peace deputations to Washington. The 
work to be done must be done in every city and town and 
village from New York to Valparaiso. And we cannot rely 
on a sudden burst of enthusiasm to carry us through. What 
is needed is a wide-spread, intense, continuous campaign of 
education. Once the peoples of the two Americas really 
want a league of peace, their governments will have no 
trouble in solving the problems of detail. 

There can be little doubt that a League of American 
RepubHcs would mean peace for us, safety from outside 
aggression, and the chance to push on in our progress 



320 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

towards liberty and justice within. No matter who wins 
in this devastating European War, no one will lightly pick 
a quarrel with all the Americas united. Great oceans pro- 
tect us from such sudden invasions as fell on Belgium and 
East Prussia. And within six months Great Britain was 
able to organize and equip a volunteer army which was 
bigger than any expeditionary force could be. 

But despite its manifest advantages, wishing for such 
a league will do Httle good. Nothing worth having is won 
without effort. And it is well to realize some of the ob- 
stacles we must face. Most of the work would have to be 
done in the United States. The opposition to a peace 
league which would be encountered in Latin America would 
be real, but small in comparison to our reluctance to give 
up our position of predominance. Before we can establish 
the Peace of Justice on our hemisphere we must change the 
habits of thought — the human nature — of our people on a 
good many points. The South American repubhcs are 
not going to ask us to establish a protectorate over them. 
They are ambitious to be something more than the tail of 
our kite. We shall have to outgrow a great deal of national 
egoism before we can accomphsh any real work of peace. 

A defensive League of American Republics would be 
more effective than any single-handed warning to Europe. 
To maintain the Monroe Doctrine unchanged is to need- 
lessly and offensively assert our political supremacy in the 
New World. Our neighbors to the south very naturally 
hesitate to admit their hopeless inferiority. And no league 
worth the name is possible without their cordial cooperation. 

It is true that we have more miles of railroads and more 
schools per hundred thousand inhabitants than Argentina. 
It is quite a different thing to insist on our political su- 
periority. New Jersey has more schools and railroads in 
proportion to its population than Nevada, but both have 
two senators at Washington, and until we are willing to 
treat the Latin republics as our equals in this sense our peace 
efforts will be fruitless. 



THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 321 

Secondly, no league of American republics is possible 
unless we widen our interests immensely. We must study 
and strive to understand our neighbors. Few of us ever 
think of Brazil except to wonder if there is by any chance 
some way in which we could make easy money down there. 
It hardly occurs to us that the Chilians have political prob- 
lems — tariff questions, trusts and labor-unions. How 
many of us understand their struggle between church and 
state? We have been too busy with our own affairs to 
trouble about theirs. But it is hardly possible to be friends 
with complete strangers. 

And thirdly, we must educate ourselves to the frame of 
mind in which we would consent to submit to the peace 
court of the League such disputes as our recent unpleasant- 
ness with Colombia. Unless we are willing to leave might 
out of such arguments, and reason them out on the sole 
basis of right, our peace talk is necessarily suspect. 

The Colombian wrangle is a good example of the chief 
stumbling-block in the way of international law. Our 
government would not, I believe, have used its might — 
and of course Colombia yielded only to a show of force — if 
it had not been convinced that we also had right on our 
side. 

The British government felt that it was armed with the 
sword of justice when it went to war with the Boer repub- 
Kcs. The French government believed that it was justified 
in dethroning the Sultan of Morocco, in tearing up the 
Algeciras Treaty. As a general proposition, the statesmen 
of these countries would say, as ours say, that it is wrong 
for a great and powerful nation to add to its domains by 
picking a quarrel with a small and weaker people. But in 
these concrete instances there were special circumstances 
which justified a departure from the general rule; the Boers 
were impossibly irritating, the Sultan of Morocco was 
manifestly incompetent, our government believed, on 
very good evidence, that the politicians of Bogota were 
trying to blackmail us. And so the Dual Monarchy could 



322 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

find no end of special circumstances to salve its conscience 
in its stern demands on Servia. 

But men are not permitted to determine for themselves 
when circumstances warrant a departure from the rules of 
law. They have to establish their rights in such cases before 
a competent tribunal. The frame of mind which recognizes 
and accepts this outside authority is what differentiates an 
outlaw from a citizen, a civilized man from a savage. 

It is the same with nations. The states which have en- 
tered into federations have managed to climb this steep 
incline of progress, Bavaria does not determine for itself 
which are its rights in regard to Hesse, Texas takes its 
disputes with Delaware before the Supreme Court. We 
have refused to submit the Panama matter to a jury of 
our peers. And as long as we are determined to be the 
deciding judge in our own disputes, all talk of a civilized 
peace with our neighbors is a contradiction in terms. We 
may not have war. Nicaragua and Venezuela and Colom- 
bia may be afraid to fight us. They may sullenly prefer 
to accept what seems to them our injustice rather than 
risk the resort to arms. But such peace is not civilized. 

We must make up our minds to it that a regime of inter- 
national law requires that we, as well as our neighbors, 
shall submit to its discipHne. This seems to me the nubbin 
of the peace problem. One school of philosophy — the 
pan-jingoists — has taught that the motor force of life was 
"the will to power" and that war is a normal activity. If 
this is true, we must change our natures and develop a will 
to justice. There is no other foundation for peace. 

There is still another difficulty to be faced before we can 
establish closer relations with South America. Our public 
opinion must not only be educated to a new attitude in 
foreign affairs; we must also contrive the means to convince 
sceptics that the conversion is sincere. Our southern 
neighbors will be slow to put trust in our change of heart. 
According to a hoary tradition in the Latin republics, our 
ideals are far from those of peace. 



THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 323 

It was a decided shock to me when I first visited Central 
America to find in one of the plazas of San Jose de Costa 
Rica, a monmnent in memory of the defeat of the filibuster 
Walker. An armed and beautiful lady — the spirit of Latin 
civiHzation — had her foot on the neck of a prostrate, but 
very villainous scoundrel, who represented us, the gringo 
aggressor. When I went to school I was not taught any- 
thing about that incident, but I found that in the history 
text-books in the Spanish-American schools there was a 
whole chapter devoted to the discreditable adventure. 
This traditional belief in our territorial greed will be hard 
to uproot. There is our Mexican War to support it, and 
of course it has been strengthened by our more recent an- 
nexations of Spanish speaking countries. It takes effort 
to overcome the inertia of such well-estabHshed ideas. 
We have a bad reputation to Hve down. 

To prepare the ground for a League of American Repub- 
lics will require great and persistent efforts. Such is the 
pioneer work, difficult, but necessary, which we must ac- 
complish before we can expect others to take our peace 
talk seriously. But certainly anyone who is daunted by 
these difficulties has no right to urge the peoples of Europe 
to lay down their arms and to submit to an international 
court. It is decidedly insulting for us to assume that they 
are not intelHgent enough to realize that our problems are 
child's play beside theirs. They are justified in sneering 
at our peace proposals so long as we have failed to put 
our own house in order. 

But great as are the difficulties for us to overcome, — 
and there is no gain in minimizing them, — they are very 
small compared with the benefits of success. Do we in 
America really want peace — the Peace of Justice? If we 
do, the first concrete step is clearly indicated: the League 
of American Repubhcs would give us peace. The effort 
would be richly repaid. And, granted a determined will, 
achievement would be assured. 

The influence of the accompHshment would be vastly 



324 THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 

greater than the security it would give us. Somewhat more 
than a century ago our fathers brought forth on this conti- 
nent a new nation dedicated to the ideal of democratic 
liberty. Although we are still far short of realizing that 
ideal, it would be hardly possible to over-estimate the 
effect of our effort on Europe. If our form of government 
were to fail, no one of us would be more disheartened than 
the republican of the Old World. Every advance of ours 
is a new weapon for them in their long fight against tradition. 

If our generation could establish the peace of justice and 
Uberty in the Americas — and we can, if we resolve to — 
the effect around the world would be stupendous. 

At last we should have a right to send peace proposals to 
Europe. The League of American Republics could most 
cordially urge other countries to similar action, could lend 
a powerful helping hand to every peace movement; and 
as soon as any new group became organized, a union would 
be possible. So might we reach the federation of the world. 

It is certainly easier to advise Europe to lay down its 
arms than it is for us to educate and discipline ourselves to 
peace; but an ounce of example is worth many pounds of 
advice. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The sources for a study of diplomatic history are of 
three kinds: official, semi-official, unofficial. 

The official documents are the pubKcations of the various 
foreign offices and the speeches of responsible ministers. 
This "source" is very Hmited. The "White Papers" and 
"Blue Books," etc., generally leave out the most interest- 
ing documents. 

There has been, for instance, no official publication in 
France in regard to the secret annex to the Entente Cordiale 
of 1904. Le Temps, one of the most reputable papers of 
Paris, printed what purported to be the text of this agree- 
ment. The chances are that it was correct. But in reply 
to a question at the Quai d'Orsay, I was told that the French 
government had taken no cognizance of this pubHcation 
and never admitted or denied its accuracy. 

The student is continually faced by lacunee and even rank 
contradiction in the "official documents." The case of 
the intrigues to gain railroad concessions in Asia Minor 
is typical. A certain amount of French "official" informa- 
tion is available on this subject. It is certain that their 
ambassador at Constantinople acted in a sense contrary 
to his instructions. There are two possible explanations. 
The French ambassador may have been working on a 
theory of his own and so ignored the orders of his chief, or 
secret instructions may have accompanied those meant 
for pubHcation. The fact that the ambassador was not 
disgraced for insubordination lends color to the second 
hypothesis. 

Another consideration which must always be borne in 
mind in studying these official documents is that a foreign 
office is rarely well organized. There is generally a strug- 
gle in progress between the permanent officials and the 

32s 



326 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

political appointees — transient chiefs. This is true in 
every country and not only in each foreign office, but in 
every embassy and legation. 

A newly appointed ambassador arrives at Pekin. He 
finds himself surrounded by a permanent legation staff, who 
know — or at least think they know — a great deal more 
about the situation than he does. It is the same when a 
new minister of foreign affairs enters his office. The "ap- 
pointed" policy and the "permanent" policy is almost 
always in conffict. It is often difficult to untangle them. 
And if anything goes wrong, the permanent officials — 
thanks to their esprit de corps — nearly always succeed in 
putting the blame on their transient chief. 

Semi-official information reaches the public through the 
periodical press and books. It is always hard to distin- 
guish it from the non-official which takes the same form. 

It is necessary to know something of the personality 
of the writer of each book or article, his private interests, 
his poHtical affiliations and his "standing" at the foreign 
office at the time of the writing. 

For several years M. Andre Tardieu wrote the daily 
bulletins on foreign affairs for Le Temps. His first ambition 
had been towards diplomacy but after an apprenticeship 
at the Quai d'Orsay, he left the carriere to become a journal- 
ist. During the period of the Algeciras crisis he was very 
close to the foreign office. It was a personal rather than 
an official relationship. He had friends at the Quai d'Orsay. 
His writings on foreign relations — at this time — had a very 
real authority. 

Later he became interested in the high finance of the 
Near East. He was connected with a group of bankers 
who were trying to persuade the French government to 
back up their railroad concessions — the Homs-Bagdad 
Line, a rival to the German Bagdadbahn. His writings 
on the diplomatic situation in the Near East during this 
phase of his career, have less authority, in my opinion. 

The London Times has also had its ups and downs. For 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 327 

years its correspondent has generally been persona grata 
at Downing Street. But now and then — frequently during 
this War — the relations between the great English daily 
and the government have been decidedly strained. 

It is sometimes said that Maximilien Harden is the only 
independent journahst in Germany. He certainly cannot 
be suspected of being protected by the bureaucracy. But 
the very independence of his paper has made it a favorite 
medium for "indiscretions." Harden has the reputation 
of never betraying the source of his information. And 
many a disgruntled ofi&cial has come to him with official 
secrets in the hope that their publication will injure a rival. 

Uncertain and variable as is the value of the periodical 
press, its study is the only way to find flesh with which to 
clothe the dry bones of official documents. Although 
much of the newspaper comment on foreign affairs is ig- 
norant, and some of it intentionally false, it cannot be 
ignored. More and more the foreign offices are developing 
their "press bureaux." As democracy develops in educa- 
tion and poHtics, it becomes necessary to know what the 
people at home were thinking in order to understand the 
actions of their far away ambassadors. 

And all these considerations bear with equal weight on 
the more pretentious bound books on foreign affairs. Their 
value depends on that of their author. 

Of the books published by Americans, the following 
have been very helpful to me: 

1. Clapp: "The Economic Aspects of the War." It is 

primarily a statement of the diplomatic controversy 
between the United States and Great Britain during 
the first year of the War. 

2. Dewey: "German Philosophy and Politics." The title 

is descriptive. It is perhaps the most profound book 
which the War has inspired in America. 

3. Gibbons: "The New Map of Europe." A valuable 

study of the events which preceded the War, especially 
informing in regard to the problems of the Balkans. 



328 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

4. Howe: "Socialized Germany." An American apprecia- 

tion of the tangible results accompKshed in internal af- 
fairs by the ideal of the Deutschtum. 

5. Veblen: "Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolu- 

tion." A searching study of the economic foundations 
and structure of the German Empire. The author is 
not pro-German. His book gives the reverse of the 
medal of which Dr. Howe shows us the face. 
Of the books which have appeared in England since the 
outbreak of the War, the following: 

1. Fayle: "The Great Settlement." It is a serious effort 

to put before English readers the fundamental problems 
of the War and the Liberal attitude towards their 
settlement. 

2. Forbes: "The Southern Slavs." This is one of the "Ox- 

ford Pamphlets," a series of university publications on 
different phases of the present crisis. They are all 
erudite but of varying worth. This is one of the best. 

3. Morel: "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy." This is a 

reprint of his "Morocco in Diplomacy" which was 
published in 191 2. It is a vigorous attack on the 
British Foreign Office. It is one of the books circulated 
by The Union of Democratic Control. It is rather 
"heated" but most of its contentions are well founded. 
It is worth careful consideration. The defenders of 
Sir Edward Grey have failed to answer it satisfactorily. 
British patriots denounce it as pro-German. 

4. Murray: "The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey." 

A sincere but weak attempt to answer the criticism of 
Morel and his friends. 

5. Toynbee: "NationaHty and the War." A book similar 

in intent to Fayle's "The Great Settlement" but giv- 
ing more special attention to the theory of the rights of 
nationalities. 
The following 'books have been translated into English 

and are worth attention: 

I. Anonymous: "J'accuse." It was first printed in Gar- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 329 

man by a respectable Swiss publisher who guaranteed 
its authenticity. The author claims to be a patriotic 
German. There is little else in the book of especial 
interest. It is a new statement in a ponderous German 
style of the famihar contentions of the orators of the 
Entente. 

2. Bismarck: "His Reflections and Reminiscences." This 

book is full of interesting information on modern Ger- 
man and international affairs. The Iron Chancellor 
knew what he was talking about but did not always care 
to tell the truth. 

3. Lipkowski: "The Polish Question." This is a pamphlet 

pubhshed under the auspices of "Polonia" a review 
printed in behalf of Polish interests in Paris. It pre- 
sents the maximum claims of the Polish Nationalists. 

4. Tardieu: "France and the Alliances." Pubhshed in 

New York in 1908. This book — a reprint of lectures 
given in America— is a statement of what the French 
wanted the rest of the world to think about Hheir 
system of international relations. It is more persuasive 
than informing. 

5. Von Billow: "Imperial Germany." This is a broad 

presentation of the policies — internal and external — 
of the ex-Chancellor of the Empire. It does not have 
the form of Memoires but it resembles such works in 
that it is to a certain extent "self-defensive." The 
Chancellor, having fallen from power, renders an 
account of his stewardship. It is of great value as a 
presentation of the psychology of the ruHng class in 
the Germany of our day. 
It is harder to recommend a few books in French, as 

there are so many of real value. 

I. Albin: "Les grandes Traites Politiques. Depuis 18 15 
jusqu'a nos jours" contains the text of most of the 
diplomatic documents which have been published 
since the Napoleonic Era. The same author has 
written since the outbreak of the War "La guerre 



330 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

AUemande. D'Agadir a Sarajevo — 1911-1914." It 
is partisan but contains a great deal of information 
about the events of 19 13 and 19 14. 

2. Andler: "Le Pangermanisme " also "Collection de Docu- 

ments sur le pangermanisme — traduit de I'Allemand. 
Publics sous la direction de M. Charles Andler." The 
first is a propaganda pamphlet. The second is the 
most sincere effort I have found in French to un- 
derstand and state the ideals of the Deutschtum. 

3. Berard: "L'Angleterre et ITmperialisme." A very good 

statement of what the French think of the British 
Tories. 

4. Cheradame: {a) "La question d'Orient — ^La Macedoine 

— Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad." (6) "L'Europe et 
la question d'Autriche au seuil du vingtieme siecle." 
This author writes with special knowledge of the 
problems of the Near East. His discussion of the 
Bagdad Railway is especially interesting. His ar- 
ticles in the periodical press, too numerous to men- 
tion, are also worth attention. 

5. Chervin: "L'Autriche et la Hongrie de demain. Les 

differentes Nationalites d'apres les langues parlees." 
A valuable statistical study of the race problem in 
the Dual Monarchy. 

6. Dupuis: "Le principe d'equilibre et le concert Europeen 

de la paix de Westphalie a Facte d'Algesiras." A 
scholarly study of the history of the ideas of "The 
Balance of Power" and "The Concert of Europe." 

7. Gobineau: "Essai sur I'inegalite des races humaines." 

The second edition of this book was published in Paris 
in 1884. It has had small vogue in France but has 
been enthusiastically "accepted" in Germany. It is 
an argument in behalf of the theory of superior and 
inferior races. 

8. Guechoff: "L'Alliance Balkanique." Guechofi' was 

Prime Minister of Bulgaria during the period which 
saw the formation of the Alliance and the First Balkan 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 33 1 

War. He writes from the inside. It is the most valu- 
able book yet published on the subject. 

9. Hanotaux: {a) "Histoire de la France Contemporaine " 

in four volumes, {h) "Etudes diplomatiques " in two 
volumes. The first is a presentation of the French 
PoHtical Life from the founding of the Third Repubhc 
to the death of Gambetta, 1870 to 1883. M. Hanotaux 
is a "Moderate Republican" and this gives him a 
certain bias. His principal interest is in Foreign 
Affairs. His long ministry at the Quai d'Orsay gave 
him unusual facilities to have access to the Archives. 
His account of the Congress of Berlin has been es- 
pecially valuable to me. The "Etudes Diploma- 
tiques" are reprints of his articles in "La Revue Heb- 
domadaire." 

10. Lair: "L'Imperialisme Allemand." A companion 
piece to Berard, "L'Angleterre et ITmperialisme." 

11. Lemonon: "L'Europe et la PoHtique Britannique (1882- 

1909)." This is a very careful study of the change in 
British Foreign Policy from her former friendship to- 
wards the Germans to her entrance into the Entente. 

12. Maurras: "Kiel et Tanger ou la troisieme republique 
devant I'Europe." Charles Maurras is the editor of 
"L'Action Frangaise," the fighting paper of the 
Royalists. It is a bitter and clever attack on the 
Foreign Policy of the Republic. 

13. Sembat: "Faites un Roi, sinon faites la paix." Marcel 
Sembat is one of the leading Socialists of France, and 
this book of his is a reply to the Royalist attacks on 
the Repubhc. It and the book by Maurras throw a 
high hght on the internal affairs of modern France. 

14. Tardieu: "La Conference d'Algesiras." This is the 

most authoritative book by M. Tardieu and by far 
the best discussion in French of the Algeciras Crisis. 
A selection from the mass of German books on European 
pontics is also exceedingly difficult. I have found some- 
thing of interest in the following: 



332 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1. Andrassy (the son): "Ungarns Augsleich mit Oester- 

reich." This gives the point of view of one of the Hun- 
garian parties towards the problems of the Dual Mon- 
archy. 

2. Dehn: "Deutschland und der Orient" and "Deutsch- 

land nach Osten." The program of the Pan-Germanic 
League in the Near East. 

3. Dernburg: "Zielpunkte des deutschen Kolonialwesens." 

Dr. Dernburg, well known in America, was for a while 
Minister of Colonies. This book is the fruit of that 
experience. 

4. Franz: "Die Weltpolitik." Two volumes published in 

1882-3. This is perhaps the most important work 
of this voluminous writer. During most of his life 
he was rather under a cloud as he was a bitter opponent 
of Bismarck. But of recent years pan-Germanic 
writers have borrowed heavily from his books. His 
theories were a strange mixture of Liberahsm and 
World Domination. Virulent in his hostihty to the 
Slavs, he was pro-English. 

5. Goebel : "Das Deutschtum in den Vereintigten Staaten." 

An account of the progress of the German idea in 
the United States. A good presentation of the non- 
aggressive and unobjectionable phase of the Deutsch- 
tum. 

6. Goette: "Deutscher Volkegeist." I have used quota- 

tions from this writer. 

7. Lange: "Reines Deutschtum." Friedrich Lange has 

been one of the spokesmen of the more hectic pan- 
Germanism. 

8. Naumann: "Asia." This writer is a protestant pastor. 

The book was inspired by the Kaiser's pilgrimage 
to the Holy Land. This pan-Germanist's comments 
on the Armenian massacres will shock all sincere 
Christians. 

9. Popovici: "Die Vereintigten Staaten Oesterreichs." 

The author is a Roumanian of Bukovina. His book — 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 333 

a plea for justice to the subject-races — is prohibited 
in Hungary. 

10. Rohrbach. (a) "Die Bagdadbahn," {h) Der deutsche 

Gedanke in der Welt." Paul Rohrbach is one of the 
best known and widely respected writers on poKtics 
in modern Germany. His last book, " German Thought 
Throughout the World, " has had an immense circula- 
tion. His point of view is moderate — one might almost 
say "modest" — pan-Germanism. His book on the 
Bagdad Railroad is specially interesting. 

11. Sprenger. "Babylonien." Dr. Sprenger is one of the 
most erudite orientalists of our day. His studies on 
Islamic subjects — especially his Life of Mohammed — 
are authoritative. In this book he has turned aside 
from his scientific specialty and has adventured into 
WeltpoKtik. He develops the "manifest destiny" of 
Germany in the Near East. 

12. Springer: "Der Kampf der Oesterreichischen Na- 

tionen und den Staat." The author is a democrat and 
approaches the race problem in Austria from this 
point of view. 

13. von Billow (Joachim): "West-Morokko deutsche?" 
A pan-Germanic treatise on the Moroccan controversy. 

14. von Halle: "Die volks- und Seevirtschaftlichen Bezie- 
hungen zwischen Deutschland und Holland." A dis- 
cussion of the relations between Germany and the 
Netherlands. 

15. Wagner: "Krieg." A treatise on war makes von 

Bernhardi's writings sound effeminate. 

16. Wirth: "Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Geschite." 
An example of the pseudo-history on which the more 
inflated pan-Germanic dreams have been based. 

17. Woltmann: (a) "Die Germanen und die Renaissance 

in Italien" {h) "Die Germanen in Frankreich." The 
first is the one in which he tries to prove that the real 
name of Leonardo di Vinci was Wincke. 



INDEX 



Africa, colonial ventures in, a cause 
of friction between Germany and 
England, 56-58; question of value 
of colonies in, to France, 203-204; 
division of colonial spoils in, if 
Allies win, 245-246; German 
claims in, in case of her victory, 
260. 

Agadir crisis, the, 1 18-122. 

Algeciras Conference, events lead- 
ing to the, 84-85; diplomatic 
defeat of Germany at, 93-95; 
War Party in Germany strength- 
ened by, 99; participation of 
United States in, 99, 284, 287. 

AUies, compared with Germany as 
to strength, 220; handicap to, of 
lack of centralized command, 
220-221; lack of coordination 
among, shown by fiascos of fall of 
1915, 221; improbability of break- 
ing up of, 221-222; potential 
strength in field, compared with 
Germany, 222-223; good outlook 
for, from military point of view, 
224; military outcome of War in 
case of victory by, 224-227; diplo- 
matic tactics to be brought 
against, by Germany, in case of 
defeat of latter, 228; obvious 
joints in armor of, 229 ff.; de- 
mands of, in case of victory, 235- 
240; division of spoils by, 241-247; 
apportionment of Turkey and 
Asia Minor among, 248-253. 

Alsace-Lorraine, application of 
theory of nationalities to, 171; 
prosperity under German rule, 
171-172; independence or a union 
with Switzerland among proposi- 
tions for eventual disposition of, 
172; plans of Allies as to, in case 
of German defeat, 235. 



Army, attitude of Germans toward 
their, 33. 

Army increase law passed by Ger- 
mans (June, 1913), 148. 

Asia Minor, reapportionment of, if 
Allies win, 248-253. 

Austria-Hungary, alliance between 
France and, feared by Bismarck, 
13; formation of alliance between 
Germany and, 14; part taken by, 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina affair, 
113-118; course of, in Balkan 
wars of 19 1 2, 143-146; confusion 
of ethnological map of, and re- 
sulting difficulty of application of 
rights of nations theory, 168; 
three groups of population in, 
and numbers in each group, 169; 
project to trajisform into a Triple 
State, 169; favored position of 
section of Poles under rule of, 
174-175; position as to trade 
routes, 183; crude methods of 
influencing public opinion in, 207; 
territorial demands on, in case 
AUies win, 237. 

B 

Bagdad railroad, German project 
for a, 65-68; bitterness caused by 
English opposition to, 68; interest 
of cotton interests in, owing to 
future plantations along route, 196; 
oil-bearing district to be opened 
up by, 196; differing opinions 
among different interests in Eng- 
land concerning, if Allies win, 
250-251. 

Balkans, alliance of powers in, de- 
clares war on Turkey, 124; his- 
torical development of states in, 
124-139; question of origin of 
alliance of 191 2, 140; secret trea- 
ties previous to breaking out of 



335 



336 



INDEX 



war, 141; course of the war, and 
results, 142-145; war between 
states in, resulting from disposi- 
tion of spoils, 145-146; effects on 
Germany of the wars in, 148. 

Belgium, treatment of, by Allies if 
they win, 235, 241; fate of, if 
Germany wins, 258; effect on 
American opinion of German 
treatment of, 297-298. 

Bessarabia, taken from Roumania 
by Russia, 133; difl&culty raised 
by applying rights of nations 
theory to, 166; slight chance of 
relinquishment by Russia, 168. 

Birth rate, fluctuations in, and re- 
lation to colonial enterprise of 
different nations, 191-193. 

Bismarck, policy of, at time of Con- 
gress of Berlin, 6, 7, 8 ff., 13; 
"coalition nightmare" of, 13, 17; 
forms alHance between Germany 
and Austria, 14; assertion by, of 
German supremacy on continent 
of Europe, 14; as an idealist, 15- 
16; supremacy of Germany in 
Europe apparently established by, 
16; draws Italy into Triple Alli- 
ance, 18-19; forms the Dreikai- 
sersbund, 20; policy of ehminating 
France, 21; policy of encouraging 
France in colonial adventure, 22; 
dropping of, by Kaiser Wilhelm 
II., 22; disadvantages attached 
to heritage left German nation by, 
22-23; French colonial adventures 
encouraged by, 38; causes of rup- 
ture between Kaiser Wilhelm II. 
and, 39; question of postpone- 
ment of dual alliance by, 42-43; 
responsible for German lack of col- 
onies, 200; may have been right in 
not wanting colonies, 205; manip- 
ulation of pubhc opinion by, 207. 

Boer War, effect of, on British hfe, 
69; demonstrates to English the 
danger of their position, 70. 

Books, comparative difficulty of 
censoring, 210. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, affair of, 
113-118. 



Boulanger, General, doctrines of, 16. 

Bucarest, treaty of, 146. 

Bulgaria, creation of principality 
of, 5; beginnings of, as a national 
unit, 127-128; progress under 
dictatorship of Stamboulov, 128; 
political and educational condi- 
tions in, 128-129; interest in liber- 
ation of Macedonians, 129; defeat 
of, in second Balkan war, 145- 
146; question of responsibility of, 
for second Balkan war, 146; penal- 
izing of, in case of Allies' victory, 
237; claims of, if Germany wins, 

259- 
Bureau of American Republics, a 
step toward the right form of na- 
tional defence, 307; establishment 
of schools in Mexico the logical 
work of, in interests of inter- 
national peace, 308. 



Casablanca crisis, the, 107. 

Censorship of the press by govern- 
ments, 206-211. 

Chamberlain, Professor, apostle of 
religion of the "Deutschtum," 
31-32. 

Chervin, Arthur, definition of prin- 
ciple of rights of nations by, 165. 

Clapp, discussion of British naval 
war against neutrals in book by, 

295-. 

Coalitions, drawbacks to, 220-221. 

Colonial expansion, European atti- 
tude toward, 80-82. 

Colonies, importance of question of, 
in European diplomacy, 190-191; 
three main causes for desire for, 
191; effect of surplus population 
on desire for, 191-195; value as 
a source of raw material, 195-196; 
importance as sales-markets, 197- 
199; points to consider in judging 
value of, 199; reasons for Ger- 
many's increasing interest in, 
199-201; two systems of coloniza- 
tion, monopoly and free trade, 
201-202; arguments of economic 



INDEX 



337 



writers against the rage for, 202- 
205. 

Commerce, rivalry between Eng- 
land and Germany in field of, 
62-63; questions of, which enter 
into modern diplomacy, 178-189. 

Congress of BerHn, monarchical 
character of, 3; marks the end of 
an epoch, 3-4; events leading to, 
4-6; brilHancy of, 6-7; account of 
intrigues and diplomatic double- 
deahngs at, 7-12; regarded as the 
starting point for modern diplo- 
macy, 12; ideal of the "Deutsch- 
tum" nearly realized at, 16. 

Constantinople, Russian claim to, 
if Allies win, 254; Bulgaria's 
claim to, in case of German vic- 
tory, 258. 

Cotton, importance of supply of, 
to European countries, 195-196; 
future plantations along route of 
Bagdad railroad, 196. 

D 

Dardanelles, effect of closing of, on 
Russian trade, 183; seriousness 
of closing of, to Allies, 252; mili- 
tary and economic importance of, 
253-254; desirabihty of free trade 
over, 255; lack of development 
of great natural wealth about, 
255-256. 

Delbruck Law, the, 292. 

Delcasse, Theophile, succeeds to 
French foreign ofiBce, 48; out- 
standing personality of, 49; ques- 
tion of attitude toward Germany, 
49-50; quarrel of France with 
Italy smoothed out by, 51; 
charged with foreseeing and pre- 
paring for the war, 52; reported 
anti-English negotiations with 
Germany, 52; visit to Saint Peters- 
burg, 52-53; arranges "I'Entente 
Cordiale" with England, in 1904, 
71; resignation demanded by 
Germany, and downfall of, 88-90; 
blunders of, in running foreign 
office single-handed, 90. 



Democratic control over foreign 
affairs, hope for a better Europe 
in, 270; arguments pro and con, 
271-276; risks of war reduced 
though not ehminated by, 277. 

"Deutschtum," the mystic ideal of 
the Germans, 15; significance of 
this ideal, 15; seeming realiza- 
tion of, at Congress of Berhn, 16; 
discussion of meaning of, to Ger- 
mans and to others, 24; tracing 
genealogy of the, 25-26; achieve- 
ments of Germans under ideal of, 
28; grouping of the nations to re- 
sist development of, 83; non- 
German Europeans frightened 

by, 151- 

Dewey, John, the " German Philos- 
ophy and Pohtics" of, 25; quoted, 
30. 

Disraeli, Benjamin, at Congress of 
Berlin, 3, 6; the "Peace, with 
honor" of, 3, 12. 

"Dollar diplomacy," meaning of, 
178. 

Dreikaisersbund, formation of, 20; 
lapsing of, 39. 

Dreyfus affair, account of, and re- 
sults, 44-46. 

Dual alliance, formation of, and 
reasons for, 39-41; significance of, 
to different nations, 41-42; 
doubtful if Bismarck could have 
postponed, 42-43. 

E 

Economic considerations of modem 
diplomacy, 178-189. 

Education, superiority of Germany 
over England in, 63; as a remedy 
for the Mexican menace, 308. 

Edward VII., role played by, in 
arrangement of "I'Entente Cor- 
diale" of 1904, 71-72. 

Egypt, provisions of "I'Entente Cor- 
diale" concerning, 73-75. 

England, relations of Germany and, \^ 
during Bismarck's regime, 17; 
disputes with France over Egypt 
and colonial ventures, 46-48; 



338 



INDEX 



date of development of ill-feeling 
between Germany and, 54; eco- 
nomic growth of Germany largely 
at expense of, 56; friction with 
Germany over colonial interests, 
56-57; Wilhelm II. 's efforts to 
reestablish cordial relations, 57- 
58; disturbance over growth of 
German sea power, 58-61; out- 
done in overseas trade by Ger- 
many, 62-63; superiority of Ger- 
man methods in the sea-trade, 
64-65; opposition of, to German 
Bagdad railway project, 65-68; 
efifect on, of war in South Africa, 
69; open to French approaches in 
1901, 71; signing of "I'Entente 
Cordiale," 71; provisions of "I'En- 
tente Cordiale," 72 £f.; apparent 
diplomatic insincerity of, in period 
after Algeciras Conference, 102; 
insincerity of, in preachments 
about preserving the status quo, 
102-103; entente signed with Rus- 
sia in 1907, 106-107; loss of pres- 
tige in Near East by, owing to 
entente with Russia, 113; unwill- 
ingness to fight for Serbia in Bos- 
nian affair, 116; supports France 
in Agadir crisis, 1 21-122; disin- 
clination to aid Russia against 
Germany and Austria in Balkan 
crisis, 147; reluctance to be drawn 
into Balkan dispute may have 
governed Germany in choice of 
pretence for war, 158; show of 
German friendliness toward, on 
eve of War, 158-159; significance 
of sea-rule by, to other nations, 
184-185; question of value of 
colonies to, 203; government con- 
trol of public opinion in, 208-209; 
percentage of potential strength 
of, in the field, 223; objections of 
other nations to sea-rule of, 229- 
230; claims of, in Africa if Allies 
win, 246; troops of, at work in 
Asia Minor, 249; question raised 
by denial of trading rights to 
neutrals by, 295-297. 
Entente Cordiale, steps leading up 



to, and signing of, 69-71; question 
of part taken by Edward VII. in, 
71-72; discussion of provisions 
of, and their significance, 72 ff.; 
secret clauses in the, 77-80; gen- 
erally favorable reception of, in 
England and France, 80; opposi- 
tion of French Socialists, 82; Ger- 
man opposition to, 82-83; action 
resulting from, by Germany, lead- 
ing to downfall of Delcasse, 84-91. 



Fashoda affair, the, 47-48. 

Fez, French expedition to, resulting 
in Agadir crisis, 119-121. 

Fichte, German ideals established 
by, 26. 
V France, alliance between Austria 
and, feared by Napoleon, 13; Bis- 
marck's efforts to prevent union 
of Russia and, 20-21; Bismarck's 
policy of elimination of, 21; saved 
by Russia and England from a 
second invasion in 1875, 21; the 
Schnaebele incident, 21-22; en- 
coura d in colf^nial adventure 
by Bismarck, 22; rebirth of, after 
1870, 36 ff.; steps in creation of 
present wealth of, 37-38; colonial 
expansion of, 38; alliance formed 
between Russia and, 39; reasons 
for Franco-Russian alliance, 39- 
40; the question of revenge, and 
of fear of fresh German aggres- 
sions 40-41; "I'affaire Dreyfus," 
44-4( ; bad state of relations 
between England and, 46; disputes 
with England over Egypt and 
colonial ventures, 46-48; the 
Fashoda affair, 47-48; Delcasse's 
policy as Foreign Minister, 49-53; 
first entente signed with Italy, 51; 
England ready to receive friendly 
approaches of, in 190 1, 71; sign- 
ing of "I'Entente Cordiale" with 
England, in 1904, 71; significance 
of "I'Entente Cordiale," 72-80; 
humiliation of, by Germany in 
forcing resignation of Delcass6, 



INDEX 



339 



88-90; failure of German plans 
for further humiliation of, at 
Algeciras, 92-94; Conference of 
Algeciras a diplomatic victory 
for, 95-96; question of sincerity 
of, in signing agreement of Al- 
geciras, 97-98; expedition to Fez 
and the Agadir crisis, 11 8-1 22; 
position of, viewed from an eco- 
nomic standpoint, 179; question of 
value of colonies to, 203-204; 
percentage of potential force in 
field, as compared with Germany, 
222; claims of, in Asia Minor if 
Allies win, 251. 

Frankfort, treaty of, 3. 

Free trade, solution of modern eco- 
nomic problems offered by, 186- 
187, 189; system of, in coloniza- 
tion, 202. 



German East Africa, treatment to 
be accorded, if Allies win, 246. 

Germany, delicate situation of, at 
time of CongJ-ess of Beri'n, 6; 
mystic ideal e pressed iv. word 
"Deutschtum," 15; national pride 
in superiority and preeminence 
of German race, 16-17; disad- 
vantages of heritage left to, by 
Bismarck, 22-23; analys's of 
"das Deutschtum," and adhieve- 
ments under, 24-35; attiti'de of 
nation toward the army and war, 
33, 34; essential difference be- 
tween beliefs of, and beliefs of 
rest of world, 35; foundation of 
French fears of fresh aggressions 
by, 40-41; attitude toward dual 
alliance, 41; date of development 
of ill-feeling between England 
and, 54; marvellous advance of, 
and question of influence of 
Wilhelm II. in this growth, 54-56; 
development of colonial policy 
and resulting friction with Eng- 
land, 56-58; growth of sea power, 
58-61; excels England in over- 
seas trade, 62-63; superiority of 



methods of, in the sea-trade, 
64-65; increased bad feeling to- 
ward England caused by Bagdad 
railroad project, and English op- 
position to, 65-68; sides with 
Boers in war in South Africa, 69- 
70; opposition of, to "I'Entente 
Cordiale," 82-83; the Algeciras 
crisis, 84 ff.; resignation of Del- 
casse forced by, 88-90; failure of 
plan to humiliate France at Al- 
geciras, 92-93; attitude of smaller 
states shown toward, 93-95; War 
Party in, strengthened by results 
of Conference of Algeciras, 99- 
100; lost opportunity for success- 
ful crusade by, at time of Algeciras 
crisis, loo-ioi; diplomatic defeat 
of, in Casablanca crisis, 107-108; 
wins friendship of Young Turks, 
112; diplomatic victory over Rus- 
sia in Bosnia-Herzegovina affair, 
113-117; yields to Anglo-French 
combination in Agadir affair, 121- 
122; deprives Serbia of fruits of 
victory in Balkan war, 147-148; 
detrimental effect on, of Balkan 
wars, 148; passes army increase 
law, 148; ideals of, a cause of 
joint fear among non-Germans, 
resulting in their union, 151 ff.; 
limited influence of pan-Ger- 
manists, 152; claim of a divine 
mission, 154; the claim that she 
is fighting a defensive war, 156; 
not German soil but the German 
ideal that is being defended, 157; 
reasons governing choice of time 
and manner of going to war, 157- 
159; problems of national unity 
in, 170-176; unsatisfactoriness 
of rule in Poland, 174; economic 
situation of, from viewpoint of 
"dollar diplomacy," 178-179; po- 
litical motive of high tariff in, 180; 
question of trade routes, 181-183; 
relative poverty of, in colonies, 
199-200; manipulation of public 
opinion in, 207-208; outcome of 
War in case of definite defeat of, 
224 ff.; territorial demands on, 



340 



INDEX 



in case Allies win, 237; diplomatic 
tactics in case of defeat of, 228- 
234; militarism of, to be destroyed, 
237-238; blows to economic life 
that may be inflicted, 239-240; 
results in case of victory of, 257- 
261; possible Europeanization of, 
261. 

Gibraltar, comparative importance 
of Gallipoli and, 253. 

Gotte, Rudolf, "Deutscher Volk- 
geist" by, 32. 

Great Britain. See England. 

Greece, modern political history of, 
134-137; possible gains to, in case 
of Allies' victory, 237; claims of, 
in Asia Minor, 251-252. 



H 

Hague Conference, attitude of 
American representatives at first, 
285; position of United States at 
second, 286. 

Hanotaux, Gabriel, French foreign 
minister, 41, 46; criticism of policy 
of, 48; resigns after Fashoda in- 
cident, 48. 

Heligoland, cession of, to Germany 
by England, 57; GaUipoli more 
important than, 253. 

Holland, fate of, if Germany wins, 
258. 

Honesty in state afifairs, advantages 
of, 270-271. 

Hyphenated Americans, problem 
of, 291-292. 



Italy, position of, after 1878, 18; 
reasons for joining Triple Alli- 
ance, 19; first entente between 
France and, 51; declares war on 
Turkey in 1911, 122; ethnological 
problems raised by application 
of theory of rights of nations to, 
168; situation of, from an eco- 
nomic viewpoint, 179; mystery 
surrounding entrance into War, 
232; results to, of Allies' victory, 



237; problems raised by territorial 
claims of, 242-244; claims of, 
in southern Asia Minor if Allies 
win, 251; results to, if Germany 
wins, 259. 



Japan, danger of American invasion 
by, 308-309; how best to plan to 
insure peace with, 310. 

Joffre, General, first appearance in 
French military history, 39. 



K 

Karageorovitch dynasty in Bul- 
garia, pro-Russian sympathies of, 
130-131. 

Kitchener, General, at Fashoda, 48. 



League of American Republics, great 
advantages to be derived from a, 
319-320; difficulties to be over- 
come before establishing, 320- 
322; persistent efforts necessary 
to prepare ground for, 323; the 
benefits of success, 323-324. 

Lusitania, effect of sinking of, on 
American feeling toward Ger- 
many, 298. 

M 

Macedonia, interest of Bulgarians 
in liberation of, 129; location of, 
and description, 137-138; quar- 
rels of different claimants to, 138; 
people and language of, 138-139; 
the cause of the Balkan alliance 
of 191 2 and war on Turkey, 139- 
140; disposition of, by secret 
treaties prior to war with Turkey, 
141; difficulty of applying rights 
of nations theory to, 166; Bul- 
garia's claim to, if Germany wins, 

259- 
Marchand, Colonel, at Fashoda, 
47-48. 



INDEX 



341 



Maurras, Charles, arguments of, 
against Republican form of gov- 
ernment, 271. 

Mesopotamia, British troops al- 
ready conquering, 249; differing 
opinions in England as to best 
policy in, 250. 

Mexico, spread of education in, 
advocated as a defensive step, 
30S; importance of the A. B. C. 
mediation in, as a step in right 
direction, 319. 

Monroe Doctrine, the, 281; remark- 
able vitality of, 282; attitude of 
European statesmen toward, 282; 
corollary of, is Europe for the 
Europeans, 283; loss of meaning 
with shrinking of the earth, 285; 
still in force, though modified, 287; 
American traditional poHcy is 
to keep alive, 288. 

Morocco, provisions of "I'Entente 
Cordiale" concerning, 73-76; at- 
titude of different classes in 
France concerning, 81-82; af- 
fairs of, under discussion at Con- 
ference of Algeciras, 93-95 ; means 
used by France to overthrow 
independence of, 98; Franco- 
German agreement concerning, 
especially regarding railroads, 
109-110; the Agadir crisis, 118- 
122. 

Munitions of war, controversy over 
export of, 299-301. 

N 

National defence, American prob- 
lem of, 305; friendly understand- 
ings between nations the best 
form of, 305-307; value of Bureau 
of American Republics in Amer- 
ican scheme of, 307; spread of 
education in Mexico one means 
of, 307-308; establishing a 
friendly footing with Japan, 308- 
309; creation of a Bureau of the 
Pacific, 310; increased army called 
for by the General Staff not the 
most important element, 31 1-3 12. 



Nationalities, theory of. See Rights 
of nations. 

Navy, dependence of England 
upon her, 59; steps in develop- 
ment of German, 59-61. 

Newspapers, governmental in- 
fluence exercised on public opin- 
ion through, 206-209. 

O 

O'Farrell, book by, cited on cause 
of growth of Germany, 55. 

Overproduction, need for foreign 
markets signified by, 197. 



Pan-Germanists, limited influence 
of, in regard to the War, 152. 

Pan-Slavism, history of expression, 
163. 

Peace, public opinion preoccupied 
with problem of, 21 1-2 13; rela- 
tion of diplomats to question of, 
213; two conceptions of, the "pax 
Romana" and a peace based on 
mutual justice, 213; why it is 
fantastic to expect peace to grow 
out of war, 214; basis of a perma- 
nent, dependent upon pubhc 
opinion, 215-216; what United 
States may do to preserve, 319- 
324. 

Peace conference, choice of a place 
for holding, 226-227. 

Persia, partition of, by England 
and Russia, 102, 107. 

Petroleum supply, rivalry of na- 
tions for control of, 196. 

Philippines, question of value of, as 
a colony, 204. 

Poland, difficulty of applying theory 
of rights of nations to, 167, 175; 
unsatisfactoriness of German rule 
in, 172-174; easier fate of Rus- 
sian section, 174; favored posi- 
tion of Austrian section, 174-175; 
possibility of autonomy for, in 
case of German defeat, 177; plans 
of AUies as to, in case of German 



342 



INDEX 



defeat, 235-236; results to, if 
Germany wins, 259. 

Population, relation of, to colonial 
enterprise, 191-195. 

Portugal, British diplomatic con- 
troversy with (1915), 232; treat- 
ment of colonial holdings of, if 
Allies win, 246. 

Press censorship, 207-211. 

Prussia, special hatred for, felt by 
Germany's enemies, 237-238; 
treatment of, by Allies if they 
win, 238. 

Public opinion, growth of, and its 
force, 206-207; methods of manip- 
ulation of, by governments, 207; 
governmental control of, in Aus- 
tria, Germany, England, and 
France, 207-210; difi&culty of 
censoring newspapers and books, 
210; governmental effort to direct, 
an admission of force of, 211; 
preoccupation of, with problem 
of a permanent peace, 211-213; 
real decisions as to basis of per- 
manent peace will depend upon, 
215-216. 

R 

Raw material, value of colonies as 
a source of, 195-196. 

Reichstadt, treaty of, 5. 

Rights of nations, theory of the, 
163; English, Russians, and 
French favorable to, 165; only 
white men included in theory, 
165; not accepted by Germans, 
166; difficulty of applying in 
cases like Bessarabia, Macedonia, 
Poland, the Tyrol, etc., 166-168; 
applied to Slav population of 
Austria-Hungary, 168-170; dif- 
ficulties presented by Poland, 
172-175; extent of application 
dependent on outcome of War, 
176-177. 

Rivers, not good frontiers, 172. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, and the Al- 
geciras crisis, 99, 284; effect on 
American foreign policy of belief in 
United States as a World Power, 



286; great body of Americans not 
converted by, 287; opposed to 
United States neutrahty in the 
War, 291, 292-293. 

Roumania, cooperates with Russia 
in war against Turkey, 5; his- 
torical development of, 131-132; 
modern conditions in, 132-133; 
despoDed of Bessarabia by Russia, 
133; neutrality of, in present War, 
134; Roumanian peasants in 
Austro-Hungarian provinces, 168- 
169; probable results to, of Allies' 
victory over Germans, 236-237; 
territorial claims of, 244-245. 

Russia, successful campaign of, 
against Turkey, prior to Congress 
of Berlin, 4-6; alliance of 1879 
between Austria and Germany 
directed against, 14; reasons for 
joining the Dreikaisersbund, 20; 
kept from uniting with France, 
by Bismarck, 20-21; German 
alliance with, not favored by 
Kaiser Wilhelm II., 39; alliance 
formed between France and, 39; 
reasons for Franco-Russian al- 
liance, 39-40; Delcasse's visit 
to, in 1901, 52-53; entente signed 
in 1907 with England, 106-107; 
forced to yield in Bosnia-Herze- 
govina affair, 115-118; satisfac- 
tion over downfall of Bulgaria in 
second Balkan war, 146; forced 
to sacrifice interests of Serbia by 
Germany, 148; favorable eco- 
nomic situation of, 178; growing 
importance of foreign trade, 179; 
disadvantages to, of insufficient 
access to ice-free seas, 181; effect 
on trade of, of closing of Dar- 
danelles, 183; percentage of 
potential force of, in field, 222- 
223; treatment of Poland by, 
in case of Allies' victory, 235- 
236; claims of, in Asia Minor, 
253; English and French promise 
of Constantinople to, 254; de- 
pendence of future of Europe on 
internal politics of, 264; chances 
of a successful revolution in, 265. 



INDEX 



343 



San Stefano, treaty of, 5. 

Schleswig-Holstein, application of 
theory of nationalities to, 170-171. 

Schnaebele incident, the, 21-22. 

Secrecy, arguments for and against 
diplomatic, 231-232, 270 ff. 

Sembat, Marcel, defence of Repub- 
lican form of government by, 
271, 272. 

Serbia, clashes with Austria in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina affair, 113- 
118; disgust of, over Russian con- 
cessions, 118; beginnings of, as a 
national unit, 129; struggles of, 
against Austria-Hungary result- 
ing in pro-Russian sympathies, 
130-131; bullying of, by Austria 
and Germany after war of 191 2, 
143-145; victory over Bulgaria 
in second Balkan war, 145-146; 
gains prestige in second Balkan 
war, 148; treatment of, by Allies 
in case of their victory, 236; terri- 
torial claims of, 244; fate of, if 
Germany wins, 259. 

Slavs, first appearance of, in Bal- 
kans, 125; great population of, in 
Austria-Hungary, and disposition 
under theory of nationalities, 169; 
effect on, of Italy's territorial 
claims, 243. 

Socialists, opposition of, in France, 
to the Moroccan adventure, 82. 

Spain, share of, in secret agreement 
between France and England, 
87, 88; entente between France 
and, 88; marriage of king to an 
English princess, 95. 

Suez Canal, threatened competition 
of Bagdad railroad with, 250. 

Sweden, angering of, by British 
naval policy, 221. 



Talleyrand, tactics of, at Congress 

of Vienna, 228. 
Tardieu, Andre, as spokesman of 

French foreign ofi&ce, 209. 



Tariffs, as an economic considera- 
tion of diplomacy, 178-181. 

Theory of nationalities, the, 163. 

Toynbee, Arnold, " Nationality and 
the War" by, 210, 267. 

Trade routes, as an economic con- 
sideration of diplomacy, 1 81-189. 

Trading rights of neutrals, 295- 

297- 

Trieste, conflict of Italian, Slav, and 
German interests in, 243. 

Triple AlKance, formation of, 19. 

Turkey, Russia's victorious war 
against, 4-6; delegates of, at 
Congress of Berlin, 7, 8; existence 
of, at stake, 9; Young Turk revolu- 
tion, no; diplomatic intrigues in, 
in period following 1906, 110-112; 
Italy declares war on, in 191 1, 
122; war of Balkan aUiance 
against, 124, 140-142; the fate 
of, in case of Allies' victory, 237, 
246-247, 248-256; possible ar- 
rangements with, if Germany 
wins, 258-259. 

Tyrol, difficulty of applying theory 
of nationalities to, 167-168. 



U 



United States, Wilhelm II.'s policy W 
toward, 34; participation in Al- 
geciras Conference, 99, 284, 287; 
question of part taken by, in 
Agadir affair, 121; growing im- 
portance of foreign trade, 179; 
as a place for holding Peace Con- 
ference, 226-227; objections of, 
to sea-rule of England, 229-230; 
traditional foreign policy of, 281 
ff.; the Monroe Doctrine, 281- 
283; not expected to intervene in 
European affairs, 283-284; repre- 
sentatives of, at first Hague Con- 
ference, 285; effect of President 
Roosevelt's view of, as a World 
Power, 286; at second Hague 
Conference, 286; question of in- 
fluence to be exerted on Europe 
by, 286-287; not pledged not to 



344 



INDEX 



go to war with European powers, 
288-289; revolution in our con- 
cept of life necessary if we would 
be a World Power, 290; problems 
brought by the War to, 291 ii.; 
sources of opposition to neutral- 
ity of, in the War, 291; shock from 
development of hyphenated 
American, 291-292; problem of 
attack on neutral policy of, led 
by Mr. Roosevelt, 292; majority 
of citizens hardly in favor of Welt- 
politik, 293; question of what to 
do to protect American interests, 
295; British infraction of trading 
rights of, as a neutral, 295-297; 
anger roused against Germany by 
outraging of Belgium and sinking 
of Lusitania, 297-298; considera- 
tion of our military situation 
forced upon us by the War, 302- 
304; sane statesmanship would 
adhere to maintenance of neu- 
trality, 304; problem of national 
defence, 305 ff.; estabUshment 
of friendly relations with other 
powers, 306-307 ; means of better- 
ing relations with Mexico, 307- 
308; investments in peace with 
Japan, 308-310; an increased 
army not the most important 
element in scheme of national 
defence, 311; Peace League of 
American Republics a promising 
field for work by, 319-324. 

V 

Veblen, book by, cited on cause of 
growth of German economic 
strength, 55. 



W 

Walfish Bay, clashing of English 
and Germans at, 56, 57. 

War, attitude of mass of German 
people toward, 34. 

Wilhelm II., Bismarck dropped by, 
22; policy of, toward United 
States, 34; causes of rupture be- 
tween Bismarck and, 39; reason 
for acceptance of dual alliance 
by, 43; attitude toward peace and 
war, 43-44; in his own way has 
tried to live on good terms with 
his neighbors, 44; beginning of 
ill-feeling between Germany and 
England coincident with advent 
of, 54; extent of influence of, on 
advance of Germany since his 
accession, 54-55; development 
of German sea power by, 58-61; 
address to Sultan of Morocco at 
Tangier, 86; worsted at Algeciras 
Conference, 93-95; qualified peace 
doctrines of, 152. 

Wilson, President, opponents of 
neutral poUcy of, 291; effect of 
pohcy, if successful, 302. 



Yellow Peril, misconceptions con- 
cerning, 308-310. 

Young Turks, question as to who 
financed revolution of, 110-112; 
won over by Germany, 112. 



Zanzibar, Anglo-German friction 
over, 56, 57. 



Printed in the United States of America. 



npHE following pages contain advertisements of books 
-*- by the same author. 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 



The Barbary Coast 



By ARTHUR BULLARD ("ALBERT EDWARDS") 
Author of "Panama," "Comrade Yetta," etc. 

Illustrated, 12°, $2.00 

Arthur Bullard's "Panama: The Canal, the Country and the People" 
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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
A NOVEL OF GREAT SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE 

Comrade Yetta 

By ARTHUR BULLARD ("ALBERT EDWARDS") 
Author of "A Man's World" 

Cloth, i2mo, $1.35 

"Comrade Yetta" is the story of a young Jewess, — Yetta — a girl 
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"We welcome this novel for its truth, for its nobility of purpose, for its 
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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 

A Man's World 

By ARTHUR BULLARD ("ALBERT EDWARDS") 

Cloth, i2mo, $1.25 

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"A new tj^e of human document — written in all sincerity 
and honesty." — New York Herald. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 

PANAMA, the Canal, the Country, 
and the People 

By ARTHUR BULLARD ("ALBERT EDWARDS") 

Illustrated, new edition, 8°, $2.00 

"A thoroughly satisfactory book for one who is looking for 
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"A book which every American ought to read, both for 
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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



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